US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Truman to Kennedy

Responses to International Challenges

A. Hybel

• Editorial: Palgrave Macmillan
• Año: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781137294869
• Categoría: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Categoría: Políticas europeas

The book has three objectives: to expose students to the ways different US presidents handled major foreign policy making problems; to test the explanatory value of alternative decision-making models; And to reintroduce students to a wide range of critical US foreign policy issues.

Chapter 1

Harry Truman, the Dropping of the Atomic Bombs on Japan, and the End of the Second World War

Introduction

On October 9, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt instructed Vannevar Bush, head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, to find out whether an atomic bomb could be built and at what cost. Three months later Roosevelt approved the production of such bombs. The initial step of the endeavor, managed by Brigadier General Leslie Groves, was to find a way to harness the power of the atom to design and build a weapon that, if necessary, could be used to accelerate the ending of the war and, eventually, to shape “post war policies.”1

By early April 1945, the scientists had nearly achieved the assigned goal.2 Sensing that victory in Europe was imminent, Roosevelt saw no need to use the new weapon against Germany to force its unconditional surrender. The war in the Far East, however, posed a different challenge. Because the fighting against Japan had been growing more violent and more deadly, Roosevelt was prepared to use the atomic bomb. He acknowledged that, after “mature consideration,” he might have no choice but to use it “against the Japanese” repeatedly “until they surrender.”3

Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 1945, after serving for twelve years as president, shocked the American public and members of government. Given the unexpected nature of his death, top officials within the executive branch had not taken the appropriate measures to elicit a smooth transition.4 Harry Truman, an inexperienced leader in matters of foreign affairs, was thrust into an arena that would have daunted even the most skilled politician. Determined to assure those both at home and abroad, allies and foes, that the change in leadership would not weaken Washington’s resolve, Truman, in his first address to the Congress as president, pledged to carry on the policies of his predecessor, including calling for the surrender of the Germans and the Japanese. “Our demand,” he stated, “has been and it remains—unconditional surrender. We will not traffic with the breakers of the peace on the terms of the peace.”5

With the war against Germany about to end, our focus in this chapter is centered on Truman’s drive to bring the war with Japan to a close. We examine Harry Truman’s foreign policy decision-making (FPDM) process during his administration’s drive to bring the war with Japan to a close. Our analysis is guided by the questions posited in the introduction. Specifically, we concentrate on the mindsets that influenced Truman’s definition of the problem, what his goals were and how he ranked them, the number of alternatives he considered, and whether he analyzed and compared those options carefully before making his final decision. During this process we will examine whether he was receptive to different points of view, the information he and his advisors considered, the care with which they assessed the information, and whether they derived the same interpretations of the intelligence they evaluated. We bring the study to a close with a discussion of the FPDM model that best explains Truman’s decision to use the atomic bombs, with an assessment of the quality of the FPDM process.

Evolution of a Decision under Truman

Within hours of assuming the presidency, two issues appeared on Truman’s agenda: an increasingly strained relationship with Moscow and intelligence concerning the development of the atomic bomb. Disagreements between Moscow and Washington over the postwar status of Poland had strained their relationship. Washington backed an independent and democratic Poland, whereas Moscow wanted to exert control over the region and its form of government.6 In an April 2 memo to Roosevelt—later provided to Truman—the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman, noted that the rift between Washington and Moscow had intensified. Harriman feared that the Soviet Union would “emerge from the present conflict by far the strongest nation in Europe and Asia . . . [and] in the foreseeable future may well outrank the United States.”7

On April 23, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, V. Molotov, met with Truman in Washington. Despite substantial disagreements, the two were able to agree on a very important issue for the United States. On April 24, Moscow declared its decision not to renew its Neutrality Pact with Japan.8 The move signaled the Soviet Union’s recommitment to aid the United States in a conventional invasion of the Japanese homeland. Planners for the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed concern about the agreement. In an April 25 memo, planners cautioned the Joint Chiefs of Staff that if “Russia enters the war, her forces will probably be the first into Manchuria . . . This will raise the question of introducing at least token US forces in Asia.”9 Despite the warning, Truman welcomed Moscow’s promises of assistance.

The development of a nuclear bomb posed a different type of challenge for the president. When Truman made his first address to Congress on April 16, he was not yet fully aware of the enormity of the venture. Nine days later, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, accompanied by Groves, informed the president that within four months the United States would “in all probability, have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city.”10 He added that the use of the atomic bomb could bring the campaign in the Pacific to a swift conclusion with fewer American casualties,11 shape history, change the nature of civilization, and alter the way wars were conducted. During the meeting Stimson suggested that Truman form a committee to consider the possible “implications of this new force.”12 The committee would also be responsible for “recommending action to the Executive and legislative branches of our government when secrecy is no longer in full effect . . . [and] the actions to be taken by the War Department prior to that time in anticipation of the postwar problems.”13

With Truman’s approval, Stimson created the Interim Committee, which he chaired. Other members of the committee were his assistant, George Harrison; Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton; Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph Bard; James Byrnes, who was to serve as the president’s personal representative on the committee; the chairman of the National Defense Research Committee, Dr. James B. Conant; Vannevar Bush; and the director of the Office of Field Service, Dr. Karl Compton. The head of the atomic lab in Los Alamos, Dr. Robert Oppenheimer; Groves; and Chief of Staff of the Army General George Marshall, were not permanent members but attended many of the committee’s meetings.14

During this period, Washington learned that the Japanese were becoming increasingly concerned about the Soviet Union’s stance and its alliance with the United States. Intelligence had intercepted communiqués from Japanese Army Vice Chief of Staff Masakazu Kawabe to his military attaches in Stockholm, Sweden, and Lisbon, Portugal. In the communiqués, Kawabe voiced Tokyo’s fear that Moscow might ultimately decide to enter the war against Japan. In one dispatch, shown to Truman and his advisors on May 10, Kawabe stated, “Russia’s anti-Japanese attitude has clearly become more vigorous since her recent action with respect to the Neutrality Pact . . . we must view with alarm the possibility of future military activity against Japan.”15

Shortly after the message was sent, Germany capitulated. Truman welcomed the news with a speech in which he clarified the terms of unconditional surrender for the Japanese. He stated: “Just what does unconditional surrender of the armed forces mean for the Japanese people? It means the end of the war. It means the termination of the influence of the military leaders who have brought Japan to the present brink of disaster . . . Unconditional surrender does not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people.”16

Truman’s speech drew the attention of military leaders and members of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), who believed that clarifying the meaning of unconditional surrender might elicit an earlier surrender from Japan.17 They were not the only ones concerned about the use of the term. On May 12, Truman received a memo from the chief of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), William J. Donovan, in which he suggested that the request for unconditional surrender from the Japanese be modified. He wrote: “One of the few provisions the Japanese would insist upon would be the retention of the Emperor as the only safeguard against Japan’s conversion to Communism . . . Undersecretary of State [Joseph C.] Grew . . . the best US authority on Japan, shares this opinion.”18

The Interim Committee began to meet during this period. On May 9, Stimson outlined the nature of the project and the role that members would play. As explained by Stimson, the committee was established “to make recommendations on temporary war time controls, public announcement, legislation and post-war organization.”19

On May 10 and 12, further attempts were made by Washington’s top officials to determine what to do about the prospect of the Soviet Union’s entering the war against Japan. Harriman argued that pursuing Soviet involvement in the fight against Japan might facilitate the collapse of China into the Soviet Communist sphere of influence. “Russian influence,” noted Harriman, “would move in quickly and toward ultimate domination . . . the two or three hundred millions in that country would march when the Kremlin ordered.”20 The attending officials accepted Harriman’s assessment but adjourned without making a decision. Later that day, Harriman, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, and Stimson’s special assistant, Harvey Hollister Bundy, met to further discuss the Soviet problem. According to Stimson, the ambassador gave them “a gloomy report . . . He didn’t think that there was any chance of getting the seeds of liberalism into Russia in the shape of liberalizing and implementing the new constitutions for the sixteen Soviet provinces or zones which Stalin has put forth but never implemented. Yet . . . [he] thinks that Russia is really afraid of our power or at least respects it and, although she is going to try to ride roughshod over her neighbors in Europe, he thought that she really was afraid of us.”21

In a separate conversation, Stimson and Marshall weighed the pros and cons of dropping the bomb on Japan against mounting a direct invasion. Stimson asked whether the invasion could be delayed until the test of the first atomic bomb. Marshall indicated that the United States likely “could get the trial before the locking of arms came and much bloodshed [brought about by the invasion of mainland Japan].”22

Two days later, on May 13, Stimson received a memo from Grew regarding the importance of Soviet entry into the war. Grew posed the following questions:

1. Is the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War at the earliest possible moment of such vital interest to the United States as to preclude any attempt by the United States to obtain Soviet agreement to certain desirable political objectives in the Far East prior to such entry?

2. Should the Yalta decision in regard to the Soviet political desires in the Far East be reconsidered or carried into effect in whole or in part?23

3. Should a Soviet demand, if made, for participation in the military occupation of the Japanese home islands be granted or would such occupation adversely affect our long-term policy for the future treatment of Japan?24

The memo also included commentary from the State Department. It emphasized that the United States should not commit itself to upholding its end of the Yalta Agreement before Washington was able to ascertain whether the Soviet Union intended to respect the sovereignty of Korea, Manchuria, and the Chinese province of Sinkiang. Stimson was pleased with the questions, for they were intertwined with and were contingent upon the success of “S-1.”25

The following day, Stimson told Marshall that he was beginning to view the weapon as a solution for the United States’ diplomatic problems with the Soviet Union. “[T]he time now and the method now to deal with Russia,” stated Stimson, “was to keep our mouths shut and let our actions speak for words. The Russians will understand them better than anything else. It is a case where we have got to regain the lead and perhaps do it in a pretty rough and realistic way.”26 From this early date Stimson reasoned that the bomb could be instrumental in obtaining three interrelated goals: controlling Soviet behavior in Poland and Manchuria, limiting Soviet involvement in Japan, and maintaining dominance in the postwar international system.

On May 15, Stimson, Grew, and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal met to further discuss the questions Grew had posed in his memo. Stimson reiterated his concern about how to deal with the Soviets and the promises that Roosevelt had made at Yalta. Stimson was aware that the successful test of the atomic bomb would be a valuable asset during diplomatic negotiations with Moscow. He also emphasized that it would be “a terrible thing to gamble with such big stakes in diplomacy without having your master car...