The Psychological Basis of Moral Judgments

Philosophical and Empirical Approaches to Moral Relativism

John Park

• Editorial: Routledge
• Año: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000402223
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Filosofia
• Categoría: Filosofia etica e morale

This volume examines the psychological basis of moral judgments and asks what theories of concepts apply to moral concepts. By combining philosophical reasoning and empirical insights from the fields of moral psychology, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and neuroscience, it considers what mental states not only influence, but also constitute our moral concepts and judgments. On this basis, Park proposes a novel pluralistic theory of moral concepts which includes three different cognitive structures and emotions. Thus, our moral judgments are shown to be a hybrid that express both cognitive and conative states.

In part through analysis of new empirical data on moral semantic intuitions, gathered via cross-cultural experimental research, Park reveals that the referents of individuals' moral judgments and concepts vary across time, contexts, and groups. On this basis, he contends for moral relativism, where moral judgments cannot be universally true across time and location but only relative to groups.

This powerfully argued text will be of interest to researchers, academics, and educators with an interest in cognitive science, moral theory, philosophy of psychology, and moral psychology more broadly. Those interested in ethics, applied social psychology, and moral development will also benefit from the volume.

Part I
The Constitution Project

1 The Groundwork for Theories of Moral Concepts

The basic unit of a moral judgment is a concept. For example, my judgment POLLUTING IS WRONG is made up of three concepts represented in all capitalized letters: POLLUTING, IS, and WRONG. Yet, what is a concept? More specifically, what is a moral concept? This book explores what theories of concepts apply to moral ones. It is concerned with examining the psychological nature of moral concepts and the implications this may have in moral philosophy. This chapter will lay down the groundwork for our inquiry into this foundational project in moral psychology.

Theories of concepts can have far-reaching ramifications in metaethics and normative ethics. In later chapters I will conclude that our moral concepts can be constituted by an array of cognitive mental states as well as by conative states like sentiments and emotions. When I say that a moral concept is constituted by a particular mental state, I mean that the moral concept just is that particular mental state, where I am using the “is” of identity. To discuss what constitutes a concept is to discuss what the nature of a concept is. My conclusion on the nature of moral concepts then will lead to a view that combines certain elements of metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism concerning the nature of our moral judgments in that our moral judgments generally express both beliefs and conative mental states. Since our moral concepts, like WRONG, are constituted by cognitive and conative states, then judgments that contain moral concepts, like POULLUTING IS WRONG, express both cognitive and conative states in virtue of containing moral concepts that just are certain cognitive and conative states. Although we will discuss metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism in much greater detail in later chapters, one aspect of cognitivism is that it generally holds that moral judgments express beliefs. On the other hand, one element of non-cognitivism is that it generally claims moral judgments express emotions, attitudes, and/or desires.¹ On an a priori approach, the cognitivism/non-cognitivism debate appears to be an interminable issue that is generally mired in philosophers having different a priori intuitions on the matter. However, the question of what mental state(s) constitutes our moral concepts is an empirically tractable question. I explore the nature of moral concepts based on experimental evidence and hope to shed new light on this debate.

Furthermore, my theory of moral concepts will lead to a certain internalist position in the motivational judgment internalism/externalism debate. Although there are variants of it, motivational judgment internalism generally maintains that there is a necessary connection between making a sincere moral judgment and at least having some degree of motivation to act on the judgment. Externalism denies this necessary connection. I will contend that my theory of moral concepts, which includes motivating emotional states and dispositions to feel emotions, leads to a certain internalist position. This debate is also one that is commonly based on a priori intuitions drawn from thought experiments in which there is a lack of consensus. However, I will show how this issue can be put on better ground via a cognitive scientific approach to moral concepts.

In normative ethics, most philosophers presuppose that their moral concepts have representations of necessary and sufficient conditions to them. They assume that if we have the proper strict definition for our concepts in mind, such as for RIGHT ACTION, PERSONHOOD, or DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, we can then apply it to real world cases. However, this assumption is one on the nature of moral concepts. It presumes that our moral concepts have classical structure in that it can be constituted by representations of necessary and sufficient conditions. For example, my RIGHT ACTION concept may be constituted by WHAT A HIGHLY VIRTUOUS PERSON WILL DO, where this represents a necessary and sufficient condition for being a right act. However, this assumption will be challenged, and the basic framework for how to approach normative ethics based on a psychologically real theory of moral concepts will be posited.

Moreover, through most of the history of philosophy and the study of concepts, most have believed that there is only one correct monolithic theory of concepts for all concept domains. Nevertheless, I will demonstrate that there are many different theories of concepts that apply to moral ones. Also, most a priori and a posteriori-based moral psychologists do not discuss what contemporary theories of concepts apply to moral ones, and those who do, fail to explore and assess all the major views. However, I will analyze all the major theories of concepts to see if they are viable for moral concepts. I will empirically prove that our moral concepts generally have four different psychological structures; three cognitive structures and one conative.

Examining the nature of concepts dates back to the likes of Plato and Aristotle. Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, and Hume called concepts ideas that are the materials of thought and the human understanding. For example, the British Empiricists claimed in varying degrees that our concepts, which are the building blocks of propositional knowledge claims, are pictorial images acquired from the senses. Rationalists who believe that not all knowledge comes from the senses deny this claim. Ideas or concepts are mental representations that are psychological states that represent or purport to refer to properties and categories. For example, my idea NIETZSCHE in my mind refers to, is about, or represents the historical German philosopher, Nietzsche. There are exceptions to this as there can be mental representations, like CHIMERA, that do not purport to refer at all. Furthermore, concepts largely are causally responsible for how we think and reason about the extension or referent of our ideas.

For those who are not familiar with the contemporary concepts literature but only its history, much has changed since Modern philosophers theorized about concepts. Although contemporary work on theories of concepts is recognizably built off of and indebted to such philosophers, today, the concepts field is interdisciplinary combining the work of philosophers, psychologists, linguists, and neuroscientists. Hence, this area concerning theories of concepts is an inquiry in cognitive science or the interdisciplinary study of the mind and cognition. What our concepts are is an empirically tractable question, and cognitive scientists have been running experiments on the nature of our concepts for decades now in order to justify concept constitution claims. Most philosophers who write about the theories of concepts tend to be philosophers of mind or of cognitive science rather than moral philosophers, so there has been far less work on examining the current theories of concepts in light of moral mental representations as compared to standard concrete concepts ordinarily tested for in the concepts literature like CAT, APPLE, and CUP that are of things like household objects and biological species. However, this book is the first to address all the major contemporary theories of concepts to see which ones apply to moral concepts.

The three books in Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects synchronically are of the understanding, emotions, and morals. Hume unifies the books of th...