Masséna at Bay 1811

The Lines of Torres Vedras to Funtes de Oñoro

Tim Saunders

• Editorial: Pen and Sword Military
• Año: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781399001335
• Categoría: History
• Categoría: Napoleonic Wars

The 1810 French invasion of Portugal, commanded by the veteran marshal André Masséna, who was known to Napoleon as the ‘Spoilt Child of Victory’ has been well covered by historians. Conversely, the shock revelation of the presence of the Lines of Torres Vedras baring the French Army of Portugal’s way to their objective of Lisbon, and numerous combats through to the Battle of Funtes de Oñoro, has been frequently and unjustifiably glossed over. This book, starting with the occupation of the Lines of Torres Vedras, which were at the heart of Wellington’s Peninsular strategy from October 1809-1812, is the story of Wellington’s pursuit of Masséna back to Spain. This was a time when the Peninsular Army was still being forged and Wellington was refining his own art of war. In addition, 1810-1811 was a period when the outcome of the struggle in Iberia was still far from certain, and Wellington could not manoeuvre with the same confidence in the outcome as he could in future years. The series of combats fought at Pombal, Redhina, Foz da Arounce and Sabugal while Masséna was at bay, though not categorised as ‘general actions’, were of the same scale and significance as those of 1808; Roliça and Vimiero. The general action at Funtes de Oñoro was one of the most significant of Wellington’s victories, but he confessed that ‘If Bony had been here we would have been beat’.

Chapter One

The Storm Clouds Gather

‘The hideous leopard contaminates by its very presence in the peninsula of Spain and Portugal. Let us carry our victorious eagles to the Pillars of Hercules.’ [Napoleon]

Despite his victory at Talavera during the high summer of 1809, the newly-ennobled Lieutenant General Viscount Wellington faced a growing threat from Napoleon. It was generally expected that the master of Europe would turn his attention to the insult to his imperial dignity that was the British army in the Peninsula. Following the Battle of Wagram and the collapse of the Fifth Coalition, there were no pressing military reasons why the emperor could not personally lead the 100,000 men he was preparing for the third French invasion of Portugal.1 Civil practicalities in France, however, intervened. Issues with money, law, national administration and a new wife saw him handing over command of the Army of Portugal to a reluctant Marshal André Masséna, one of the few in the marshalate capable of independent action without Napoleon’s supervision.

Created Prince d’Essling following his success in the 1809 Danube campaign, Marshal Masséna was tired and recovering after a fall from his horse, and at 55 he was ageing somewhat. According to Major Marbot, an aide-de-camp (ADC) on Masséna’s staff, another reason for Masséna’s reluctance to take command was that he was concerned that his senior subordinates would resent him being placed in command over them.2 In short, he did not want the command, but even though he was visibly no longer ‘Masséna of the flashing eyes’ of his younger days, ‘the spoilt child of victory’ was prevailed upon by Napoleon to take to the field again. His task in invading Portugal was to ‘throw the leopard into the sea’ and reinstate his master’s Continental System,3 thereby bringing Britain to her knees via her economy. The system, however, leaked badly, especially at the extremities of Europe where Portugal continued to trade with Britain.

To help persuade Masséna to take the command, Napoleon promised to give him an army of 100,000 men, everything he needed in terms of matériel, that he would be ‘lacking nothing in supplies’ and that he would have freedom of action. Fatally for the marshal and the Army of Portugal, Napoleon kept none of these promises.

British Peninsular Strategy

In March 1809, as preparations were being made to return to the peninsula and reinforce Sir John Craddock’s small British army left in Lisbon, the then Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Wellesley wrote in a ‘Memorandum on the Defence of Portugal’:

Marshal André Masséna, Prince d’Essling, commander of the Army of Portugal.

I have always been of opinion that Portugal might be defended, whatever might be the result of the contest in Spain; and that in the meantime the measures adopted for the defence of Portugal would be highly useful to the Spaniards in their contest with the French.

My opinion was, that even if Spain should have been conquered, the French would not have been able to overrun Portugal with a smaller force than 100,000 men; and that as long as the contest should continue in Spain this force, if it could be put in a state of activity, would be highly useful to the Spaniards, and might eventually have decided the contest.

Lieutenant General Viscount Wellesley.

The British force employed in Portugal should … not be less than 30,000 men, of which number 4,000 or 5,000 should be cavalry, and there should be a large body of artillery.4

Ensign Leith Hay5 wrote of the significance of the presence of a British army in the peninsula in ‘giving confidence to the Spanish cause, protracting the struggle, forming the nucleus of future strengths to be marshalled against him [Napoleon]. It was this influence which he especially wished to destroy.’

In addition to the size of the British contingent, Wellesley recommended reforming the Portuguese army.6 He wrote in his memorandum:

My notion, that the Portuguese military establishments, upon the footing of 40,000 militia and 30,000 regular troops, ought to be revived … It is obvious, however, that the military establishments of Portugal cannot be revived without very extensive pecuniary assistance and political support from this country.

Under Marshal Beresford and a leavening of British officers in the chain of command, the Portuguese army was rebuilt.

The experience of attempting to work alongside his other ally, the Spanish, in offensive operations during 1809 had been a salutary experience for Wellesley. They had consistently failed to live up to their promises and Wellesley, complaining to Lord Castlereagh, wrote that it ‘… has opened my eyes regarding the state of the war in the Peninsula.’ Deciding ‘not to have anything to do with the Spanish [way of] warfare’, he wrote to Marshal Beresford that his plan ‘is to remain on the defensive’.

In on the defensive, Viscount Wellington recognized the unique position of Lisbon as the heart and soul of Portugal and if it remained in Portuguese hands, the invader would not have achieved his aims. In addition, he believed that as long as the British army remained in Portugal it would be able to perform the role outlined above by Leith Hay. To ensure that the army could stay in the country, Wellington ordered the construction of defensive lines across the 25 miles of the Lisbon Peninsula. These defences, the Lines of Torres Vedras, were both a refuge for the allied armies and the defences of the city. Consequently, they lay at the very heart of Wellington’s strategy during 1809 and 1812.

Of course, not everyone was happy with the cost of the war in the peninsula or its prospects. Even one of Wellington’s own divisional commanders was what Wellington described as a ‘croaker’. Major General Thomas Picton shared the views of Whig politicians and many soldiers serving in the peninsula when he wrote:

We shall affect nothing worth talking of in Portugal. We may delay the entire occupation of the country for some months, but certainly not much longer, and that too with a considerable degree of risk: for if we protract our opposition too long we may experience, I understand, very considerable difficulty in bringing the Army off: for should the enemy, which we cannot prevent, get possession of the left Bank of the Tagus, opposite Lisbon, our ships of war and Transports must quit the Harbour, and in that case our communication with them will become extremely difficult and precarious.

Thanks to some extraordinarily effective operational security, even Picton was clearly not aware of Wellington’s strategy or the extent of the Lines of Torres Vedras.

The Army of Portugal

In early 1810, there were more than 250,000 French troops in the peninsula keeping Napoleon’s brother King Joseph on his throne in Madrid. The marshals and generals who commanded them, however, were committed to holding down their own fiefdoms and staving off attacks by Spanish guerrillas. In addition, they were famously unco-operative, being jealous of each other and the spoils of Spain they could garner. This meant that Masséna and the Army of Portugal were effectively on their own facing 40,000 British and Portuguese troops under Wellington’s command. It would appear from French estimates that Napoleon dismissed the newly-raised Portuguese army as irrelevant.

A French centre company infantryman.

The army that Masséna joined in Salamanca during May 1810 consisted of Marshal Ney’s veteran VI Corps and General Junot’s VIII Corps, totalling not the 100,000 men, including the Imperial Guard, originally considered necessary by Napoleon, nor the watered-down promise of 70,000 but fewer than 50,000. On his arrival Masséna made it clear to his headquarters staff: ‘Gentlemen, I am here against my own wish: I begin to find myself too old and too weary for active service.’7 As he feared, his senior subordinates were already resentful at being placed under the command of a senior marshal rather than Napoleon. Ney and Masséna were old enemies and the situation was made worse by Ney being ‘furiously jealous’ at being superseded as commander of the Army of Portugal. Despite some fine words of loyalty, from the start Masséna’s corps commanders were in a state of almost open dissent and were reluctant to follow his orders.

The Army of Portugal had a hard core of veterans, particularly in Ney’s VI Corps, but to bring that corps up to 27,000 strong, the marshal had been reinforced by a division of recruits. The other smaller corps was even more heavily reinforced by additional battalions of inexperienced levees formed by regiments at their depots across France. Napoleon assembled these battalions into formations for service in the peninsula, having carefully kept his Grande Armée veterans in France or garrisons in Germany. Those understrength units already in Spain were reorganized into provisional regiments of cavalry or battalions of infantry. Consequently, the French army preparing to invade Portugal in 1810 was not of the same quality as those that had delivered victory after victory to Napoleon elsewhere in Europe.

In contrast with the campaign season in central Europe, Masséna’s campaign started later in the year for the simple reason that Portugal was one of the poorest parts of Europe and large areas of the country had already been impoverished by the previous French invasions. By 1810 the French had learned that their preferred tactic of living off the land, which allowed them to move fast, unencumbered by slow-moving supply trains, did not work in the peninsula. Napoleon had appreciated that the army would inevitably have to increase its reliance on magazines and convoys. The difficulties of extemporizing a logistic system deep in Spain and being unable to significantly resupply by sea meant that logistic support would be minimal. Consequently, the invasion of Portugal would have to wait until the Portuguese harvest had been gathered in.

Of the three practicable routes into Portugal, only the northern route had not been previously used and offered greater foraging opportunities for French units. Wellington had, however, appreciated this and moved most of his command north to Beira, leaving General Hill to cover the southern routes. His estimate was confirmed by secret correspondents who reported the arrival of reinforcements, preparation of magazines and the concentration of divisions at Salamanca.

The 1810 theatre of operations: the third French invasion of Portugal.

On whichever invasion route was to be taken into Portugal, Napoleon knew that the Spanish and Portuguese border fortifica...