Conduct of Operations and Operational Discipline

For Improving Process Safety in Industry

• Editorial: Wiley-AIChE
• Año: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781118029190
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Tecnología e ingeniería
• Categoría: Ingeniería química y bioquímica

Process safety management (PSM) systems are only as effective as the day-to-day ability of the organization to rigorously execute system requirements correctly every time. The failure of just one person in completing a job task correctly just one time can unfortunately lead to serious injuries and potentially catastrophic incidents. In fact, the design, implementation, and daily execution of PSM systems are all dependent on workers at all levels in the organization doing their job tasks correctly every time. High levels of Operational Discipline, therefore, help ensure strong PSM performance and overall operational excellence.

This book details management practices which help ensure rigor in executing process safety programs in order to prevent major accidents.

Chapter 1

WHAT IS COO/OD AND HOW CAN I TELL IF I NEED IT?

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This book describes the concepts of conduct of operations (COO) and operational discipline (OD), the attributes of effective COO/OD systems, and the steps an organization might take to implement or improve its COO/OD systems. This chapter should be read by everyone using this book to familiarize themselves with the principles of COO/OD. It will explain the basic COO/OD concepts and help you decide whether your current COO/OD system activities need improvement. It will also define important terms used throughout the book and the relationship between COO/OD and other management systems.

In general, COO encompasses the ongoing management systems1 that are developed to encourage performance of all tasks in a consistent, appropriate manner. OD is the deliberate and structured execution of the COO and other organizational management systems by personnel throughout the organization. Formal definitions of COO and OD can be found in Section 1.4.

COO addresses management systems. OD addresses the execution of the COO and other management systems.

1.2 PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK

This Concept book is intended to explain the key attributes of COO/OD and to provide specific guidance on how an organization can implement effective systems.

The purpose of this book is to help organizations design and implement COO and OD systems. This book provides ideas and methods on how to (1) design and implement COO and OD systems, (2) correct deficient COO and OD systems, or (3) improve existing COO and OD systems.

1.3 FOCUS AND INTENDED AUDIENCE

The primary focus of this book is on improving process safety management within the process and allied industries. However, the concepts and activities described in this book should be applicable to a broad spectrum of facilities in many industries.

Its intended audience is everyone—from upper management to front-line workers — who will be involved in designing, implementing, maintaining, and improving COO/OD systems. Section 1.5 discusses how the intended audience might use this book.

PSM USAGE

The terms process safety management” and “PSM,” as used throughout this book, refer to the systems used to manage process safety within an organization. They do NOT refer to a specific regulation (such as 29 CFR 1910.119 in the United States).

Implementing an effective COO/OD system inevitably produces positive changes in an organization’s culture; however, changing the overall culture of an organization is a broader topic than the COO/OD systems addressed herein. Likewise, the broad application of COO/OD principles will likely produce occupational safety, environmental, reliability, quality, and many other benefits. However, this book focuses on the process safety aspects of COO/OD. The examples used throughout the book and the work activities described emphasize process safety issues.

PROCESS SAFETY FOCUS

This book focuses on improving process safety performance, which may also bring occupational safety benefits.

BP Texas City — An Example of COO/OD Failings

On March 23, 2005, an explosion occurred in the Isomerization Unit (ISOM) at the BP refinery in Texas City, Texas, during a startup after a turnaround (Ref. 1.1). The incident resulted in 15 fatalities, more than 170 people injured, and major damage to the ISOM and adjacent process units.

The vapor cloud explosion occurred after liquid hydrocarbons were ejected from the stack of the blowdown drum serving the ISOM raffinate splitter column, which had been overfilled.

COO/OD-related issues associated with this incident include the following:

• An operational check of the independent high level alarm in the raffinate splitter tower was not performed prior to startup, even though it was required by procedures.
• The operators did not respond to the high level alarm in the splitter (it was on throughout the incident).
• The level indication available to the operators was useless during most of the startup because they deliberately maintained the level above the indicated range of the level instruments.
• When the Day Shift Supervisor arrived at about 7:15 a.m., no job safety review or walkthrough of the procedures to be used that day was performed as required by procedures.
• The board operator printed off the wrong startup procedure (although this was not a significant factor because he never referred to it).
• The splitter bottoms were heated at 75°F per hour despite the procedural limit of 50°F per hour.
• The Day Shift Supervisor left the plant during the startup about 3 1/2 hours prior to the explosion. No replacement was provided during this period.
• The operating procedures were certified as current, although they did not include changes to relief valve settings made prior to the most recent recertification.
• Outside operators did not report significant deviations of operating parameters (such as rising pressure on the splitter bottoms pumps) to the control room.
• Deficiencies first identified in 2003 and 2004 still existed in training programs for ISOM operators.

Other notable examples of incidents with significant COO/OD issues include the following:

• Three Mile Island nuclear plant incident, March 28, 1979 (Ref. 1.2)
• Union Carbide methyl isocyanate release, Bhopal, India, December 3, 1984 (Ref. 1.3)
• Chernobyl nuclear plant explosion, April 26, 1986 (Ref. 1.4)
• Piper Alpha oil production platform fire, July 6, 1988 (Ref. 1.5)
• Exxon Valdez oil tanker spill on Bligh Reef near Valdez, Alaska, March 24, 1989 (Ref. 1.6)
• Sinking of the Petrobras P-36 oil production platform in the Roncador Field, May 15, 2001 (Ref. 1.7)

In all of these incidents, the information needed to safely operate the facility was present in the procedures and practices of the facility or known by facility personnel. Yet, in every case, well-intentioned, well-trained workers committed grievous errors. Why didn’t the facility personnel perform the work appropriately? One contributor to these incidents was a lack of an effective COO/OD system.

Consider an acid leak that developed unnoticed as a result of poor housekeeping. This book will focus on the process hazards associated with the acid leak, not on the company’s culture of using only a proven technology requiring acid instead of an inherently safer, but unproven, acid-free alternative. If the worker was injured as a result of not wearing the proper per...