Regionalism in the Post-Cold War World

Stephen C Calleya, Stephen C Calleya

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351787338
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Social Sciences
• Categoría: Sociology

This title was first published in 2000: This text describes, analyzes and projects the implications of regionalism on contemporary international relations. Regional policy positions are examined in order to increase our understanding of how the direct impact patterns of relations at a regional level of analysis are having in the shifting balance of international power. The book clarifies what types of regional dynamics are manifesting themselves in different parts of the world, and consists of both theoretical and empirical assessments (similar to those developed in the author's previous book on regionalism) that ensures that the comparative analysis conducted is a comprehensive and coherent one.

Section Three

Global Regionalism

6. Regional Dynamics in
the Mediterranean

Stephen C. Calleya

Introduction

Developments around the Mediterranean area in the post-Cold War years have underlined the fundamental fact that this geo-strategic location continues to be dominated by a mosaic of distinct sub-regional constellations, each evolving according to their own indigenous pattern of relations.

Given such a heterogeneous cluster of regional dynamics, is a multilateral initiative such as the Euro-Mediterranean Process (EMP) the correct mechanism to contend with the plethora of security challenges largely emanating along Europe’s southern periphery? If so, what can be done to make this process more effective and sustainable than it has been to date?

Geo-strategic Setting

An analysis of the society of states which are geographically proximate to the Mediterranean basin reveals two prominent international regions: the geographical space which borders the north-west sector of the Mediterranean which is labelled the European Union, and the geographical area covering the south-eastern flank of the basin which is labelled the Middle East.

The four sub-regions encompassing the Mediterranean are southern Europe, the Balkans, the Maghreb, and the Mashreq. Each of the sub-regions continue to follow different evolutionary patterns and there is very little to indicate that any of them will integrate with their counterparts across the Mediterranean any time soon. Relations across Southern Europe are largely cooperative dominant, with this group of countries increasing their intergovernmental and transnational ties with the rest of Europe on a continuous basis.

In contrast, conflictual relations have consistently hindered closer cooperation between countries in the Balkans, North Africa and the Levant. Relations in these three sub-regions of the Mediterranean remain primarily limited at an intergovernmental level, with cross-border types of interaction across the southern shores of the Mediterranean limited to the energy sector and Islam.¹

The geopolitical shifts that have taken place throughout the Mediterranean since the Barcelona conference in November 1995, particularly the slowdown in Middle East peace talks and the escalation of hostilities in the Kosovo conflict, have forced Euro-Mediterranean strategists to reconsider what policy mechanisms should be introduced to ensure that the goals outlined in the Barcelona Declaration are attainable. This includes paying more attention to specific sub-regional trends that are currently manifesting themselves around the Mediterranean.

The thaw in cold war relations in the Levant which systematically spread to other parts of the Middle East after the historic Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement of 1993 came to a practical halt with the election of Benjamin Netanyahu in late 1995. Aspirations that the Middle East peace process would become more comprehensive with the inclusion of both Syria and Lebanon were largely replaced by efforts to preserve the fragile peace process.

Neither the Europeans nor the Americans were able to influence Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s more hard-line approach to the peace process that resulted in a freezing of peace negotiations. The suspension of the MENA process in 1998 was the result of a concerted effort by the majority of Arab League members to terminate normal relations with Israel and revive the economic boycott against Israel.²

Any hope of revitalising the peace process took a back seat in the last quarter of 1997 and throughout 1998 and the first half of 1999 as Middle East leaders became more preoccupied with the possibility of another showdown between the United Nations and Iraq or Israel and its Syrian neighbours. The election of Ehud Barak as Israeli Prime Minister in May 1999 offers a window of opportunity to reactivate the dormant Middle East peace process.

In the Maghreb, efforts to promote more cooperative relations have also been at more or less of a standstill in recent years. Internal strife in Algeria and international sanctions against Libya have stifled attempts to reactivate the notion of a more integrated Maghreb as was outlined in the Arab Maghreb Union Treaty of 1989.³ The European Union’s more active policy towards Algeria in 1998 and the United Nation’s decision to suspend the sanctions regime against Libya in 1999 have helped create a more conducive climate to remove some of the numerous political stalemates that continue to prevent further intra-regional cooperation across North Africa.

Along the northern shores of the Mediterranean, Southern European countries have also had to contend with an increase in turbulent relations in their vicinity. Animosity between Greece and Turkey reached quasi-hostile intensity in early 1996 when a dispute over the sovereignty of a number of Aegean Islands resulted in an escalation of military movements on both sides. Diplomatic initiatives to formalise a set of good neighbourly principles since have largely failed to move Greece and Turkey towards a more cordial relationship.⁴ Despite diplomatic interventions by the European Union and the United States, Athens and Ankara also remain stalemated as a result of their failure to broker a peaceful resolution to the Cypriot issue.⁵

Since January 1997 Turkey has further strengthened its strategic alliance with Israel conducting a series of joint maritime search and rescue exercises. Operation Reliant Mermaid took place off the coast of Israel and included the participation of the United States and Jordan. The naval manoeuvres demonstrated this alliance’s ability to dominate the pattern of relations in the eastern sector of the Mediterranean. The subsequent balance of power shift has resulted in an occasional outcry from Iran, Syria and Iraq who perceive the intensification of military cooperation as a direct threat to their sovereignty.⁶

Further West, stability in the Balkans has blown hot and cold. Regional relations received a boost in December 1997 when U.S. President Clinton announced that U.S. troops would remain stationed in the region until a more secure peace was achieved. Paradoxically, instability again emerged when the neighbouring country of Albania appeared to be on the brink of fragmentation. The increase in tension in Kosovo throughout 1998 and the outbreak of war between NATO and Yugoslavia in March 1999 once again plunged the Balkans into turmoil. The fragile peace that has emerged with the creation of a western Kosovo protectorate in no way guarantees that the decade of instability across the Balkans has come to an end.⁷

Prospects for the Future: A Regional Assessment to 2010

A number of indicators extant today can be used to project the strategic environment in the Mediterranean to 2010. Unless these indicators change significantly, the environment for the first ten years of the next century will be set by the year 2000. The speed with which the events in Europe and the Middle East are moving makes it likely that the shape this part of the world will take by 2010 will be clearly discernible by the end of this century. The United States and Europe will continue to depend on the Persian Gulf and North Africa for much of their energy supplies. They will however be joined by the likes of China and India who will need to satisfy their growing energy demands and therefore access to these areas will remain a high foreign policy priority.

In the first half of the 1990s the Mediterranean showed signs of becoming a cooperative dominant area. But the past four years has witnessed an increase in conflictual relations throughout the Mediterranean and a resultant shift to an indifferent type of region. Fault-lines along a north-south and south-south axis have become more apparent, with no sign of a process of regional transformation taking place.

As relations stand, two scenarios are possible: the first is one in which a number of Mediterranean countries manage to integrate at both a regional and international level, while the rest continue to go through a process of fragmentation. The second is one in which the majority of countries in the Mediterranean are not able to integrate into the international political economy and gradually become failed states.

As patterns of relations across the Euro-Mediterranean area stand, the majority of littoral countries in the Mediterranean seem unlikely to integrate into the global political economy that is emerging. Transnational ventures remain limited, with states in the area more concerned with intra-state and inter-state conflictual issues than with promoting inter-state types of cooperation.

If European Union efforts to foster inter-Mediterranean political and economic cooperation are to succeed they must be complemented by initiatives that Mediterranean states themselves initiate as part of a process that aims to create a transnational network upon which cross-border types of economic and financial interaction can take place. To date, the Mediterranean has not succeeded in creating an environment where people, products, ideas and services are allowed to flow freely. At the moment there are too many bottlenecks in the system and this will prohibit the region from competing and prospering in the global village of tomorrow.

In contrast to the more cohesive and cooperative South-East Asian and Latin American developing regions, the Mediterranean currently consists of a number of sub-regional constellations, i.e., Southern Europe, the Maghreb, the Mashreq, and the Balkans, that are evolving along separate and distinct paths. Perhaps the label that best describes the pattern of relations in the area is “fragmegration” which denotes the integration efforts being pursued by the EU Southern European countries and the fragmentation type of relations that continues to dominate the southern and eastern shores of the basin. In fact, the lack of cohesion and unity achieved to date somewhat mirrors regional dynamics manifesting themselves across central Africa.⁸

During the first ten years of the new millennium the United States will shift its foreign policy concerns in the region further east, focusing on the management of relations in the Mashreq and the Persian Gulf. The rest of the Mediterranean will become a European Union sphere of influence once a common foreign and security policy is operational. In the interim, the EU will continue to contain instability that may emerge along its southern periphery. In the short-term, its priority will be to achieve internal cohesiveness through the successful implementation of economic and monetary union. In the medium term, the EU’s objective will be to integrate as many central and eastern European countries as is feasible.

The EU has an opportunity to further strengthen its external relations in the Mediterranean by strengthening its ties with the three European Union Mediterranean candidates of Malta, Cyprus and Turkey Relations with the three countries are currently proceeding at different levels and different speeds.

Malta is currently gearing up for EU accession negotiations and eventual membership by conducting a screening process with the EU. The Maltese Islands hope to commence actual accession negotiations early in the year 2000. Malta has been playing a proactive constructive role in the Euro-Mediterranean process since its launching in Barcelona in 1995. In addition to hosting the second Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting in April 1997, Malta is also actively promoting the idea of a stability pact for the Mediterranean.

Cyprus has already commenced accession negotiations with the EU, with half of the thirty-one chapters already open. By the end of the Portuguese Presidency in mid-June 2000 Cyprus is expected to have opened all EU chapters for negotiation. Any EU aspirations that accession negotiations would have a positive impact on Turkish-Greek relations and the division of the Mediterranean Island have however failed to materialise.

Turkey’s sheer size, religious and cultural traits, and human rights record continue to prevent it from becoming an EU member. The European Union’s indifferent attitude towards Turkey at the Luxembourg summit of December 1997 cast a cold shower on EU-Turkish relations that could become permanent unless Brussels introduces a more cooperative framework of relations in the near future. The stalemate between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus is another factor that continues to hinder EU-Turkish relations and unless resolved in the near future could delay the next round of EU enlargement altogether, given Greece’s veto status. Despite EU pronouncements to the contrary, the EU is unlikely to adopt the Cypriot stalemate as it stands.

The Euro-Mediterranean Summits: From Malta to Stuttgart

The EMP is certainly the most important regional process that currently exists in the Mediterranean as it brings together all of the European Union member states and twelve Mediterranean countries which are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta.

Given the more indifferent patterns of regional relations that exist in the Mediterranean than those that existed in November 1995, it was no small feat that the second EMP meeting, the first ministerial meeting of its kind that took place in the Mediterranean, could take place. The high turnout of foreign ministers at the EMP meeting in Malta, particularly the presence of Syria, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, illustrates the importance that the participating countries attach to the process that offers the possibility of extending cooperative patterns of relations at several levels.

In addition to strengthening north-south relations as the EU becomes more active in the Mediterranean, a high priority is also being given to nurturing south-south relations that are to date lacking. Specific efforts are being made to assist Mediterranean countries to become more aware of the opportunities that exist in their neighbouring states, and offering the Mediterranean countries involved in the EMP with incentive packages to pursue trans-Mediterranean ventures. After dedicating the majority of its external resources to Central and Eastern Europe at the start of the 1990s, the EMP is an EU attempt to revitalise its outreach programme towards the Mediterranean in an effort to spur cooperative relations in the area.

At the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference which took place in Barcelona in November 1995 the twenty-seven partner countries established three principal areas of cooperation. The Barcelona Process set out three basic tasks:

• a political and security partnership with the...