Asia-Pacific Security

An Introduction

Joanne Wallis, Andrew Carr, Joanne Wallis, Andrew Carr

• Editorial: Georgetown University Press
• Año: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781626163461
• Categoría: Politics & International Relations
• Categoría: Asian Politics

This new textbook gathers an international roster of top security studies scholars to provide an overview of Asia-Pacific's international relations and pressing contemporary security issues. It is a suitable introduction for undergraduate and masters students' use in international relations and security studies courses. Merging a strong theoretical component with rich contemporary and historical empirical examples, Asia-Pacific Security examines the region's key players and challenges as well as a spectrum of proposed solutions for improving regional stability. Major topics include in-depth looks at the United States' relationship with China; Security concerns presented by small and microstates, the region's largest group of nations; threats posed by terrorism and insurgency; the region's accelerating arms race and the potential for an Asian war; the possible roles of multilateralism, security communities, and human security as part of solutions to regional problems.

Part I

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The Changing Asia-Pacific Security Order

1 Can the United States Share Power in the Asia-Pacific?

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BRAD GLOSSERMAN

Reader’s Guide

The twentieth century is often described as the “American Century.” For most of it, the United States was the world’s largest economic and military power, and the post–World War II order in the Asia-Pacific was largely an American creation. In the twenty-first century, however, questions have been raised about the possible decline of US power, the rise of challenger states, and whether the United States has the will and desire to sustain the order it developed. While there may be questions about whether the United States is “the indispensable power,” it does remain “the indispensable partner,” especially as the security landscape evolves. This chapter explores what is meant by the term “great power” and argues that the United States clearly fits this label. It then outlines the reasons behind Washington’s “pivot” to Asia in 2011 and the implications for the United States and the region. Finally, the chapter explores the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (hereafter, China)—especially from the US perspective—to shed light on perhaps the primary security challenge the region faces in the new century.

Introduction

Few in the US public, and none who walk its corridors of power, question the great power credentials of the United States. Madeleine Albright, secretary of state under President Bill Clinton, considered the United States to be the “indispensable power,” a sentiment that grew out of her experience during the Cold War and watching Europe flail and fail while trying to deal with the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia.¹ In recent years, however, it has become clear that great power status “ain’t what it used to be.” Even the United States, the sole remaining superpower, has discovered that it is increasingly unable to dictate outcomes around the world. Some blame an increasingly partisan political system or economic difficulties at home. In fact, however, twenty-first-century problems and challenges are more complex, and power and capabilities are more diffused. As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq made clear, the United States can blow things up, but rebuilding enduring structures of peace and ensuring stability are such huge challenges that even a superpower must look for help from coalition partners.

This is the new reality of power in the twenty-first century, and one that increasingly dominates US thinking about foreign policy. In this world, a new type of leadership is required. The most apt formulation of this new reality comes from Jane Harmon, a longtime student of foreign policy who served eight terms as a member of the US House of Representatives and now heads the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She considers the United States the “indispensable partner,” a compelling and important tweaking of Albright’s dictum.² The Obama administration’s “rebalance to Asia” is the official articulation of this new type of leadership and a framework for implementing it. This chapter asks “what is a great power?” and whether the United States qualifies as such, two easily answered questions. More significantly, it probes the meaning and relevance of great power status in the twenty-first century, which invites an examination of how power works today and the changing US role in the Asia-Pacific region as it adapts to this new world. Finally, it explores the US-China relationship, identifies its major components and currents, and outlines a framework for understanding this critical bilateral relationship.

What Is a “Great Power”?

A great power is a state that is able—and is recognized as able—to exert influence around the world. This requires both the possession of interests that demand its attention and protection and the means to assert these interests. Traditionally, great powers were determined by crude measures—size of population, as well as economic and military strength. An effective political system was an implicit feature of a government able to exert its will, coupled with access to and control of the resources needed to fuel the economy and sustain the military. The historian A. J. P. Taylor provided a simple definition: “The test of a great power is the test of strength for war.”³

The management of far-flung interests requires a capable diplomatic corps as well, and this requirement has taken on additional importance as the international system has become more complex; the number of states has been growing, institutions are proliferating, and economic and information systems are diversifying as globalization proceeds. International institutions and conferences can recognize and validate great power status. The Congress of Vienna explicitly identified the great powers of the nineteenth century; the possession of nuclear weapons was a symbol of great power status in the second half of the twentieth century (although the significance of that marker has diminished in recent years), as is a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. This reasoning and the evidence it uses reflect the realist mindset, which was explained in the preceding chapter.

The evolution of the international system—the changes just noted, as well as the growing acceptance of a normative structure rooted in individual rights and democratic values (leavened by the sovereignty of states)—has yielded new thinking about power. Traditional notions of hard power ultimately focus on an ability to compel another state to act in a particular way. Yet in an increasingly democratized world, the use of force—except in very particular circumstances—is losing legitimacy. Sheer power is no longer accepted as an acceptable rationale for the resolution of international disputes. The exercise of force to resolve such questions must be authorized, and hence legitimated, by some generally accepted international authority. Persuasion—the real thing of daily politics, not The Godfather’s famous “offer you can’t refuse”—has become a critical component of the great power foreign policy tool kit. The capacity to attract or co-opt rather than coerce or compel is what the Harvard University professor Joseph S. Nye Jr. calls “soft power.”⁴ Considerable confusion surrounds this concept, and it remains the subject of great dispute and debate. It is hard to measure and difficult to isolate. Nevertheless, the ability to win other governments over, to convince one state that what another state wants is also good for it, is a new prerequisite for great power status.

Is the United States Still a Great Power?

By every metric, the United States remains a great power. It is the world’s leading economy, with a GDP estimated at $17.4 trillion in 2014, about 25 percent of global wealth (table 1.1). Even as the US share of global riches decreases, it remains twice as large as its leading competitor, and though the United States may yield the number one position to China, its GDP per capita is orders of magnitude larger. The US population is the third largest in the w...