Exercising Control of the Sea

Theory and Practice

Milan Vego

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000196054
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: History
• Categoría: Military & Maritime History

This book explains both the strategic and the operational aspects of exercising control of the sea.

The struggle for sea control consists of three mutually related and overlapping phases: obtaining, maintaining and exercising sea control. It is in the phase of exercising sea control when one's strategic or operational success is exploited; otherwise, the fruits of victories achieved would be wasted. This work describes the strategy of a stronger side in wartime after a desired degree of control has been obtained, which is followed by a discussion on the objectives and main methods used in exercising sea control. The remaining chapters explain and analyze in some detail each of the main methods of exercising sea control: defence and protection of one's own and destruction/neutralization of the enemy's military-economic potential at sea, capturing the enemy's operationally important positions ashore, destroying/weakening the enemy's military-economic potential ashore and supporting one's ground forces in their offensive and defensive operations on the coast.

This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, sea power and naval history.

1Strategic framework

Exercising or exploiting sea control is the culmination of the efforts by a stronger side to obtain and maintain control of the sea. Naval or maritime strategy provides a necessary and critically important framework for accomplishing, consolidating and exploiting strategic or operational success. Naval strategy will rarely remain unchanged once the hostilities start. It will be modified or even radically altered because of the changes in a strategic situation. These changes would depend on the degree of resistance by the opposing side and the changes in the composition of the alliances/coalitions. Such changes would be more pronounced in war between two major sea powers than between a major and medium/minor sea power.

In a war between two major sea powers, both belligerents possess large navies. And initially both belligerents would be strategically on the offensive and would try to obtain control of the sea. Only after one side suffers major losses would it shift strategically on the defensive. In contrast to war on land, this shift would occur after a relatively long period of balance characterized by an intense struggle for sea control as the Pacific War of 1942–1943 illustrates.

The best examples of wars between major sea powers were Anglo-Dutch Wars and war in the Pacific (1941–1945). All three Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652–1654; 1665–1667; 1672–1674) were essentially a struggle for control of trade. The geographical advantage was with England; all Dutch ships had to pass through the English Channel; the English had unified command under Oliver Cromwell, while the Dutch had five semi-independent United Provinces.¹ Yet, Cromwell made a big error by detaching a major part of the English fleet to the Mediterranean for trade protection after the battle of the Kentish Knock in September 1652. This allowed the Dutch to obtain control of England's home waters.² Cromwell expanded strategic objectives by attacking Spain. England's strategy was based on blockading Spain's coast to capture the treasure convoys and destroy the enemy main fleet. Cromwell also sent amphibious expedition to the West Indies. Yet the British failed to capture Santo Domingo in February 1654. The English attacks on treasury fleet at Cádiz and Tenerife in 1656 had a major negative effect on the Spanish armies in Portugal and Flanders.³

During the Time of Restoration (1660–1688), there was no change in England's strategy. Tangier (a city in northwestern Morocco at the entrance of the Strait of Gibraltar) was acquired by England as a dowry of Catherine of Braganza. The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1664–1667) was provoked by King Charles in 1664. The main cause of the war was trade rivalry. On 14 June 1667, Admiral Michiel Adriaenszoon de Ruyter penetrated right up the River Thames and inflicted great losses on the English. England has forgotten that control of the narrow seas demanded everlasting vigilance. On 31 July 1667, the Treaty of Breda ended the war; England got better terms than it deserved. The Dutch gave up New Amsterdam (later New York) and thereby virtually gave away to control of the eastern seaboard of what is now the United States to England.⁴

In the war in the Pacific (1941–1945), Japan was strategically on the offensive from December 1941 to August 1942. Afterward and until the summer of 1943, a state of strategic equilibrium prevailed between Japan and Allies. After the summer of 1943, Japan shifted to a strategic defensive and remained on the defensive until the end of the war in August 1945.

Prior to December 1941, Imperial Japan was inferior in naval strength to Britain and the United States. The Japanese naval strategy was defensive. Japan controlled Korea, Manchuria and coastal areas of China's mainland. In the central Pacific, the Japanese controlled the Mandates, as they were called [that is, the Marianas (less Guam), the Marshalls and the Carolines]. In 1941, the Japanese adopted an offensive strategy. The new national strategic objective as expressed in its basic plan for war were to “make Japan self-sufficient, by obtaining permanent possession of the sources of raw materials essential of the maintenance of Japanese economy both in peace and war; in particular, the riches of ‘Southern Resources Area’ – Malaya, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies including Timor.” These objectives will be achieved by “a rapid attack on the interests of three principal powers in the Far East: Great Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands East Indies, taking advantage of surprise to enable all resistance to be overpowered.”⁵

The principal objective of the Japanese, in what they called the “First Operational Stage of War,” was to destroy and capture the most important American, British and Dutch positions in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia. They were greatly surprised at the speed and easiness of their own early victories in December 1941–April 1942. In December 1941, they occupied the U.S.-controlled Wake Islands and Guam. By early 1942, they had conquered Malaya, in a brilliant campaign. The British strongpoint of Singapore fell on 15 February 1942. The Japanese invaded the Philippines in the first week of December 1941. By 2 January 1942, the capital of Manila had fallen into their hands, and the defending American and Filipino forces had been forced to withdraw to the Bataan Peninsula, Luzon. The United States was facing complete defeat in the Philippines. On 17 December 1941, the Japanese invaded the resource-rich NEI. By 9 March 1942, the entire NEI was in their hands. In the process, the Japanese decimated the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command forces that opposed them. The Allies did not expect rapid collapse of their position in Malaya, Singapore and quick capture of Burma. The American planners tacitly acknowledged that the defense of the Philippines could not be possible until the relief was sent across the Pacific.⁶

By March 1942, the Japanese had gained control of Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific, a vast expanse rich in natural resources (oil, tin, rubber and bauxite) and had incorporated it into what they called the “Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” The Japanese defense perimeters stretched from the Kurile Islands southeastward through Wake, the Marianas, the Marshalls and the Gilberts Archipelago, then along the northern coast of New Guinea through Borneo, Java, Sumatra, up to Malaya Peninsula and then again westward from the borders of Indochina to Siam, Burma and the border of India.⁷

The Japanese had included the invasion of the Bismarck Archipelago in their plan, for the “First Operational Stage” of the war in the Pacific, developed in November 1941. In their view, their major base at Truk, in the central Carolines, would not be secure as long as Rabaul, the capital of the Australian Mandated Territory, on New Britain, was in enemy hands.⁸ By the beginning of 1942, the strategic situation in southwest and South Pacific had become extremely serious for the Allies. The Japanese troops captured Rabaul on 23 January 1942. The fall of Rabaul alarmed greatly the Australian government and people. Australia's Northeast Area was now virtually open to Japan's attack. The Japanese next occupied the rest of New Britain, as well as the Admiralties, New Ireland and Bougainville in the Upper Solomons.⁹

By April 1942, the Japanese had accomplished almost all their initial strategic objectives. Their losses were surprisingly low. Yet instead of consolidating their strategic successes, the Japanese high command made a fatal mistake of deciding to expand Japan's defense perimeter. Already in January 1942, the Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) in Tokyo had initiated the staff studies for the “Second Operational Stage of the War.”¹⁰ The Plans Division of the First (Operational) Section of the Navy's Section (i.e., the Naval General Staff) of IGHQ was a strong advocate of invading Australia. As early as December 1941, it had insisted on an invasion of the strategically important points in northern and northeastern Australia. Naval General Staff believed that these objectives could be accomplished, with very little expenditure in men and matériel.¹¹ It argued that Australia represented the greatest threat to Japanese control in the South Pacific, because it could serve as a base for the enemy's counteroffensive. Australia also possessed economic resources of great potential importance to Japan's war industry.¹² The Naval General Staff argued that no more than three Army divisions or 45,000–60,000 troops would suffice to secure Australia's northeastern and northern territories. However, the Army General Staff was opposed to any invasion of Australia. The Army had available in September 1941 only fifty-­one divisions (twenty-eight divisions were deployed in China; thirteen in Manchukuo while only ten divisions (including five not fully trained) were deployed on the home islands. For the “First Operational Stage of the War,” the Army committed only eleven divisions (five from China and six from Japan) and achieved a great success in a very short time.¹³ In contrast to the Naval General Staff, the Army General Staff estimated that it would require at least ten, possibly twelve divisions, or 150,000 to 200,000 troops to invade Australia. To supply and sustain such a force would require 1.5 to 2.0 million tons of shipping. Such a huge requirement would in fact destroy the national economy.¹⁴

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the Combined Fleet and his staff started planning for the Second Operational Stage of the war also in January 1942. He had very different views on the future operations from those of the Naval General Staff. Yamamoto wanted to expand Japan's defense perimeter to the eastern Pacific. Yamamoto argued that the IJN should capture Midway and the islands of Johnston and Palmyra as advanced bases for an eventual landing on the Hawaiian Islands.¹⁵ He considered the capture of New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa to be a “folly.” In his view, it would be difficult to hold the islands some 4,000 miles from the home islands. Moreover, the operation would not be effective, because as long as the U.S. Pacific Fleet was afloat, it could always reach Australia by another route. Yamamoto was willing only to provide ships for the capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi, in the Solomons, but not for other positions in the South Pacific.¹⁶ The Combined Fleet plans also included the destruction of the British Eastern Fleet and the capture of Ceylon (today's Sri Lanka), thereby extending Japanese power over the central Indian Ocean, protecting the western flank of the NEI, and allowing the Combined Fleet to deal with the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

On 29 January 1942, the Naval General Staff issued “Great Navy Instruction N...