1 Management of Knowledge-Intensive Organizations
1.1 Theoretical Framework
Scholarly management has not thoroughly investigated governance models that address innovative and ethical academic institutions and scientists.
The objective of this book is to explore governance frameworks of knowledge-intensive organizations (KIOs) that are to transform scientific discoveries to address human diseases. This study bases on management and governance theories of KIOs that originate in two research streams: studies on knowledge-intensive service firms (Bettencourt, Ostrom, Brown, & Roundtree, 2002; Choi, Hilson, & Millar, 2004; Choi & Millar, 2005; Den Hertog, 2000) and those on professional service firms (PSFs) (Hinings, Muzio, Broschak, & Empson, 2015a; von Nordenflycht, 2010). Here, European Commission (EC) comprehensively defines KIO as an entity in which knowledge is the primary production factor and goods offered (EC, 2012, p. 6). This broad definition encompasses academic institutions and multilateral organizations such as World Health Organization in the scope. The present study bases on this definition in investigating science governance of academic KIOs. Meanwhile, von Nordenflycht (2010) characterizes the organizational structure of KIO as not being controlled by outside and commercially motivated owners. In this context, norms and codes ensure trusteeship behaviors of constituents (von Nordenflycht, 2010). This basic structure has been altered in academic KIOs as below mentioned. Here, academic KIOs constitute not only of universities but also of independent research institutes that conduct basic scholarly research (see, Radder, 2010b), such as Max Planck Institute and Scripps.
Among several governance models, this book focuses on trusteeship governance (Sherer & Leblebici, 2015; von Nordenflycht, 2010) that encompasses self-regulation of academic sciences (Resnik, 2008; Ziman, 2000). This book investigates (i) specific factors that make some academic science fields understudied, and (ii) governance models to modify such bias from management theories of KIOs.
Companies recognize science and technologies as a source of organizational capability change (Arora, Belenzon, & Patacconi, 2015; Pisano, 2006) and corporate renewal (Zahra, Neubaum, & Hayton, 2016). While biotechs explore applications for academic discoveries, multinational pharmaceuticals seek opportunities to involve in their endeavors. Channels include corporate venture investment, 1 in-licensing, late-stage clinical trials, marketing, and manufacturing. By strengthening relations with academic KIOs and biotechs, established pharmaceuticals have largely changed their pipeline portfolios to strengthen biologics. 2
In general, technology-leader companies recognize academic sciences as a source of spillovers (Alcacer & Chung, 2007; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Here, academic biomedical sciences are more than spillovers for therapeutics development industries. By funding or directly participating in academic research, pharmaceuticals have outsourced basic research to academic KIOs (Arora et al., 2015; Contopoulos-Ioannidis, Ntzani, & Ioannidis, 2003; Etzkowitz & Leydoesdorff, 2000; Etzkowitz & Webster, 1995).
Meanwhile, there emerged understudied science fields despite their scientific significance and potential impacts on humans (Kunneman, 2010; Radder, 2010b). Radder (2010b), among others, ascribe this phenomenon to the involvement of commercially motivated organizations and other nonacademics.
The study of this book identifies that, though there are undoubtedly external forces that undermine academic sciences, several institutional and organizational constraints are also contributing to biases that make certain fields understudied. Examples include epilepsy science and neurobiological understanding of translational pain science (Chapter 4).
In encountering several conflicting factors, this study aims to understand and moderate issues from perspectives of management and governance of KIOs. By starting from self-regulation of academic KIOs , the study seeks overlaps with other governance models, including agency-based governance (Riordan & Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1979, 1981), fairness-based stakeholder theory (Miller & Wertheimer, 2011; Phillips, 2003. See also, Evan & Freeman, 1988; Freeman, 1984: Rawls, 1958/1999; Wicks, Gilbert, & Freeman, 1994), and liberal accounts of common good-based stakeholder theory (Argandona, 1998).
Agency-based governance is to determine a threshold of introducing external governance into internal governance of KIOs (Riordan & Williamson, 1985). It connects internal governance to contractual relations that consist of a bundle of property rights . As regulatory policies adopt agency-based concepts in optimizing incentives and protections of those in weak positions in contractual relations (Armour, Hansmann, & Kraaman, 2017) (Chapter 8), agency theory helps to understand a structure of external factors that lead KIOs to optimal behaviors.
On the other hand, stakeholder theory concerns over moral obligations toward those who have legitimate interests to organizations. Problems arise on the stakeholder legitimacy and their reasoning. In this regard, this study focuses on fairness-based stakeholder theory and liberal accounts of common good-based stakeholder theory . The former defines a moral obligation of stakeholder fairness over that due regarding civil society obligations (Phillips, 2003). It has consistency with biomedical society’s “fair transaction model” (Miller & Wertheimer, 2011) that reasonably limits investigators’ responsibilities in the institutional process. Regarding the latter, the concept of common good relates to duties and obligations toward stakeholders in achieving the common good while positively positioning private incentives (Argandona, 1998, p. 1100). In this book, common goods are vaccine discoveries and translation capacities of KIOs.
The basis of extending self-regulation is the concept of organizational boundaries (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). The underlying assumption is that this study defines governance as management of boundaries and relations (Choi et al., 2004; Sherer & Leblebici, 2015). This study extends previous literature to explore boundary conceptualizations specific to academic KIOs .
Here, research questions are two folds: (i) What are specific factors that make particular academic biomedical sciences understudied despite their scientific significance and potential impacts on humans? (ii) What kinds of governance models and mechanisms modify the biases from the perspective of management theories of KIOs?
A methodology is an inductive approach. This study sets propositions and tries to extend or reject them by examining selected cases of translational science . Case selection criteria are fitness to the management and governance theories of KIOs, and not of the scientific superiority.
This study has a potential to contribute to management and governance theories of KIOs by seeking overlapping parts of heterogeneous governance models. This study also brings practical implications for academic KIOs to bridge transformative discoveries ...