The Practice of Constructivism in Science Education

Kenneth G. Tobin, Kenneth G. Tobin

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136489747
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Pedagogía
• Categoría: Educación general

This volume provides a needed elaboration of theories and potential applications of constructivism in science education. Although the term "constructivism" is used widely, there has been a dearth of materials to guide science educators concerning the potential of constructivism to influence what is done in the field. In fact, there has been a tendency for constructivism to be viewed as a method that can be used in a classroom. This view tends to diminish the power of constructivism as a way of thinking about education, and in particular, about science education. The chapters in this book address the need to document the theoretical roots of constructivism and to describe how practitioners have applied constructivist oriented beliefs in the practice of K-12 teaching of science and mathematics, as well as teacher education. Not only does this book contain different theoretical perspectives on constructivism, but it also features a chapter that critiques constructivism as an epistemology. Specific topics covered include: * cooperative learning,
* the negotiation of meaning,
* problem centered learning,
* social construction of knowledge,
* science in culturally diverse settings,
* curriculum planning and implementation, and
* instructional technology. Issues associated with the preparation and enhancement of science teachers and the reform of science education are also explored.

PART 1

The Nature of Constructivism

1

Constructivism as a Referent for Teaching and Learning

Kenneth Tobin and Deborah Tippins

THE NATURE OF CONSTRUCTIVISM

Von Glasersfeld (1992, 5) noted that

from the beginning of the 5th century B.C., the skeptics have shown that it is logically impossible to establish the “truth” of any particular piece of knowledge. The necessary comparison of the piece of knowledge with the “reality” it is supposed to represent cannot be made, because the only rational access to that reality is through yet another act of knowing.

Von Glasersfeld (1992, 6) wrote that construetivists, unlike the skeptics, endeavored to break away from the perennial paradox associated with the requirement that knowledge represent an independent world

and admit instead that knowledge represents something that is far more important to us, namely what we can do in our experiential world, the successful ways of dealing with the objects we call physical and the unsuccessful ways of thinking with abstract concepts.

Critics of constructivism (e.g., Matthews 1992) often make the accusation that constructivists deny the existence of a reality. Whereas some constructivists might do this, we see constructivism as a form of realism in the sense that the existence of a reality is acknowledged from the outset What constructivism has to say about that reality, however, is that we can only know about it in a personal and subjective way. To take the example of gravity, a constructivist position is that gravity exists and through our experiences we come to know about gravity. Our knowledge of gravity is both individual and social, and through negotiation, agreement is reached within our social system that the concept of gravity has numerous verifiable properties. We construct a model of gravity that is viable in that the model fits experience, but no matter how elegant, that model cannot claim to be an absolute truth. The model has evolved, as all knowledge evolves, through the processes of negotiation and consensus building. It is a set of assertions about our experiences with gravity. As our experiences have changed, so too has the model been explicated. Each day most of us test our own versions of that model as we experience the world. Things do fall downward and we could not construct a viable theory with things falling upward. Our constructions are constrained by experiences, which comprise subjective interactions with the real world as we have constructed it. Since there is no objective account of what gravity really is, we cannot tell whether our model for gravity gets closer and closer to an absolute reality. Suffice it to say that we can only know gravity in a personal, socially mediated way.

The discussion of gravity provides insights into the way that constructivism explains the development of science. Science does not exist as a body of knowledge separate from knowers. On the contrary, science is viewed as a set of socially negotiated understandings of the events and phenomena that comprise the experienced universe. Knowledge is accepted by the scientific community as viable because of its coherence with other understandings and its fit with experience. Accordingly, scientific knowledge is subject to empirical verification and must be accepted as viable by the scientific community. As Kuhn (1970) and others have pointed out, scientific knowledge changes over time because goals and problems of society change, leading to new experiences; technology provides new ways of experiencing; what is known continues to increase at an exponential rate; and the individuals that comprise the scientific disciplines continually change.

A constructivist perspective acknowledges the existence of an external reality but realizes that cognizing beings can never know what that reality is actually like. This is just one paradox that often is confusing to those wanting to understand constructivism. Von Glasersfeld is clear that radical constructivism does not deny the existence of reality in the presence of cognizing beings to think of it. An absolute reality does exist; however, constructivists point out that an individual can never come to know that reality as a truth. Von Glasersfeld noted that

a basic misunderstanding of constructivism … springs from the resistance or refusal to change the concept of knowing. I have never denied an “absolute reality,” I only claim, as the skeptics do, that we have no way of knowing it. And as a constructivist, I go one step further: I claim that we can define the meaning of “to exist” only within the realm of our experiential world and not ontologically…. Of course, even as constructivists, we can use the word “reality,” but it will be defined differently. It will be made up of the network of things and relationships that we rely on in our living and of which we believe that others rely on, too.

Because of the somewhat different focus of constructivists and epistemologists, von Glasersfeld prefers to think of constructivism as postepistemological. That is, constructivism is not concerned with the question of knowledge as a representation of truth; rather, it focuses on the manner in which knowers construct viable knowledge, that is, knowledge that enables an individual to pursue goals in the multiple contexts in which actions occur. Von Glasersfeld points out that

viability—quite unlike “truth”—is relative to a context of goals and purposes. But these goals and purposes are not limited to the concrete or material. In science, for instance, there is, beyond the goal of solving specific problems, the goal of constructing as coherent a model of the experiential world as possible. (von Glasersfeld 1992, 7)

An often misunderstood aspect of constructivism is that the theory incorporates a value position that any construction is as viable as another. Such a position is based on a belief that personal viability is the critical issue in constructivism. The position ignores the social component of knowledge, that is, that knowledge must be viable not only personally, but also in the social contexts in which actions are to occur. Viability is thereby determined with respect to the actions of an individual and the extent to which those actions facilitate the attainment of goals in the social contexts of action. If the subculture of the classroom is considered, therefore, it is not the case that constructivism suggests that students ought to be able to retain naive theories or incorrect knowledge. The teacher, representing society, has an obligation to educate students (i.e., to have students construct knowledge they do not seem to have, because we think it would be good and useful for them to have it [von Glasersfeld 1992, 2]), to assist them in learning what is currently regarded by society as viable knowledge. Accordingly, if a teacher regards the constructions of any individual to be inviable in the larger set of contexts in which actions are to occur, it is the teacher’s duty as a professional to structure learning environments to facilitate the process of learning what society regards as having greatest viability at that particular time. Far too often, however, that which society regards as having greatest viability dignifies and reinforces a dominant culture in which certain ways of speaking are legitimate, others are not, particular forms of knowledge are certified and specific histories taught. As we structure learning environments to facilitate science learning, we must keep in mind, as Giroux (1989, 181) suggests, that schools are “contested cultural sites, not simply places where instruction takes place and bits of neutral knowledge are transferred.”

PERSONAL AND SOCIAL COMPONENTS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM

Over the past decade practitioners in a variety of fields have embraced constructivism as a theoretical framework on which to base some of their activities. Not surprisingly, different parts of the theory appeal to different practitioners. For example, many science educators throughout the world have studied alternative frameworks in science and conceptual change. These practitioners focused on the importance of prior knowledge in learning. The trend for so many practitioners to describe their theoretical rationale in terms of constructivism led to the emergence of a number of adjectives to characterize the particular brand of constructivism that was used in particular situations. Von Glasersfeld (chapter 2) uses the term radical constructivism to emphasize that knowledge could not be separated from knowing. The term radical is used as a counterfoil to those who see constructivism mainly or only in terms of learning being built on prior knowledge. In this weak form, constructivism is referred to as trivial constructivism.

An examination of the views of those who have used constructivism (e.g., Bauersfeld 1992; Wood et al. 1992; Saxe 1992; von Glasersfeld 1992) leads us to a synthesis position that knowledge is personally constructed but socially mediated. That is, knowledge only exists in the minds of cognizing beings, but cognizing beings only exist in a socio- cultural sense. From the outset, an organism constructs knowledge in the presence of others who are able to perturb the environment in such a way that a learner’s experiences are constrained by the presence of others. The newborn infant learns with the assistance of others to make sense of the signs of the culture, which would not exist without the existence of the culture. Accordingly, the constructions of the individual are constrained by the perturbations that become a part of that individual’s experience. A concrete example of this process is the use of language. Language is a tool that facilitates communication between participants in a society. When a learner thinks in terms of language, the thinking is a social process even though it is occurring within the mind of a single individual. Each person constructs her own environment, which includes those with whom she interacts. Thus, individuals construct speakers and listeners and assign roles to those with whom they interact. When we think of knowledge, it is convenient to think in terms of both the individual and the social components. Just as it is sometimes useful to think of an electron as a particle and at other times a wave, so it is sometimes useful to think of knowledge as an individual construct and at other times as a social construct. But at all times knowledge is both social and individual, a dialectical relationship existing between the individual’s contribution to knowledge and the social contribution. To those who want to give greater emphasis to one than the other this may seem a paradox; however, to those who are comfortable with multiple ways of representing reality it is acceptable for knowledge to be thought of in complementary ways. The recognition that knowledge has both individual and social components that cannot be meaningfully separated enables us to construct science learning environments where multiple ways of knowing (i.e., women’s ways of knowing, indigenous people’s ways of knowing) are sought and valued.

Evidence of scholars emphasizing the social aspects of constructivism is clearly evident in the work of Cobb and Saxe (e.g., Cobb 1990; Saxe 1992). As Cobb and his colleagues pointed out, it is not helpful to think of the personal and social emphases as an either/or dichotomy. Rather, both have important roles in thinking about knowledge, knowing, and teacher and learner roles in classrooms:

It is useful to see mathematics as both cognitive activity constrained by social and cultural processes, and as a social and cultural phenomenon that is constituted by a community of actively cognizing individuals. (Wood et al. 1992, 3)

Saxe (1992) noted that for Piaget the socio-cultural processes were largely unanalyzed. His preference was to build a theoretical framework for knowledge that emphasized the social and cognitive components. Saxe makes a compelling case for a problem-solving approach to the learning of mathematics in which students are involved in structuring their own problem. In his two case studies, the emphasis was on finding a coherent solution to a problem rather than remembering how to apply a recipe to obtain a solution. Indeed, in Saxe’s studies, more interest was focused on learning mathematics to be “street wise” and to negotiate effective deals in the commercial sense. In Saxe’s subsequent classroom studies, he used a game format to enable students to construct goals that are not directly related to mathematics. To achieve these goals, it is first necessary to learn and apply mathematical knowledge. Saxe concentrated his framework on the notion of goals. Cognitive goals emerge through an individual’s daily participation in cultural practices. In attempting to accomplish these emergent goals, children generate new knowledge linked to social and cultural life. According to Saxe, individuals construct novel understandings as they attempt to accomplish goals rooted in both their prior understandings and their socially organized activities.

CONSTRUCTIVISM: METHOD OR REFERENT?

Some authors (e.g., Fosnot 1992) use constructivism to represent a method of teaching whereby the teacher bases what happens on beliefs that are consistent with constructivism. What they mean by this is that constructivism has been used as a referent to build a classroom that maximizes student learning. Typically, the teacher takes account of what students know, maximizes social interaction between learners such that they can negotiate meaning, and provides a variety of sensory experiences from which learning is built. Another example of this practice is seen in chapter 15 where some teaching practices, such as lecturing, are regarded as having little value compared to alternatives such as small group learning or interactive discussions that are “constructivist” in nature. This position, although understandable, reduces constructivism to a set of methods and diminishes its power as a set of intellectual referents for making decisions in relation to actions. Just as constructivism can be used to explain how students make sense of experience in interactive discussions or in small group problem-solving activities, so too can constructivism be used to explain why learning occurs in lectures and how lectures can be adapted to improve the quality of learning.

Wheatley (1991) described approaches to curriculum that have been carefully built with constructivism as a referent. Known as problem-centered learning, students work together in small groups making meaning of tasks and setting out to solve problems that are perplexing. The teacher in such classes has an important mediating role, ascertaining what students know and structuring tasks such that they can build knowledge structures that are commensurate with knowledge of the discipline. Wheatley described how students negotiate meaning in small group situations, and then negotiate consensus in whole class settings. The teacher’s role is to monitor student understandings and guide discussions so that all students have opportunities to put language to their understandings and to engage in activities such as clarifying, elaborating, justifying, and evaluating alternative points of view. Such visions of classroom learning environments are exciting and appeal as viable alternatives to those so often reported in studies of learning in traditional classrooms (e.g., Tobin and Gallagher 1987). However, as appealing as these alternative visions of classroom learning might be, to label them as constructivist tends to mask an import...