Advertising and Propaganda in World War II

Cultural Identity and the Blitz Spirit

David Clampin

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9780857737328
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Politische Propaganda

The Blitz- the period of Nazi bombing campaigns on civilian Britain during World War II- was a formative period for British national identity. In this groundbreaking book, David Clampin looks at the images, campaigns and slogans which helped to form the fabled 'Blitz spirit'- powerfully echoed in Winston Churchill's speeches. Because advertisers attempted to capitalise on war-time patriotism, Clampin's unique focus on advertising provides a visually rich seam of new information on the everyday war, and makes an enormous contribution to the debate on people's experiences of war and nationalism. Using a remarkable and hitherto unseen range of primary source material-advertisements in the press, slogans and posters-this work will reshape the contested meanings of the 'Home Front', opening up cultural history discourses on gender and nationalism. Advertising and Propaganda in World War II is essential reading for historians of World War II as well as students and scholars of Media Studies and Communication Studies.

CHAPTER 1

THE PLACE OF COMMERCIAL
ADVERTISING IN WARTIME
BRITAIN

‘To guide, help and hearten millions’
Advertiser’s Weekly, 30 May 1940, p. 234

Commercial advertising appears to be entirely out of place in a state embroiled in total war, driving up consumer demand at a time when the government was urging consumers to save, alluding to a world of luxury that was no longer accessible and consuming valuable space in the press that might usefully be employed to convey important information to the public. Indeed, the advertising industry in Britain faced the outbreak of war in September 1939 with anxiety and dread: there was great uncertainty as advertisers contemplated what the impact on their businesses would be, reviewing their advertising plans accordingly. Further, the advertising industry was unsure how much freedom it would have to operate as the government began to implement a raft of restrictions and regulations directly curtailing the practice of agencies—there was an implicit suggestion that commercial advertising was superfluous to the pursuit of the war.

However, throughout World War II, private companies continued to spend large sums of money on advertising, often at a time when they were unlikely to meet the demand that that advertising was designed to create or even when those products were simply not available. That commercial advertising persisted is testament to the efforts of the commercial advertising industry and especially the main industry bodies, the Advertising Association and the Institute of Incorporated Practitioners in Advertising (IIPA). Between them, concerned that the very survival of the industry was under threat, they launched a concerted campaign to protect their concerns and project a positive image into the marketplace, to persuade government and people that, contrary to first impressions, they were making a positive contribution to the war effort. As it transpired, for the most part, that contribution was appreciated and fitted very well with the mood of the nation, largely because the ongoing presence of these advertisements the continued existence in the press of familiar, well-known brands, offered some form of continuity with the pre-war world. The persistence of commercial press advertising was a clear and obvious sign that normal life had not come to a complete end or been entirely displaced. Contrary to dire pre-war predictions, here was evidence that normal life could continue in wartime, as well as practical suggestions as to how that might be achieved, alongside the conclusive proof that was the result of the period of the Phoney War between September 1939 and May 1940.

There is evidence to suggest that the government was amenable to this perspective and was generally convinced that ongoing advertising did, indeed, provide evidence that, despite the war, British life did go on. Thus, the government tended to be acquiescent in its actions and despite the plethora of new rules, regulations and restrictions, took no decisive action to stop advertising outright. The advertising industry was further ‘aided’ in its efforts to retain its place in society and its freedom to operate by the apparent inability of the Ministry of Information (MoI) to impose its will in the face of the actions of the press and advertising industry either acting independently to protect its interests or, on occasion, in combination. In its dealings with the advertising industry and in relation to commercial advertising in the press, an impression is given of an organization paralysed by a sense of powerlessness, either unwilling or unable to enforce its will and prepared to sacrifice its own perceived needs in order to placate the press. Consequently, not only was the advertising industry able to persist in the face of ongoing criticism but also, in some respects, it was strengthened to the extent that it felt able to act contrary to the expressed wishes of the government. Despite pressure from inside and outside the government to act to curtail advertising, the government failed to take decisive action. This was in part out of fear of the consequences, a negative or uncooperative stance in press editorial or an obstructive attitude on the part of the industry in general, but also in recognition that the press had to retain a pre-war appearance if it was to be read and trusted by the public.

The continued presence of commercial advertising in the press was an important factor in newspapers and magazines preserving a pre-war appearance rather than appearing to be wholly concerned with government pronouncements and official news. Without this spirit of compromise, it is doubtful whether the advertising industry would have been able to survive the years of war in the manner in which it did.

To some extent, ongoing commercial advertising, for all its irrelevance, frivolity and triviality in the face of total war, highlighted continuities in life despite the challenge that the nation now faced. Further, extending from this hint that life would not come entirely to an end as war was declared, or that an entirely new countenance or way to go about conducting oneself would not be required, a beacon was held up that suggested that the British nation would never become totally absorbed by the war, or give itself over completely to a state of war-mindedness. For their part, those in positions of authority were resigned to this point of view, nervous as they were of the unity and strength of popular morale. They thereby found room to accommodate such distractions on the Home Front. It was quickly apparent to those within government that the people could not be forced into active engagement in the ‘People’s War’ and, extending from this, the notion of Blitz spirit was more an ideal than an actual, all-embracing pattern for life: it was totemic. Those who encountered commercial advertising on a day-to-day basis, though most likely unaware of the significance, could find in it an obvious and deliberate sign that diversions from the war were both acceptable and encouraged, and that wartime concerns ought to be kept in balance alongside the more mundane and everyday.

Compared to the rest of the British war economy and its constituent parts, the advertising industry appears unique in the extent to which it was able to preserve its autonomy during the war. The very survival of the wartime advertising industry was the result, at least in part, of the extraordinary efforts that the main trade bodies went to in order to demonstrate that commercial advertising had a legitimate role to play in a nation at war. In so doing, the function of advertising in wartime was defined and subsequent actions, along with the design, style and look of advertisements, were compromised by the divined need to act in such a way as to protect the advertising industry’s interests and income while retaining the goodwill of the people. The commercial advertising of World War II is coloured by those ongoing efforts to quell public anxieties while proving to all that advertising could play a constructive role in society both in the present and in a future postwar world. However, the ultimate consequence of all these efforts and machinations is that commercial advertising continued to have a presence in the press throughout the war and, while not necessarily a deliberate intention, the all-encompassing nature of the war was relieved, or at least diluted to some extent, by the garish efforts of producers to draw attention to themselves and frequently provide a distraction from the war.

Four key themes characterise the performance of the advertising industry during the war. First, the necessity on the part of the commercial advertising industry to consolidate its position and re-orientate its approach on the outbreak of war to ensure that its voice was heard in official circles and to guarantee, as far as was possible, that its opinion would be solicited when it came to the government taking decisions that might have an impact on its business. Second, as the dust settled, the efforts of the industry to more forcibly dictate the role to be played by advertising (including its argument that this was vital to the war effort) alongside economic arguments that required advertisers to keep advertising in their own interests, holding up advertising as an investment and as a guarantor of brands and private profits. The third theme was the use of advertising to ‘inform and direct’ the public, with commercial advertisers acting (in their own words) to ‘guide, help and hearten millions’. The fourth and final theme was the efforts of advertising trade bodies to maintain appearances, to exercise a degree of circumspection in regard to just how far the war could be turned to the advertisers’ advantage without tarnishing the good name of the advertising industry itself. Partly by design, the advertising industry played a role in shaping wartime society in such a way as to stress the need to retain elements of a normal, pre-war life. Of course, in so doing it was absolutely in its best interests given that the end result would be proof that commercial advertising did have a part to play in the war on the Home Front.

Consolidation and Re-orientation: War Begins at Home

The advertising industry considered the prospect of war with some dread. The role that it could hope to play in such a conflict was not obvious, and considering the war’s likely extent, it was widely believed that the government would at once give the nation over to a state of total war in which there would be no space for private companies producing and promoting a variety of consumer goods. In the face of an increase in government regulation of the economy, advertising would, it was feared, prove to be redundant and thereby sound the death knell for the industry. Many advertisers, resigned to this fate, took the decision to withdraw their advertising by choice before being officially compelled to do so.

Further, the advertising industry trade bodies recognised that if, in the event of war, commercial advertising was banned outright, many of their members would, literally, be rendered redundant. The acting secretary of the Advertising Association reported as early as September 1938 that it had received requests ‘from advertising men’ in regard to how best their services could be ‘utilised in the event of a war’. In response, the council drafted a resolution to the government ‘offering the services of the Association during the present crisis’.¹ Its offer consisted of providing assistance to the government in formulating any advertising or propaganda scheme, or putting at the disposal of the government the services of experienced and qualified advertising personnel. The IIPA made a similar offer and reported that the ‘replies received evidenced sincere appreciation of the Institute’s offer’.² In an effort to prove that the advertising industry could play a vital part in a nation at war, and to ensure that it might have some influence in official circles, deliberate efforts were made to move closer to the government.

The initial pessimism of commercial advertisers was corroborated by a drastic fall in advertising expenditure on the outbreak of war. Advertising expenditure in September 1939 was just 49 per cent of what it had been in September 1938.³ In response, many agencies fired staff and, for those who remained, reduced their level of pay. Advertiser’s Weekly reported with bravado what it might have hoped would become a self-fulfilling prophecy:

[T]he whole of the advertising and newspaper world are endeavouring to adjust themselves to vastly changed conditions so that they may uphold the ‘carry on’ tradition of British business.⁴

On the outbreak of war, the president of the IIPA, Sir William Crawford, closing ranks in response to the predicted assault on its free practice, issued ‘an appeal to all Members for co-operation and mutual assistance’, while at the same time offering the IIPA’s services to the MoI.⁵ The Advertising Association was also keen to ensure that the voice of advertisers was well heard, and moved to set up its Government Contact Committee. This committee was made up of representatives of the Newspaper Proprietors’ Association, the Periodical Trade Press and Weekly Newspaper Proprietors’ Association, the Newspaper Society, the Advertising Association, the IIPA and the Incorporated Society of British Advertisers. Its chairman was Lord Ashfield, chairman of the London Passenger Transport Board and, from 1940, chairman of the Advertising Association. The committee became commonly known as the Ashfield Committee, its task to ‘co-operate with the Government and all trade organizations in an endeavour to bring about a new effort on the part of British trade and commerce’ with a view to ‘a restoration of trade activities’.⁶ Meanwhile, the Advertising Association mounted a concerted campaign to ensure that advertisers kept advertising. Its General Purposes Committee in its meeting of 21 September 1939 concluded:

Direct approaches to be made to leading advertisers and distributors to maintain and, where possible, to increase their trade and selling activities, and the weight of the support of these large interests to be used in various ways to bear upon the trade situation.⁷

Such an attitude accorded with the position of the Chamberlain government, which was keen to protect ‘business as usual’ and not to interfere with normal trade activities. Indeed, Ivison Macadam, director of the Co-ordination Division of the MoI, told a meeting of the heads of the Publicity Division in September 1939 that, rather than create new organizations to undertake propaganda, it made more sense for the government to exploit the spirit of cooperation with industry that had been built up since the First World War. Business was already in close partnership with government: this merely represented an extension of that spirit. What is more, such a vehicle fitted the ethos of the Chamberlain government well by not overtly extending the role of the state or causing undue alarm among the public. The heads of the Publicity Divisions therefore resolved:

It is intended to use business firms extensively for publicity purposes […] since publicity received through normal channels is much more effective than that received through ad. hoc bodies.⁸

The MoI was persuaded that industry and the press, and especially commercial advertising, could play a useful role in helping to spread government messages and attitudes thought to be advantageous to the war effort.

Here is clear evidence of the caution with which the government approached the British people and its timidity when it came to the prospect of compelling them to adopt a wartime demeanour or act in proscribed ways. That the MoI should seek out such insidious means of communication might be cause to give it at least some credit in terms of understanding the state of the nation and the limits and extent of its influence. As a consequence, this would prove beneficial to the advertising industry: if advertisers could not expect the active support of government, they had at least its tacit acquiescence in their own efforts to maintain a semblance of normality in their trade efforts, thereby keeping the wheels of commerce turning.

Such efforts seemed to be rewarded since, despite serious initial setbacks, ‘towards the end of September business was coming back’.⁹ Indeed, advertising expenditure in October 1939 was up 26 per cent on the preceding month, if still down 52 per cent y...