Conflict, Security and Development

An Introduction

Paul Jackson, Danielle Beswick

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351264143
• Edición: 3
• Categoría: Politics & International Relations
• Categoría: Peace & Global Development

This textbook draws on academic theory, field research and policy developments to provide an overview of the connections between security and development, before, during and after conflict. This third edition is revised and updated to take account of changes that have occurred in both policy and academic arenas which are relevant to students and practitioners in this area. In addition, there is a new chapter on memory and memorialisation after conflict.

In an interdependent world, it is often argued that the challenges of underdevelopment and insecurity have global implications. This textbook charts an accessible course through these complex debates, providing a comprehensive introduction for those encountering these issues for the first time. The main aims of the revised edition are:

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• to set out how thinking on conflict, security and development has changed over time and continues to evolve;

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• to explore the consequences of these changes, particularly for the theory and practice of development and security promotion;

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• to introduce a range of case studies from across the globe, in order to explore the implications of a combined approach to security and development.

The authors are experienced in both the theory and the practice of this field, and illustrate the links between conflict, security and development with practical examples, drawing on key case studies from the past twenty years. Each chapter is informed by student pedagogy, and the book will be essential reading for all students of development studies, war and conflict studies, and human security, and is recommended for students of international security and international relations in general.

1Are security and development mutually reinforcing?

This chapter investigates what is meant by the terms ‘security’ and ‘development’ and the basis for thinking on violence and conflict in the developing world. It interrogates the assumption made in much of the academic literature, and by international policymakers, that ‘there is no security without development and no development without security’ and begins to unpack and historically situate the notion of a security-development nexus.

We argue that to consider how security issues impact on development, and vice versa, it is important to have an appreciation of the contentious nature of the terms we are using and the understandings which inform them. The chapter therefore provides a historical analysis of how security and development became so closely related and considers in what ways the concepts are similar to or differ from each other. It draws on theoretical literature to provide a conceptual approach to the relationship and places policy-relevant approaches within the academic debates about the relationship.

In terms of international approaches to security and development, this chapter outlines the implications of human security as a way of integrating the development discourse into debates about security, and vice versa, but it also looks at competing ideas of what ‘development’ might mean in this context. It relates debates around human security back to contemporary theory in international security, questioning the core approach to security analysis, which is based primarily on the state as the key (sole) actor in conflict. It also outlines the rise of the concepts of ‘fragile states’, ‘statebuilding’ and ‘peacebuilding’ in development discourse and policy, considering their implications and how they might map onto these older debates on security–development linkages. These themes will form a background to the following chapters.

Finally, this chapter moves on to examine the policy implications of the security and development ‘nexus’ and the challenges which are beginning to emerge to these frameworks from rising and emerging powers as well as the ‘fragile states’ themselves.

In practice, it may be true that the mixture of security and development approaches has grown out of practice on the ground rather than theory. Nevertheless, as we will discuss later, the World Bank’s World Development Report (WDR) in 2011, the New Deal for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, and the debate on successors to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) all demonstrate an effort to reconnect practice with theory, building on what we think we know about why violent conflict happens in order to better design and carry out development activities and to assess their likely impacts.

Whose security are we talking about?

Security as a concept and field of academic study has broadened considerably in recent years. Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar world order, it has often been suggested that the number and type of issues that could be labelled security threats have mushroomed. From a relatively narrow focus, particularly in international relations (IR) theory, on security as an expression of the relative balance of power between the superpowers and their allies, essentially the security of states or networks of states, we see from the early 1990s a growing focus on non-traditional threats, or ‘new security’ threats, including crime, migration, small arms and insurgencies.

The move from traditional international security to ‘new security’ has been characterised as a widening and deepening of security that can be summarised as in Table 1.1. From civil war, state ‘collapse’ and refugee flows to the growth of international networks trafficking in arms and conflict diamonds, threats of environmental disaster and climate change, the range of potential security threats under study and on the agenda of international policymakers has greatly increased in the last two decades. In particular, they have become ever more complex and difficult to control, requiring co-ordination of action by a range of actors above and below the level of the nation-state as well as states themselves. But are these ‘threats’ really new, or are they merely being rediscovered by academics and policymakers who had, until 1990, focused on a security agenda largely captured by Cold War concerns and interests?

Table 1.1The widening and deepening of security

Security concept	Widening	Deepening
Traditional security agenda	Formal security services (military, police, intelligence)	Security of the state National security
‘New’ security agenda	Non-military security (political, economic, environmental, criminal, social, etc.)	Security of the individual Human security

Regardless of whether we regard these concerns as new, what cannot be denied is that the range of potential ‘threats’ to security raises key questions for those interested in the ways security and development are linked in specific contexts. Spear and Williams (2012) signal how security and development are areas of academic reflection and practice that do not involve static actors or consensus over core themes and policies but that require different approaches and issues. In particular, we can consider understandings of security as revolving broadly around two poles – the traditional ‘state-centric’ view and the more recent ‘human security’ approach. This is a simplistic rendering of a very complex debate, which will be unpacked further throughout this book, but to think of the two extremes helps us to locate particular policy interventions and theoretical analyses on a spectrum of approaches to security. Each has significant implications for how we understand the links between security and development. There are specific implications for the types of development which are prioritised if an approach privileges either state security or human security, and, whichever is seen as most important, a wide range of actors, from the state to inter-state, sub-state and non-state actors, are charged with particular responsibilities for achieving that development.

A traditional security approach, often associated with the realist or neo-realist branches of IR theory, regards the integrity and security of the state as being critical to creating both security and the conditions for development. In this analysis, the survival, reinforcement and sustainability of the state, its ability to reproduce itself and to act on the international stage, perhaps in concert with others through global governance organisations, are crucial. Such an approach puts an emphasis on the development of institutions and security organisations necessary for ensuring that the state maintains control of its territory through an institutional framework and a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This is linked to the ideal of the Weberian state, which has not only juridical statehood, internationally recognised and existing in international law, but also empirical statehood, with the ability to extend its reach across its territory and potentially to provide a minimum level of benefits of citizenship in that state, such as public services – especially security – and including welfare provision. This approach attempts to create a de facto state measured against formal criteria of what a state is. An example of this is the wide range of indices used to measure ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states; for example, the Failed States Index published by the US Fund for Peace.

Fragile states

Fragile states have emerged over the previous decade as a key focus of analysis and as a priority for international intervention. This has resulted from a coming together of several factors, particularly the increasing emphasis on human security, peacebuilding and effective statebuilding, but also the development of the security–development nexus, whereby security and development are seen as inextricably entwined. The first UK National Security Strategy in 2008 reflected the state of thinking amongst many of the world’s policymakers. It stated that:

In the past, most violent conflicts and significant threats to global security came from strong states. Currently, most of the major threats and risks emanate from failed or fragile states … Failed and fragile states increase the risk of instability and conflict, and at the same time have a reduced capacity to deal with it, as we see in parts of Africa. They have the potential to destabilise the surrounding region. Many fragile states lack the capacity and, in some cases, the will adequately to address terrorism and organised crime, in some instances knowingly tolerating or directly sponsoring such activity.

(Cabinet Office 2008)

Similarly, the US National Security Strategy of 2006 argued that:

The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.

(White House 2006)

Around 1 billion people, including some 340 million of the world’s poorest people, are estimated to live in a group of between thirty and fifty ‘fragile’ countries, most of which are in Africa. There is a current international consensus that, without better and more international engagement, these countries will continue to provide insecure environments for their populations. At the same time, as we will see in the discussion on the New Deal for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, most aid agencies and, indeed, the recipient states themselves have realised that fragile states require co-ordinated and carefully thought out interventions that can contribute both to security and to development more broadly. The key to managing this is the creation of critical effective governance mechanisms in developing countries to provide effective local ownership of development.

In this vision, if the development of the state and the institutions and security apparatus needed to maintain its control and integrity were achieved, the outcome would be stability through the creation of a predictable and stable international order, regulated by international law, and based on sovereign states. This model, where the state is the key arbiter of the relationship between security and development, providing international and domestic security for development to occur, is closely linked in development terms to the statebuilding approach. This can be seen in practice in the current approach of, for example, the newly created US AFRICOM (see Box 1.1) in providing security support and training for uniformed militaries to reinforce the institutions of the state and its ability to bring about or maintain a monopoly on legitimate use of force in its territory.

Box 1.1AFRICOM

The US Africa Command was created as a separate entity from other US regional commands in 2008. It is currently headquartered in Germany and co-ordinates US defence and security engagements with African states and institutions.

The US has few troops based in Africa compared with other regions. Its only permanent military presence, a base in Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, was established in 2001 and contains around 2,500 troops.

The national security strategies of 2002 and 2006 and statements by US policymakers suggest Africa has increased in strategic importance for the United States. However, given the unwillingness of the United States, following its 1993 engagement in Somalia, to contribute its troops directly to missions in Africa, operations have focused primarily on training, equipping and supporting African militaries to tackle security issues on the continent. This is an approach often defined as supporting ‘African Solutions to African Problems’. Amongst key US-led programmes of this type are:

•bilateral relationships with individual African militaries;

•African contingency and operations training and assistance;

•the Pan-Sahel Initiative;

•the trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative.

Criticisms of AFRICOM, and the US military and security engagement with Africa more broadly, are numerous and include the following:

•The approach is too state-centric, ignoring the complex security environment in Africa, wherein states are not the only providers of security and may even be causes of insecurity.

•Reinforcing the military arm of regimes with poor human rights records may lead to a growth in insecurity for some groups and potentially, through generation of popular grievances, to conflict.

•Engagement has focused on US security requirements rather than those of African populations, in particular highlighting terrorism, the need to secure energy resources, and US concern at the rising influence of China in Africa.

•Because of its engagements in the Middle East and elsewhere, the United States has relied on private security companies to deliver its programmes in Africa. Such companies are seen by critics as challenging the accountability and legitimacy of developing states.

In contrast, a human security approach would be significantly different and would clearly focus on the security of the individual within a given society. This would – at least theoretically – provide a far more diverse range of options for development interventions, including a wide variety of local approaches at sub-state level and many at regional level. It also recognises the possibility that a dysfunctional state may be the chief source of insecurity for citizens, through oppression, torture, imprisonment, social exclusion or political persecution. Human security is, however, an even more contested notion than state security. The most widely cited definitions stem from the 1994 Human Development Report (see Box 1.2).

Box 1.2The UNDP Human Development Report, 1994

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report of 1994 is widely regarded as having signalled a sea-change in thinking about security, encouraging policymakers to shift their focus from nation-states to individuals. Its exposition of the human security term has been the basis for much subsequent debate on what it means to be secure and to feel secure, and on the interdependence between human security, human development and, latterly, human rights. It suggests that the concept of security must change urgently in two basic ways:

1From an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security.

2From security through armaments to security through sustainable human development.

The report suggests there are seven main categories that indicate the sources of threats to human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.

Human security is therefore seen as an integrative concept which relies on the promotion of solidarity. Achieving it requires that organisations and individuals at all levels work towards the attainment of two main freedoms: freedom from fear and freedom from want.

However, there remains much debate as to what human security is and why it has become such a prominent concept. As a result, supporters of human security have often been accused of not being clear enough about its definition or the policy implications of taking a human security approach. The range of features of conflict in the developing world identified earlier, alongside other less traditional security threats such as climate change, raise ...