In 1977, the then Egyptian President Anwar Sadat went to Jerusalem. During his speech at the Knesset, he stated that there is a psychological wall between Arabs and Israelis that was the cause of seventy per cent of the problems between these two peoples. In response, the American Psychiatric Association’s Committee on Psychiatry and Foreign Affairs, of which I was a member, brought influential Arabs and Israelis together for unofficial dialogues for six years to make this wall permeable. In 1988, at the University of Virginia School of Medicine, I opened the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI), with a faculty of psychoanalysts, other mental health professionals, former diplomats, political scientists, historians, an environmentalist, and a linguist. This interdisciplinary team and I visited many areas of the world where international conflicts existed and brought together enemy representatives for years-long unofficial dialogues. After my retirement from the University of Virginia and after the closure of CSMHI in 2005, I established the International Dialogue Initiative (IDI) in 2008. The IDI is a private, multidisciplinary group comprised of psychoanalysts, academics, diplomats, and other professionals who meet biannually to examine large-group differences. The present IDI members come from Germany, Iran, Israel, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the West Bank.
Prior to my involvement in the Israeli-Egyptian dialogues, I studied the Cypriot Turkish society that had been living for eleven years (1963–1974) in enclaves surrounded by their enemies and their responses thereafter to the Turkish army’s de facto dividing of the island into north Cypriot Turkish and south Cypriot Greek sections (Volkan, 1979). Working in the international arena I also observed refugee Palestinians who were settled in Tunisia after the 1982 war in Lebanon (Volkan, 2013, 2014a) and visited traumatised Georgian and South Ossetian societies many times for five years after the war between these two societies, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. I observed Croats, Bosnians, and Serbians following the collapse of Yugoslavia and witnessed Kuwaitis’ response to the Iraqi invasion after the Iraqi forces withdrew. I also examined societies traumatised by dictators: Romanians and Albanians following the deaths of Nicolae Ceauşescu and Enver Hoxha (Volkan, 1997, 2004, 2013). I also spent four months in Israel in the period 2000–2001, interviewing Israelis and Arabs living there.
My observations of societal consequences of natural disasters, however, are very limited. I visited Mexico City ten days after the impact of an 8.1 magnitude earthquake that occurred on the morning of 19 September 1985, followed by a 7.5 magnitude earthquake thirty-six hours later. This natural disaster resulted in the collapse of more than 400 multi-storey buildings in the city. Official figures for the number of fatalities vary between 9,500 and more than 30,000. A magnitude 7.6 earthquake devastated Izmit, near Istanbul in Turkey, on 17 August 1999. Officials estimated that 17,000 people were killed, although other sources gave much higher figures, and more than 40,000 were injured. Two weeks later I went to Istanbul and consulted with dozens of psychiatrists and psychologists who were still working with survivors and injured individuals. The helpers themselves, stunned by what they had seen, needed psychological support as well.
News about shared massive catastrophes is continually brought to our attention. Some result from natural causes, such as earthquakes, floods, or volcanic eruptions; some are accidental catastrophes like the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Sometimes, the death of a leader, or of a person who functions as a “transference figure” for many in the society, creates individualised as well as societal responses. We witnessed this after the assassinations of John F. Kennedy in the United States (Wolfenstein & Kliman, 1965) and Yitzhak Rabin in Israel (Erlich, 1998; Moses-Hrushovski, 2000). Other shared experiences of disaster are due to the deliberate actions of an ethnic, national, religious, or ideological enemy group. Intentional catastrophes themselves range from wars to terrorist attacks, and from the traumatised group actively fighting its enemy to the traumatised group rendered passive and helpless. In this chapter I will not focus on the impact of massive trauma on individual psychology; I will instead examine psychological responses to a massive trauma shared by thousands or millions of people.
Sharing jokes
Sharing jokes is one of the first societal responses to a massive trauma. A psychoanalyst picked me up at the airport and drove me to Mexico City at the start of my visit ten days after the earthquake. While we were driving she asked me: “What is the similarity between a doughnut (a round pastry with a hole in the middle) and Mexico City?” The answer was that the middles of both were missing. I was surprised that the psychoanalyst was joking about a major tragedy within her own country, but later I would notice similar responses elsewhere. After the 28 January 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, the United States experienced a shared trauma. Classrooms all over the country had tuned in to the event on television so the children could witness and celebrate teacher Christa McAuliffe going into space. Instead, they witnessed a terrible tragedy and, starting with children, the whole country was traumatised. Soon tasteless jokes were heard countrywide. One described how the shampoo, “Head and Shoulders,” could be found on Miami Beach, symbolically referring to body parts of the dead crew members. Tasteless jokes also circulated in the United States following the events of 11 September 2001. Sigmund Freud (1905c) identified unconscious elements within a person by examining dreams and slips of the tongue (parapraxis), as well as jokes, and illustrated some similar psychodynamic elements in jokes and dreams (see reviews of Freud’s ideas on humour by Altman, 2006; Newirth, 2006). Still, circulating jokes within a society after a massive trauma has not been studied in depth within the psychoanalytic literature. On the surface, sharing jokes during and after a massive trauma, even while expecting such a trauma, sounds like an unreasonable thing to do. A closer look, however, illustrates that circulating certain jokes is part of the shared grieving and mourning processes, and also utilises defences against the impact of a shared trauma. By sharing jokes, traumatised members of a large group—such as a national, ethnic, religious, or ideological group—discharge their emotions after defensively reversing their affect and laughing instead of crying. They celebrate staying alive while hiding their “survival guilt” (Niederland, 1968).
Some jokes reflect discharging a shared sense of helplessness and humiliation. During dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu’s regime in Romania from 1965 to 1989, there were many jokes about a fictitious character named Bula (in Romanian, “bula” is a vulgar term for penis). A typical buffoon, he was an impotent, humiliated coward. In one story, Bula goes to a meeting, opens his briefcase, pulls out a revolver, and aims it at Ceauşescu. He shoots and shoots, but in their enthusiasm, the encouraging crowd push Bula to and fro, causing him to constantly miss his target in a pathetically comic manner.
Under authoritarian governments, other shared jokes are used with an opposite aim: to minimise the danger or humiliate a “bad” leader. I have no information about jokes shared by the Jewish population during the Nazi period, but today both types of jokes about Nazi Germany can be heard. The following joke, for example, illustrates an attempt to minimise danger: a German child happens to pass through a ghetto and notices another child with the yellow star. The German child asks the second child: “Are you Jewish?” The Jewish child answers: “No, I am the sheriff!”
Dictators, authoritarian political leaders, and people in their close circle do their best to suppress jokes about such traumatizing leaders. During the Third Reich, Joseph Goebbels forbade jokes about Adolf Hitler (Reimann, 1976). After the death of Joseph Stalin, I interviewed his two private interpreters, Valentin Berezhkov (Volkan, 1991a) and Zoya Zarubina. I learned that Stalin was unable to tolerate any jokes about himself. During the last decade, as the leadership in Turkey has become authoritarian, liberal-minded citizens have begun to experience, using Leonard Shengold’s (1991) term, “soul murder”. Shengold originally used this term to refer to the abuse or neglect of children that deprives them of their identities and ability to experience joy in life. In Turkey, many academicians circulate jokes about the present Turkish political leadership, while experiencing fear of going to jail.
I know of only one occasion in which the psychological meanings of jokes after a major trauma were not only understood, but were used therapeutically. Damir Arsenijević (see Chapter Nine), founder of the Psychoanalytic Seminar Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and his colleagues collected jokes after horrible events following the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. They were successful in opening what can be called “public classrooms” where they presented their findings on jokes. During these occasions laughter was lost, but Arsenijević and his colleagues were able to open up difficult topics of war, genocide, loss, and mourning.
Shared jokes that are circulated soon after a massive trauma takes place can indicate to an investigator whether a massive trauma is going to break the tissue of the affected society or not.
Breaking or not breaking the tissue of a society
Williams and Parkes (1975, p. 304) referred to a process after a shared trauma that they named “biosocial regeneration”. They informed us that for five years following the deaths of 116 children and 28 adults in an avalanche of coal slurry in the Welsh village of Aberfan in 1966, there was a significant increase in the birth rate among women who had not themselves lost a child. Thirty-three years af...