The Tiger Of Malaya:

The Story Of General Tomoyuki Yamashita And "Death March" General Masaharu Homma [Illustrated Edition]

Lt. Col. Aubrey Saint Kenworthy

• Editorial: Verdun Press
• Año: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781786251558
• Categoría: Geschichte
• Categoría: Militär- & Seefahrtsgeschichte

Includes over 30 illustrationsAs in Nazi occupied countries that were liberated by the Allies, horrible crimes had been uncovered, perpetrated in the name of superior culture on defenceless civilians and prisoners of war. As the emaciated American, British, Australian soldiers emerged from the prisoner of war camps with barbaric tales of torture, mistreatment and neglect, it was clear that justice must be sought. The U.S. Military fixed on two Japanese generals who were foremost in causing and ordering these outrages, the conqueror of Malaya Tomoyuki Yamahsita and the notorious "Death March" Masaharu Homma.Lt. Col. Kenworthy was a member of the U.S. military police assigned to the Philippines and saw at first hand the military tribunal ordered at the express command of General MacArthur. He was detailed to guard both Yamashita and Homma during the trial and was able to view their reactions to the detailed evidence that was used against them. He was determined to write this account of this momentous event, he recorded not only the evidence of the crimes but also the stoic calm with which the two generals faced the weight of Allied Justice.A fascinating sidelight on the ending of the World War Two.

1 — A Direct Order

The buzzer in the Operations Office of the Provost Marshal’s office, Manila, Philippine Islands, growled twice at ten hundred hours on 26 August 1945.

This meant that Colonel Jeremiah Paul Holland, affectionately known as the “Dutchman” to his very close friends, wanted to see the Operations Officer, or S-3, right now and not mañana.

Having served directly under Colonel Holland from early in 1943 in Australia, through New Guinea, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines, I jumped when the buzzer sounded this warning, regardless of the fact that I had been relieved as Operations Officer that morning and placed in command of the 742nd Military Police Battalion stationed on the Maraquina Road on the northern edge of the City of Manila. I had been relieved by a Major Kirley.

I was momentarily relieved when I realized that Major Kirley would have to answer instead of myself.

My nerves were not to remain tranquil for long. Kirley returned and said, “It’s you he wants, and don’t spare the horses getting in there, for the old man is lighting cigarettes one after the other and throwing them out of the window behind him.”

The “Dutchman” just did not believe in wasting words. He would give you all of his liquor, most of his cigarettes and any number out of his little black book, particularly the Australian ones, but he was exceptionally saving on words.

When I reported to him in my best military manner, he said, “Who have you got that can take over your battalion?”

Many months previous the lesson had been brought home to me not to ask him questions at a time like this.

I named an officer who was exceptionally capable. The Colonel immediately said, “All right, get thirty-two of your men ready. You are going after Yamashita. I’ll see you later.”

With considerable difficulty I maintained my composure until I got out of his office. Then, with Major Kirley and Major Valiet, the Adjutant, I tried to figure out what it was all about, but we could not arrive at any satisfactory conclusion.

In order that the reader may fully appreciate the task assigned me by the Colonel, it might be well to know something of General Yamashita with relation to the Philippine campaign. The following story was written by Lieutenant General Akira Muto and presented to the writer in Tokyo, 19 May 1946:

“General Yamashita, Commander of the Fourteenth Army Corps, arrived at Manila on October 7 1944. He immediately took over from Lieutenant General Kuroda Shigenori the duty of defending the entire extent of the Philippine Islands. The plan of campaign made by his predecessor was roughly that in case the Americans opened their attack on the southern part of the Philippines, they would be engaged mainly by the naval and air forces, with the cooperation of the land forces in the immediate vicinities only; but that if the Americans landed on Luzon Island, the Army would bear the brunt of the attack with the cooperation of the naval and air forces. Yamashita tentatively adopted this plan pending a more detailed study of the whole situation. At the time of his arrival at Manila, the disposition of the Japanese forces was as follows:

1. The defense of South Philippine, including the islands of Lawar, Mattsbate and Panay, was entrusted to Lieutenant General Sosaku Suzuki’s 35th Army (roughly 100,000 strong).

2. Luzon and its adjacent islands were to be defended by the Army under Yamashita’s direct command (some 120,000 strong).

3. Besides the above, there were independent units which did not belong to Yamashita’s command. They were:

(a) Army Air Force (60,000)

(b) Naval Force (65,000)

(c) Reserve units belonging to the Imperial General Headquarters or to the Supreme Southern Command (30,000)

(d) Special Water Transport Units (10,000)

Thus the entire Japanese forces in the Philippines aggregated over 380,000, but those under Yamashita’s control were 220,000, of which only the 120,000 in Luzon belonged to his direct command. A considerable portion of the above forces had to be employed in small detachments for the preservation of peace and order in various localities, so that deficiency of the necessary strength was felt by every command. Furthermore, the sudden and general expansion of the Japanese Army led to the deterioration of quality, both in respect of men and equipment. The defense installation and the amount of munitions that could be assembled also left much to be desired. Faced with such a situation, General Yamashita tried as best he could to make up the deficiencies, but seeing that it was only ten days after his arrival at his post that the American attack on Leyte began on October 18, 1944, it may well be said that he was thrust into the fray almost without preparation. Before giving an account of the actual fighting, it may be necessary to describe briefly the system of command of the Japanese forces in the Philippines. The Army and Navy units in the south belonged each to a different and independent system of command. The Supreme Commander of the land forces was Field Marshal Terauchi, under whose control were the 4th Air Corps, the 3rd Water Transport Corps and the 14th Army Corps. That is to say, the Japanese forces in the Philippines were not placed under the unified command of General Yamashita, but each time he wanted to undertake some strategic move, he had to consult the other commanders or ask for the approval of Marshal Terauchi.

“Immediately after the opening of the attack of Leyte by the Americans, the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order to General Yamashita to repel the enemy by participating, with as great a force as he could possibly dispatch, in the battle of Leyte, which was being fought by the naval and air forces with determination/

“That involved a fundamental alteration of the plan of campaign mentioned at the outset. Yamashita was without any preparation for such a course and found great difficulty in fulfilling the order. It necessitated the extraction of units from the forces provided for the defense of Luzon Island, causing an extended modification in the entire defense system. A considerable amount of bottom (water transportation) was required for transport of the reinforcements; arrangements had to be made with the naval and air command for their convoy, and above all there was the important question of supplying the necessary amount of munitions. All that did not proceed at all smoothly. Nevertheless, he succeeded by the beginning of December in dispatching to Leyte, in nine installments, some 50,000 contingents and considerable quantities of munitions. But the 1st Division was the only unit that reached Leyte intact, the rest having been subjected to the ruthless attacks of the American airplanes and submarines with sorrowful results.

“On 24 and 25 October, the naval and air forces made desperate attacks upon the enemy both outside the Leyte Bay and in the air, but the effect was only temporary, making little contribution to the improvement of the general situation. The Commander of the 35th Army, Lieutenant General Suzuki, proceeded to Leyte Island and in person tried to check the advance of the enemy, but in face of the overwhelmingly superior power of the Americans, especially of their absolute command of the air, he could do very little. Around December 7 the Americans at last landed at Ormoc on the inner side of the island, which spelled the end of the battle of Leyte.

“Field Marshal Terauchi left Manila for Saigon on November 17.

“From early December, American naval forces became active in the Sulu Sea, and on December 15 landed on Mindoro Island, at a point about 250 kilometers from Manila.

“General Yamashita, acknowledging the defeat at Leyte, sub-mitted, both to the Imperial General Headquarters and to the Supreme Command of the South, the opinion that it was now imperative to hasten by all means the defense preparations on the Island of Luzon, Insufficient as was the defense system on Luzon at the time of General Yamashita’s arrival there, it had now been reduced to quite a dangerous point as a result of the despatch of units from Luzon to Leyte. If the Americans had at once landed on Luzon at the time, they would have been able to occupy it without much ado.

“The Imperial General Headquarters, acceding to General Yamashita’s request, decided to despatch three divisions to Luzon from Korea and Manchuria. These reinforcements reached Luzon in the middle or latter part of December, but due to the attack of the enemy airplanes and submarines, their fighting capacity had been reduced by one third or one half of their original strength.

“About that time there were in Manila some 30,000 soldiers, consisting of those originally meant for replenishment for southern Armies, healed soldiers and shipwrecked contingents. They were either used to fill up the gaps of the newly arrived divisions or were formed into new units.

“Our headquarters had to work feverishly both day and night. The defense of Luzon was a hard proposition indeed. The Americans, who had a perfect command of the sea and the air, could have landed at any spot and at any time they chose. Moreover, once on land, they could absolutely rely upon their fire equipment and mobility. For the Japanese Army, as it then was, to try to meet them on a flat terrain would be like throwing eggs against stone. General Yamashita therefore decided upon a holding-out strategy, largely making use of mountainous districts. His plan of campaign was roughly as follows:

1. The Americans were expected to land at Lingayen Bay with their main forces in the early part of January, while attempting at the same time, with minor forces, to land at Batangas and Bataan promontory with the object of marching upon Manila City. It was also considered possible that an attempt should be made to land at Aparri or to occupy Cagayan Valley with parachute units.

2. The Japanese forces were to draw back upon three main positions, the first in the hilly district east of Manila, the second in the mountains west of Clark Field, and the third around Baguio and Balete Pass, all three groups coordinating their operations in such a way as was best calculated to restrain the American forces rushing on towards Manila and thereby to retard their ultimate employment in the attack upon the mainland of Japan or elsewhere.

3. One detachment was to be sent to Batangas peninsula to check the enemy’s march upon Manila.

4. One Army corps was to be despatched to the vicinity of Aparri to stop the enemy’s landing and to secure the Cagayan Valley.

5. The City of Manila was to be left outside the zone of battle.

“Because of the strategic as well as political value of Manila, this last point in the plan adopted by General Yamashita was met with opposition in various quarters. However, Yamashita put his idea into execution insofar as it was within his competence. In other words, while he could not declare Manila an open city, he definitely made it known that the city would not be included within the field of battle. With that end in view, he transferred the seat of government from Manila to Baguio on 22 December. He also ordered Lieutenant General Kobayashi, the Commander of the Manila district, to make a public announcement of his intention to the people of Manila.

“On 1 January 1945, the 4th Air Corps, which had until then belonged to an independent command, was placed under Yamashita’s direction. From January 5, the naval units to be engaged in land fighting were also placed under Yamashita’s strategic control. So the entire forces in Luzon under Yamashita’s command numbered 240,000 in the early part of January. But it was after all a very motley army, poor in education and equipment and inferior in fighting quality.

“General Yamashita’s Headquarters was established at Baguio on 3 January 1945. On January 8, the American forces began landing at Lingayen Bay. While at once opening attack on the Baguio front, they started on their southward advance. A perfect unity of command over land, sea and air forces characterized the American operations ever since the landing at Leyte. It was a model of central direction. The whole Philippine campaign must be called General MacArthur’s masterpiece. On the other hand, the direction of Japanese operations suffered sadly from the lack of unity between land, sea and air forces. Especially the defect of dual command of the Army and Navy was fully disclosed during the campaign. Moreover, the undue importance attached to the Leyte fighting, and the sacrifices entailed thereby, left the defense preparations at Luzon utterly insufficient at the moment of the American attack.

“The whole system of direction and control of the Japanese forces was destroyed at a very early stage. From January 11, the communication between Manila and Baguio was cut and wireless telegraph was the only means of giving direction to the various units. Even this meager channel of communication, however, became daily less satisfactory through the bombing by enemy planes, the lack of fuel, and the deterioration of vacuum tubes and batteries. Nothing could be known about the fighting around the base of Clark. On February 4 or 5, the Americans entered the City of Manila. It was learned that, contrary to General Yamashita’s intention, fighting occurred in the city districts. On or about February 12, General Yamashita ordered Lieutenant General Yokoyama, the highest Commander in Manila district, to direct Rear-Admiral Iwabuchi, who was in Manila, to withdraw at once from the city. The Admiral did not obey General Yokoyama but continued to fight until his unit was annihilated to the last man. Little else was reported to the Headquarters before the termination of hostilities,

“The American attack on the Baguio base was very tenacious. They attempted at the same time to break through the line connecting the Balete and Saraksa Passes, thus to advance into the Cagayan Valley. The Japanese losses mounted steadily and the want of provisions was felt more keenly every day. They opposed their spiritual force against the physical strength of their enemy and coped with the overwhelming fire power of the Americans with human bullet attacks.

“On the night of March 22, President Laurel, together with Ambassador Murata, left Baguio for Japan. Considering the extreme importance of the Balete Pass front, General Yamashita left Baguio on the night of April 16 in order to assume direct personal direction on that front. His Headquarters were transferred to Baubau on April 19. The Americans occupied Baguio on April 25 and the Japanese forces on that front withdrew to the Plogg Mountain district. Anticipating the future development, General Yamashita decided to construct a last ditch base in the mountainous district around Mount Plogg. So he moved to Kiangan on May 20. ...