An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue

Francis Hutcheson

• Editorial: Rare Treasure Editions
• Año: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781774642498
• Categoría: Philosophie
• Categoría: Ästhetik in der Philosophie

A seminal text of the Scottish Enlightenment, this consists of two treatises exploring our aesthetic and our moral abilities.

INQUIRY

CONCERNING

Moral Good and Evil.

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[105]

INTRODUCTION.

Moral Good and Evil.

The Word Moral Goodness, in this Treatise, denotes our Idea of some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, attended with Desire of the Agent's Happiness. Moral Evil denotes our Idea of a contrary Quality, which excites Condemnation or Dislike. Approbation and Confirmation are probably simple Ideas, which cannot be farther explained. We must be contented with these imperfect Descriptions, until we discover whether we really have such Ideas, and what general Foundation there is in Nature for this Difference of Actions, as morally Good or Evil.[106]

These Descriptions seem to contain an universally acknowledg'd Difference of Moral Good and Evil, from Natural. All Men who speak of moral Good, acknowledge that it procures Approbation and Good-will toward those we apprehend possess'd of it; whereas natural Good does not. In this matter Men must consult their own Breasts. How differently are they affected toward these they suppose possess'd of Honesty, Faith, Generosity, Kindness; and those who are possess'd of the natural Goods, such as Houses, Lands, Gardens, Vineyards, Health, Strength, Sagacity? We shall find that we necessarily love and approve the Possessors of the former; but the Possession of the latter procures no Approbation or Good-will at all toward the Possessor, but often contrary Affections of Envy and Hatred. In the same manner, whatever Quality we apprehend to be morally evil, raises our Dislike toward the Person in whom we observe it, such as Treachery, Cruelty, Ingratitude; whereas we heartily love, esteem, and pity many who are expos'd to natural Evils, such as Pain, Poverty, Hunger, Sickness, Death.

Now the first Question on this Subject is, "Whence arise these different Ideas of Actions?[107]"

Interest. Advantage.

Because we shall afterwards frequently use the Words Interest, Advantage, natural Good, it is necessary here to fix their Ideas. The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of natural Good or Happiness; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this Pleasure are call'd immediately good. Those Objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are call'd Advantageous: and we pursue both Kinds from a View of Interest, or from Self-Love.

Our Sense of Pleasure is antecedent to Advantage or Interest, and is the Foundation of it. We do not perceive Pleasure in Objects, because it is our Interest to do so; but Objects or Actions are advantageous, and are pursu'd or undertaken from Interest, because we receive Pleasure from them. Our Perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is advantageous or naturally good to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure mediately, or immediately. Such Objects as we know either from Experience of Sense, or Reason, to be immediately or mediately advantageous, or apt to minister Pleasure, we are said to pursue from Self-Interest, when our Intention is only to enjoy this Pleasure, which they have the Power of exciting. Thus Meats, Drink, Harmony, fine Prospects, Painting, Statues, are perceiv'd by our Senses to be immediately[108] good; and our Reason shews Riches and Power to be mediately so, that is, apt to furnish us with Objects of immediate Pleasure: and both Kinds of these natural Goods are pursu'd from Interest, or Self-Love.

Opinions about our Sense of moral Good and Evil.

Now the greatest Part of our latter Moralists establish it as undeniable, "That all moral Qualitys have necessarily some Relation to the Law of a Superior, of sufficient Power to make us happy or miserable;" and since all Laws operate only by Sanctions of Rewards, or Punishments, which determine us to Obedience by Motives of Self-Interest, they suppose, "that it is thus that Laws do constitute some Actions mediately Good, or Advantageous, and others the same way disadvantageous." They say indeed, "That a benevolent Legislator constitutes no Actions advantageous to the Agent by Law, but such as in their own Nature tend to the natural Good of the Whole, or, at least, are not inconsistent with it; and that therefore we approve the Virtue of others, because it has some small Tendency to our Happiness, either from its own Nature, or from this general Consideration, That Obedience to a benevolent Legislator is in general advantageous to the Whole, and to us in particular; and that for the contrary Reasons alone, we disapprove the Vice of others, that is, the prohibited Action, as tending[109] to our particular Detriment in some degree." And then they maintain, "That we are determin'd to Obedience to Laws, or deterr'd from Disobedience, merely by Motives of Self-Interest, to obtain either the natural Good arising from the commanded Action, or the Rewards promised by the Sanction; or to avoid the natural evil Consequences of Disobedience, or at least the Penaltys of the Law."

Some other Moralists suppose "an immediate natural Good in the Actions call'd virtuous; that is, That we are determin'd to perceive some Beauty in the Actions of others, and to love the Agent, even without reflecting upon any Advantage which can any way redound to us from the Action; that we have also a secret Sense of Pleasure arising from Reflection upon such of our own Actions as we call virt...