China's Globalization from Below

Chinese Entrepreneurial Migrants and the Belt and Road Initiative

Theodor Tudoroiu

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000435818
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Sciences sociales
• Categoría: Études ethniques

This book analyzes the Chinese-centered globalization 'from below' brought about by China's entrepreneurial migrants and conceived of as a projection of Chinese power in the Belt and Road Initiative partner states. It identifies the features of this globalization 'from below, ' scrutinizes its mutually reinforcing relationship with China's globalization 'from above, ' and shows that these two globalizations are intrinsically related to the construction of a new international order. It outlines how the actors in China's globalization 'from below' include Chinese emigrants who are located in informal transnational economic networks. It reveals that Beijing has enacted many laws that compel these emigrants to contribute to the development of their country of origin but also influences them through the successful promotion of a specific type of deterritorialized nationalism; and that China is ready to impose harsh punitive actions on political elites in partner states which fail to protect its migrants or limit their economic activities. Finally, it argues that China's globalization 'from below' is fundamentally different from the non-hegemonic globalization 'from below' represented by, among others, Lebanese and East Indian traders, and that China's globalization 'from below' is rather a self-interested national strategy intended to support the construction of a Chinese-centered international order.

1 Introduction

DOI: 10.4324/9781003204947-1

Unknown to many, there are no less than five contemporary globalizations. This book is the first to analyze the most discreet of them: the Chinese-centered globalization ‘from below.’ It is enacted by millions of Chinese entrepreneurial migrants – hence the ‘from below’ label – that everybody can see and many anthropologists have studied. But it is also closely associated with exotic-sounding concepts such as deterritorialized nationalism and normative power; unusual structures that include the overseas Chinese state; obscure activities such as overseas Chinese work and united front work; and grandiose strategies that target no less than the construction of a new international order. These various aspects have already been examined, separately, by academics ranging from aforementioned anthropologists to International Relations (IR) scholars. However, the overall phenomenon they form has never been put together and analyzed in its fascinating complexity. This is done in the following pages in the hope that other studies will further develop this field of research.

‘Globalization’ is widely acknowledged as the most important international process of our times. Hated or hailed, the tremendous Neoliberal, Western-centered transformation of the world enacted by multinational corporations and shaped by multilateral institutions cannot be ignored by anyone. However, the first sentence of this Introduction has certainly surprised a good number of readers. ‘Five globalizations? Unlikely. I would have heard about them.’ In fact, two ‘from below’ ones have already been studied in detail. In their case, possible puzzlement is simply due to the relatively narrow fields to which associated scholars pertain. On the one hand, a significant corpus of literature concerning the transnational social movements analyzes what is known as the counter-hegemonic globalization ‘from below’: the political resistance movement organized by transnational protest networks that try to construct a ‘global opposition’ to Neoliberalism. The World Social Forum and the highly publicized 1999–2001 anti-globalization protests of Seattle, Washington, Quebec, and Genoa are part of this globalization. On the other hand, anthropologists have provided in-depth studies of the non-hegemonic globalization ‘from below’ represented by informal transnational economic networks, which include ‘shuttle traders’ and local street vendors of global gadgets. Unconcerned by hegemony, the informal economy enacted by such small traders nevertheless challenges the regulatory framework of the Neoliberal international order. It fills the niches and interstices neglected by the Western-centered globalization ‘from above’ that, in many poor Global South societies, it actually replaces. Scholars, on the contrary, have been hesitant to speak explicitly about the two globalizations associated with China’s transformation into a global power. The frequently employed term ‘globalization with Chinese characteristics’ remains rather ambiguous. A clear difference should be made between the Middle Kingdom’s role within two different globalizations ‘from above.’ China is deeply involved in the working of the Western-centered one, but mainly as a key source of manufactured goods. Despite significant efforts to upgrade its status, Beijing plays only a marginal role in setting the rules of the game. This is why it has launched its own globalization ‘from above’ that uses the Belt and Road Initiative as its main vehicle and the Chinese socialization of political elites in partner states as a highly effective instrument. At the same time, it has set up the Chinese-centered globalization ‘from below’ studied in this book. Interestingly, China’s two globalizations are interconnected and reinforce each other. They form a virtuous circle conducive to the construction of a new, Chinese-centered international order, which represents Beijing’s ultimate objective. When all five globalizations are considered, it is important to emphasize the fact that they are not ‘forms,’ ‘dimensions,’ or ‘components’ of one general process. They represent separate processes, with distinct and frequently contradictory logics and dynamics. In particular, the Western-centered globalization ‘from above’ is explicitly or implicitly challenged by all the other ones, which have in fact emerged as reactions to its dominance.

This book proposes an International Relations analysis of the Chinese-centered globalization ‘from below,’ which I define as the massive transnational flow of people and goods that is enacted by Chinese entrepreneurial migrants, targets mainly Belt and Road Initiative partner states, relies on business and social ethnic networks, and is based in part on informal transactions. Critically, this process is in large measure entangled with China’s policies and projection of normative power intended to construct a Chinese-centered international order. This definition and the present book are based on the following line of reasoning, which is presented in an expanded form in Section 9.1. The Chinese entrepreneurial migrants are heavily dependent on their country of origin in terms of capital, merchandise, and labor. They tend to settle in Belt and Road Initiative partner states, where the government in Beijing supports them through the imposition of its social norm on the local Chinese-socialized political elites in power. This norm prevents BRI governments from regulating Chinese migrants’ inflow or economic activities. Most migrants are under the strong influence of the overseas Chinese state due to its successful promotion of a specific form of deterritorialized nationalism. This is done through manipulative political strategies that use instruments such as the control of Chinese-language media and ethnic Chinese organizations in the host country, united front work, economic incentives, and diplomatic protection. In fact, the very decision to emigrate and much of the migrants’ ensuing actions have to be understood as being in large measure associated with another set of factors than those characterizing the spontaneous, rational choice moves of migrants from other countries. They are ‘intimately entangled with Chinese state policies and processes’ (Huynh et al. 2010: 290; Green 2012–2014: 26). Between 1978 and 2000 alone, no less than 360 laws were adopted that concern Chinese emigrants (Pokam 2015: 51, 53; Röschenthaler and Socpa 2017: 180). The overseas Chinese state has succeeded in promoting its deterritorialized nationalism in ways that have shaped the identity and modified the interests of most new and many old members of the diaspora. They have become an expression of China’s soft power, as well as bearers of Chinese national interests (Barabantseva 2011: 101) and ‘conduits of China’s globalization’ (Nyíri 2011: 148; Wang and Zhan 2019: 18). The Chinese entrepreneurial migrants contribute to diminishing unemployment and alleviating social tensions back home, repatriate profits, act as highly useful intermediaries between Chinese and local companies, spread the Chinese civilization, increase the Chinese presence and influence in their country of settlement, and serve as public diplomats. Critically, prominent entrepreneurial migrants have become influent actors in their host countries who provide ‘strategic local links and pathways to the backdoors of power’ (Tjon Sie Fat 2009: 144) to the overseas Chinese state. These migrants represent valuable intermediaries between China’s diplomats and firms, on the one side, and local decision-makers, on the other. They help the overseas Chinese state to interact with and further socialize the local political elites in power. This is a major contribution to the enhancement of China’s globalization ‘from above,’ which is responsible for the initial socialization of local elites and their internalization of the Chinese social norm. Because they contribute to and depend on the socialization of local political elites, the two Chinese globalizations are expressions of China’s normative power. Moreover, in the case of the ‘from below’ one, there is a double projection of this type of power. On the one hand, it is used directly against the local political elites in power; on the other hand, it targets the very Chinese entrepreneurial migrants, who are made to accept China’s deterritorialized nationalism and act as Beijing’s agents of influence. Finally, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Chinese-centered globalization ‘from below,’ as well as the ‘from above’ one, does not represent the ultimate goal of the leadership in Beijing. It is only an instrument used to construct a future Chinese-centered international order that would reflect China’s new potential and aspirations.

The theoretical approach I employ to analyze this complex phenomenon is International Relations Constructivism. Accordingly, the Chinese socialization of political elites is assessed as a form of role playing, Type I socialization, to use Jeffrey Checkel’s terminology. China’s globalization ‘from below’ as a whole is understood as a still immature Constructivist international regime. However, perhaps the most important consequence of my theoretical orientation is the post-positivist bias present all over the analysis, which I fully acknowledge. I reject the determinism of approaches centered on the overwhelming power of structures. I believe, on the contrary, in the power of values and ideas. Despite their heavy material content, I see globalizations as products of cognition. In this context, I have to mention my strong conviction that International Relations structural approaches previously employed in the study of the non-hegemonic globalization ‘from below’ are incompatible with the agency of entrepreneurial migrants repeatedly emphasized by fieldwork findings as discussed in Section 9.3; hence my preference for Constructivism.

The issue of fieldwork brings me to the book’s methodology. All data are drawn from secondary sources, which are abundant. There are literally thousands of works exploring various aspects of the Chinese ‘from below’ presence in the Global South. Numerous anthropological studies provide detailed information on the activities and trajectories of Chinese entrepreneurial migrants individually and as a group. The way they are perceived by and interact with the Chinese-socialized local political elites and the society at large is also well-documented in both the scholarly literature – books, peer-reviewed articles, and conference papers – and reports, newspaper articles, website pages, and other sources available on the Internet. The book draws its conclusions from four case studies that are representative of the variety of situations depicted by these sources. The key criterion I used in their selection was to avoid overlapping, which allows concerned chapters to cover highly diverse circumstances and patterns of interaction.

The case study of Ghana is representative of the frequently discussed and highly controversial Chinese presence in Africa. The country experienced Chinese socialization of political elites under President Nkrumah back in the 1960s. More recently, the renewed partnership initiated in 2001 by President Kufuor has been marked by the usual large Chinese loan-financed infrastructure projects – which helped socialize the political elites in power – and by Chinese-triggered deindustrialization. The massive inflow of Chinese entrepreneurial migrants resulted in a numerous but surprisingly fragmented community that perceives itself as highly vulnerable. Paradoxically, the strong China-weak Ghana contrast is replaced at an individual level by the opposition between weak Chinese and strong Africans. This vulnerability, as well as other factors, makes the migrants very sensible to Beijing’s state transnationalism, which has resulted in their adoption of deterritorialized Chinese nationalism and the preservation of strong ties with the fatherland. The most interesting aspect, however, is represented by the galamsey (illegal gold mining) episode that illustrates the transformation of China’s social norm into a strong form of conditionality: when illegal Chinese migrants involved in an illegal and widely criticized economic activity were legitimately deported by the Ghanaian authorities, the government in Beijing retaliated with severe sanctions conceived as a lesson to all Belt and Road governments that might contemplate actions detrimental to the Chinese-centered globalization ‘from below.’

No such measures were needed in Suriname, which is presented in the second case study. There, two specific factors significantly influenced the relationship with China and its migrants: apanjaht consociationalism as a form of ethnic power-sharing resulting in massive clientelism, and President Bouterse’s authoritarian past and criminal record that, during his 2010–2020 tenure, dramatically diminished development assistance from the West. Loan-financed infrastructure projects calculated to be inaugurated shortly before elections were used by Beijing to successfully socialize the Surinamese political elites in power. The ensuing acceptance of China’s social norm resulted in considerable numbers of ‘new’ Chinese entrepreneurial migrants entering the country legally or illegally. The weight of ethnic Chinese increased from 2 percent to perhaps 10 percent of the population. Taking advantage of the clientelist system associated with apanjaht consociationalism, prominent Chinese entrepreneurial migrants forged close links with the political elites in power. They have become valuable intermediaries between the latter and China’s embassy and firms, and contributed to the further socialization of elites. However, the ‘new’ Chinese migrants came to be very negatively perceived by the Surinamese society. On two occasions, they became the target of large-scale violence, which allowed for the vocal intervention of the Chinese ambassador. A clear gap has developed between Suriname’s elites and citizens, but this has not prevented the former from maintaining their Beijing-friendly attitude that is greatly beneficial to the Chinese globalization ‘from below.’

The situation is fundamentally different in Kyrgyzstan, which is the object of the third case study. While they do preserve a parallel partnership with Russia, the Kyrgyz political elites were socialized by China through an original use of its large infrastructure projects. Corruption is so developed in the Central Asian state that institutional structures are often replaced by informal corruption-based clientelistic relations. The patronage networks that control the country have little interest in the political legitimacy and electoral support associated with the completion of loan-financed projects. They prefer to use the latter as a source of massive illicit revenue. The huge bribes paid by Chinese firms reinforce the patronage networks – which distribute profit among their members – and increase the chances of their leaders to stay in power. But this is very negatively perceived by the citizenry, which also harbors strong anti-Chinese sentiments due to a multitude of economic, political, historical, and cultural factors. Resulting Sinophobia led to widespread hostility against the Chinese influence and the Chinese entrepreneurial migrants that, at one point, represented a major group in Kyrgyzstan’s bazaars. The elites-society gap reached a level that delegitimized – and threatened the very stability of – the government in Bishkek. It should be noted that the weak Kyrgyz state experienced revolutions in 2005, 2010, and 2020. To prevent the possible overthrow of its protégés, the leadership in Beijing accepted to significantly downscale the Chinese presence in Kyrgyzstan. Having to make a choice between China’s state-owned firms constructing large Belt and Road Initiative projects and the Chinese entrepreneurial migrants, it was the latter’s globalization ‘from below’ that was sacrificed. The Chinese migrants in Kyrgyzstan almost disappeared, which allowed the ‘from above’ components of the Sino-Kyrgyz partnership to continue their expansion.

The last case study is somewhat surprising, as it examines a developed country, New Zealand, which joined the Belt and Road Initiative and whose Chinese-socialized National Party elites adopted a pronounced pro-Beijing attitude between 2008 and 2017. A points-based immigration system led to the massive arrival of Chinese entrepreneurial migrants, many of whom reached prominent social positions. This allowed them to directly interact with local political elites and to contribute decisively to their Chinese socialization. An elites-society gap developed as elsewhere in the Belt and Road Initiative; but, interestingly, it was mainly associated with the issue of democratic values that the government in Wellington failed to support in its interactions with the Chinese Big Brother. A series of scandals that led to the electoral defeat of the Chinese-socialized government in 2017 revealed detailed information about Beijing’s complex actions (that critically included united front work) targeting both the political elites of the antipodean country and the Chinese migrants eventually used to influence them. The case of New Zealand is also interesting because it shows the failure of the ‘compartmentalization’ strategy promoted by the National Party in its effort to preserve parallel partnerships with both China and the United States. This example is useful to the discussion in the book’s last section of possible scenarios describing the evolution of the Chinese-centered globalization ‘from below’ in a world strongly marked by Sino-American competition.

The four case studies illuminate a large number of features of this globalization, which are analyzed in the final chapter. Here, I will only mention two of them. First, it is beyond the shadow of a doubt that, unlike their East Indian or Lebanese counterparts, the Chinese entrepreneurial migrants do not pertain to the non-hegemonic globalization ‘from below.’ Theirs is a different globalization, which is deeply influenced by the multifaceted involvement of the Chinese state. Second, while globalizations are complex phenomena particularly difficult to control, the huge bureaucratic apparatus constructed by the leadership in Beijing – which includes the so-called overseas Chinese state – has been highly successful in shaping and steering the Chinese-centered globalization ‘from below.’ In particular, it has been able to ensure its intertwining with China’s globalization ‘from above’ and their mutual reinforcing resulting in a virtuous circle. In Suriname, this was a natural process due to local elites’ total indifference to the elites-society gap. In Ghana it was not, as shown by the galamsey crisis. But harsh Chinese retaliation brought deviant elites back on the right...