Conflicted are the Peacemakers

Israeli and Palestinian Moderates and the Death of Oslo

Eric N. Budd

• Editorial: Bloomsbury Academic
• Año: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781441113191
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Politics & International Relations
• Categoría: International Relations

The 1993 Oslo Accords were a key attempt to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict whose failure was largely attributed to extremists on both sides. The book challenges this conventional wisdom by examining the role of Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers themselves in derailing the peace process. Looking at the role of moderates before and after Oslo, the different agreements and peace proposals they negotiated, and their rhetoric, the book shows that these peacemakers retained an inherent ambivalence toward the peace process and one another. This prevented them and their constituents from committing to the process and achieving a lasting peace. This unique survey shows how the people who drive the peace process can not only undermine it, but also prevent its successful conclusion. By dealing with such an important aspect of negotiation, the book will foster a better understanding of the role of moderates and why peace processes may falter. It will fill a gap in the literature and be a valuable research tool for anyone studying conflict processes, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Middle East politics.

1

Introduction: The Moderates and the Elusive Search for Peace

This is a type of terrorism used by lunatic people who are prepared to strap explosives to their bodies, or place them in cars, in order to kill Israelis, and in order to eliminate the chance for peace in the most complex conflict which has existed between us and the Arab world—the conflict between us and the Palestinians.¹

Yitzhak Rabin

Israeli extremism has succeeded in pushing us into a circle of action and reaction and drowned us in a bloody situation, creating a climate in which it is difficult to give precedence to the political and negotiating aspect in managing the conflict.²

Mahmud Abbas

I am forced to say that the extreme right in Israel is dancing on the blood (shed by) the Islamic extremist terrorist murderers, and trying to turn Israeli victims into a force against the (peace) accord. . . . The extremist murderers of the Islamic Jihad and Hamas are the tools of the extreme right wing in Israel.³

Yitzhak Rabin

As soon as the shock of the (Rabin) assassination was over, the forces of extremism on both sides of the conflict were concluding an unwritten and unholy alliance to undermine the peace process. They revived all the factors of fear, hatred, and hostility between two peoples that were still feeling the beginning of the road to close the page of war and violence and to open a new page of co-existence, peace, and good neighborliness.⁴

Ahmed Qurei

On September 13, 1993, the Israelis and Palestinians took the world by surprise when they came together on the White House lawn to sign the Declaration of Principles, an agreement they had negotiated in Oslo for resolving their conflict. The Oslo Peace Process, which started with so much hope and promise, is if not dead, then certainly is in critical condition.⁵ While there is no shortage of explanations for the breakdown of the Oslo Peace Process, the quotes above are indicative of one popular explanation that places the blame on extremists on both sides who deliberately sought to sabotage the peace process.⁶ Violence attributed to the Israeli far right as well as Hamas and/or the Islamic Jihad on the Palestinian side, is seen as having undermined popular support for the Oslo peace process and as having stymied any further momentum as well. Extremists serve as “spoilers,” doing everything within their power to disrupt the peace process. With trust in the other side at a minimum, the extremists are able to play upon the lingering doubts of whether there really is a partner for peace on the other side. By stoking these doubts, the extremists are able to stymie the peace process by creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, where peace is seen as impossible, and there is not a partner for peace.

Extremist violence on both sides leads each partner to come to doubt the other. According to Barry Rubin:

[I]ncessant bombings and shootings undermined the peace process’ confidence-building element—Israelis believed Palestinians still wanted to destroy Israel and that the Palestinian Authority was unwilling or unable to stop attacks. Palestinians thought Israel had no intention of relinquishing territory or accepting a Palestinian state—when Israel postponed negotiations or closed territories it was seen as Israel’s way of avoiding its commitments. By mobilizing people to action, extremist ideas had become—at least partly and temporarily—a self-fulfilling prophecy.⁷

Extremist violence is very effective at preventing any further progression of the peace process. In the face of extremist violence, the moderates lose control over the peace process, which creates room for the extremists to set the agenda. This dynamic is what is known as Gresham’s Law of Conflict. It occurs when the extremists drive out or eliminate the moderates, such that

leaders begin to focus narrowly on staying in power and containing extremists at the expense of exploring a substantive compromise with the enemy. At a minimum, this implies that any peace process that emerges will be tentative, that posturing for domestic constituencies to prove that the leader is not giving away too much and that he is bargaining hard to achieve maximal goals will dominate, and that the process will be slow, crisis-driven, and always in danger of self-destruction.⁸

As we shall see, the preceding quote perfectly depicts the situation that has unfolded in the years since the launching of the Oslo Peace Process. So, are Israeli and Palestinian extremists solely to blame for the death of the Oslo Peace Process? Does the key to peace in Israel and Palestine lie in finding a way to sideline the extremists so that they cannot sabotage the peace process anymore? When I first started this project, I believed that the answer to both of those questions was a resounding “yes!” However, as time passed, I started to wonder whether, in fact, the Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers themselves might share a large part of the blame for Oslo’s death? This book will argue that the Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers, due to their inherent ambivalence over whether or not peace is really possible ended up sabotaging the very process they were trying to promote. After initially laying out an argument why the moderates, in other words peacemakers, are essential for the peace process, subsequent sections of this chapter will discuss why I believe the moderates cannot bring the peace process to fruition.

The moderates and the peace process

Both the Israeli and Palestinian societies are internally divided between the hawks, doves, and the moderates. The hawks argue that peace with the enemy is not possible, and that there is no one on the other side with whom to negotiate, while the doves would argue the opposite. According to the hawks, the doves are idealistic dreamers who endanger the nation’s security and survival with their futile efforts at conflict resolution. While ideology (political or religious) is the motivation for some hawks, for others geostrategic considerations are the source of their opposition to the peace process. The moderates, on the other hand, are torn. For a long time they shared the hawks’ pessimism, but as a result of developments on the national, regional, or international levels, they came to question their initial pessimism.

It is important to recognize that these categories are not permanent but rather are very fluid. In other words, where an individual falls on this spectrum can change with time. For example, a hawk like Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon can moderate his views and unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip, an act he never would have considered previously. Chapter 4 will examine the rhetoric of moderates such as Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak, two men whose moderate status some might question. However, during the years of the peace process, or in Barak’s case during the years in which he was in power, both Barak and Arafat adopted a more moderate stance. Thus, although Barak initially opposed the Declaration of Principles, once he became the Israeli prime minister he moderated his position and thus warrants inclusion as an Israeli moderate.

Resolving intractable conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a multilevel game involving bargaining and negotiating on multiple levels. While in the past students of conflict resolution focused exclusively upon interparty negotiations, they have increasingly come to recognize the importance of the intraparty negotiations as well.⁹ Therefore, negotiations are not only taking place between the two adversaries but also within each adversary there are negotiations between the leader and his/her constituency as well as between the hawks, doves, and moderates. Furthermore, both sides have to negotiate with their external benefactors as well.

The moderates bring the following qualities or skills to the negotiating table for their bargaining and negotiating at each level:

•Credibility

•Persuadeability

•Flexibility/Practicality

•Empathy

•Collegiality

Credibility

One might think that the doves on both sides would be the logical parties to make peace. However, the problem for the doves is that they lack credibility with the rest of society, and, as will be seen, with their adversaries as well. They are seen as being too soft, too weak, and too willing to make major concessions to the other side. The following quote powerfully captures the “credibility gap” the doves confront. “We felt a joint statement involving major substantive concessions by both sides that was signed by figures of such eminence—individuals who were well known in both camps and who were not identified and discounted as the usual ‘peaceniks’—might galvanize the moribund peace process.”¹⁰

The moderates, on the other hand, have much more credibility. The moderates are seen as tougher and as better defenders of the national interest. Oftentimes the moderates have served in the military or defense establishments, which further enhances their credibility vis-à-vis the “peaceniks.” For example, Yitzhak Rabin’s history as chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces and as defense minister provided him with the social legitimacy necessary to move toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (Tragically, as his assassination demonstrates, it was not sufficient for the Israeli extremists of the far right, but it was for the majority of Israeli society.)

The moderates, who initially shared the hawks’ pessimism over the feasibility of peace and on the existence of a partner for peace, can reevaluate their earlier pessimism. If this happens, then due to their credibility they can lead others to reassess the situation as well. In other words, the moderates’ credibility can enable them to serve as a catalyst for a reassessment of the conflict’s status quo and thus of the peace process itself.

Significantly, the moderates enjoy this credibility within their own society, as well as their adversary’s. Just as the moderates can facilitate a reassessment of the viability of the peace process on their own side, they can do the same for their enemy’s. The moderates can convince their enemy that there is a partner for peace with whom negotiations are possible. The moderates can help to overcome what Laura Eisenberg and Neil Caplan call the “Groucho Marxian” dilemma of Middle Eastern peacemaking, where “anyone willing to negotiate with me can’t be worth negotiating with.”¹¹ Basically, what Eisenberg and Caplan are getting at is neither side wants to negotiate with the opposing side’s hawks, as it is deemed a waste of time. However, to negotiate with the enemy’s doves is seen as equally futile, since the doves are not seen as being able to deliver on any concessions they might make at the negotiating table. The moderates, on the other hand, would not only be more willing than the hawks to make concessions, but also be better able than the doves to deliver an agreement.

Persuadeability

One of the defining characteristics of the moderates is their persuadeability. The moderates navigate between the inherent pessimism of the hawks and the optimism of the doves. While they initially tend to be more pessimistic, changes on the national, regional, or international levels can lead them to reassess their views. In Chapter 2 we will see how these changes brought the Israelis and Palestinians together at the negotiating table in Oslo. Whereas the moderates initially shared the hawks’ belief that violence was the only way to resolve the conflict, these changes persuaded them that the status quo is no longer tenable, and that force will not resolve the conflict. Furthermore, they were persuaded that it might be possible to achieve their goals peacefully.

In order for the peace process to begin, moderates on both sides need to be persuaded th...