Countering Terrorism

Martha Crenshaw, Gary LaFree

• Editorial: Brookings Institution Press
• Año: 2017
• ISBN:
  9780815727651
• Categoría: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Categoría: Terrorismo

Can We Construct a Grand Strategy to Counter Terrorism?

Fifteen years after September 11, the United States still faces terror threats—both domestic and foreign. After years of wars, ever more intensive and pervasive surveillance, enhanced security measures at major transportation centers, and many attempts to explain who we are fighting and why and how to fight them, the threats continue to multiply. So, too, do our attempts to understand just what terrorism is and how to counter it.

Two leaders in the field of terrorism studies, Martha Crenshaw and Gary LaFree, provide a critical look at how we have dealt with the terror threat over the years. They make clear why it is so difficult to create policy to counter terrorism. The foes are multiple and often amorphous, the study of the field dogged by disagreement on basic definitional and methodological issues, and the creation of policy hobbled by an exacting standard: the counterterrorist must succeed all the time; the terrorist only once. As Countering Terrorism shows, there are no simple solutions to this threat.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The Context for Analyzing Counterterrorism Difficulties—Current Threats and the State of Academic Research

What is it about terrorism that makes it such a challenging policy problem? The purpose of this book is to explain the characteristics of terrorism that make it inherently difficult for governments, especially the U.S. government, to formulate effective counterterrorism policies. Why is terrorism so intractable? What are the obstacles to developing a consistent and coherent counterterrorism strategy? The barriers that we identify flow from the issue itself, not the particular political predispositions of individual policymakers or flawed organizational processes. We find that scholars and policymakers face similar difficulties—the study of terrorism is often confused and contentious, and the study of counterterrorism can be even more frustrating.

Our main thesis in this book is that the conceptual and empirical requirements of defining, classifying, explaining, and responding to terrorist attacks are more complex than is usually acknowledged by politicians and academics, which complicates the task of crafting effective counterterrorism policy. Although the policymaking process, the goals of individual American leaders, and American societal and political pressures are relevant factors, our focus is on the daunting complexity, variation, and mutability of the issue itself. Moreover, the stakes are especially high since the consequences of missteps and miscalculations in responding to terrorism are potentially catastrophic. In the chapters that follow we outline some of the barriers to recognizing and responding to terrorist attacks and suggest ways to overcome the obstacles we identify. Terrorist attacks are rare, yet they encourage immediate and far-reaching responses that are not easily rolled back. Most attempts actually fail or are foiled, so that examining only successful terrorist attacks gives an incomplete picture. The actors behind terrorism are extremely difficult to identify, since there is no standard “terrorist organization.” Governments and researchers often struggle to establish responsibility for specific attacks. Evaluating the effectiveness of counterterrorism is problematic. For empirical comparisons we rely to a large extent on the nearly 157,000 terrorist attacks that have occurred around the world over the past four and a half decades since 1970; they are catalogued by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), maintained at the University of Maryland.1

Following this introduction, in chapter 2 we argue that the atypicality of terrorist attacks makes them difficult to study and predict and, consequently, to prepare for and counter. We examine the frequency of terrorist attacks worldwide and against Americans at home and abroad, and we demonstrate that terrorist attacks, especially those with mass casualties, are exceedingly rare, however ubiquitous they might appear. Nevertheless, the U.S. government responded to 9/11 as though it presaged the beginning of a trend. The transformative policies and institutional reorganizations adopted in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 have reshaped international and domestic security politics. It has not been easy to roll back changes made in the moment of crisis in order to adapt to a shifting threat. Democratic governments may not be capable of treating rare but highly destructive terrorist events as outliers rather than regularities.

In chapter 3 we address the complications caused by the fact that a large number of attacks against Americans at home, apparently motivated by adherence to jihadist principles, fail or are foiled (an inference drawn from an original dataset). Much of the information about terrorism that is presented to the public is the proverbial tip of the iceberg, showing only terrorist attacks that transpired rather than attempts that were thwarted. Often the difference between success and failure in terrorism is difficult to discern. In general, failed and foiled plots are more difficult to study and have less impact on public opinion and on policy than do completed attacks—with some exceptions that we will discuss. Yet developing a comprehensive response to terrorist threats requires that we not only track “successful” attacks attributed to groups and individuals but also examine who planned to accomplish what, how close they came to completion, and the intentions behind their actions.

Chapter 4 focuses on the elusiveness of the adversary. There is no single type of terrorist organization. We argue that our counterterrorist policies must be tailored to varying, complex organizational types as well as to relations among groups as they shift between cooperation and competition. The rivalry between al Qa’ida and ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) is a case in point. We compare common stereotypes about hierarchically organized, long-lasting terrorist organizations to the range of actors that are in fact linked to terrorist attacks. On one end of the spectrum are individuals operating with little or no direct support from formal organizations; on the other, a handful of hierarchically structured, relatively long-lived entities.

In chapter 5 we take up the related issue of attribution of responsibility for terrorist attacks, a process that is frequently uncertain. Often those responsible for a particular attack are never known. Sometimes groups incorrectly take credit. In other cases one terrorist group falsely claims that an act was committed by another group. In the aftermath of a deadly terrorist attack there is often tremendous pressure to assign responsibility, understandably, because punishment is impossible without this knowledge, unless a government wishes to take the dubious path of collective punishment. Moreover, attribution can be controversial as well as indefinite, especially if there is the possibility of state involvement or the question of blame has aroused domestic political controversy.

In chapter 6 we assess the difficulties of determining how effective counterterrorism policies are. How can we tell when policies are successful in preventing or diminishing terrorism? How can the costs and benefits of different measures be calculated? Developing metrics for success has proved problematic. In fact, consensus on what success means is lacking. Conceptions of successful counterterrorism have varied considerably in the years since the 9/11 attacks.

In the final chapter of the book we summarize our main conclusions and consider their implications for developing a coherent and sensible counterterrorism policy. Terrorism can encourage outsized responses whose scope may be greater than they need to be to prevent further attacks. Overreaction by governments has been a stated goal of some users of terrorist tactics, so in these instances a disproportionate response may actually reward terrorists. On the other hand, without credible responses to terrorist threats, the risk of another catastrophic attack could increase to unacceptable levels. Certainly the public demand for an effective response will be almost impossible to resist. Finding a middle path between overreaction and underreaction is a persistent dilemma for the United States—one that is not likely to disappear in this century.

In the remainder of this introduction we provide background for the issues that will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters. We begin by providing historical context for the evolution of the terrorist threat in the United States, emphasizing how the general conception of terrorism has developed and how it has come to dominate the American security agenda since the 9/11 attacks. We also clarify some of the conceptual and methodological obstacles to policy-relevant academic research into terrorism and counterterrorism.

The Evolving Threat of Jihadist Terrorism in America and the West

Since 2001 violence associated with Salafi-jihadist variants of Sunni Islamism has been at the center of the American conception of the terrorist threat. The jihadist danger has understandably dominated the counterterrorism agenda, initially as a foreign threat and over time as an internal “homegrown” threat as well.2 Domestic right-wing violence has caused more harm to American citizens at home in the same period of time, and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing remains second after the 9/11 attack in terms of lethality within the United States.3 However, the threat of violence from sources such as white supremacists, antifederalists, and the Christian Identity movement does not have the same resonance for the security agenda. Indeed, merely bringing up the issue or defining violence associated with right-wing causes as “terrorism” can produce a firestorm of criticism. Our purpose is not to equate or even compare the two strains of violence but to note that this dispute demonstrates yet again the contentiousness of trying to define terrorism, one of the obstacles to progress in research that we discuss later in this chapter.

Why the difference in perspective? Whereas much jihadist violence is transnational and poses a threat to national and international security, American far-right violence is a domestic problem. Domestic, localized violence is easier for the American government to control or contain, the ideology behind it is more familiar, it is organizationally and ideologically more fragmented, and in terms of overall destructiveness its effect is minor compared to that of worldwide jihadism. Images of extreme ruthlessness such as videotaped beheadings and immolations, massacres of religious minorities, mass-casualty attacks targeting schoolchildren, university students, or shoppers at a market, and extreme intolerance such as the destruction of historical antiquities and the imposition of harsh punishments for infringements of a rigid code of justice have a powerful effect on mass-media audiences. Those responsible, al Qa’ida and its affiliates and rival offshoots such as the post-2014 self-proclaimed Islamic State (known also as ISIS or ISIL), seek publicity for their deeds and are adept at advertising their message worldwide, with a social media presence that is unprecedented among violent nonstate actors. Their capacity for mobilization and communication appears to outstrip that of most other groups that have used terrorism, even if one holds technological progress constant.

In addition to their expanding transnational reach, jihadist groups undermine the domestic stability of American allies embroiled in civil conflicts. There is a real risk that states in critical regions will either collapse into chaos or come under the control of forces hostile to American interests that rule by principles antithetical to democratic and humanitarian values. This prospect became especially ominous in the summer of 2014, when ISIS moved from strongholds in Syria to seize extensive territory in Iraq, including the city of Mosul. Policymakers are fearful that jihadist expansionism will jeopardize whatever gains the United States and its allies won in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the global war on terrorism generally. They also fear continued civil conflict involving jihadist groups in Syria, Libya, Yemen, North Africa, Somalia, and Nigeria.

Both jihadist self-promotion and extensive outside media coverage magnify the threat as perceived by the public. Yet with the 9/11 shock always in the background, definitively framing the issue of terrorism, it is understandable that Americans would fear another devastating surprise attack. It is impossible to ignore the fact that before 9/11 few analysts or policymakers thought that terrorism by small conspiracies truly threatened American national security. The jihadist danger has undoubtedly been exaggerated in some quarters, but there is a sober reality behind the exaggerations, and it continues to be at the top of national and international security agendas in a way that right-wing threats are not.

The association between Islam and terrorism is also a sensitive subject to broach. The proposition that religious beliefs might be a cause of violence is often assumed rather than demonstrated, and we discuss the difficulty of establishing the causes of terrorism in the second part of this introduction. Many Muslims quite reasonably object to the idea that all Muslims should somehow be held responsible for the actions of a tiny minority who claim to be acting in their name but who are not in the least representative. Few people want to hear that their core beliefs are associated with violence, especially if those beliefs are distorted in the process of making a false equation. Yet researchers and policymakers have to deal with the fact that jihadists explicitly justify terrorism in terms of their interpretation of Islam. These adversaries are associated with or claim to act in the name of groups such as al Qa’ida or the “Islamic State.” There are risks to making the connection, such as unfairly stigmatizing an entire community, but there are also risks to silence, such as neglecting the power of ideological motivations for violence.

How did the threat of terrorism move from irrelevance to American national security before September 11, 2001, to the top of the agenda for the next decade and more? How did it come to pose such an intractable policy problem? The development of the jihadist threat is characterized by a pattern of growth and decline. Each seeming downturn or setback has been reversed when new opportunities for expansion emerged. The threat has proved extraordinarily persistent, mutable, and virulent. It does not take the form of a monolithic movement, although many core ideological principles are shared. Its polycentric organizational structure may actually be a major source of its strength and adaptability, and its kaleidoscopic quality and tenacity impede coherent counterterrorist strategy.

The violent jihadist trend emerged in the context of resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. This history is scarcely news, but the repercussions of that early time period are still very evident. The idea then, as now, was that jihad, interpreted as violent opposition to foreign occupation of Muslim lands, was an individual obligation for all Muslims, wherever they might live. All are considered to be obliged to defend the Muslim community from external aggression. One inspiration was Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian cleric who became a mentor to Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Bin Laden’s narrative is well known, but the crux of the story is that he arrived in Pakistan as a wealthy and pious Saudi to aid Afghan refugees. An Egyptian physician, Ayman al-Zawahiri, also traveled to Pakistan on a humanitarian mission, although what was more relevant was his experience in organizing armed underground conspiracies to overthrow the Egyptian regime. As a result he had spent three hard years in Egyptian prisons. When Azzam was assassinated, Zawahiri apparently replaced him as the dominant influence on bin Laden. The early al Qa’ida organization was established to keep track of the volunteers in the assistance program.

In retrospect it is ironic that at the time all were legitimate figures in the eyes of the West and certainly in the countries they came from. Both Azzam and Zawahiri traveled to the United States to raise money for the cause. “Foreign fighters” from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Algeria, or Egypt volunteered to aid the mujahideen. The Reagan administration generously supported the anti-Soviet resistance, including supplying the Stinger missiles that were lethally effective in defeating the Soviet Union. Pakistan, restored to American good graces after being isolated as a result of its nuclear ambitions, was the conduit for both military and humanitarian aid to the mujahideen.

The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 was a victory for both the United States and the Afghan resistance. But American attention turned elsewhere, and Afghanistan slowly collapsed into civil war. Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia determined to change the Saudi regime—not necessarily to overthrow the monarchy but to induce the country to reject Western influence. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden supposedly volunteered to defend Saudi Arabia and was bitterly offended when his offer was dismissed and American troops were invited instead. By 1991 bin Laden had become such an irritant that he was expelled from the country.

He relocated to the Sudan, an extremist sanctuary designated by the U.S. State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993. There bin Laden at first seemed content with managing his business enterprises, including local construction projects that ensured his welcome. Simultaneously, however, his wealth and his far-flung organizational contacts in al Qa’ida allowed him to support violent opposition in Muslim territories around the world, in Somalia, the Balkans, Chechnya, and the new former Soviet republics in Central Asia—struggles that were not necessarily anti-American, although bin Laden later claimed to have helped drive the United States from Somalia.

This activism led Saudi Arabia to revoke his citizenship in 1994. In 1996 the Sudanese government was induced to expel bin Laden. It is not clear where bin Laden was expected to go, but the most obvious destination was Afghanistan, a transfer he accomplished just as the Taliban was poised to come out on top in the civil war.

In 1997, from Afghanistan, bin Laden issued a call for jihad against the United States. In 1998 a public declaration of a “Holy War against the Jews and Crusaders” signaled his alliance with Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad group and the beginning of the terrorist campaign that resulted three years later in the devastating 9/11 attacks. The amalgamated al Qa’ida turned its attention from the “near enemy”...