Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II

The 'Warthog' Ground Attack Aircraft

Peter C. Smith

• Editorial: Air World
• Año: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781526759276
• Categoría: Historia
• Categoría: Historia militar y marítima

A comprehensive account of the origins, design, and history of the A-10A Warthog: "Highly recommended." — AMPS Indianapolis Includes photos The Fairchild-Republic A-10A Close Support aircraft has become a legend over its long front line life. Known as the Warthog due to her unusual appearance, this little aircraft has built up an awesome reputation in the specialized ground-attack role, where her accuracy and deadliness are widely recognized as the best of their kind. Hard lessons from World War II, which were reinforced by the bitter experience of the Vietnam War two decades later, showed it was both impracticable and cost-inefficient to use supersonic fighter jets in the close air support mission. A requirement was therefore drawn up for a plane capable of carrying a heavy and varied load of ordnance, which had good endurance and unprecedented maneuverability and could survive heavy ground fire—thus the A-10 was born. But by the time it came into service its role had changed to that of a tank-buster in the defense of Western Europe in the face of the overwhelming numbers of Soviet battle armor. With her straight wing, twin tails, and turbine engines mounted high on her rear fuselage, this single-seat aircraft certainly presented a unique appearance. But all these features served a vital role, as Peter C. Smith explains in this highly detailed study. Although the Warthog's expected missions on the plains of Germany did not materialize, she did destroy hundreds of Soviet-built tanks during the Gulf wars. The A-10 has also flown almost continuous missions over the Balkans, against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and ISIS in Iraq and Syria. This beautifully illustrated and comprehensive volume brings the A-10's incredible story right up to date.

Chapter 1

Varying Origins

Close Air Support, Anti-Tank, COIN, LARA

The A-10A Thunderbolt II earned itself a formidable reputation as the tank-busting aircraft par excellence during the Gulf War. This was no hyped-up accolade; the facts speak for themselves. Although ‘Warthogs’ (as the A-10A has been affectionately and universally known almost since its inception) formed but a small fraction of the combined United Nations’ aerial armada that pounded Saddam Hussein’s massive tank force, the A-10A was credited with the bulk of the actual tank ‘kills’ by a very wide margin.

Yet the A-10A was not originally conceived as a totally dedicated tank-killing aircraft and, from its earliest inception, forced upon an extremely reluctant Air Force by the needs of the army on the ground and the army’s determination to see those needs satisfied, its role changed according to circumstances as it metamorphasized into the supreme armour-destroyer that we know today.

In fact, it can be said that there were three strands of history that influenced thought and which ultimately led to the A-10A ending up as a destroyer of tanks and armoured vehicles. These were (1) Immediate: with the urgent requirement by the army for a specially-designed close support aircraft following their experiences during the Vietnam War which forced them to adopt the semi-obsolete Navy AD Skyraider pistonengine aircraft as the A-1 because their own policies and neglect of this facet of air power had led to a paucity of suitable machines for the job. The Skyraider could carry an enormous total and range of ordnance and could loiter in the battle zone, but with improved AAA from enemy forces and the introduction of SAMs, such aircraft were proving vulnerable to ground defences. What was required was a ground-attack aircraft with the armoured protection of another Second World War aircraft, the Soviet Il-2 or Shturmovik. A modern equivalent, with the combined qualities of the AD and the Il-2, was thought to be the solution. (2) Generic: via the precision of the North American A-36 Apache dive-bomber, which was highly accurate, and via the Republic-linked name of original P-47D Thunderbolt fighter aircraft, also of the Second World War, which adopted both dive-bombing with bombs and low-level attacks with rockets to strike at German tanks and was thus thought a suitable precedent. (3) Historic: via the examples of the specialized and totally dedicated aircraft and weapons developed by the Junkers company and others for the German Air Force from the First World War on, and especially those designed to combat the self-same threat posed by tens of thousands of heavily-armoured Soviet tanks during the Second World War, the exact same threat that hung like a nightmare over all NATO defence planning more than thirty years later (see Diagram 1).

Diagram 1: Influences on design of A10A

(1) Immediate: Douglas AD Skyraider + Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik

(2) Generic: North American A-36 Apache - Republic P-47D Thunderbolt

(3) Historic: Junkers JI and CLI - Junkers 87 G Panzerknacker

Let us examine each facet of influence in turn and in detail.

(1) The role of close support had long been an area of acute controversy in the US Air Force. Even in the 1930s, while the US Navy was specializing in the dive-bomber as its main air weapon, the USAAF shunned the concept and preferred the low-level ‘Attack’ concept, also favoured by the RAF at that time. When the US eventually became embroiled in the Second World War its land forces came up against the German Junkers Ju 87 Stukas in North Africa and found themselves stopped dead by them on several occasions. There was much recrimination at the time1 and the only available aircraft the USAAF had to carry out the Close Air Support (CAS) role, Curtiss P-40 fighters armed with under-wing bombs, proved totally inadequate and inefficient for this role.

The introduction in 1943 of the North American A-36, an Alison-engine prototype of the Mustang fighter fitted with Vultee dive brakes, proved more valuable, and this aircraft was both fast and accurate. It served very satisfactorily at Sicily, Salerno and Anzio in 1943–44 and in Burma and China in the same period, but only 500 had been built and once they had been used up, the USAAF was forced back to fighter-bombers for CAS once more.

Although a special study into Tactical Air Power was set up post-war, the introduction of the jet aircraft again produced argument and counter-argument and during the next major incident, the Korean War, there was again an acute lack of suitable aircraft for this duty. Once more, there was much bitterness between the army, who wanted Marine-type air support that was heavy, accurate and sustainable, and the Air Force jet pilots, who simply wanted to dogfight with MiGs and not get involved in ground-attack other than quick ‘in-bash-out’-type operations, which proved both inaccurate and meaningless. This lesson had to be re-learned in the Korean War in the early 1950s and was promptly forgotten, or more truly buried, by a strategical bomber-dominated Air Force hierarchy who still despised the Close Air Support role.

Again the arguments were vented and re-vented but the sum total was that when the Vietnam War became a full shooting war for the Americans, the most reliable aircraft to support troops on the ground proved itself to be the same old slow, reliable but accurate and enduring Douglas AD Skyraider that the US Navy and Marine Corps had used in Korea a decade or more earlier, for which there was still no US Air Force equivalent.

The deep studies into Counter Insurgency (COIN) aircraft came up with various answers, none of which was a satisfactory one. In the end, following the lead of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), the US Air Force was forced to adopt retired US Navy ‘Spads’, refit and refurbish them and use them in the Ground Support role themselves as nothing else proved suitable. This was obviously not a satisfactory outcome for the USAF, but with the army calling for an aircraft that could deliver varied and sustainable ordnance and loiter over the battle zone, only the Able Dog filled the bill, even though she was to become increasingly vulnerable as time went on. So badly did the army want such an aircraft and so powerless was the Air Force to supply it, that serious consideration was given by the former service to buying, training and utilizing their own aircraft to do the job. This naturally raised hackles and alarm in the Air Force, who considered CAS ‘their job’, having been assigned the task when they gained independence from the army in 1948 under the Key West Agreement, even though they had refused to produce any specialized warplanes to carry it out. They were forced into a hasty re-think on policy.

Close Air Support was defined by the USAF in 1974 thus: ‘Air attacks against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which required detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.’2 This definition still holds good today of course, but even back then how to best provide such aerial firepower on the battlefield and, equally controversial, who was to provide it, was subject of the same bitter debate. Then, as now, it turned into a ‘war of attrition’ for steadily reducing funding in the aftermath of the disastrous outcome of the Vietnam War and enormous acrimony between the USAF (who did not want the job but did not want to relinquish any fixed-wing aircraft), and the US army (who deemed the mission absolutely vital and were therefore prepared to conduct it themselves). The army made repeated attempts to have its say on CAS but was repeatedly thwarted by the USAF throughout the 1950s, 1960s and onward.

The expeditious use of the North American T-28D trainer converted for use as a light ground-attack aircraft was considered, following the lead of the French in Algeria with the Fennec, but of course they faced little or no ground opposition and were thus able to operate almost freely. Initially the same conditions may have been relevant against the Viet Cong, but as the Soviet Union increasingly supplied them, and later the North Vietnamese regular army forces engaged with sophisticated 12.7mm-calibre multi-barrel AAA and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems, the vulnerability of such makeshift types rapidly increased. This increased firepower by the Communist forces brought about the early termination of the projected Light Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LARA) project, which had called for a relatively unsophisticated aircraft able to operate with all three services (Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy) as well as the Vietnamese. Although such an aircraft did eventually appear, the Rockwell OV-10 Bronco, it was used more as a Forward Air Control (FAC) aircraft for this reason. Another solution had to be found and another interim measure was adopted.

The French had also used their own Douglas Skyraiders in the CAS role, and the Vietnamese Air Force was also supplied with this aircraft by America. It proved a great success, so much so that the USAF eventually adopted the A-1 Skyraider themselves.

The establishment of 1 Fighter Squadron (Commando) FS(C) at Bien Hoa airfield significantly escalated American intervention in South-East Asia. Originally three American Skyraider squadrons were planned in order to give the necessary ‘stiffening’ of the VNAF units. The first detachment, 1 FS(C), commanded by Lieutenant Commander John M. Porter (later relieved by Lieutenant Commander William R. Eichelberger), was based at Bien Hoa from 8 July 1963 as part of 34 Tactical Group, their A-1Es Skyraider arriving there on 1 May 1964.

Re-designated 1 Air Commando Squadron, Composite, this unit became part of 6251 Tactical Fighter Wing on 8 July 1965, before moving into 3 Tactical Fighter Wing on 21 November 1965 and then, by 8 March 1966, 14 Air Commando Wing. Their duties soon expanded from the training of VNAF pilots to much more active participation in the war, flying psychological warfare, photo reconnaissance missions and, eventually, full combat bomber missions.

On 15 August 1967, this unit was re-designated as 1 Air Commando Squadron, Fighter, commanded by Lieutenant Commander James R. Hildreth, and was once more re-organized to become part of 56 Air Commando Wing on 20 December 1967. This wing was soon re-designated as 56 Special Operations Wing and, on 15 August 1967, was re-designated 1 Special Operations Squadron, with Lieutenant Commander John A. Saffell Jr. taking command on 20 December 1967. On 5 January 1966, 1 Air Commando began operations from Pleiku Air Base.

A-1J Skyraider (Bu. 142028) from USS Intrepid, of VA-176 over Vietnamese waters in 1966. (US Navy National Museum of Naval Aviation Pensacola, Florida)

From their success, a second USAF Skyraider squadron, 6 Air Commando, was established at England Air Force Base as part of 1 Air Commando Wing. From August 1967, the initial duties of the pilots of this squadron were to fly A-1H and A-1J Skyraiders from Davis-Monthan air base over to the US Navy facility at Quonset Point, Rhode Island for them to be refurbished and then fly them back to England AFB. Eventually fourteen pilots, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Repp, initiated a full re-training programme which continued until February 1968. On completion of this they transferred, via the Survival School at Clark AFB, to Pleiku, Vietnam. Under the command of Commander Wallace A. Ford, they had an establishment strength of 25 pilots with 135 airmen. In mid-March, the squadron’s twenty aircraft were unloaded at Cam Ranh Bay from the escort carrier transport ship and the squadron commenced operations.3

The Skyraider had enormous load-carrying capability and staying power but, with growing Communist AAA and SAM power, she proved more and more vulnerable to ground defences. Extra protection for both pilot and powerplant were necessary to give some degree of immunity in such a dangerous role. A powerful precedent for this type of flying armoured box had been set during the Second World War by the Soviet Union, who, developing strong anti-aircraft defences of their own, had seen the need early on.

The most famous development of the Soviet approach to low-level air attack and ground strafing had been the development and use of the Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik aircraft, which had received wide publicity in the West at that time.4 The Il-2 was indeed a formidable weapon of air warfare for, although of standard construction and lacking any outstanding performance like its contemporary, the Petlyakov Pe-2 dive-bomber, which was faster than many fighters, the Shturmovik was immensely strong and rugged, able to take considerable punishment and also to operate efficiently at low level. Its origins dated back to the unsatisfactory performance of the Nyeman R-10 and Sukhoi Su-2, which led in turn to an extremely specialized aircraft being demanded to fulfil the ground-attack role, the BSh-2, Bronirovanny Shturmovik (which can be translated as Armoured Assault).

As envisaged, the BSh-2 was to incorporate the heaviest possible armour protection, simplicity and toughness of construction, with the largest possible engine to haul it through the sky and carry into action a heavy forward-firing machine-gun armament of four ShKAS 7.62mm guns mounted in the wings, along with unguided rocket-projectiles like the RS-82 and the later RBS-82 and ROFS-132, exclusively for ground-attack work. High performance, rear gun protection and all other considerations went by the board in order to concentrate on this principal mission.

Ilyushin took up the challenge and came up with a single-engine, the AM-38 in-line rated at 1,600hp, which was originally a twin-seat design that seemed to fit the bill. Basically of standard metal construction with regard to the outer portions of the aircraft, nose, tail, rear fuselage and wings, the core of the Il-2 was virtually an armoured box that encased the vitals of the machine, the pilot’s area (Stalin having insisted the design be altered from a two-seater to a single-seater to economize on space), the engine compartment, the fuel tanks and the radiators. This ‘box’ was built of 7mm thick armour plate, which increased to a maximum of 12mm behind the pilot, the most vulnerable area as there was now no rear gunner.

By the time the Il-2 entered service, the strafing potential had been considerably enhanced by the adoption of two ShVAK 20mm cannon, with 100 rounds per gun, in place of two of the wing-mounted machine guns, with up to eight RS-82 rockets being carried on under-wing racks. The aircraft had an internal bomb-bay but, by utilizing the under-wing capacity in place of rockets, up to 1,320lb of bombs could be taken into battle. The speed was of course limited, some 270 mph being about the best, but this was not deemed essential, nor was the range – a mere 370 to 450 miles at most – for what was a totally dedicated tactical aircraft.

When the Soviet Union was invaded by Germany in June 1941, only a small number of Shturmoviks were available and their first taste of action was on 26 June 1941 when 4 Shturmovoi Aviapolk (ShAP or Ground Attack Air Regiment) went into action over the Berezina River. With an established strength of sixty-five aircraft, this former medium bomb unit was thrown into battle with little or no conversion training for either aircrew or ground-support complement and suffer...