Empire and Holy War in the Mediterranean

The Galley and Maritime Conflict between the Habsburgs and Ottomans

Phillip Williams

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781848859852
• eBook ISBN: 9780857735980
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Early Modern History
• Index: History

In the century after 1530 the empires of the Habsburgs of Spain and the Ottoman Turks fought a maritime war that seemed destined to lead nowhere: lasting peace was as unlikely as final triumph, in part because the salient feature of this conflict was a violent form of piracy practiced by the 'corsairs' of North African and Malta. It was fundamentally a war of unequal means, since the Habsburgs of Spain had too few good warships and the Ottomans too many bad ones. Christendom and Islam engaged in a war fought largely through the exercise of private violence: the Hospitaller Knights of Malta and ghazi captains of North Africa succeeded in imposing their crusading ethos on the Mediterranean. If a degree of futility loomed over these campaigns, it was nevertheless true that the Mediterranean witnessed a sustained conflict which in scale and intensity was far greater than that of any contemporary form of warfare at sea. Moreover the sea was never abandoned as, until at least 1620, large galley fleets continued to patrol the inland sea. The raiding methods employed by Elizabethan 'seadogs' like Sir Francis Drake would certainly not have worked in this theatre of arms, as the defences in Italy and North Africa were much more formidable than those of the Atlantic. Phillip Williams begins with a detailed examination of the oared warships used in these campaigns. He then explores the structures of political and military organization and the role of geography and the environment in shaping the fighting; stressing that the Italian territories were of vital significance to the Habsburgs of Spain. He considers the cultural and historical outlook of protagonists such as the Habsburg rulers Charles V and Philip II and the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent, examining the extent to which the dictates of prudence triumphed over ideals of performing 'the service of God'. Providing a unique perspective on early modern maritime conflict, this book will be essential reading for all students and researchers of Mediterranean History and the early modern world.

Notes

Introduction

1. AGS, Sec.Prov.leg.987 sf CCI Madrid, 17 December 1598.

2. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, translated by Siân Reynolds, 2 volumes, Collins: London 1973, ii, pp.1139–42, 1184–85.

3. José Luis Casado Soto, Los Barcos Españoles del siglo XVI y la Gran Armada de 1588, Editorial San Martin: Madrid-Spain 1988, passim.

4. Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II, Yale University Press: New Haven and London 1998, p.176.

5. Braudel, Mediterranean, ii, pp.1088–1185; Andrew C. Hess, ‘The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History’, in Past & Present, No.57 (Nov. 1972), pp.53–73; I.A.A. Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain 1560–1620, UCL: London 1976, pp.13–14; C.H. Imber, ‘The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent’, in Archivum Ottomanicum, vol. VI (1980), p.220.

6. A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, reprinted London 1965, passim. Mahan’s arguments are examined and set in context by Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, Penguin edition: London 2001, pp.1–9.

7. John Francis Guilmartin, Jr., Gunpowder and Galleys. Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the 16th Century, 2nd edition, Conway Maritime Press: London 2003.

8. Carlo M. Cipolla, Guns, Sails and Empires. Technological Innovation and the Early Phases of European Expansion, 1400–1700, Sunflower University Press: Manhattan, Kansas 1985, see especially pp.100–01.

9. For a valuable recent overview, Jan Glete, Warfare at Sea, 1500–1650, Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe, Routledge: London and New York 2000, see especially p.5.

10. Braudel, Mediterranean, ii, p.994. The numerous problems encountered in the constuction of La Goleta are examined by Antonio Sánchez-Gijón, ‘La Goleta, Bona, Bugía y los presidios del reino de Túnez en la política mediterránea del Emperador’, in C.J. Hernando Sánchez ed., Las fortificaciones de Carlos V, Ministerio de Defensa, AEAC, CECCFC: Madrid 2000, pp.625–51.

11. Philip II himself referred to ‘las ruines intenciones del dicho rey de Túnez, y cuan de mala gana provee las cosas que está obligado a dar para aquella fuerza’, CODOIN, xxix, pp.78–79.

12. AGS, Est.leg.1126, fol.39 Medinaceli to King, Palermo 26 April 1561.

13. AGS, Est.leg.1127 fol.14 Grand Master of Hospitallers to Viceroy of Sicily, Malta 25 February 1562.

14. Manuel Fernández Álvarez, Carlos V, el César y el Hombre, Fundación Academia Europea de Yuste: Madrid 1999, pp.504, 509.

15. Francisco López de Gómara, Guerras de mar del Emperador Carlos V, SECCFC: Madrid 2000, edited by Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra and N.E. Jiménez, pp.171, 175.

16. Anne Brogini and María Ghazali, ‘Un enjeu espagnol en Méditerranée: les présides de Tripoli et de La Goulette au XVI^e siècle’, Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 70 (2005), para 97,‘mis en ligne le 12 mai 2006’.

17. CODOIN, xxix, pp.177–79, 181–83.

18. Enrique García Hernán, ‘La conquista y pérdida de Túnez por don Juan de Austria’, in G. Candiani and L. Lo Basso eds, Mutazioni e permanenze nella storia navale del Mediterraneo secc. XVI–XIX in Guerra e pace in età moderna. Annali di storia militare europea, II (2010), Franco Angeli: Milan pp.39–95, pp.44–48, 89–95.

19. Between 1571 and 1577 the government of Sicily spent 1,600,000 scudi on defence and supplies for the fleet. Rossella Cancila, Fisco Ricchezza Comunità nella Sicilia del Cinquecento, ISI: Rome 2001, p.62; the cost of foods to the Kingdom of Sicily in 1571, 1572 and 1572 ran to 1,250,000 ducats, García Hernán and García Hernán, Lepanto, p.86 ; on the reduced, but still significant, contribution made by Sicily in the 1640s and 1650s, Davide Maffi, Il baluardo della corona. Guerra, esercito, finanze e società nella Lombardia seicentesca (1630–1660), Le Monnier Università: Florence 2007, pp.328–31, 344.

20. I.A.A. Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560–1620, UCL: London 1976, passim and see especially pp.163–84, 230–31; David Parrott, The Business of War. Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe, CUP: Cambridge 2012.

21. David Parrott, ‘France’s Wars against the Habsburgs, 1624–1659: the Politics of Military Failure’, in García Hernán and Maffi eds, Guerra y sociedad, i, pp.31–48, p.34; Thompson, War and Government, p.256.

22. Thompson, War and Government, passim and especially his ‘Conclusion’, pp.274–87; Parrott, Business of War, Chapter VI.

23. Parrott, ‘France’s Wars’, p.47.

24. David Parrott, ‘A “prince souverain” and the French crown: Charles de Nevers, 1580–1637’ in Robert Oresko, G.C. Gibbs and H.M. Scott eds, Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe. Essays in memory of Ragnhild Hatton, CUP: Cambridge, New York and Melbourne 1997, pp.149–87, especially pp.176–83.

25. Robert Oresko, ‘The House of Savoy in search for a royal crown in the seventeenth century’ in Oresko, Gibbs and Scot...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• List of Illustrations
• Introduction: The Mediterranean World in the Age of Captain Francisco de Holanda
• I The Domains of War
• II The Habsburgs, the Ottomans and the ‘Naval Battle’
• III Chusma
• IV Those Esteemed Dreadful Monsters
• V The Sea-Wolves
• VI The Royal Armada
• VII The Shadow of God on Earth
• VIII Dear Prudence
• IX The Lordship of the Sea
• X The Shift to the Mediterranean
• XI The Problem of Holy War in the Sixteenth Century
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Select Bibliography