European Economic Legal Order After Brexit
Legacy, Regulation, and Policy
Enzo Cardi
- 144 páginas
- English
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European Economic Legal Order After Brexit
Legacy, Regulation, and Policy
Enzo Cardi
Información del libro
This book takes an innovative approach to provide a mirror perspective of the legal systems of the UK and the EU in contemporary institutional scenarios.
At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the legal systems of the EU and the UK are facing challenges of epic proportions. Never before have the two legal orders been confronted with the simultaneous impact of a series of events. First, the effect of the "divorce" between the two regulatory systems caused by the UK's withdrawal from the EU. The Negotiating Documents and the Draft Texts being discussed and aimed at leading to a `New Partnership' are examined in the book. Second, the book discusses the impact of the coronavirus shock in all European economies leading to a substantial change of political perspective in the EU legal order implying innovative debt instruments. Third, it explores the consequences of the judicial activism of the German Constitutional Court undermining the strategic role of the European Central Bank and the primacy of the European Union Court of Justice. The book questions the effects deriving from the legacy, i.e. the foundations of the two legal systems, on handling the issues of our time, the impact on market regulation of the striking contemporary events and the unsettled consequences on policy of the current convulsing political and financial landscape.
The book will be essential reading for those working in the areas of European public regulatory law.
Preguntas frecuentes
Información
Part 1
LEGACY
Chapter 1
ORIGINS
Intellectual Legacy
“Alongside and allied to this is the fact that it was a world dominated by the rule of law, which closely regulated the relations between the individual and the State and between one man and another” [P. SALWAY (1981)].
“à partir de ius s’est forgé tout un vocabulaire qui passera du latin aux langues européennes avec la renaissance médiévale du droit romain dans les universités” [S. KERNEIS (2018)].
“les difficultés des juristes à construire un droit européen illustrent bien sȗr la diversité des cultures juridiques […] de l’attachement des nations à leurs droits et aux traditions qui les fondent” [S. KERNEIS (2018)].
“from the middle or end of the thirteenth century, no lawyer in an English Common law court, for example, would have thought to build an argument on texts drawn from Roman Law” [J. BELL, C. KILPATRICK (2006].
“‘Civilian’ was the term commonly used to describe English lawyers trained in the Roman hand canon laws whose careers were spent in the several courts where the European ius commune provided the principal source of substantive and procedural law” [R.H. HELMOLTZ, in D. IBBETSON et al. (2019)].
“so far as there is any consistent theory of custom at all in Roman Law, it is clearly relegated to a subordinate position among the sources of law” [C.K. ALLEN (1964)].
“Durant les siècles qui suivirent, ils divergèrent pour former deux grandes familles, celle des droits issus de ce que les juristes anglo-saxons considèrent être Civil Law, le droit romain, et celle des droits de Common Law, un droit des juges prétendu coutumier. L’opposition allait durer, elle divise aujourd’hui l’Europe” [S. KERNEIS (2018)].
“entre droit et économie dans l’élaboration de la norme ou bien encore de la concurrence entre Civil Law et Common Law à travers notamment le projet de construction d’un droit européen” [S. KERNEIS (2018)].
The age of “accession”
“to become larger than the Roman Empire, let alone the Holy Roman Empire, had ever been. It now includes countries that had not been part of either, and indeed countries that never accepted the aim of a federation, like Britain. The effect is undoubtedly one of overstretch, not only in physical and financial terms, but also in terms of having brought in societies where the values of the old members are not fully shared” [B. HEUSER (2019)].