Languages & Linguistics

Concrete Nouns

Concrete nouns are words that represent tangible, physical objects that can be perceived by the senses. They include things like animals, plants, people, and inanimate objects. Concrete nouns are the opposite of abstract nouns, which represent ideas, emotions, or concepts. In language, concrete nouns help to provide specificity and clarity in communication.

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3 Key excerpts on "Concrete Nouns"

  • Book cover image for: Linguistic Perspectives on English Grammar
    Consider the following remarks: One of the primary uses of nouns in everyday discourse is to code “thing- like” entities. Our world is filled with people, creatures, and objects and we use nouns to talk about them. . . . This is not to say that words like hatred, joy, and respect are not nouns; they certainly are. But more often than not the nouns we use in everyday discourse refer to entities that have physical real- ity. (Berk, 1999, pp. 56–57) The points Berk makes here are good ones, particularly her appeal to what she calls the language of “everyday discourse.” Most of the nouns we find ourselves using on a regular basis do indeed refer to concrete aspects of our experience, or “entities that have physical reality,” as Berk puts it. If we were to simply abandon the semantic definition of nouns, we would be in danger of losing sight of this. Instead, I suggest that we need a better— that is, a more linguistically adequate—semantic definition that can be used alongside the morphosyntactic approach we have discussed already. One such modified semantic approach has been proposed by the linguist Talmy Givón (see 1993a, pp. 54–55; 2000, pp. 50–51.) I want to consider this now, showing how it can be employed both to identify nouns as a syntactic cat- egory and to subdivide nouns within that general category. Givón contends that the words we think of as nouns tend to have cer- tain semantic features in common. In particular, these words tend to be used to refer to aspects of the world that are: ◾ Time-stable ◾ Concrete Nouns and Noun Phrases in Linguistic Perspective  9 I will discuss both of these terms in turn. Givón lists four properties altogether, the other two being “spatial compactness”—or “degree of spa- tial scatter” (2000, p. 50)—and “complexity”—or “number of defining sub- features” (2000, p.50). I am ignoring these latter properties. I should also mention that even though I have adapted these terms from Givón, my in- terpretations differ somewhat from his.
  • Book cover image for: A linguistic commentary on John Fearn's "Anti-Tooke" (1824/27)
    • Brigitte Asbach-Schnitker(Author)
    • 2017(Publication Date)
    • De Gruyter
      (Publisher)
    As we have pointed out before, definition does not refer to something linguistic. The most likely interpreta-tion of this term seems to imply that definition stands for the sum of cognitive features (intensional meaning) connected with the term, thus corresponding to the essen-tial properties of the 'thing' to be denoted by the term. 66 have existence and reality; in other words that they must be concrete and real objects such as tables, houses etc. He sets out to show that we can also talk about objects which are ab-stract in their own essence (cf. A.-T. II, 182), such as Uni-versals, Generals, Species etc. (cf. A.-T. II, l8l). Also, he observes, there are objects which have only a supposed reali-ty such as the sword of Harlequin. But, he argues, if we em-ploy the latter terms in a sentence, we are also forced to prefix lOl them by a noun concretive. {ibid.). ' Now, in such cases, [he says] we are to observe that, by the employment - the unavoidable employment - of the CONCRETIVE Term, we EMBODY THE OBJECT in question into a FICTICIOUS CONCRETE OBJECT of our CONTEMPLATION, and of LANGUAGE.... (A.-T. II, 181-182). It is correct to assert that there are abstract objects the names of which do admit of quantification, but we cannot agree with the generality of this assertion. It seems to be un-deniable that we can talk about abstract objects without the idea of quantification coming in at all, for example: justice is rare. The function of nouns concretive, to sum up, is explained by purely philosophical or semantic considerations. Moreover, nouns concretive derive their grammatical status from being connected with nouns generic; insofar they are syncategorematic. Nouns concretive, we have seen, can only occur in a sentence when they are connected with nouns generic; the same consideration holds for nouns specific; the items belonging to the latter class of words always occur with both a noun concretive and a noun generic.
  • Book cover image for: Logico - Linguistic Papers
    CHAPTER Vili Some Comments on Abstract Nouns Stultus est qui fructus magnarum arborum spectat, altitudinem non metitur. Such words or phrases as 'man', 'living being', and 'generous' are common-ly regarded as concrete in some sense, with 'humanity', 'life', and 'gener-osity' then being regarded as abstract nouns corresponding to them. Likewise 'Ceasar' and 'Plato' are said to be concrete proper names, with 'Caesarism' and 'Platonism' being then corresponding abstract nouns. Abstract nouns or phrases are commonly said to stand for qualities or attributes, whereas concrete words or phrases are said to stand for sets or classes. Concrete proper names then are thought to stand for specific objects or events, and their corresponding abstract nouns, for qualities or attributes especially characteristic or typical of those objects or events. But all such talk is of course rather vague unless sharpened in terms of some well-knit semantical or pragmatic theory. Another traditional distinction is between sortals and mass nouns. Sortals are count nouns or phrases such as 'man', 'the living', 'the generous', whereas mass nouns include 'iron', 'water', 'butter' and the like. For the handling of mass nouns the part-whole relation of the calculus of indivi-duals, or some surrogate for it such as 'bit o f , is useful, indeed indispens-able, it would seem. 'Ironness', 'wateriness', and 'butteriness' are charac-teristic abstract nouns corresponding to these lexical mass nouns. Usually such abstract nouns can be analyzed as involving reference in some fashion to paradigmatic or typical or essential or characteristic properties. Thus 'wateriness is to be analyzed perhaps in terms of characteristics typical or paradigmatic or whatever of bits of water. These traditional distinctions are not to be presumed defended here, but do serve as useful reminders to help get us started in a difficult terrain that is in urgent need of careful study.
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