Business
Global Ownership Structures
Global ownership structures refer to the various ways in which ownership of businesses and assets is distributed across different countries and entities. This can include multinational corporations, joint ventures, subsidiaries, and other forms of international ownership arrangements. Understanding global ownership structures is crucial for businesses operating across borders to navigate legal, regulatory, and tax implications.
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4 Key excerpts on "Global Ownership Structures"
- Lee H. Radebaugh, Sidney J. Gray, Ervin L. Black(Authors)
- 2015(Publication Date)
- Wiley(Publisher)
These are called market-centered economies. On the other hand, German and Japanese own- ership of firms tends to be concentrated among majority owners such as banks or other large financial institutions. These are called bank-centered economies. 320 Chapter Twelve Corporate Governance and Control of Global Operations As further studies began to look beyond these four countries, it was found that concentrated ownership structures were the most common form of ownership out- side of the United States and the United Kingdom. For example, firms in conti- nental Europe are mostly family owned and controlled. In Israel, banks and insti- tutional investors are the most common majority shareholders. In China, ownership is split relatively equally between the government, institutions, and domestic individuals. It is hard to know if this concentrated ownership is due to a lack of highly developed stock markets, or if the lack of highly developed stock mar- kets is an outgrowth of this preference for concentrated ownership. Studies have shown that outside of the United States, concentrated ownership is positively associated with firm performance. For example, a study of East Asian companies found that strong government ownership was positively associated with performance while corporate ownership negatively affected performance. In sev- eral other countries, it was shown that bank ownership is associated with positive firm performance. Another worldwide trend in recent years has been to sell traditionally state- owned enterprises to private investors. This dramatic shift in ownership structure is known as privatization. Several studies have shown that after privatization, firms sig- nificantly increase their profitability. Other reported effects include cost savings, more efficiency, better employment conditions, and increased dividends. The results are very similar for developed and emerging markets.
eBook - ePubThe Corporation
Growth, Diversification and Mergers
- Dennis Mueller(Author)
- 2020(Publication Date)
- Taylor & Francis(Publisher)
6 Corporate governanceIn recent years, considerable attention has been devoted to differences across countries in the institutional environments in which corporations operate, and the consequences of these institutional differences for corporate performance. One branch of this literature has been concerned with corporate governance structures.1 Under the broad heading of corporate governance are usually included (1) the identity and degree of concentration of ownership, (2) the institutional structure by which owners monitor and control managers by means of boards of directors and the like, and (3) the institutional structure for disciplining and replacing managers as, for example, through proxy contests and/or takeovers. A second branch of the literature focuses upon the broader legal environment in which corporations operate. Within this literature would come laws governing a shareholder’s access to various sorts of information about a company, a shareholder’s rights to sue the management for certain actions detrimental to the shareholder’s interests, and so on.2 Although corporate governance structures are imbedded within the broader legal system of a country and thus are affected by it, the two sets of institutions are not synonymous, as we shall explain shortly.One distinction drawn within the corporate governance literature is between “insider” governance systems in which ownership stakes are concentrated and the major stakeholders are directly represented on the boards that monitor managers, and perhaps in management itself, and “outsider” governance systems in which ownership stakes are dispersed, and owners exercise indirect control on management by electing representatives to the monitoring boards, or perhaps by voting on specific proposals of management. The United States and Great Britain are the most important examples of countries with outsider governance systems, and thus this form of governance structure is often called the “Anglo-Saxon” system.
eBook - ePubThe Corporation
Growth, Diversification and Mergers
- Dennis Mueller(Author)
- 2003(Publication Date)
- Taylor & Francis(Publisher)
6: Corporate governance
In recent years, considerable attention has been devoted to differences across countries in the institutional environments in which corporations operate, and the consequences of these institutional differences for corporate performance. One branch of this literature has been concerned with corporate governance structures.1Under the broad heading of corporate governance are usually included (1) the identity and degree of concentration of ownership, (2) the institutional structure by which owners monitor and control managers by means of boards of directors and the like, and (3) the institutional structure for disciplining and replacing managers as, for example, through proxy contests and/or takeovers. A second branch of the literature focuses upon the broader legal environment in which corporations operate. Within this literature would come laws governing a shareholder’s access to various sorts of information about a company, a shareholder’s rights to sue the management for certain actions detrimental to the shareholder’s interests, and so on.2 Although corporate governance structures are imbedded within the broader legal system of a country and thus are affected by it, the two sets of institutions are not synonymous, as we shall explain shortly.One distinction drawn within the corporate governance literature is between “insider” governance systems in which ownership stakes are concentrated and the major stakeholders are directly represented on the boards that monitor managers, and perhaps in management itself, and “outsider” governance systems in which ownership stakes are dispersed, and owners exercise indirect control on management by electing representatives to the monitoring boards, or perhaps by voting on specific proposals of management. The United States and Great Britain are the most important examples of countries with outsider governance systems, and thus this form of governance structure is often called the “Anglo-Saxon” system.
eBook - PDFInstitutional Approach to Global Corporate Governance
Business Systems and Beyond
- J. Jay Choi, Sandra Dow(Authors)
- 2008(Publication Date)
- Emerald Group Publishing Limited(Publisher)
Journal of Finance , 57 , 1147–1170. Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2008). Complex ownership structures and corporate valuations. Review of Financial Studies , 21 , 579–604. Lasfer, M. A. (2006). The interrelationship between managerial ownership and board structure. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting , 33 , 1006–1033. Probing Corporate Governance Globally 29 Lemmon, M. L., & Lins, K. V. (2003). Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis. Journal of Finance , 58 , 1445–1468. Licht, A. N., Goldschmidt, C., & Schwartz, S. H. (2005). Culture, law, and corporate governance. International Review of Law and Economics , 25 , 229–255. Martin, J. D., & Sayrak, A. (2003). Corporate diversification and shareholder value: A survey of recent literature. Journal of Corporate Finance , 9 , 37–57. Mason, G., Chun-Keung, H., & Ashok, R. (2001). Do shareholders benefit from the adoption of incentive pay for directors? Financial Management , 30 , 45–61. Maury, B. (2006). Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western European corporations. Journal of Corporate Finance , 12 , 321–341. Maury, B., & Pajuste, A. (2005). Multiple large shareholders and firm value. Journal of Banking & Finance , 29 , 1813–1834. McGuire, J., & Dow, S. (2003). The persistence and implications of Japanese keiretsu organization. Journal of International Business Studies , 34 , 374–388. Miyajima, H., & Kuroki, F. (2007). The unwinding of cross-shareholding in Japan: Causes, effects and implications. In: M. Aoki, G. Jackson & H. Miyajima (Eds), Corporate governance in Japan: Institutional change and organizational diversity . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moeller, S. B., & Schlingemann, F. P. (2005). Global diversification and bidder gains: A comparison between cross-border and domestic acquisitions. Journal of Banking & Finance , 29 , 533–564. Morck, R., & Nakamura, M.
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