Arms And Politics In The Dominican Republic

G. Pope Atkins

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429724329
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Categoría: Politica

This chronicle and interpretation of recent military and political events in the Dominican Republic analyzes the political behavior of the country's armed forces and scrutinizes policies put in action since the nation's civil war and the subsequent U.S. intervention of 1965.

1
Introduction

Arms and politics in the Dominican Republic since the crisis of 1965, affected by special circumstances and peculiar dynamics of Dominican social processes, have not been a microcosm of Latin American civil—military relations. While extant theory about Latin America alerts us to questions and explanations that should be addressed in the Dominican context; the remarks that follow suggest general inadequacies with theoretical perspectives about Latin American civil-military relations when applied to the Dominican experience. However, this chapter does not analyze contemporary theory, or even summarize its content. It has the considerably more modest purpose of offering some concepts considered central to understanding Dominican processes.

Some Analytical Concepts

Theoretical Shortcomings. Deep military involvement in Latin American politics has been a salient feature of the region’s history since its national beginnings. Curiously, this phenomenon did not receive systematic analysis until the late 1950s. Since then, scholarship devoted to Latin American civil-military relations has undergone continuous conceptual change. Distinct and contending theoretical schools developed, and an array of perspectives emerged about the proper emphasis that should be placed on various factors for explaining political behavior of Latin American armed forces. But the Dominican experience with arms and politics since 1965 defies categorization and generally supports no extant theoretical position.

The principal shortcoming of all theoretical perspectives is that they assume the institutional nature of Latin American armed forces. They see them as organized into a cohesive military establishment and acting as a disciplined corporate entity, either for good or evil. Theories of Latin American civil-military relations must be revised to allow for Dominican and other similar phenomena, broadened to include the concept of “noninstitutionality” as a continuing rather than transitory state. Theory must take into account the consequences of personalities and interpersonal relationships. The point that no more than a rudimentary military “establishment” existed is crucial to analysis of arms and politics in the Dominican Republic, and a number of related key terms require clarification before proceeding with that analysis.

Some Definitions. When reformist President Antonio Guzman took office on August 16, 1.978, he announced as his major objective the “institutionalization, professionalization, and depoliticization” of the armed forces. His emphasis on these matters was an indication of a long debate about military affairs in the Dominican Republic. His remarks also hinted at assumptions about civil-military relations different from those held in other cultural traditions.

Institutionalization refers to a military establishment characterized by corporate identity., institutional autonomy, and professionalized expertise. The establishment is “command responsive;” that is, it responds to civilian political directives as a military entity through its chain of command, from top leaders to subordinate units at all levels. Institutionalized civil-military relations depend not on individuals but on the existence of the corporate entity made up of military men responding as members of the organization rather than as individual political personalities. This perspective grows out of the western (Anglo-European) political tradition. It suggests a civilian-run state interacting with the military institution. Each sector is legitimate in its own sphere, but the military establishment, endowed with its own professional functions, is subservient to civilian authority.

The entire Dominican experience runs counter to this tradition. The armed forces were always highly personalized within their organization and lines between civil and military authority are tenuous, making the western meaning of civil-military relations almost meaningless. Personal loyalties, allegiances, animosities, rivalries, and opportunism were operational realities, not command responsiveness. President Joaquín Balaguer (1966–78) thrived in this noninstitutionalized setting, controlling the armed forces through individuals without the armed forces responding through a chain of command. Balaguer promoted noninstitutionalization because it gave him an arena in which he could practice his political agility, operating and balancing in a way that would be impossible If dealing with a coherent military institution that could disagree with him. Military men responded to ideology, class, issues, and so on, but they did so primarily as individuals with mutual interests and secondarily as a corporate entity. They saw threats to the military organization more as challenges to their personal sinecures than to the institution or profession. If President Guzmán succeeds in developing an institutionalized military establishment, it will be far more difficult for future presidents to deal on a personal basis with the armed forces.

Professional expertise, characteristic of an institutionalized military establishment, is both a product of and contributor to institutionalization. Professionalism refers to both particular military knowledge and career commitment. That is, it means the ability of the armed forces to carry out their functions, as well as awareness by military men of their professional status and norms of behavior. Professional skill begins with ability of individuals to carry out their tasks effectively, then with succeedingly larger units to meet their assignments, culminating with an entire military establishment realizing its missions as a professional institution. Proper professional military missions in the western tradition are threefold: 1) to perform protective functions for the state, defending against both external and internal threats; 2) to act offensively against the staters antagonists, compelling them to accede to its demands: and 3) to fulfill certain nation building functions, helping develop physical and human resources.

Dominican technical skills, on individual and unit levels, remained low under Balaguer. The armed forces were professionalized in this sense to a degree, but never to the level of a modern military establishment. Individual officers and some units had attitudes of commitment to the military profession, but they were clear exceptions to the rule. Most militares viewed officership in terms of personal opportunism to the virtual exclusion of pursuing advanced levels of professional skill. While defensive and nation building missions were relevant to a degree, their domestic political roles were of fundamental significance. Guzmán initially elevated to high positions some of the more professional (in a highly relative sense) officers available and publicly espoused professionalization of the military. The challenge was immense and political expediency was pursued in subsequent command changes., although not in the degree associated with the Balaguer government.

A consequence of institutionalization and professionalization, according to western standards, is that direct military intervention into politics is considered an aberration and violation of constitutional norms. Military establishments may be political in the sense of competing within the political system for professional and institutional well-being, and having a say in public policies related to military missions. They are precluded, however, from influencing politics and policies outside their legitimate sphere. A major theme in Dominican history is political involvement by the armed forces in the latter sense, with officers functioning as both military men and politicians. They did not accept civilian supremacy as an imperative nor feel constrained from participating in non-military matters. Balaguer recognized the political nature of the armed forces, and his efforts to balance powerful military individuals through distribution of rewards and punishment was a political matter. Pursuit of individual opportunism was a natural consequence of institutional and professional weakness. Guzmán emphasized depoliticization first, following with professionalization and then institutionalization policies.

The concept of noninstitutionality in military affairs serves as the point of departure for analyzing personal relationships in detail and forms the principal theme of this book. However, not even the Dominican Republic can be understood solely in terms of personalities and their interaction. We must first examine the developmental environment, military organization, and foreign influences that impinged on personalist political processes.

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Armed Forces in the Political System

System This chapter explores the nature of Dominican armed forces, in the context of the political system of which they were a part, during Balagueros presidency. If roles of the armed forces at least partly develop out of social and political structures, then a discussion of the larger political system and its environment is necessary for understanding military affairs. It may be too much to expect that societal and political factors will provide causal explanations of military behavior., but those factors provided a context within which the armed forces operated. An investigation of armed forces organization and capability also is necessary, for resources at the service of or denied to ambitious individuals was an important factor. Likewise, the consequences of foreign military influences must also be considered. Nevertheless, proper analysis of Dominican armed forces requires understanding their non-institutionalized nature as they operated in a complementary political system characterized by personalism and presidential dominance.

Historical Legacy

From Colony to Nation. Contemporary civil military relations in the Dominican Republic have been greatly influenced by the nation’s historical legacy. The Dominican people have had an unhappy developmental tradition, experiencing almost five hundred years of tragedy and violence. National history has been characterized by chaos, dictatorship, and foreign domination accompanied by severe economic problems. Armed force has been a paramount political factor.

The Dominican nation to the present day has been affected by the nature of its long colonial era and tumultous movement toward independence. Spain’s first American colony developed rapidly following the initial voyages of Columbus and became the base for Spanish exploration and expansion at the end of the 15th century and the early 16th. But the island was largely depopulated by mid-sixteenth century with an exodus to other colonial centers. It fell into decay, remaining a neglected, poverty-ridden, isolated backwater of the great Spanish-American empire. Spanish rule was harsh, evolving into a system based on political authoritarianism, Negro slavery, economic exploitation by the mother country, and a rigidly hierarchical society. The way to independence involved a complex half-century process characterized by changing foreign masters. In 1697, Spain had ceded the western third of the island to France, establishing the basis for later national divisions between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. France forced Spain to transfer ownership of the remainder of its colony in 1795; but Dominicans successfully revolted against French control in 1809 and recalled Spain to reestablish the colony. Spain reverted to harsh rule and was ousted by Dominicans in 1821. Before the new nation could be established, Haiti, independent since 1804, invaded and conquered Dominicans in 1822 and ruled for twenty-two years. Dominican nationals ejected Haitian occupation, declared independence for the second time, and proclaimed the Dominican Republic on February 27, 1844.

Dominican national history after the “Restoration of Independence” in 1844 involved power rivalry among competing upper-class factions represented by military strongmen (actually non-professionals wearing uniforms). National presidents, with few exceptions, were a succession of “generals” presiding over corrupt dictatorships. Leaders were caciques (local political-military strongmen) ruling by means of treachery, bribery, murder, military force, imprisonment and exile. On the national level, Generals Pedro Santana and Buenaventura Báez dominated politics from 1844 until 1878. They or their personal choices alternated the presidency. An even more brutal dictator, Ulisis “Lilis” Heureaux, dominated Dominican politics from 1882 until his assassination in 1889. Dictatorship did not bring stability; the struggle among strongmen for supremacy resulted in constant plotting, revolts and counterrevolts. During the seventy-two year period from 1844 to 1916, the Dominican Republic had forty-eight presidents and twenty-nine coups.

Foreign powers took considerable advantage of Dominican chaos. Haitian invasions occurred frequently after 1844. but Dominican governments somehow repulsed them. Santana invited Spain to reannex the country and serve as military protector end economic patrón, and Spanish colonial rule resumed in 1861 with Santana as governor. But Dominicans again revolted and, with the ironic help of Haiti, pressure from the United States, and the destructive effects of yellow fever on the Spanish army, forced Spain to annul the annexation in 1865. Dominicans declared their independence for the third time. Báez also sought Dominican dependence on foreign powers, committing the nation to unpayable foreign loans. In 1870 he negotiated a treaty of annexation with the United States, but the U.S. Senate rejected the treaty. Heureaux also sold Dominican bonds abroad, accepting bribes and creating a huge foreign debt. Continuing political chaos following Heureaux’s death culminated with the United States taking control of the Dominican economy beginning in 1905. In that year, the United States established a customs receivership, administering the most important aspects of the economy, in order to satisfy foreign creditors claims and forestall European military intervention to collect them. The receivership lasted in some form until 1941.

No national military establishment existed in the decentralized Dominican political system from 1844 to 1916. With concentration of political and military power in the persons of caciques little central government control was exercised over regional forces. Personal military groups organized into approximations of national units in the 1840s and 1850s to resist Haitian attacks and in the 1860s to evict the Spanish army. But these temporary national forces never coalesced into a single establishment and reverted to their regional character once the external dangers passed. Infrequent attempts to centralize, modernize, and professionalize the armed forces were unsuccessful.

U.S. Occupation. With continued factional strife in the Dominican Republic, the United States intervened militarily in its Caribbean client. Contingents of U.S. Marines began landing in May 1916 and a military government was established. The occupation, lasting for more than eight years, had a profound impact on Dominican society and economy and on political and military affairs. U.S. civic action emphasized social and economic matters, resulting in improved educational, transportation, communications, agricultural, health, and sanitation facilities. Financial., judicial., and military reforms were also achieved. But the foreign presence, wielding arbitrary power, engendered considerable opposition and strong anti-yvanqui bitterness. Nationalist upper-class elites especially opposed U.S. activities, considering U.S. occupation an affront to Dominican sovereignty as well as the end of their local power. They refused to participate in government or the armed forces.

In military affairs, the United States was determined to disarm the populace, pacify the country, bring caciques under control, and establish a centralized professional and nonpolitical military establishment. Consequently, the U.S. Military Government initiated organization of national standing armed forces along U.S. Marine Corps lines, and denial of military units to local politicians. Marines began to train a Dominican National Constabulary in 1917. By mid-1921 the guard was fully organized, replacing most other military organizations in the country, and its name changed to Policía Nacional Dominicana, Enlisted men were easily recruited from the lower classes, many of them former guerrillas and bandits whom the Marines had fought. The Haina Military Academy was founded in 1921 to provide a professional (although brief) training program and source of regular officers.

Development of an officer corps faced serious difficulties. Caciques and their upper-class allies strongly opposed creation of a national force that threatened their local power. Upper-class officers resigned their commissions and elite families refused to allow their sons to accept commissions. Because of the impossibility of attracting upper class Dominicans to the officer corps, commissions went to people from the emerging middle class and the lower strata. (For a time, U.S. Marines were authorized to accept appointments as officers in the Dominican service. Most were enlisted personnel carrying officer rank in the constabulary.) Thus a new social composition of the Dominican officer corps was set that has obtained to the present day.

The United States ended its occupation in 1924. It supervised national elections in March of that year and withdrew the last troops in September, shortly after the inauguration of General Horacio Vásquez as president. In a real sense, Dominicans achieved independence for a fourth time.

The Truiillo Dictatorship. During the U.S. occupation, the United States had intended that a newly nonpolitical Dominican military establishment would maintain order and protect future constitutional governments, clearly a naive assumption in retrospect. Dominican political habits did not change. In February 1930, General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, head of the army, conspired to overthrow the president. Using military force and duplicity, Trujillo ensured Vásquez’ overthrow by a civilian revolutionary group and then maneuvered himself into the presidency.

Born in 1891, Trujillo began his rise to power during the U.S. occupation. He attended the Haina Military Academy course in 1921, entered the new constabulary officer corps, and rose rapidly thereafter. President Vásquez made Trujillo chief of the national police in 196. When it was converted to a brigade in 1927., Trujillo became its commanding general. In 1928 this military body was constituted the National Army and Vásquez named Trujillo chief of staff. He developed a personal following through adroit handling of promotions and appointments as well as by force of personality. Trujillo used the army that was newly centralized and had a near monopoly on arms, both largely consequences of earlier U.S. efforts, to come to power and to maintain his dictatorship for thirty-one years thereafter (1930–1961).

Trujillo established Latin America’s most thoroughgoing dictatorship....