Non-Aligned Movement Summits

A History

Jovan Cavoški

• Editorial: Bloomsbury Academic
• Año: 2022
• ISBN:
  9781350032101
• Edición: 1
• Categoría: Geschichte
• Categoría: Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts

Using newly declassified documents from Serbian, British, Indian, Chinese, Myanmar, U.S., and Soviet archives, Non-Aligned Movement Summits shows how the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) gradually evolved into the third force of Cold War politics, enveloping most of the post-colonial and non-bloc world. Jovan Cavoški follows the evolution of the NAM through its summits and other gatherings, during which major political decisions pertaining to the destiny of the Third World were made. These events were scrutinized by all major powers and had a corresponding effect on their policies. From the Belgrade Conference in 1961 until 1989, all major Third World and non-bloc nations met to demonstrate to the Eastern and Western Blocs that they were independent, active and respected participants in world affairs. Cavoški shows how these summits were also closely related to events occurring in the relationship between the two blocs, providing opportunities for non-bloc actors to influence the global balance of power. By moving the focus of 20th-century international history away from the bloc nations, and instead giving developing nations in Africa and Asia due attention, this book provides a fresh perspective on Cold War history and fills a significant gap in the literature. It is an important study for all students and scholars of the Cold War and international history.

1

The Historical Meaning of Non-Alignment

In order to more firmly grasp the role of different non-aligned summits in the evolutionary process of formation and expansion of the NAM, one needs to better understand what global non-alignment was essentially about, its basic rationale and motives, underlying ideas, immediate historical origins, different regional and conceptual emanations, pioneering influences, as well as its role within the Cold War international order. These features mark non-alignment and the NAM’s separate historical paths, compared to other similar phenomena present during those decades.

Non-alignment did not emerge as part of some initial deliberations among different newly liberated or non-bloc nations or through implementation of some preconceived theories or ideas, but rather as an expression of different struggles for political or economic independence and as a distinct response to the emergence of two antagonistic blocs in world affairs. It was the ascendancy of the Cold War and the concurrent downfall of European colonial empires that heralded sweeping geopolitical changes, which had ushered in fundamental political, social and economic transformation that eventually enabled the non-aligned foreign policy orientation to expand globally and gradually evolve.¹ In the words of Indonesian President Ahmed Sukarno at the 1961 Belgrade Conference: ‘There was no prior consultation and agreement between us before we adopted our respective policies of non-alignment … We arrived at this policy inspired by common ideals, prompted by similar circumstances, spurred on by like experiences.’²

We can define four general historical preconditions that eventually led to the emergence and evolution of global non-alignment: anti-colonial revolutions which introduced political liberation and independence to a majority of Asian, African and some Latin American countries; economic underdevelopment as a dominant common feature of this diverse group of states, which eventually induced many of them to closely link the freedom of their international action with the overriding priorities of economic modernization; the Cold War bipolar system which constituted the general global framework within which non-alignment could freely operate and interact, while simultaneously advocating the lessening of international tensions and reduction of great power interferences; and finally the establishment of the UN with its broad and egalitarian democratic character which created additional opportunities for non-aligned countries to participate equally in the dialogue with the great powers and present their views and ideas freely through individual or collective actions.³

The Essence of Non-Alignment

Non-alignment was a foreign policy strategy that clearly implied diplomatic freedom of action and choice with respect to both the main Cold War contenders – i.e. both blocs and the two superpowers – thus strongly emphasizing opposition to any permanent diplomatic or military identification. Essentially, non-alignment originated from the common desire of many newly independent and non-bloc countries to survive politically and develop economically under the conditions of tense international peace.⁴ This concept became an instrument of preservation of one’s independence and a further guarantee of freedom of choice, primarily one fully tailored to suit the needs and desires of small and feeble nations, while also providing them with a sense of certainty, predictability and stability in their foreign engagements. Non-alignment was an expression of realistic assessments of the new international equilibrium, granting non-bloc nations with a stable basis for forging dynamic mutual cooperation, irrespective of all their historical, geographical, cultural, religious, political, social, economic and other differences. Therefore, non-alignment had also become a constructive means for launching collective actions of small countries, which individually, due to their many internal constraints, could not achieve much on the world stage.⁵

Global non-alignment was an all in one – a foreign policy orientation, a political doctrine and a worldwide movement (at first just a loose group). From the very beginning, this concept was endowed by an established system of guiding principles, most of them clear to everyone involved although not always rigid in their interpretation. But, at the same time, these principles could not represent something more than just a statement of interest, unless they had been previously firmly wedded to any concerted collective political actions, both institutionalized and ad hoc ones, undertaken by different countries adhering to them.⁶

The word non-aligned may be differently interpreted but basically it was used … with the meaning non-aligned with the great powers blocs of the world. Non-aligned has a negative meaning, but if you give it a positive connotation it means nations which object to this lining-up for war purposes – military blocs, military alliances and the like. Therefore, we keep away from this and we want to throw our weight … in favour of peace, once stressed the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.⁷

The basic character of non-alignment, therefore, was non-bloc actors’ clear and open opposition to any kind of bloc affiliation, resistance to any political subjugation and ideological indoctrination exercised by the great powers, standing up to the surrender of sovereign interests and hard-won independence to any other international actors, while simultaneously pursuing disclosed aspirations of achieving economic emancipation and social modernization.⁸ During one debate Nehru stressed:

What does joining a bloc mean? After all it can only mean one thing: give up your view about a particular question, adopt the other party’s view on that question in order to please it and gain its favour. It means that and nothing else as far as I can see, because if our view is the view of that party, then there is no giving up and we do go with that bloc or country.⁹

This point was also once observed by the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser while welcoming the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah in Cairo, stressing the fundamentally unreasonable choice of joining any blocs: ‘If we are tied to one of the blocs, we would be a weightless appendage whose word does not have any influence … An independent policy based on non-alignment and positive neutralism will … make our countries a great force permitting an independent say. Such a position would be met with respect from all over the world.’¹⁰ In fact, this comprehension of independence and freedom of action, primarily a political one, stood as a cornerstone of any deliberations regarding the current and future role of non-alignment.

However, as staunchly opposed to the very essence of bloc policies, non-alignment had never become a dogma for any country advocating it, since this notion was often subjected to frequent reinterpretations and redefinitions before and throughout the existence of the NAM. Basically, non-alignment was, and remained, a rather pragmatic concept, devoid of any dominant ideological guidelines, not only with respect to its own specific materialization but also in its relationship with the promotion of individual goals. Furthermore, any kind of ideological rigidity would have completely voided non-alignment from this dominant pragmatic feature and have totally subverted its true essence, a tendency that any radicalization drive inside the NAM would ultimately demonstrate.¹¹ Therefore, as already mentioned, freely pursuing non-bloc foreign policy became a dominant propensity of all non-aligned countries, clearly separating them from any similar concepts or organizations, and presenting itself as a ‘quest for distinctive, intellectual expression of independence’.¹²

Since the majority of these countries were either former colonies or had suffered under some kind of great power domination or subjugation, any formal alignment with one of the two blocs was primarily perceived as being fundamentally detrimental to the preservation of their newly acquired freedom and tantamount to a devastating moral defeat. Non-alignment was, in fact, a deliberate attempt, even a far cry, which ultimately ‘enabled the powerless to hold a dialogue with the powerful and to try to hold them accountable’, irrespective of the ultimate measure of success.¹³ In short, we can define non-alignment as a policy strictly based on the goal of preservation of independence, which was generally pursued by countries burdened by an overall sense of insecurity and backwardness, thus often facing the incapacity to strongly and timely react to challenges occurring in their wider surroundings. Sometimes such threats implied a kind of closer alignment with one of the superpowers, as occurred during the late 1970s, thus profoundly affecting the basic direction of non-alignment.¹⁴

Therefore, global non-alignment also contributed to the rise of the so-called ‘zone of autonomy’ consisting of subordinated political groups standing between the two dominant blocs, though outside their immediate control, thus enabling lesser powers to assume partial influence over the policies of great powers. Essentially, rivalry between the great powers only increased the amount of influence and pragmatism exercised by small states, above all endowing them with the tentative possibility to defect to the other side of the Cold War division or at least threaten them with this kind of defection.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the emergence of non-alignment would have been quite possible even outside the Cold War framework; as a result, it continues to exist today in the form of the multi-vector policies of many developing countries, since the outstanding differences between the Global North and the Global South go well beyond the very nature of the superpower conflict. As long as these non-bloc nations opted for independent, nuanced and diversified international engagements, while also taking into account these global economic and social contradictions, some version of non-alignment, under any name, could still have become a viable alternative.¹⁶

Originally, non-alignment was not an isolationist policy or a policy of expediency and opportunities, in spite of its pragmatic character, nor it was a policy of self-righteousness and moral superiority, since it strived to remain morally neutral, regardless of some strong anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiments. It did not offer an easy escape from troublesome situations, while many critics outright labelled it as inherently ‘immoral’ as a means of largely discrediting non-alignment and making it less appealing for other potential followers to step in.¹⁷ In the words of an anonymous Indian author, non-alignment was ‘anything but the easiest way out of a dilemma; it often brings the wrath of both power blocs on the non-aligned government; it needs courage and conviction to resist the pressure of bigger and greater powers and follow an independent path’.¹⁸ This line of thinking was also picked up by the Ceylonese (Sri Lanka since 1972) Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike who once stressed all the perils this kind of foreign policy choice often entailed: the ‘path of non-alignment is not an easy one for small developing nations to tread on … I can say with certainty that non-alignment is not the line of least resistance, but is rather the most difficult, challenging and positive policy of our time.’¹⁹

Such a daring attempt to assume more control over their own destiny, without irresponsibly surrendering it to the will and decision of any of the great powers, was the hardest foreign policy choice any of the no...