International Relations and the Origins of the Pacific War

Ko Unoki

• Editorial: Palgrave Macmillan
• Año: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781137572028
• Categoría: History
• Categoría: Military & Maritime History

International Relations and the Origins of the Pacific War takes the unique approach of examining the history of the relationship between Japan and the United States by using the framework of international relations theories to search for the origins of the Pacific War, that erupted with Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941.

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Realism and Power Transition in
International Relations

Realism

When the study of IR first emerged in the world as an academic discipline in the UK after the First World War,¹ Realism was from the start one of the core doctrines that were taught to IR students. Most of the early scholarship and concepts to emerge from IR studies were based on Realist models, and over the decades Realism became the most influential school of thought in IR in both the US and in Europe.² IR scholar Michael Doyle considers it to be the “dominant” theory of IR and reminds us of the overwhelming number of IR theorists working within the Realist tradition.³ Indeed, since the end of the Second World War it is reported that over 90% of the hypotheses tested were Realist in inspiration. It has produced creative new works in applications of game theory, political psychology, and political economy.⁴ And equally significant, as the dominant framework for understanding the relations between states, Realism has shaped the thinking of almost every person involved in foreign policy making in the US and much of the rest of the world.⁵ As noted by IR scholar Stephen Walt, as much as academics hate to admit it, Realism remains the most compelling framework for analyzing international affairs.⁶ The impact that Realism has had in the development of IR scholarship and the importance of Realism for many IR scholars and foreign policy makers will thus hopefully be sufficient reason for the reader to allow my use of Realist theory later, to analyze the origins of the Pacific War.

Sources of Realist thought

Although the roots of Realist thought go back many centuries, the assumptions behind Realism as a theory gained prominence in the 20th century through the writings of theologians, theorists, scholars, and historians such as Reinhold Niebuhr, E.H. Carr, George F. Kennan, and Hans J. Morgenthau. The dynamism of the theory is apparent in the further contributions to its development and evolution by scholars such as Kenneth Waltz and Mearsheimer, who proposed different approaches in Realist thought that are widely known as Neo or Defensive Realism and Offensive Realism respectively.⁷ Accordingly, Realism as an intellectual tradition has today become so broad and diverse as to create a situation where we have not one single Realist theory but several theories that coexist within a single Realist framework.⁸ As a detailed examination of all the writings of the various approaches of Realism and their differences is beyond the scope of this work, what will be presented in the following and for the primary purpose of use in a theoretical analysis of the origins of the Pacific War is an overview of Realism that encompasses some of the major assumptions of Realist thought derived over the centuries from the Western “classical” texts of Realism, such as those written primarily by the ancient 5th-century B.C.E. Thracian historian Thucydides, the 16th-century Florentine historian Nicolo Machiavelli, and the 17th-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. What follows is an overview on some of the major assumptions of Realism.

Realist assumptions on human nature and the lust for power

A dim view of human nature

For Realists, the sovereign state is the key actor in international affairs.⁹ And since the state is the aggregate of individuals, Realism sees human nature as an underlying factor that impacts and drives the conduct and behavior of states in the realm of politics and diplomacy.¹⁰ Realism generally takes a dim view of human nature and behavior.¹¹ Political scientist Francis Fukuyama suggests that this may be due in part to the first hand experiences of Realist scholars and practitioners such as former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who as a young man witnessed the brutal behavior that was displayed by the Nazis during their rise to power and control over his native Germany.¹² One view of human nature from the Realist literary tradition is given by Machiavelli. In his no-nonsense Renaissance-era guide to statecraft, The Prince, Machiavelli stated that men are essentially “bad” creatures who have no compunction about not keeping their word and are always ready to deceive others.¹³ As such, he advised that individuals, including rulers of states, must not keep their word or act virtuously if it puts them at a disadvantage or they are no longer able to keep it.¹⁴ He warned that a ruler who may want to act virtuously among many who are not virtuous will always come to grief and therefore if he wants to live he must learn how not to be virtuous and to make use of this according to his needs.¹⁵ That is to say, in a world where there are many who are not good, one must learn not to be good. For Machiavelli, the virtues associated with “the better angels of our nature,” as US President Abraham Lincoln put it, are simply incompatible with the harsh and immoral realities of life and with preserving the existence of a state. Accordingly, a ruler needs the power of the lion to terrify the wolves among men and the cleverness of the fox to avoid traps if he wants to preserve his state and ensure his own survival.¹⁶ But why are humans such deceiving, “bad” creatures in the first place? It is because, according to Machiavelli, men are selfish creatures who are driven towards fulfilling their own self-interests.¹⁷ Machiavelli, however, was not the first to have articulated such negative views on the nature of man. Over in East Asia in the 3rd century B.C.E., the Chinese scholar Xunzi saw man as being born with those characteristics that lead to contention, strife, and violence: “a fondness for profit … feelings of envy and hate … and … desires of the ears and eyes;” a view that was perhaps shaped after witnessing the brutal wars that led to the unification of the Chinese feudal states under the Qin dynasty.¹⁸

The lust for power

“Power,” as defined by the IR scholars James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr., is the ability of one actor (whether it be a state or an individual) to compel another actor to do or not to do something which is not necessarily in accordance with the will of the latter.¹⁹ A century after Machiavelli expounded his advice to princes and his thoughts on human nature, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes wrote in his Leviathan that mankind has “a perpetual desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.”²⁰ Centuries later, IR scholars such as Morgenthau and Mearsheimer, who belong in the Offensive Realist camp of Realism, argued that the condition of international relations is essentially determined by man lusting after power and seeking self-aggrandizement and dominance over others.²¹ One such example of the pursuit of power that is often cited as “timeless” by IR scholars is described in The History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides, an account of the wars fought between the Peloponnesian League led by the ancient Greek city state of Sparta and the Delian League led by Athens.²² In a fictionalized dialogue between the representatives of the ancient Greek city state of Athens and the people of another city state, Melos, the drama unfolds as Athenian diplomats visit the island of Melos and demand of its inhabitants, the Melians, to abandon their allegiance to Sparta and pay tribute to Athens. The Athenians couch this demand with what they consider a magnanimous offer that would allow the Melians to enjoy their property, to avoid war with Athens, and to live in safety under an Athenian protectorate. The Athenians explain to the Melians in a matter-of-fact tone that “the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”²³ In response, the Melians refuse to accept the argument of the Athenians and attempt to appeal to their sense of justice and mercy towards a small and weak city, imploring that the Athenians “should not destroy a principle that is to the general good of all men—namely, that in the case of all who fall into danger there should be such a thing as fair play and just dealing …”²⁴ The Melians add that for standing up for what they believe to be right, they trust that the gods will bestow good fortune on Melos. The Athenians scoff at this answer and their view of what the gods would do by replying that, “it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule wherever one can … and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way …”²⁵ To the very end of this dialogue the Melians continue to refuse to submit to the arguments of the Athenians, prompting the latter to castigate the Melians for their “lack of common sense,” given their scanty resources compared to Athens and false hopes for the future, and their being led voluntarily astray to irrevocable disaster by a “false sense of honor.”²⁶ What follows after the Melian refusal and the departure of the Athenian diplomats is the immediate commencement of a siege by the Athenians on Melos. Melos eventually surrenders unconditionally and the Athenians proceed with the wholesale slaughter of all the men of Melos and the enslaving of its women and children. As was observed by Thucydides, powerful states such as Athens used their power to compel other weaker states to follow them or face the consequences, which Melos tragically did. That this would happen was, in the opinion of the Athenians, in accord with the laws of nature; that is to say, it is only natural for man to rule over others when they can. Neither morality nor an appeal to a sense of fairness or mercy has a role in the relations between states. Justice, in short, is on the side of those who have the power to rule over others or to force others to change their behavior. Centuries later, Morgenthau recapitulated this essential aspect of power observed by Thucydides by stating that all politics is a struggle for power,²⁷ and that whatever the ultimate goal of peoples or states—whether it be that of obtaining freedom, security, or prosperity—in the arena of international affairs the end is achieved by striving for power.²⁸ Although Thucydides does not explicitly state any lessons for the reader to note from the Athenian-Meilian dialogue, we can infer from the unfortunate experience of the Melians that in a world where the wielding of power is the ultimate factor that determines the rise or fall of a state, a state would have to be “realistic,” i.e., capable of facing up to reality and accepting and adapting to the harsh realities surrounding it in accordance with their actual power capabilities, and should not be bounded to any argument of moral justice or sense of honor if they wished to survive and prosper.

Various historical figures and theorists have over the centuries also argued that along with a lust for power, men have a natural lust for food, sex, glory, and a desire for recognition from others. The English economist John A. Hobson commenting on the origins of imperialism, or the act of one state conquering and ruling over another, wrote of a lust of slaughter and the crude “animal lust for struggle,” which was once a “necessity” that continues to survive in the blood of individuals (especially among Anglo-Saxons, he added) and drives them on to conquering and controlling land.²⁹ The British historian W.G. Beasley, likewise, on commenting the impetus towards imperialism, wrote that men “acting individually or in communities, have always sought to establish dominion over others, where they could,” and that this was therefore an act that need not be explained.³⁰ As regard to the desire for recognition, according to Fukuyama, the German philosopher Georg W.F. Hegel interpreted a human drive for dominating others as being based on a primal aspiration of humans to be recognized by others as having worth and dignity. This quest for recognition was a fundamental factor that distinguished humans from other animals.³¹ Morgenthau also considered the factor of recognition a significant manifestation of the struggle for power, and that the desire for it is a potent dynamic force that determines social relations, the prime purpose being to impress, and to seek the confirmation of others of one’s own importance and the power that one actually possesses.³²

The Realist worldview: anarchy, fear, and insecurity

Anarchy

The word “anarchy” has its origins in the Greek language and is composed of two parts “an” and “archos” which put together literally mean without an authority.³³ In his Leviathan, Hobbes described a situation of anarchy as one where, in the absence of an all-powerful authority that could ensure peace and security, “the condition of man … is a condition of war of every one against every one,” and that as nothing would stop him helping to preserve his life against his enemies, every man would assert that he has a right to claim anything, even another person’s body. As long as an individual asserts this “natural right of every man” to have everything, humans cannot have a life secure from violence.³⁴ The life of an individual in an environment where everyone was at war with one another was nothing but “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”³⁵ Furthermore, Hobbes concluded that in the circumstances of war, “the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have … no place.” That is to say, “nothing can be unjust.” And when there is no common Power to enforce and maintain peace, so it is the case that “there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind.”³⁶ For Hobbes, morality has no role in ensuring the survival of the individual, and by transposing this belief onto the realm of international relations the same can be said for the survival of the state as well. Morgenthau, centuries later, added that “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract, universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.”³⁷ In his view, states are not governed by a morality similar to that in effect among individuals in their personal relationships. Rather, since the leaders of a state must ensure its survival, they must be judged for their actions on a different moral plane than that which is applied to individuals.³⁸

To cope with this situation of anarchy, Hobbes saw the creation of a “Commonwealth” or state and the subjection of individuals either by force or through volunteerism to a sovereign who can guarantee the safety of all as the answer to dealing with the natural state of man.³⁹ Unfortunately, however, given the nature of man, governed by a perpetual desire for power that is caused by a need to assure their own security and ceases only with death,⁴⁰ so it is the case that cities and kingdoms (which are the aggregate of power-hungry individuals) will “enlarge their dominions upon all pretenses of danger, and fear of invasion,” and will strive as much as possible for the weakening of their neighbors using force as well as clandestine methods.⁴¹ For Hobbes, the relation between states—as it is with individual—is defined as a struggle for power, coming from a quest for security and survival in a condition of anarchy. Waltz further articulated this Hobbesian view of the world by noting in his Theory of International Politics that among nations “the state of nature is a state of war … with each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force…”⁴² As such, states “conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence”⁴³ and the international political realm is correspondingly anarchic, that is, decentralized and horizontal with no overriding authority. This, according to Waltz, is in stark contrast to the realm of national politics that, with a centralized governing authority and a framework of laws, has a structure which is hierarchical.⁴⁴

Fear

As Doyle noted, within a situation of p...