Between Jews and Heretics

Refiguring Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho

Matthijs den Dulk

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351243476
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: History
• Categoría: Ancient History

Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho is the oldest preserved literary dialogue between a Jew and a Christian and a key text for understanding the development of early Judaism and Christianity. In Between Jews and Heretics, Matthijs den Dulk argues that whereas scholarship has routinely cast this important text in terms of "Christianity vs. Judaism, " its rhetorical aims and discursive strategies are considerably more complex, because Justin is advocating his particular form of Christianity in constant negotiation with rival forms of Christianity. The striking new interpretation proposed in this study explains many of the Dialogue's puzzling features and sheds new light on key passages. Because the Dialogue is a critical document for the early history of Jews and Christians, this book contributes to a range of important questions, including the emergence of the notion of heresy and the "parting of the ways" between Jews and Christians.

1
Justin Martyr, Heresy Hunter

The life of the author of the Dialogue, Justin of Neapolis, is unfortunately not particularly well documented. Only limited external evidence has survived and much of what we do have is of late date and historically suspect.¹ The best way to get to know him is therefore by studying his other compositions, in particular the (First) Apology,² Justin’s one other major preserved treatise, which was written prior to the Dialogue.³

I argue in this chapter that in 1 Apol., in addition to his evident apologetic interests (i.e., his efforts to formulate a defense of his version of Christianity to an ostensibly outside audience), Justin sought to attack and undermine other self-identified Christians.⁴ The attack on these “heretics” is more central to the argument of 1 Apol. than is often recognized; whereas 1 Apol. is routinely described as an argument against the prosecution of Christians, Justin is in reality only interested in securing a better judicial position for his kind of Christians, and he works actively to undermine that of certain other Jesus-followers. He is particularly focused on Christians who do not regard the Jewish God as the Supreme Being. Justin targeted these “demiurgical Christians” not only in 1 Apol., but likely also in the lost anti-heretical treatise that he mentions in 1 Apol. 26. Justin’s deep and prolonged concern with demiurgical forms of Christianity had a decisive impact on the Dialogue, as we will see in later chapters.

The (first) Apology

1 Apol. is an innovative work. It employs the Roman petition format and is addressed to the Emperors (Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and Commodus), along with the holy Senate and the Roman people, but it transforms the genre of the Roman petition into something unprecedented.⁵ Because of its extraordinary length, irreverent tone, and unusual subject matter, whether it was ever accepted as a petition at the imperial court or was even intended as such has been doubted.⁶ Justin was presumably aware that his “apology” was very much unlike other petitions, but he may have submitted it regardless in the hope of getting a wide hearing for his message. If so, the petition format would have served as a hook that would have allowed Justin to accomplish what was otherwise so very difficult to do: get a Christian text in front of a non-Christian audience.⁷ That audience consisted of the imperial rulers in this case, and, since petitions were publicly placarded, the Roman populace more generally as well (cf. 2 Apol. 14.1).⁸ This scenario adequately explains, perhaps, the remarkable length and unusual subject matter of the petition, and the occasionally irreverent tone may be best seen as part of Justin’s philosophical parrhēsia and his conviction that forceful language was necessary to awaken the emperors from their demon-induced slumber (cf., e.g., 1 Apol. 5.1, 14.1).

The central appeal of the Apology to the emperors, whether fictional or not, is routinely characterized as the cessation of hostilities against the Christians. This characterization is only partly accurate, because Justin actively seeks to weaken the judicial position of “other” Christians (i.e., those whom Justin would categorize as “heretics”). Justin fully develops the above-mentioned distinction between correct Christians who should be tolerated and “heretics” who ought to be persecuted only in Chapter 26, but earlier chapters lay the groundwork for this argument.

1 Apol. 4 and 7

The first reference to “other” Christians comes early on in 1 Apol. It appears in a section (1 Apol. 4.1–12.11) that begins with Justin’s claim that “something is not judged to be either good or bad on the basis of the name by which it is called without (considering) the actions associated with that name” (1 Apol. 4.1).⁹ The argument that the name “Christian” should not form the basis for prosecution governs much of the discussion in this part of 1 Apol. One of the problems that Justin faces, however, is that in the eyes of at least some people a connection between the name “Christian” and illegal activities had been clearly established. Some people had apparently been convicted both of being Christian and of (other) criminal activity. Justin addresses this issue in 1 Apol. 4 and 7:

1 Apol. 4.7–8

(7) In the same way that some people, although they have learned not to deny from Christ the teacher, fall into error when questioned, so too, by living evil lives they equally offer pretexts to those who choose to generally accuse all Christians of impiety and injustice. (8) And this also is done unfairly. For indeed some claim the name and appearance of philosophy, who do nothing worthy of this way of life. For you know that those among the ancients who thought and taught contradictory matters are all called by one name, philosophers.¹⁰

Apol. 7.1–3

(1) But, someone will say, already some who were arrested have been exposed as criminals. (2) Indeed. This often happens in many cases whenever you closely examine the life of each one of the accused. But you do not sentence them on the basis of those who have previously been convicted. (3) Generally, then, we admit this, that just as among the Greeks those who taught whatever was pleasing to them are always called by the one name of philosophy, although their teachings are contradictory, so also do those among the barbarians who are and those who (only) seem wise share the same name. For they are all called Christians.¹¹

In 1 Apol. 4.7, Justin acknowledges that some among the Christians are “living evil lives” (κακῶς ζῶντες). He draws a close association between engaging in such conduct and “denying” Christ when being questioned. Justin admits, in other words, that there are people who are called “Christian,” who do not live up to the demands of Jesus and in doing so offer pretexts for the Christians’ opponents to claim that all of them are engaged in impious and unjust behavior.

In 1 Apol. 7.1 Justin again addresses this problem. He does not deny that some Christians have been in fact exposed as criminals, but counters that whenever one arrests a group of people (on whatever grounds) and closely examines their lives, one will find criminals among them. The Christians are no different in this regard.¹²

Importantly, Justin does not simply deny that Christians are involved in illegal activities or claim that the convictions referred to in 1 Apol. 7.1 were wrongful. Perhaps he felt that it would have been needlessly antagonizing to suggest that the Roman judicial apparatus had failed by unjustly convicting Christians of crimes. Elsewhere, though, Justin is not afraid to harshly criticize Roman policy and practice. In the immediate context, for example, he tells the emperors: “with irrational passion, and driven under the whip of despicable demons you punish us without any consideration” (1 Apol. 5.1).¹³ Alternatively, public perceptions that Christians were involved in criminality may have been too deeply rooted for Justin to simply dismiss these accusations as nonsensical. Indeed, they may not have been nonsense at all; the cases referred to in 1 Apol. 7.1 may have been indisputable facts. In light of what follows, however, I suggest that part of the reason for Justin’s willingness to admit that some Christians were involved in crimes is that doing so will give him a figurative stick with which to beat the “heretics.” He will suggest that the “heretics” committed immoral and criminal acts while falsely claiming the name “Christian.” His association of those among the Christians who “fall into error” with the accusations of impiety and unjustness in 1 Apol. 4.7 already sets up this argument. Justin will try to convince his audience that because of the criminal conduct as well as the “atheistic” teachings of these “other” Christians, they are the ones who deserve Roman prosecution.¹⁴

1 Apol. 4 and 7 begin to prepare the audience for this remarkable claim inter alia by describing Christian diversity as analogous to the diversity apparent among philosophers. The significance of the analogy with philosophy to Justin’s heresiology is evident from his use of it twice in the space of just a few paragraphs (in 1 Apol. 4 and 7) and then a third time in 1 Apol. 26, where he develops the comparison further. The first part of 1 Apol. 4.8, where Justin sets up the analogy with philosophy, is suitable to his argument that the crimes of some Christians should not be held against all Christians. He writes, “some claim the name and appearance of philosophy, who do nothing worthy of this profession.” Attacks on faux philosophers are widely attested in the literature of this period.¹⁵ Critics such as Lucian of Samosata were unrelenting in their disdain for those who falsely claimed the name (ὄνομα) and appearance (σχῆμα) of philosophy. Justin draws on this literary trope in 1 Apol. 4.8 when he dismisses the charges against the Christians in general as unfair, because the case is similar to that of philosophy, where “some claim the name and appearance of philosophy, who do nothing worthy of this way of life.”¹⁶ Justin suggests that the Christians were confronted with the same problem that the false philosophers posed to the philosophical tradition. They too confronted people who claimed the ὄνομα, but did not live in accordance with the tradition’s ideals.

What follows in 1 Apol. 4.8 is slightly less apropos. “For you know,” Justin writes, “that those among the ancients who thought and taught contradictory matters are (all) called philosophers.” The problem at hand is that some Christians have been convicted of crimes. They are giving Christians a bad reputation through their conduct, not their teaching. Likewise, in 1 Apol. 7, Justin refers to differences in teaching even though the issue he responds to is that of Christians being condemned because of criminal activity. This focus on “teaching” might seem out of place in the context, but its appearance should probably not be understood as the result of sloppiness. Rather, Justin is beginning to develop the idea that those who hold different teachings (i.e., the “heretics”) are responsible for the crimes committed.

The statement immediately following in 1 Apol. 4.9 is worth noting in this connection. Justin writes, “Some of them [the philosophers of old] taught atheism and those who were poets proclaimed the licentiousness of Zeus and his children, and those who follow them are not barred from your presence, but you offer prizes and honors to those who insult them [the gods] in a pleasing manner.”¹⁷ According to Justin, philosophical ideas that are atheistic receive the emperors’ approval in the form of praise for artists whose performances incorporate such ideas. In what to Justin is an absurd contradiction, Christians are prosecuted for their alleged “atheism,” while those who openly teach “atheism” receive praise. Justin will develop the same argument in relation to the “heretics” in subsequent sections of 1 Apol.: they teach atheism, yet they receive more favorable treatment than the “true” Christians.

1 Apol. 16

Following this section (1 Apol. 4–12), Justin moves on to a new topic: “we will demonstrate that we revere, on good grounds, Jesus Christ, who became the teacher of all these things to us and was born for this” (1 Apol. 13.3).¹⁸ Justin cites a number of sayings of Jesus to demonstrate their ethical quality and potency in 1 Apol. 15–16 and intersperses them with comments regarding their positive effects on “those who have joined us” (τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν γεγενημένων [1 Apol. 16.4], cf. 15.6–7, 17.1). At the end of 1 Apol. 16, Justin addresses the problem that Jesus’s words did not, apparently, change everyone for the better:

1 Apol. 16.8–14

(8) And let those who are not found to be living as he taught be known as non-Christians, even if they utter the teachings of Jesus with their tongue. For he said that not those who only speak, but those who do the works will be saved. (9) He said: “Not everyone who says to me ‘Lord, Lord’ will enter into the kingdom of heavens, but the one who does the will of my Father who is in heaven. (10) For he who listens to me and does what I say listens to the one who sent me. (11) And many will say to me: ‘Lord, Lord, did we not eat and drink and perform miracles in your name?’ And then I will say to them: ‘Go away from me, workers of lawlessness.’ (12) Then there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth; while the righteous shine like the sun, the unrighteous...