Being the Chosen

Exploring a Christian Fundamentalist Worldview

Julie Scott Jones

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317175353
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Scienze sociali
• Categoría: Antropologia

Being the Chosen explores Christian fundamentalism in the USA, focusing particularly on the belief system of Protestant fundamentalists. It establishes the key characteristics of the Protestant worldview, investigating the degrees to which these are adhered to amongst different groups and how such belief systems are constructed and reinforced through everyday life. By presenting rich empirical material, Being the Chosen sheds light on the manner in which the Protestant fundamentalist worldview shapes and constructs the beliefs and actions of its adherents, providing them with agency and reinforcement in the face of oppositional forces. As such, it will interest not only sociologists, but also scholars of religion and the culture and society of the USA.

Chapter 1
‘Furiously Religious’: Contextualising Fundamentalism

Religious Fundamentalism … the Exception to the Theory

Religious fundamentalism has been a subject for research since the 1920s (Barr, 1977, Marsden, 1980). Initially research focused on fundamentalism among American Protestants, for reasons that will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this book. This early research focused initially on theological issues, such as, fundamentalists’ reaction to the rise in Biblical criticism, secularism, theological liberalism, and the teaching of evolutionary theory in schools (Ammerman, 1993, Marsden, 1980). As well as exploring the interconnections between fundamentalists, evangelicals and other charismatic and traditional Protestant churches.

Sociologists of religion became interested in American Protestant fundamentalists, as they did not ‘fit’ neatly into sociology’s central dogma: the secularisation thesis (Ammerman, 1993). This group of inter-related theories have dominated sociological accounts of religion’s (particularly Christianity’s) position in relation to modernity. It contends, to put it simply, that as society modernises religion ‘loses its social significance’ (Wilson, 1966) and becomes a matter for private choice or conscience. Religion as a socio-political or economic institution with a key structural role within society (as was the case in pre-modern European societies) is dismantled, eroded and eventually ceases (Bruce, 2002). Mainstream religion is then left to become a provider of life-cycle (for example, naming, marriage, and funeral rituals) and calendrical rituals (for example, harvest festivals, Christmas, and Easter), which become increasingly secularised (Bruce, 2002). It may serve as an historical ‘memory’ resource (Hervieu-Leger, 2000) that communities can draw upon to reinforce a sense of shared identity based on perceived past patterns of beliefs. Religion can become an identity provider for marginalised communities, such as migrant communities (Herberg, 1956, Bruce, 2002). Finally, religion operates as a meaning ‘safety net’ to be used when mainstream meaning systems, such as science or medicine appear to ‘fail’ to resolve individual or communal existential ‘worries’ (Davie, 1994, Berger, 1967). Religion shifts from a communal activity, at the heart of social life, with a key role in reinforcing social norms and consensus to a matter of individual ‘choice’ (Bruce, 2002, Heelas, 1997). Thus, religion becomes ‘privatised’ and a matter of consumer ‘choice’, which is demonstrated, in western societies, by the popularity of New Age beliefs with their focus on self-sacralisation and an ‘if it works for you, it works’ ethos (Heelas, 1997). It can also be seen in the phenomenon of ’believing without belonging’ where people still appear to believe or have some sense of attachment to the idea of believing but choose not to attend regularly an actual place of worship (Davie, 1994). The gap between statistics which show low church attendance rates but relatively high (65 to 75 per cent) rates for belief in god/spirit (Davie, 1994, Bruce, 2002) also suggest ‘privatisation’ and individualised spirituality at work.

In many respects, mainstream religion (specifically Christianity) in the western context is following the wider social trend for a structural division between ‘public’ and ‘private’ domains. This divide is not present in pre-modern societies: moral issues, family life, personal conduct, work, and so forth are conducted in ‘public’ and open to scrutiny and communal monitoring; hence the high levels of cohesion and control in such societies (Foucault, 1979). Modernisation brings with it structural changes that create a divide between the ‘public’ spheres of work, social participation, social institutions, etc. and the ‘private’ sphere of family, sexuality, individual conduct, etc. An example of this is how the state retracts from moralising, monitoring, and interfering in private matters such as family life and sexuality: only becoming involved in matters of child protection and public decency (Sennett, 1996).

Fundamentalism among American Protestants challenged the secularisation thesis’ account of religion and modernity in the western context (Ammerman, 1993). Fundamentalists do not recognise a division between the ‘public’ and ‘private’; God is everywhere and thus everything is under scrutiny, nothing is ‘private’. Similarly, faith is not for them a matter of individual, consumer ‘choice’ but rather a ‘gift’ bestowed on them by God. Most important of all is that God and faith should be at the heart of society and embedded within all society’s structures and institutions (Ammerman, 1991, Bruce, 2008). Therefore, while the majority of western European societies appeared to follow the secularisation model in respect to Christianity; Christianity in America and particularly in relation to the phenomenon of fundamentalism posed a theoretical quandary. Initially theorists explained the emergence of American Protestant fundamentalism as a ‘knee jerk’ reaction to modernisation: a retreatist position taken by communities who could not ‘cope’ with the modern and more importantly secular world (Ammerman, 1993). This was a ‘neat’ theoretical account in that it explained away the fact that fundamentalism had emerged in the most modern of modern societies: the USA. It also reinforced the stereotype that is implied subtly within secularisation theories that religious people are somehow ‘backward’, ‘irrational’ and ‘anti-modern’. This theoretical account of fundamentalism remained dominant until the 1980s; it was reinforced by the seeming lack of fundamentalism elsewhere in the world. In other words, this seemed like a peculiarity of American Protestantism. Additionally, American Protestant fundamentalism did not seem to be anything other than a regressive theological movement. However, this perception started to change in the late 1970s with two events that caused researchers to think again about religious fundamentalism (Ammerman, 1993, Bruce, 2008).

In 1976, President Jimmy Carter, who claimed to be a ‘born-again’ Christian, was elected, in part, by the mobilisation of evangelical and fundamentalist Protestant voters. Yet, Carter’s politics and actions while president did not demonstrate any specific allegiance to this bloc grouping; nor did he enact legislation to change the relationship between church and state. Religion and religious-moral issues were not central preoccupations of his administration, despite his professed personal beliefs. However, his election did bring this brand of conservative Protestantism into public consciousness at a national and global level. In 1979, evangelical and fundamentalist churches, groups and communities mobilised against Carter and campaigned for future President Ronald Reagan, who was elected in 1980. Reagan, unlike Carter, openly courted this bloc of voters (and raised important campaign funds in the process) and campaigned on some issues, such as abortion, which were central to evangelical and fundamentalist campaigns. The rise in political influence, both as fundraisers and agenda setters, of evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants caught Americans ‘by surprise’ (Ammerman 1993: 1). The extent to which Reagan, when in power, actually placed evangelical and fundamentalist concerns at the heart of his administration, is open to debate (Bruce, 1990). The importance rather is that by the 1980s this bloc of Protestants had become a political and culturally influential group who could not be ignored. The reasons behind the emergence and rise of American Protestants, as well as the differences between evangelicals and fundamentalists will be explored in Chapters 2 and 3 of this book.

In 1979 another event happened that raised awareness of and changed how we think about so-called ‘fundamentalists’: the Iranian revolution. The Iranian leader Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was overthrown in February 1979, by the religico-political movement led by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini had become a focus for Iranians’ disaffection with the socio-economic consequences of the Shah’s ‘White Revolution’ of the 1960s, which had at its heart an agenda of modernisation (including industrialisation and urbanisation) and ideological westernisation (including encouraging a consumer society, asserting secular values, eradicating gender divides, encouraging western style dress and ‘tastes’). The ‘Shah’s Revolution’ had created a prosperous urban middle class, but the majority of working class Iranians remained poor and excluded from the benefits of the consumer society built on Iran’s oil economy. The Shah’s increasingly repressive regime also facilitated dissent among Iran’s urban poor. The mosques soon became the focus of dissent. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini became the figurehead of the revolutionary movement, despite being in exile in France (Salehi, 1998, Daniel, 2001).

Khomeini reasserted the need for an Islamic government, what he called ‘God’s Government’, essentially a theocracy ruled by ultra-conservative Islamic clerics, who stressed a literal interpretation of Islam and the dismantling of all things secular, western and ‘unIslamic’ that the Shah had established (Salehi, 1998, Daniel, 2001). The Iranian revolution had been fermenting for many years but the new regime again proved surprising for political commentators and researchers of religion alike. Again, the secularisation thesis proves inadequate in accounting for modernisation’s impact on religion, in this instance Islam. It was presumed that the European model of modernisation, which has secularisation as a key consequence, would be applicable elsewhere in the world, irrespective of the religion in question. More importantly, the Iranian Revolution popularised the word ‘fundamentalism’.

Although, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, the word ‘fundamentalism’ has its roots in early twentieth century American Protestantism; it was not used beyond theological or sociological circles. Following the events in Tehran in 1979, the word entered mainstream usage as the media adopted it to describe the new Islamic republic’s version of Islam, in an attempt to offer a simplistic description of it for a western audience with little or no knowledge of any variety of Islam. From this point onwards, the term ‘fundamentalism’ would be used to refer to extremism and politicisation in all varieties of religion (Scott Jones, 2009). It became a word, which slowly drifted from its theological origins within American Protestantism (Scott Jones, 2009). Increasingly, ‘fundamentalism’ has become a pejorative label, often used synonymously with ‘terrorism’, which is one reason that many theorists avoid using the term at all (Munson, 1995). This issue will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 2. Iran remains, since the fall of the Taliban who ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, the world’s only example of a longstanding fundamentalist state.

By the 1980s ‘fundamentalism’ has entered a wider public consciousness where it would remain through the long standing ‘culture wars’ in the USA in the 1980s and 1990s; and in the powerful political movements that would support successive Bush administrations and rally support against the Clinton and more recently Obama administrations. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism, beyond the continuing existence of the Iranian version, and its ties to radicalisation and in some instances terrorism, further illustrates the power of religious fundamentalism. Within the social sciences, particularly sociology, fundamentalism has proven to be a key element in critiques of the secularisation thesis, proving as Peter Berger puts it that the modern world is ‘as furiously religious as ever’ (1999, 2). Challenges to the secularisation model have now rightly seen it revised as a model almost exclusive to Europe and her satellites (Bruce, 2002). Fundamentalism also remains the best example of what happens when religious communities become politicised and the role that religious beliefs can play in political activity. Religion can be a powerful revolutionary force, as exemplified by the Iranian example.

The Extent of Religious Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism occurs in all the world’s major religions, including Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism. Marty and Appleby’s five volume ‘Fundamentalism Project’ (1991-1995) illustrates the diversity and spread of religious fundamentalism across the world’s religions and regions. As fundamentalism is a theological term this should be expected; it should exist in all religions in the same way that ‘liberalism’, ‘conservatism’ and so forth, also exist. However, as will be discussed in the next chapter, ‘fundamentalism’ is also a sociological label that implies a specific worldview and an element of politicisation, usually leading to socio-political action in the world. Although fundamentalism can be found in all the major religions of the world, it predominates in the monotheistic, religions of ‘the book’, i.e. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Marty and Appleby, 1991, Bruce, 2008). This is not surprising given fundamentalism’s focus on scriptural literalism and claims to a unifying and single ‘true’ reality. Fundamentalism is less likely to prosper in religions with less focus on one single authoritative account of ‘reality, i.e. a central sacred scripture, and a unitary view of god. Therefore it is no surprise that fundamentalism predominates in Christianity (particularly Protestant varieties) and Islam.

Although fundamentalism can be located throughout the world’s faiths and across the globe it is difficult to accurately chart the size of fundamentalist populations. One reason for this is definitional (Ammerman, 1993, Scott Jones, 2009): the term ‘fundamentalist’ is not often used by so-called ‘fundamentalists’, they prefer to adopt names that stress their mission or uniqueness, such as ‘God’s soldiers’ or ‘God’s Way’. The over-use of the term in a pejorative sense also lumps non-fundamentalists together with ‘actual’ fundamentalists; too often traditionalists, the orthodox, and conservatives are lumped together and mislabelled as ‘fundamentalists’. The latter is particularly a problem when looking at Islam, which stresses orthodoxy (the right way to believe) and orthopraxy (the right way to act or behave), as core tenets; often leading to traditional or conservative Muslims being categorised as fundamentalists (Scott Jones, 2009). Generally, it could be said that fundamentalism is widespread across the Islamic world, particularly, where modernisation (and westernisation) have created socio-economic inequalities and marginalised communities; for example, in Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia. Jewish fundamentalism is an active agent in stalling and fuelling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Within Christianity, Protestant fundamentalism is growing in influence in South America, some parts of Europe and remains a significant force in the USA (Scott Jones, 2009). The final chapter of this book will explore the extent of religious fundamentalism on a global scale and explores some of the reasons for fundamentalism’s continued growth.

A Way of Viewing the World

This book is about Protestant fundamentalism in the USA, although it will look at the wider global context of fundamentalism in the final chapter, Chapter 9. The book explores Protestant fundamentalism through looking specifically at the fundamentalist worldview. As was noted previously, fundamentalism is a theological label for a particular approach to religion, but it is also a sociopolitical term that stresses agency and political activity in the secular world. Fundamentalists were once stereotyped as ‘retreatist and ‘anti-modern’ but rather than retreat back into literal, ‘blind faith’, these are individuals and more importantly communities that seek to act in the world; to effect change. They do not retreat from the modern world but rather offer an alternative version of modernity, which places religion at its heart. In doing so, they also posit a powerful critique of modernity. Fundamentalists may have an end goal that is otherworldly (for example, to enter heaven or survive the end of the world), but in the interim, they seek to effect socio-political change in the present. They willingly utilise the ‘modern’ against itself, for example, making extensive use of modern media technology, such as the Internet and satellite television, to disseminate their beliefs and mobilise communities (Marty and Appleby, 1991). However, action and a blueprint for social change and political action can only be understood through locating such action within an individual or community’s worldview.

A worldview is, simplistically, how individuals see, understand and interpret the world around them (Gerth and Mills, 1991). Everyone in that sense has a worldview; we all see the world in a subjective way that is unique to us. However, as Berger and Luckmann (1966) note, it is more complex than that. Our worldview is an all encompassing, ‘comprehensive meaning system’ that establishes what is ‘social reality’; why ‘social reality’ is how it is; and it also accounts for why ‘social reality’ may change (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). In that sense worldviews are normative and explanatory (Berger, 1967, Berger and Luckmann, 1966); they establish ‘the norm’ and account for it. To illustrate, we agree the sky is blue and not green, and we can offer an explanation for it. To suggest the sky is not blue is to then go against a shared consensus, which is presented as ‘commonsense’. Worldviews are built on and maintained by meaning systems, that is, forms of knowledge by which ‘reality’ is established. Meaning systems are typically built on one default form of knowledge; for example, in most modern societies scientific, empirical knowledge is the default (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). To illustrate, one would not got to the exorcist if one fell ill; one would seek out medical assistance and remedies, based on empirically tested knowledge that we can ‘prove’ works, for example, taking antibiotics to cure an infection. Meaning systems (and therefore worldviews) change and thus so do the knowledge forms on which they are built (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Consider the reaction of an individual in the Middle Ages when confronted with what we today would label as ‘epilepsy’ : it would have been explained as demonic possession and the expected, i.e. ‘normal’ thing to do would have been to call for an exorcist. Such action today would be seen as ‘irrational’ and ‘odd’. Although most meaning systems are built on a default knowledge position, individuals and communities’ worldviews may shift and draw on alternative knowledge providers in the face of the failure of the dominant meaning system (and knowledge) to account for reality. For example, if an individual remained seriously ill, despite the best efforts of modern, western medicine, she may be drawn towards a religious knowledge base instead. ‘Moral panics’ (Cohen, 1972) are a good example of how communities can shift their meaning-knowledge position in the face of seeming disruption to their ‘social reality’. Although we have individual worldviews that are subjective; society requires some semblance of consensus on what is ‘really real’. If we fail to have consensus on what is ‘real’ then existential chaos threatens and we begin to appreciate that what is ‘real’ is a mere social construction; at that stage ‘anomie’ becomes a reality and society may become chaotic. Thus, socialisation operates to socialise individuals with regard to what the group agrees is ‘reality’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). The accepted version of ‘reality’ is hegemonic, and maintained and reinforced by society’s key social structures and through forms of control. Psychology (for example, the Asch conformity experiments of the 1950s) has long demonstrated the innate human tendency to conform to the group consensus, even if the individual believes the group’s interpretation to be wrong. Thus, worldviews may have a subjective aspect: we have agency to act in the world and interpret to what extent we adhere to the hegemonic version of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Nevertheless, worldviews are built upon shared understandings of what is ‘reality’.

Religious based meaning systems are particularly powerful providers of ‘social reality’, partly because they solve the issue of ‘meaning crisis’ far better than alternative knowledge forms. Weber (1991) labelled humanity’s self-consciousness a ‘curse’ because it meant that we search for meaning to our existence. The majority of us are not content to accept that we live in an arbitrary and random universe, where to put it colloquially, ‘shit happens’. We want, again to put it colloquially, ‘shit to happen for a reason’. Most of modern, western life is secure and the sorts of events that forced individuals and communities in the past to confront the discrepancy between how reality should look and how it actually is no longer trouble us; for example, famine, natural disasters, plague etc. However although our lives are safer and more sanitised we still have what Weber (1991) called the ‘meaning problem’. That is there remain the big existential questions of existence; they may not trouble u...