Power Of Ideas, The: The Rising Influence Of Thinkers And Think Tanks In China

The Rising Influence of Thinkers and Think Tanks in China

Cheng Li

• Publisher: WSPC
• Year: 2017
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9789813100251
• Subtopic: Science General
• Index: Biological Sciences

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China's momentous socioeconomic transformation is not taking place in an intellectual vacuum: Chinese scholars and public intellectuals are actively engaged in fervent discussions about the country's domestic and foreign policies, demographic constraints, and ever-growing integration into the world community. This book focuses on China's major think tanks where policies are initiated, and on a few prominent thinkers who influence the way in which elites and the general public understand and deal with the various issues confronting the country.

The book examines a number of factors contributing to the rapid rise of Chinese think tanks in the reform era. These include the leadership's call for "scientific decision-making," the need for specialized expertise in economics and finance as China becomes an economic powerhouse, the demand for opinion leaders in the wake of a telecommunication revolution driven by social media, the accumulation of human and financial capital, and the increasing utility of the "revolving door" nature of think tanks.

It has been widely noted that think tanks and policy advisors have played an important role in influencing the strategic thinking of the top leadership, including the formation of ideas such as the "Three Represents," "China's peaceful rise," "One Belt, One Road," and the founding of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In 2014, President Xi Jinping made think tank development a national strategy, and he claimed that "building a new type of think tank with Chinese characteristics is an important and pressing mission."

Though the media outside China has often reported on this important development, it has all but escaped rigorous scholarly scrutiny. This book will categorize Chinese think tanks by their various forms, such as government agencies, university-based think tanks, private think tanks, business research centers or consultancies, and civil society groups. It will not only analyze the problems and challenges in China's think tank development, but also reveal the power of ideas.

--> Contents:

• Introduction:
• • The Power of Ideas and Ideas of Power: Chinese Think Tanks in Search of Prominence
• Prominent Chinese Thinkers:
  • Hu Angang (Demographer and Economist): Championing Chinese Optimism and Exceptionalism
  • Yu Keping (Political Scientist): Making Democracy Safe for China
  • He Weifang (Legal Scholar): Fighting for a Constitutional China through Public Enlightenment and Legal Professionalism
  • He Huaihong (Philosopher and Ethicist): Bringing Ethics Back into Chinese Discourse
• The Dynamics and Constraints of Chinese Think Tank Development:
  • China's New Think Tanks: Where Officials, Entrepreneurs, and Scholars Interact
• An Imperative for China's New Think Tanks: Seeking Uniqueness and Diversity
• The Prospects for China's Private Think Tanks
• Dissemination of Ideas and Credibility of Think Tank Research
• The Role of Think Tanks in Reconstructing Values in Present-Day China
• The Role of Think Tanks in Promoting Mutual Understanding and Preventing Misjudgment in Sino–US Relations
• Chinese Think Tanks Go Global

• Towards a More Pluralistic Decision-Making Process:

• Interest Group Politics in China: A Paradox of Hope and Fear
• Shaping China's Foreign Policy: The Role of Foreign-Educated Returnees

• Conclusion: Top-Level Design of Reform and China's Political Future:

• Will China's "Top-Level Design of Reform" Prevent a "Bottom-Up Revolution"?
• Xi Jinping's Reform Agenda: Promises and Risks

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Readership: Students, researchers, and academics who are interested in the important role the Chinese think tanks play and the strong impact of the nation's most influential public intellectuals on China's domestic development and foreign policy.
-->Think Tanks;Chinese Thinkers;Chinese Politics;Public Intellectuals;Soft Power;Decision-Making;Interest Group Politics;Foreign-Educated Returnees Key Features:

• This will be the first English book on the increasingly important role of China's think tanks in both Chinese domestic development and foreign policy published by a non- PRC scholar who works at Brookings Institution, the world's leading think tank
• This conceptually innovative and data-rich book reveals both the important role of Chinese think tanks and the strong impact of the nation's most influential public intellectuals on China's domestic development and foreign policy
• International communities will benefit from a solid understanding of the subject, especially at a time when China has more influence on global economic and regional security issues than at any previous time in modern history

I
Introduction

Chapter 1

The Power of Ideas and Ideas of Power: Chinese Think Tanks in Search of Prominence

Thought precedes action as lightning precedes thunder.

— Heinrich Heine

Ideas have consequences.

— Victor C. Ferkiss

In 2005, Qian Xuesen, a 94-year-old, Caltech-educated Chinese scientist known as “the father of China’s space program,” raised an intriguing question during his meeting with then premier Wen Jiabao. “Why are Chinese schools not able to foster outstanding intellectual giants?” asked Qian.¹ He observed that, in terms of academic achievements, none of China’s post-1949 graduates could be compared with the gurus educated during the Republican era.²

Qian’s question, later dubbed “the Qian Xuesen Question” (钱学森之问, Qian Xuesen zhiwen), has brought public attention to some major defects in the education system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially its relative disregard for innovation and creativity. To many observers at home and abroad, despite the country’s remarkable economic rise on the global stage in the reform era (1978–present), China has not yet produced world-class scientists and thought leaders.³ Some critics cite the absence of PRC-educated Nobel laureates in the sciences and literature as key evidence supporting Qian’s critical observation.⁴

Of course, not all observers share this negative assessment of Chinese universities and academia. Yang Zhenning (Chen-Ning Franklin Yang), a Chinese American who received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1957, stated in July 2012 that Qian Xuesen was too hasty in making such a generalization.⁵ Interestingly, only three months later, the Chinese writer Mo Yan received the Nobel Prize in Literature. And three years after that, in 2015, Tu Youyou, a Chinese pharmaceutical chemist who discovered a drug to treat an especially virulent form of malaria, became the first PRC citizen to receive a Nobel Prize in the sciences. Both Mo and Tu received their college educations in the PRC and conducted their intellectual pursuits almost exclusively in their native land.

According to Yang Zhenning, younger generations of Chinese scholars and thinkers are even more likely to excel than the older generation of intellectual sages like Mo and Tu.⁶ Yang believes that Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy for international educational exchanges has benefited the country intellectually and surely will produce still-greater achievements in the years to come. PRC-born scholars — including those who were trained both at home and abroad and those who currently work in China or elsewhere — are among the most promising candidates for future Nobel Prizes and other globally prestigious awards. In Yang’s view, “the development of the sciences in the PRC during the reform era has not been too slow, but actually exceptionally fast.”⁷

Contrasting Assessments of China’s “Think Tank Fever”

Opinions on the role of the social sciences in the PRC are perhaps even more polarized, particularly in relation to the nature and implications of the leadership’s recent emphasis on public policy research and think tank development in the country. In April 2013, when President Xi Jinping remarked that China should regard think tank building as part of its national development strategy, the statement sparked an unprecedentedly high-profile discussion on the role of think tanks. Meanwhile, many institutions across the country — including those within the party apparatus, government ministries, the military establishment, local administrations, universities, research institutions, business enterprises, social organizations, and media outlets — all have ridden the wave of Xi’s pronouncement by establishing so-called “new types of think tanks with Chinese characteristics.”⁸

China’s New National Strategy on Think Tank Development

According to Caijing, a well-respected Chinese magazine focused on finance and economics, the terms “think tank,” “Brookings Institution,” and “Rand Corporation” are now commonly mentioned in the Chinese media.⁹ Some scholars have begun referring to this trend as “think tank fever” (智库热, zhikure).¹⁰ This development has been driven largely from the top down, with heavy promotion and endorsement from the Xi administration. The government’s recognition of and support for think tank–building is, of course, not entirely new. In 2007, the report of the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) explicitly identified a need to enhance “the role of think tanks.”¹¹ But under the leadership of Xi Jinping, think tank development has become a government-sponsored national strategy (国家战略, guojia zhanlüe). A brief chronological review of major events relating to the promotion of Chinese think tanks demonstrates how this objective has become unambiguously pronounced:

• In November 2012, the 18th National Party Congress report called for “the improvement of decision-making mechanisms and procedures, exhibiting a greater role for think tanks.”¹²
• At the CCP Central Economic Work Conference held in December 2012, Xi Jinping stated that China should establish high-quality think tanks engaged in forward-looking research and policy consultation.¹³
• In November 2013, the resolution of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee endorsed Xi Jinping’s comments made in April 2013 by stating that building new types of think tanks with Chinese characteristics should be part of China’s strategic mission.¹⁴
• In October 2014, at the meeting of the CCP Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, Xi Jinping stressed the importance of China’s think tank development in enhancing the country’s soft power.¹⁵
• In January 2015, the General Offices of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued Guidelines for Strengthening the New Type of Think Tanks with Chinese Characteristics, announcing China’s effort to promote 50–100 high-end think tanks.¹⁶ The goal was to have “several think tanks wielding major global influence” by 2020.¹⁷
• In December 2015, the Chinese government announced the first group of 25 high-end think tanks, covering the areas of politics, economics, ideology, science and technology, military, law, and international affairs.¹⁸
• In April 2016, in an important speech delivered at the Internet and Information Security Work Conference, Xi Jinping proclaimed that China should adopt the “revolving door” (旋转门, xuanzhuanmen) mechanism prevalent among think tanks in many foreign countries, whereby political and intellectual elites move fluidly between positions in think tanks, the government, and the private sector.¹⁹
• In May 2016, Xi Jinping made a detailed speech concerning the development of the social sciences and philosophy in China, in which he called for strengthening international academic exchanges at research institutions, establishing overseas Chinese academic research centers, encouraging China studies in foreign institutions and foundations, and promoting scholarly collaborations between Chinese and foreign think tanks.²⁰

The emphasis on building think tanks with Chinese characteristics does not imply that the Chinese leadership is pitting these institutions against their foreign counterparts. On the contrary, collaboration with foreign think tanks has been deemed a necessity. In March 2013, Xi Jinping stated that collaboration in think tank research should be part of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) agenda. On subsequent foreign state visits, President Xi Jinping continued to emphasize the need for bilateral think tank exchanges with countries such as France, Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Indonesia, and Pakistan.²¹ Think tank exchanges with foreign counterparts are now considered the primary channel for “second track diplomacy” (二轨外交, ergui waijiao).²²

Nowadays, China’s top leaders often choose to deliver foreign policy speeches at think tanks abroad. During his visit to Europe in the spring of 2014, President Xi Jinping made speeches at two think tanks: the Körber Foundation in Berlin, Germany, and the Collège d’Europe, an independent university think tank for the EU based in Bruges, Belgium. In June 2014, Premier Li Keqiang gave a major speech at a forum organized by two British think tanks, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Within China, international think tank dialogues have been frequently held not only in major coastal cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, but also in inland cities.

Cynicism and Negativity toward Chinese Think Tanks

Critics in China and abroad assert that the urgency to develop Chinese think tanks is driven primarily by the party leadership’s desire to augment China’s soft power and influence.²³ According to these critics, the old-fashioned bureaucratic me...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Acknowledgments
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Abbreviations
• I. Introduction 1
• II. Prominent Chinese Thinkers
• III. The Dynamics and Constraints of Chinese Think Tank Development
• IV. Toward a More Pluralistic Decision-Making Process
• V. Conclusion: Top-Level Design of Reform and China’s Political Future
• Index
• About the Author