The Fifteen Weeks (February 21 - June 5, 1947)

Joseph M. Jones

• Publisher: Arcole Publishing
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781789125337
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire de l'armée et de la marine

A DRAMATIC AND REVEALING ACCOUNT, FROM INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT, OF THE MOMENTOUS DAYS IN WHICH AMERICA ASSUMED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF WORLD LEADERSHIP.First published in 1955, Joseph M. Jones' memoirs The Fifteen Weeks chronicle his role in the development of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan."The fifteen weeks which form the title and subject of this book comprise the period in 1947 when the United States stepped out irrevocably and wholeheartedly as leader upon the world stage...."The greatness of a nation, like the greatness of an individual, is in the last analysis a mystery. We do not know why at one time immense exertions and far-reaching vision are more prevalent than at others. Yet to look within, to account for the obvious factors in the situation is highly useful. That function is performed in a book which for readability and for responsible narration would be hard to surpass."—August Heckscher in the New York Herald Tribune.

PART I—THREE OCCASIONS AND THREE SPEECHES

1—THE CAPITOL, WASHINGTON, D.C., MARCH 12, 1947

THE Speaker of the House, Joseph Martin, at 12:16 p.m. on March 12, 1947, declared the House in recess subject to the call of the Chair. The House and Senate were shortly to meet in joint session to hear a Special Message to be delivered in person by the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman.

The confusion in the House Chamber was greater than usual. The representatives occupying the front ranks on the House floor were in process of evacuating them to accommodate the expected guests, members of the Senate, and the President’s Cabinet. Dozens of ex-congressmen, exercising their prerogatives on this special occasion, loitered in conversation with old friends on the periphery of the Chamber. Every clerk, secretary, or functionary on Capitol Hill whose familiar face would get him past a guard at a door was on the floor. One Democratic representative had planted himself, with his small daughter on his lap, in a seat on the center aisle.

The gallery seats, except those few kept free by vigilant door-keepers, had long since been taken, and distinguished visitors were now being packed in on the steps. The warm and sparkling day had brought out in their spring finery all the wives of high officialdom who could wangle a ticket from their husbands. The diplomatic gallery was jammed. At the west end of the Chamber the central gallery reserved for the White House was overflowing with Cabinet wives, White House staff, and guests. Mrs. Truman, arriving in the company of a friend five minutes before one o’clock, was trying rather unsuccessfully to pick her way unrecognized down the packed steps to her seat in the front row when a White House aide, belatedly recognizing her and appreciating the indignity of the situation, with authority and a firm voice cleared a path for the wife of the President.

Meanwhile, at 12:45 p.m., the Speaker had called the House to order, and although very little order resulted the doorkeeper announced the President pro tempore of the Senate and members of the United States Senate. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, flanked by the Secretary of the Senate and the Sergeant at Arms, walked down the center aisle and mounted the Speaker’s rostrum; some fifty senators straggled behind him and took the good seats courteously yielded to them by their colleagues in the House. The Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate each appointed three members to a committee of six to conduct the President of the United States into the Chamber.{1} At 12:57 the doorkeeper announced the Cabinet of the President of the United States. Two by two they entered—headed by Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State (General Marshall was in Moscow), and John Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury, followed by James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, and Robert Patterson, Secretary of War, and the others—and progressed rather stiffly to the seats left for them in the front row.

At 1 p.m. the doorkeeper announced the President of the United States, and, as all in the Chamber rose and applauded, President Truman, escorted by the committee of senators and representatives and carrying a black folder under his arm, strode briskly down the aisle. Leaving his escort in the House well, he mounted to the Clerk’s desk below the Speaker’s rostrum and acknowledged with a broad smile the continuing ovation. As the applause died away he opened his black folder and, after turning for a moment to address the Chair behind him, began to read. His voice was flat and not impressive, but this day he spoke with a newly acquired forcefulness, tripping only occasionally. And what he had to say was impressive indeed.

“Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress of the United States, the gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.”

It had been just nineteen days earlier that the first in the chain of events leading to this appearance of the President before Congress had occurred, the official news that the British government could no longer aid in sustaining and strengthening Greece and Turkey. On the fourth day after Sichel’s call (the four days covered a weekend) the State Department had ready a documented statement of position approved by Secretary Marshall. On the fifth day this position had been endorsed by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and approved by the President. On the sixth day it had been laid by the President before congressional leaders of both parties, none opposing. On the seventh day a working party in the State Department had been appointed to draw up a detailed program of aid, draft a message to Congress for the President, and work up a program of public information. In the twelve following days all this had been done, the proposed program had been approved by the Cabinet and discussed again with congressional leaders, and the message had been polished and approved in the White House for final delivery. It had all gone like clockwork. No one in the government had opposed. No one had dragged his feet. Veterans in government service had never seen anything like the unanimity of view, and this on a matter recognized as a major turning point in American history. Nor had they ever before witnessed such efficiency in the government as that with which the job was done.

Now the President was displaying the end product to Congress, to the American people, to the world.

“One aspect of the present situation...concerns Greece and Turkey...”

President Truman described the tragic physical, financial, and economic condition of war-wrecked Greece, the threat to the very existence of the Greek state posed by the activities of the Communist-led terrorists in the north, the inadequacies of the Greek army, the urgent appeal of the Greek government to the United States. The British government, he said, could give no further financial or economic help after March 31. The question had been considered as to how the United Nations might assist in this crisis, but the situation was an urgent one requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its related organizations were not in a position to extend help of the kind required.

“Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-respecting democracy.

“The United States must supply this assistance.

“There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn.

“No other nation is willing and able to provide necessary support for a democratic Greek government.”

Mr. Truman emphasized that the Greek government had asked for our assistance in utilizing effectively the financial and other aid we might give to Greece and in improving its public administration. “It is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece,” he said—and here he was interrupted by the first applause—“in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece self-supporting, and will help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish.”

The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state, the President continued, was clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. Turkey, having been spared the disasters of war, was in much better condition than Greece, but nevertheless needed our support “in order to effect that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.” If Turkey was to have the help it needed, the President concluded, the United States would have to supply it, for we were the only country able to do so. This was brief treatment indeed, but it is all the message contained about Turkey.

Up to this point President Truman had said things that had been more or less expected as a consequence of news leaks, discussions with congressmen over the previous two weeks, and background information officially given to the press. It was unique in our history that a President should ask Congress for an appropriation in time of peace to help foreign countries maintain their “integrity and independence”—financial aid to accomplish frankly political purposes—but it was a not illogical extension of Lend-Lease. But all the President had said thus far was but prologue. Now came the main drama.

“I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey....

“One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion....To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States....

“At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guaranties of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and suppression of personal freedoms.

“I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

“I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their destiny in their own way.

“I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.”

Here, in its essence, was the Truman Doctrine. There was at this point no applause. It was as though the President’s listeners were stunned, some perhaps dismayed, by the sweep, the boldness, of the President’s utterance. The President went on.

“It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their independence. Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action.”

President Truman asked Congress to appropriate $400 million for aid to Greece and Turkey and to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction and to supervise the use of United States aid. He also asked authorization to train selected Greek and Turkish personnel in the United States.

“This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious....The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation. Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift course of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.”

It is customary, when the President has finished delivering a message to Congress, for those present to rise, applaud, and remain standing while the President and his Cabinet take their leave from the Chamber. There was no exception on this occasion, but the applause had a bewildered quality about it. There was no vocal acclaim, no rebel yells. The President was solemn as he acknowledged the applause, except that a fleeting smile accompanied a special look and bow toward Mrs. Truman in the west gallery. He shook hands with Senator Vandenberg and Speaker Martin and descended from the rostrum, briefly clasped a few outstretched hands as he made his way to the door, and hesitated long enough to shake the hand of the little girl who had twisted on her father’s lap throughout the speech and was now carried in his arms.

The President retired from the House Chamber at 1:21 p.m., followed by his Cabinet, and Speaker Martin declared the joint session dissolved. Mr. Truman motored directly to the Washington airport and boarded the Sacred Cow for a flight to Key West, where he would vacation for a few days and await the reaction to his message.

The reaction was not slow in coming. It was tremendous, somewhat confused, and on the whole favorable. But that is a matter to be considered in a later chapter.

2—THE DELTA COUNCIL, CLEVELAND, MISSISSIPPI, MAY 8, 1947

THE Greece-Turkey aid bill was well along toward final passage in Congress and missions were being assembled for Athens and Ankara when on May 7, 1947, Dean Acheson, accompanied by Francis Russell, chief of the Department’s Office of Public Affairs, boarded a DC-3, assigned by the Air Force to the Secretary of State, to fly to Cleveland, Mississippi, where, the following day, he was to deliver a major address on foreign policy before the Delta Council. The moving stream of human woe and government trouble the world over had swelled steadily during the previous eight weeks and was now swirling ahead in full flood, sweeping away comfortable premises and inundating preconceptions of the post-war world. The President’s Doctrine of March 12 had been broad enough in conception to contain the floodwaters, but the specific project of aid to Greece and Turkey had sandbagged only a tributary to the main stream, which was now out of banks.

The most acute and dangerous situations were developing throughout Europe, especially in France, Italy, and Britain. Economic reconstruction was grinding toward a halt, and, with inflation mounting, the stream of farm products to the cities and raw materials to industries was drying up. Governments were spending precious and limited reserves of gold, dollars, and other foreign exchange at an alarming rate, to pay not for reconstruction materials but for food and fuel. Strikes and social disorders abounded. Communism’s rapid advance had been stunningly checked in most continental European countries by the psychological barriers thrown up by President Truman on March 12, which had a powerful influence upon the government change in France on May 4 and in Italy on May 13, when the Communists were eliminated from the government coalitions and their ministers disappeared from the Cabinets. But Communist voting strength, organization, and plans to take over remained intact. And as the Moscow Conference progressed (March 10-April 24), it became clear that Soviet policy was set against the economic recovery of Europe—for reasons that were obvious. The worsening situation in Western Europe cast a lengthening shadow over the deliberations of late February on aid to Greece and Turkey and contributed to the breadth of the President’s policy statement of March 12, but recognition within the government of the specific character and proportions of the crisis confronting Western Europe did not crystallize until later in March. Just how that came about, and why, will be considered later.

There are some who contend that the highest officers of the government should restrict their speech-making to times when they have something to say; that official speeches at the top level should be more consciously used as a vehicle to project or foreshadow desired policy development and to enlist public discussion as a helpful partner in its realization; and that if a top official has something important to say it doesn’t matter very much whether it is pitched to the immediate listening audience gathered together for an “occasion,” for his real audience is the nation and the world, and those physically present who may not appreciate the importance of what he says will be satisfied to hear a distinguished man utter solemn phrases. Many would have considered Cleveland, Mississippi, to be one of the least promising places in the country from which to call the attention of the American people to their responsi...