Power and Progress

Joseph Ibn Kaspi and the Meaning of History

Alexander Green

• Editorial: SUNY Press
• Año: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781438476049
• Categoría: Theology & Religion
• Categoría: Jewish Theology

The philosopher and biblical commentator Joseph Ibn Kaspi (1280–1345) was a provocative Jewish thinker of the medieval era whose works have generally been overlooked by modern scholars. Power and Progress by Alexander Green is the first book in English to focus on a central aspect of his work: Ibn Kaspi's philosophy of history. Green argues that Ibn Kaspi understood history as guided by two distinct but interdependent forces: power and progress, both of which he saw manifest in the biblical narrative. Ibn Kaspi discerned that the use of power to shape history is predominantly seen in the political competition between kingdoms. Yet he also believed that there is historical progress in the continuous development and dissemination of knowledge over time. This he derived from the biblical vision of the divine chariot and its varied descriptions across different biblical texts, each revealing more details of a complex, multifaceted picture. Although these two concepts of what drives history are separate, they are also reliant upon one another. National survival is dependent on the progress of knowledge of the order of nature, and the progress of knowledge is reliant on national success. In this way, Green reveals Ibn Kaspi to be more than a mere commentator on texts, but a highly innovative thinker whose insights into the subtleties of the Bible produced a view of history that is both groundbreaking and original.

Chapter 1

History as Power and Competition

The first model of history that Ibn Kaspi describes in his writings is political history, defined by power and competition between kingdoms, similar to the kind of history written by ancient realist historians like Herodotus and Thucydides. Ibn Kaspi takes it as a given that political history is not guided by a higher code of ethics or standard of justice, but by realpolitik: the advantage of the stronger. This is unfortunate, of course, for any small minority, like the Jews, but Ibn Kaspi does not think the Jews are fated to be continuously oppressed and persecuted throughout history. He even thinks it is possible that they could return someday to rule their ancient land. This is because he sees history as open to myriad possibilities and argues that the biblical prophets were fully aware of this. He claims that this is a secret teaching hidden in the Bible. To understand this truth about political history, he argues, it is necessary to dissect key verses and chapters of the Bible. These include: “the scepter shall not depart from Judah” (Genesis 49:8−10), the command to appoint a king (Deutoronomy 17 and I Samuel 8), the metaphor of the four animals (Daniel 7) and the prophets’ predictions on the destruction of the temple and its rebuilding, all of which are examined in this chapter.

“Man is Political” by “Nature” or “Necessity”

One place to begin in defining Ibn Kaspi’s model of political history is by comparing how he and Maimonides interpret Aristotle’s famous statement in the Politics that “man is by nature a political animal.”1 Maimonides rephrases Aristotle’s statement in the Guide as “man is political by nature and that it is his nature to live in society. He is not like the other animals for which society is not a necessity.”2 Maimonides explains there that although he says “man is political by nature” he is not saying that political communities simply exist naturally, without human effort, but rather that humans, unlike other animals have a need to form political communities and live in them. He argues that diversity of temperament is unique to man. This makes it necessary for us to live in a community founded by laws. For we need laws to provide order and perfect character, by moderating natural extremes of temperament, pushing us always toward the mean. This is what Maimonides means when he says “that the Law, although it is not natural, enters into what is natural.”3 This law can take place in the form of either political law or divine law, but there is one crucial difference between these laws. Political laws perfect only the body, by abolishing injustice. Divine laws, however, perfect both the body and the mind by teaching correct opinions.4

Ibn Kaspi quotes Maimonides’ restatement of Aristotle with one subtle but important change of emphasis, stating that “man is political by necessity.” This is in his Commentary on Ecclesiastes. He applies his version of Aristotle’s statement to help interpret the verse “And moreover I saw under the sun, in the place of justice, that wickedness was there; and in the place of righteousness, that wickedness was there”:5 He states that

Here is another important matter that shows the uselessness of this [political] wisdom, namely that the entire world is sustained by judgment, as our Rabbis said: “by three things is the world sustained: judgment, truth and peace” (Ethics of the Fathers 1:18) and they also said: “pray for the peace of the government; for were it not for the fear of its authority, man would swallow his neighbor alive” (Ibid., 3:2). This occurs, without a doubt, when the political ruler is clever and wise. One should pitch one’s tent,6 and fix one’s residence in a just and righteous place, in other words, the city in which the clever and wise king rules and most of the people in the political community are righteous and wise because “man is political by necessity.” Even more so, when the exalted sage, who delves deeply into his own thoughts, makes choices in these worldly matters. But we see that what is a place of justice today will be the opposite tomorrow because a new generation or a new king7 will arise, as it is explained: “how the faithful city has become an adulterous city! She that was full of justice, righteousness lodged in her, but now murderers.” (Isa. 1:21)8

It can be seen from this that Maimonides and Ibn Kaspi draw very different lessons from the “necessity” of man’s political nature. For Maimonides, man’s political nature is necessary like eating or drinking are necessary for his existence. Maimonides takes this as a sign that laws are needed in any human society to establish order and foster moral and intellectual improvement. For Ibn Kaspi, however, the actualization of man’s political nature by forming a regime, whether a political or divine law, is dependent on forces beyond human control. Perhaps this is why Ibn Kaspi emphasizes that “man is political by necessity,” instead of “man is political by nature,” for if politics does not represent a striving toward perfection in human nature, but is instead a force that one cannot fully control; it follows that one should be involved with it only by necessity. A consistent standard of justice cannot be ensured over time, Ibn Kaspi argues, because it is impossible to predict what the nature of the next ruler will be and, therefore, whether or not he will be just or enforce justice. This lesson, he hints here, can and should be taken from events in the Bible. For example, the Pharaoh described in Genesis may have been just, but he proved unable to pass this on to his successor, who had no concern with justice, as is shown in Exodus. Likewise, by quoting Isaiah, in the above passage, Ibn Kaspi shows us that the same is true of justice in Israelite society, again as described in the Bible. There, too, justice depended on the same subjective whims of rulers. Some were concerned with morality and justice, some were not. History, for Ibn Kaspi, is accidental and has no rhyme or reason. Contra to Hegel, history has no progress or direction.

Why Write an Epitome of Averroes’ Commentary on Plato’s Republic?

For Ibn Kaspi, man is political only by necessity since the political community cannot be the foundation for achieving human perfection of character and mind. The vicissitudes of regime change and the inability to ensure a consistent standard of justice makes the political community too unstable for moral and intellectual perfection. Why, then, does Ibn Kaspi write a faithful summary of Averroes’ Commentary on Plato’s Republic entitled Terumat Kesef (Gift of Silver)? It may be because Plato advocates, in the Republic, having political leaders who are also philosophers. Such a leader is characterized by Averroes as being a combination of “ ‘philosopher,’ ‘king,’ ‘Lawgiver’; and so also is ‘Imam.’ ”9 Does this not contradict Ibn Kaspi’s position that one should not rely on an ideal or just political community to come to fruition? Why summarize the Republic if its ideal is so rare as to be unrealistic?10

Medieval Islamic philosophers were divided between two opposing readings of Plato’s Republic revolving around the question of the relationship of the philosopher to the political community. Al-Farabi argued in The Perfect State that the ideal city described in the Republic is a realistic possibility and that philosophers must strive to make it a reality, while Ibn Bajja argued in the Rule of the Solitary that the ideal city of Republic is not a realistic possibility and philosophers must strive to avoid involvement in the political community, except when necessary.11 Ibn Kaspi’s interpretation of Plato’s Republic follows that of Ibn Bajja (though he does not cite him) that the philosopher must focus on his own perfection and avoid political rule. Like Ibn Bajja, Ibn Kaspi did not believe that human beings can, by their own power, effect meaningful change in the political community, and thus concluded that political activity is a waste of time. Better to stay home and study.

It is difficult to get a sense of where Ibn Kaspi stands from a quick perusal of Terumat Kesef, since it is mostly a summary of Averroes’ commentary.12 In general it is difficult to ascertain the editor’s voice in such an epitome since both Averroes and Ibn Kaspi do not often speak in their own voices.13 One way to decipher Ibn Kaspi’s position, in such a close summary of a text, is to notice what Ibn Kaspi leaves out of his summary and consider how he chooses to end it. He ends his discussion of the Republic with a summary of how unrealistic a philosopher-king would be, a summary that is taken from Book VI of the Republic. He leaves out Plato’s famous allegory of the cave of Book VII, his discussion of less than ideal regimes in Book VIII, the case Plato makes for the unhappiness of the tyrant of Book IX and the image of the afterlife he gives in Book X (which are mostly summarized in Averroes’ Commentary). In moving directly from the critique of the philosopher-king to a case for knowledge as the final purpose for a human being, Ibn Kaspi’s summary ends with a poetic defense of a secluded philosophic life.14

Ibn Kaspi’s interpretation of the Republic in Terumat Kesef can be fleshed out by examining where and how he quotes Plato’s Republic or uses political ideas influenced by it, in other writings where he is more forthright. The central lesson Ibn Kaspi draws from the Republic is that rule by philosopher-kings is highly unlikely and, absent this, it is necessary for the philosopher to be separate from the non-philosophic citizens in order to avoid trouble. In Terumat Kesef he follows Averroes’ summary of Plato, showing that political communities do not benefit from the involvement of philosophers for two reasons: first, inhabitants do not care to follow the recommendations of the wise; and second, those who aim for wisdom do not possess all the necessary qualities for leadership, and so will end up doing more harm than good. In a non-virtuous city, therefore, a truly wise philosopher must avoid irritating or even inadvertently harming his fellow citizens, thereby turning them against him. If possible, therefore, he should choose a solitary life.15 One can see the importance of this position for Ibn Kaspi in his biblical interpretations. In Ṭirat Kesef he states that he has no intention of seeking friendship with others, referring to the masses derogatorily as animals, and using an analogy of an individual with a candle looking to “light the flame,” a metaphor for his social relations with others.

My custom was to minimize friendship with other human beings and I was very careful not to speak about important matters. This was due to my dismay regarding my lack of knowledge of that which is beyond me. I will not be consoled by my superiority over horses and mules. Therefore, my customary way of acting with my contemporaries was analogous to that of an individual who gets up from his bed [in the middle of the night] to do some chore at home and has no candle. He takes a wick and goes to the extinguished stove filled with ash to look for a burning coal or a spark of fire to light his wick. If he finds some, he will light his wick and if not, he will go back to sleep. This is the way I act with regards to other people. If one of them has a spark of fire, of what I consider the true religion, I continue speaking with him. If not, I leave his home in peace and close the door.16

Ibn Kaspi thus recommends as much separation as possible between the philosopher and the masses and would necessarily suggests that a perfect society must look down upon the ignorant masses, commenting on Proverbs 29:27, “one who endeavors to live in peace with surroundings by hiding views sins to truth.”17

The only possible role he sees for a philosopher is in the rare occasion when it is possible to rule in a virtuous city in such a way as to spread wisdom to others. Ibn Ka...