The Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties, 1947-1949

Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series I, Volume X

Tony Insall, Patrick Salmon, Tony Insall, Patrick Salmon

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781134736843
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Histoire
• Categoría: Histoire de la Grande-Bretagne

This volume documents the drafting, negotiation and signature of the treaty that has been the cornerstone of European defence for the past sixty-five years: the North Atlantic Treaty signed in April 1949.

The story begins at the end of 1947, when the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, became convinced of the need to persuade the United States of America, which had emerged from the Second World War as the pre-eminent global military and economic power and one of the only two superpowers, to underwrite the future security of Western Europe. It progresses through the negotiation of the Brussels Treaty of March 1948—an essential prerequisite to securing American participation in a wider defensive system—and ends with the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty after a series of setbacks, difficulties and security threats. The documents, drawn from the archives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet Office and No. 10 (with some transferred into the public domain for the first time), demonstrate how diplomatic skills and determination, inspired by Bevin's vision, led to a system of collective security that played an indispensable part in the preservation of peace between East and West for the rest of the twentieth century.

This book will be of much interest to students of the Cold War, European and American history, British political history, international history and IR in general.

CHAPTER III

Negotiation and signature of the North Atlantic Treaty 1 January – 7 April 1949

No. 191

Sir O. Franks (Washington) to Mr Bevin, 1 January 1949, 7.13 p.m.

Tel. No. 4 Important, Secret (FO 371/79218, Z19/1074/72/G)

North Atlantic Pact

My immediately following telegram¹ contains text of telegram which subject to your concurrence the State Department propose to send to the United States Minister Dublin asking him to obtain informally the views of the Irish Government about the form and timing of an official approach concerning Irish participation in the negotiations for a North Atlantic Pact.

2. State Department also intend subject to your views to send a similar telegram to the United States Ambassador Lisbon. They would however omit the first paragraph of the draft telegram to Dublin and substitute the following:

Preliminary information concerning proposed North Atlantic Treaty given Foreign Ministry by British and American Ambassadors 7th October. Late in October, Governments of Canada and parties to Brussels Treaty advised United States Government they were agreed in principle on desirability of concluding such Treaty. Explanatory talks resumed 10th December have brought steady progress towards concrete proposals for Treaty following closely lines previously indicated.

The State Department would also propose to add the following paragraph to the message to Lisbon:

You should add orally that Treaty is designed to strengthen the defensive capability of sovereign parties in order better to assure security of all of them against aggression from any source; that it bears no relation to ‘Western Union’ concept or any other concepts of progressively closer political or economic integration of Western European countries; that it would in no way derogate from full sovereignty of parties and that it will not be applicable to colonial possessions of any party except through providing for consultation should they be threatened. You may also add orally merely as expression of United States Government opinion that United States Government would like to see Spain included whenever this may become politically possible but that under present circumstances Spain’s inclusion is not (repeat not) politically possible for most European participants.

3. State Department recognise that you have not yet had an opportunity to comment upon the idea, tentatively agreed at the recent Washington talks, that informal approaches on the above lines should be made. They also know that you wish to make specific comments on the timing and method of the approach to Ireland. They think however that it would be advisable to say something at an early date to the Irish and Portuguese Governments and would be grateful if you could let them have your views as soon as possible. They hope that His Majesty’s Ambassador Lisbon would be able to make similar representations at the same time to the Portuguese Government.²

No. 192

Mr Bevin to Sir O. Franks (Washington), 4 January 1949, 11.30 a.m.

Tel. No. 88 Most Immediate, Top Secret (FO371/79218, Z77/1074/72/G)

Atlantic Pact

In general I regard the working party’s draft as satisfactory and I wish to congratulate you on the progress made.¹

2. There seem to be three major and two minor points outstanding on which you require instructions.

(1) Should Italy be invited to be an original party to the Pact?

You should maintain our view about Italy on the following main grounds.

(a) At this stage Italy would be a military liability and her inclusion would involve an unwise dispersal of effort. Moreover it would raise the question of the Peace Treaty and so might lead to an embarrassing conflict with the Soviet Government.

(b) To include Italy and exclude Greece and Turkey would cause embarrassing resentment in the two latter countries.

(c) Italian public opinion is still opposed to military commitments. It would be better to get Italy at the outset to join the Council of Europe (which carries no military commitments) and to consider her accession to the pact at a later stage. Meanwhile the same provision should be made for Italy as is made for Greece and Turkey and possibly Iran.

(d) The United States are prepared to agree to a pact of longer duration if the treaty is truly Atlantic and does not embrace Mediterranean Powers.

(2) Should French North Africa be included in the scope of the pact?

You should continue to oppose inclusion on the grounds that we should not cause unnecessary delay or increase the difficulties of the Administration on account of a proposal which leads to demands for the inclusion of other African territories and is largely academic. It is obviously highly unlikely that any potential enemy would launch a maritime or air expedition against North Africa except as part of a general campaign. The French Ambassador in London urged that Algeria at all events should be included since it is part of metropolitan France. But Algeria is not included under the Brussels Treaty and there seems to be no reason why the United States and Canada should be pressed to do more for France than the signatories of the Brussels Treaty.

(3) What provision should be made for Italy (if not included), Greece, Turkey and possibly Iran?

I recognise that something should be done to bind Italy to the West and to give some assurance of security to Greece and Turkey. It has been suggested that this might be done by a protocol in which the High Contracting Parties should undertake to consult in the event of an attack on any of these countries. I should prefer a joint declaration to a protocol and I think you should go a little further and try to obtain acceptance of a formula declaring the integrity and security of these countries to be a matter of concern to the High Contracting Parties, who undertake to consult in the event of an attack. Such a formula would not involve an absolute commitment to go to war, but it would be a warning to an aggressor and would bring more comfort to the countries concerned than a mere undertaking to consult.

3. I am not anxious to add to our commitments, but I recognise that there are advantages in including Iran in the terms of any declaration. You should not press for her inclusion, but you may agree to it if this is the general consensus of opinion.

4. There remain the two minor points:

(1) Should provision be made for the use of the International Court and conciliation for the settlement of disputes between the signatory Powers?

You should press the French to drop this proposal forthwith on the grounds already stated. To argue it further will only cause damaging delay and the point has no substantial importance since it is highly improbable that there will be disputes between the Western Powers which cannot be settled by the existing agencies.

(2) What should be the duration of the pact?

The Treaty of Dunkirk and the Brussels Treaty were concluded for fifty years. It would be convenient for the Atlantic Pact to have the same duration. You should ask for this, but you may accept any duration between twenty and fifty years.

5. There are two other points to which I should like to call your attention.

(1) The Chiefs of Staff attach great importance to the inclusion of Sweden. They consider that without Sweden, Norway and Denmark would be militarily more of a liability than an asset. It may be that the best way of getting Sweden in is to induce Norway and Denmark to join in the hope that Sweden will follow them. But in any event these Scandinavian countries will have to be very carefully handled. You should impress this on your colleagues, particularly the United States representative, and keep in close touch with him when the question of sounding the Scandinavian countries arises.

(2) Article 10 (ratification) at present provides that the treaty shall come into force when a majority of the signatories have ratified. This could lead to a ridiculous situation in which the treaty might come into force without the participation of the United States or Canada. In order to avert this danger it would be well to add the words ‘including Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States’ after the words ‘majority of the signatories’. If this or a similar amendment is not accepted, the Brussels Powers will have no option but to withhold ratification until Canada and the United States have ratified.

6. My immediately following telegram² contains a few minor drafting amendments designed to bring greater clarity to the text.

7. If an approach is made to Eire, this should be undertaken by United States. In any case Eire will surely raise the partition issue and we should prefer to avoid this being raised in this connection.

8. My understanding is that after Ambassadors’ meeting, draft with any further amendments will be submitted for trial approval of Governments.

No. 193

Sir O. Franks (Washington) to Mr Bevin, 4 January 1949, 8.40 p.m.

Tel. No. 48 Immediate, Top Secret (FO 371/79219, Z78/1074/72/G)

Your telegrams Nos. 72, 88 and 89:¹ North Atlantic Pact.

We are grateful to you for sending these instructions so promptly. State Department told us this morning however that owing to the necessity of their taking further soundings of Congressional leaders they might not be ready for the next meeting for a few days. This delay gives us the opportunity to ask you for further elucidation on the following points raised in your telegram No. 88.

2. Italy

French Embassy received their instructions so quickly that their Government’s attitude is presumably unchanged. We may therefore expect French to press vigorously for Italy’s inclusion. Canadians, we understand, will oppose Italy’s inclusion and Belgians and Dutch are likely to be more against than in favour. We may however have to meet growing pressure from Americans in support of Italy’s participation. We have already developed all arguments in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 88 and would welcome some fresh ones—more especially since we doubt if argument about American attitude in (d) holds good any longer. In particular, it would help us:

(I) To have military arguments against Italy’s participation spelt out in greater detail.

(II) To know probable attitude of Italian Government towards Italy’s participation at present time in

(a) Atlantic Pact; and

(b) Brussels Pact;

(III) To know whether Italian Government and Italian opinion would be likely to regard Italy’s participation as founder member in Council of Europe as adequate recognition at present time of her association with the West.

3. French North Africa

Canadians have been instructed to oppose this, and Benelux representatives are likely to join with them and the Americans in wishing to restrict pact to Europe. Hitherto, acting on instructions (see Article 5 (II) of text in METRIC document No. A.106, paragraph 6 of your despatch No. 1689,² your telegram No. 13109³ and paragraph 7 of your telegram No. 13403)³ we have, after originally arguing in favour of the inclusion of the whole of North Africa, been supporting the French in asking for the inclusion of French Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. It is therefore not a question, as you suggest, of ‘continuing to oppose the inclusion of French North Africa’ but of changing our position and abandoning our support of the French, who will then be left in a minority of one. Unless you have already warned the French in London or Paris of our impending change of attitude, it might be useful if you could do so before we have to go into action as otherwise the French representatives here may be rather upset.

4. Special provisions for Italy (if not included), Greece, Turkey and possibly Persia

Are we right in assuming that your proposed ‘joint declaration’ would not form part of the North Atlantic Pact, but wo...