Geopolitics

From the Cold War to the 21st Century

Francis Sempa

• Editore: Routledge
• Anno: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351517683
• Edizione: 1
• Argomento: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Categoria: Politica

Writers, observers, and practitioners of international politics frequently invoke the term "geopolitics" to describe, explain, or analyze specific foreign policy issues and problems. Such generalized usage ignores the fact that geopolitics as a method of understanding international relations has a history that includes a common vocabulary, well-established if sometimes conflicting concepts, an extensive body of thought, and a recognized group of theorists and scholars. In Geopolitics, Francis P. Sempa presents a history of geopolitical thought and applies its classical analyses to Cold War and post-Cold War international relations.

While mindful of the impact of such concepts as "globalization" and the "information revolution" on our understanding of contemporary events, Sempa emphasizes traditional geopolitical theories in explaining the outcome of the Cold War. He shows that, the struggle between the Western allies and the Soviet empire was unique in its ideological component and nuclear standoff, the Cold War fits into a recurring geopolitical pattern. It can be seen as a consequence of competition between land powers and sea powers, and between a potential Eurasian hegemonic power and a coalition of states opposed to that would-be hegemony.

The collapse of the Soviet empire ended the most recent threat to global stability. Acting as a successor to the British Empire, the United States organized, funded, and led a grand coalition that successfully countered the Soviet quest for domination. No power or alliance posed an immediate threat to the global balance of power. Indeed, the end of the Cold War generated hopes for a "new world order" and predictions that economics would replace geopolitics as the driving force in international politics. Russian instability, the nuclear dimension of the India-Pakistan conflict, and Chinese bids for dominance have turned the Asia-Pacific region into what Mahan called "debatable and debated ground." Russi

Part 1

Geopolitical Perspectives

1

Introduction

The Geopolitics of History

“Geopolitics” is a much-overused term. Writers, observers, and practitioners of international politics frequently invoke the term to describe, explain, or analyze specific foreign policy issues and problems. Such overuse ignores the fact that geopolitics as a method of analyzing international relations has a history that includes a common vocabulary, well-established if sometimes conflicting concepts, an established body of thought, and a recognized group of theorists and scholars.

The goal of this book is to present salient aspects of the history of geopolitical thought and to apply classical geopolitical analysis to past, recent, and current international relations. Pride of place is given to the geopolitical ideas and theories of Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Nicholas Spykman, and James Burnham. These “geopoliticians” combined brilliant analyses of past events with remarkable predictions of future developments. Mackinder, for example, foresaw in the early 1920s, and again in 1943, the emergence of the North Atlantic Alliance that was founded in 1949. Burnham in the late 1940s and early 1950s proposed a strategy to undermine Soviet power in Central and Eastern Europe that foreshadowed the successful policies of the Reagan administration in the 1980s.

The end of the Cold War resulted in hopes for a “new world order” and predictions that economics, or as Edward Luttwak put it, “geo-economics,” would replace geopolitics as the driving force in international politics. Events soon proved that geography still matters; that nations still struggle for power and territory; that military power still trumps economics (at least in the short run); that we are not, contrary to Francis Fukuyama, at “the end of history.”

The Cold War was not the end of history, but rather the most recent collision between a potentially hegemonic power and a coalition of states opposed to that power’s bid for global hegemony. Before the Soviet Union, there was Hitler’s Germany allied to Imperial Japan. Before Hitler’s Germany and Japan there was Wilhelm II’s Germany and Austria-Hungary. Before Germany and Austria-Hungary there was Napoleon’s France. Before Napoleon there was the France of Louis XIV. Before Louis XIV there was the Austrian and Spanish Hapsburgs. Each bid for hegemony was countered by a coalition of states determined to reestablish or uphold the balance of power.

There is no reason to believe that the twenty-first century will be any different. There are unmistakable signs that China is in the early stages of a bid to become the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. This is a potential threat that the United States ignores at its peril. With Russia currently undergoing another “time of troubles,” and Europe dominated by peaceful democracies, the world’s focus has shifted to Central Asia, Southwest Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific Rim. Due to many factors, including the break-up of the Soviet Empire, large supplies of oil and natural gas in the Caspian Sea region, the nuclear dimension to the India-Pakistan conflict, and the rise of China, this huge region has once again become what Alfred Thayer Mahan called the “debatable and debated ground.” Russia, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, China, Japan, the Koreas and the United States have interests that collide in one or more areas of this region.

Previous global or regional power struggles involved battles on land, at sea, and in the air. The twenty-first century’s struggles will likely involve efforts to gain control of outer space or at least to deny to others the use of outer space. Anti-satellite weapons, space-based lasers, ballistic missile defenses, and orbital space stations are no longer the stuff of science fiction. The impact of technology will force statesmen to enlarge their geopolitical vision.

Geopolitics is about perspective. It is about how one views the world. In elementary and high school geography classes, we were taught that the world is composed of seven continents (Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, South America, Australia, and Antarctica) and four oceans (Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Arctic). Viewed geopolitically, however, the world is composed of one great continent, Eurasia-Africa, many smaller islands, and one great ocean. This distinction between geography and geopolitics is important to the study and practice of international relations.

Knowledge of geography is essential to geopolitical analysis. Geopolitics is about the interaction among states and empires in a particular geographical setting. Throughout history, geography has been the stage on which nations and empires have collided. Geography is the most fundamental factor in international politics because it is the most permanent. The geography of a state—its position in a geographical region and in the world as a whole—presents opportunities to, and imposes limitations on, the state. For that reason, geography also conditions the perspectives of a state’s leaders or rulers and, thereby, affects their decision-making in matters of foreign policy.

Throughout history, geography has influenced the geopolitical orientation of countries in the direction of either land power or sea power. An insular or island location will likely orient a country to the sea, whereas a continental location will likely orient a country toward land. Some countries are located on continents but have ready access to the ocean, a situation that can result in a sea or land orientation. The sea or land orientation of a country is not necessarily absolute. A sea-oriented country may be able to project power on land, and a land-oriented country may take to the sea. When that happens, as when Wilhelmine Germany sought to challenge British sea power in the early 1900s, conflict often ensues.

The sheer size of a country is an important factor in the role it can play in international politics. In recent times, the dominant geopolitical players were the Soviet Union and the United States, two continental-sized giants. But the size of a country alone is insufficient to guarantee geopolitical significance. Brazil, Argentina, and Australia are large countries that, by themselves, have never played a significant role in world politics. The much smaller countries of England and Japan, meanwhile, have ruled great empires.

Geographical position—where a country is located relative to other countries—is more important than size. The study of world history shows, for example, that countries located wholly or mostly in the Northern Hemisphere have had the greatest impact on world politics. Until the twentieth century, world politics was dominated by countries located on Eurasia, its offshore islands, and Africa, north of the Sahara. For many centuries, the Western and Southern Hemispheres were little more than the objects of Eurasian colonial powers. The United States is the only Western Hemispheric country to greatly impact global politics.

Other factors that affect a country’s ability to play a significant role on the world stage include population, economics, technology, military power, and character of government. Those factors, however, unlike geography, are subject to change over time. Geography is constant, though its impact can change. Technological and scientific advances can alter the effects of distance, topography, and climate. The protection afforded the United States by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, for example, has lessened over time with the development of faster ships and submarines, airplanes and jets, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

At its most fundamental level, international politics is about the struggle for space and power. Throughout history, nations and empires have sought to expand their territory and their influence over other countries and peoples. History records the rise and fall of empires and whole civilizations, most compellingly catalogued by Arnold J. Toynbee in his twelve-volume A Study of History. Toynbee argued that civilizations rise and fall due to the dialectic of “challenge and response.” In international politics, challenges have frequently taken the form of rising powers that upset or threaten to upset the existing balance of power. After the Napoleonic Wars, the diplomacy of the Congress of Vienna resulted in what Henry Kissinger called “a world restored”—an international structure or system that lasted until the First World War. The challenge to the “structure of peace” established by the Congress of Vienna emerged in 1871 with the rise of Germany to a dominant position in the center of Europe. Today, the international system created by the end of the Cold War is being challenged by the rise of China in the East Asia-Pacific Rim region.

The United States, meanwhile, has emerged as the geopolitical successor to the British Empire. In the nineteenth century, Britain used its insular geographical position and command of the seas to support the European balance of power erected at the Congress of Vienna. Today, the United States uses its insular geographical position and command of the sea, air and space to support the Eurasian balance of power in the wake of the Cold War.

Lord Palmerston famously remarked that nations have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests. Geopolitics helps statesmen determine their country’s interests, and helps them distinguish between enduring and transient interests. Those interests can, of course, change over time. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for example, England sought to prevent a hostile power from controlling Belgium. Later, as her empire expanded, England sought to maintain command of the seas and an evenly balanced European continent. Finally, as her empire faded, England supported a strong NATO and a “special relationship” with the United States.

U.S. foreign policy had a similar evolution. Initially, after the War of Independence, the United States sought to eliminate European influence on the American continent and to expand westward (the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny). In the late nineteenth century, the United States sought to expand into the Pacific Ocean and East Asia (the Open Door). In the twentieth century, the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy was to prevent a hostile power or alliance of powers from dominating Europe or East Asia (containment).

The geopolitics of the twenty-first century is taking shape. Globalization, economic interdependence, and the information revolution will affect how nations interact in this century. But those factors have not rendered geopolitics irrelevant. Instead, those factors and others will operate on nations within a larger geopolitical framework. To understand where we are, however, it is necessary to look back into the geopolitics of history. To do that, we need to familiarize ourselves with the timeless methods of geopolitical analysis employed by the great geopolitical theorists.

In other words, we need to see the world as Mackinder, Mahan, Spykman, and Burnham saw it.

2

Mackinder’s World

The study of international relations is impossible without a firm grasp of geography. The geographic factor in world history is the most fundamental because it is the most constant. Populations increase and decrease, natural resources are discovered and expended, political systems frequently change, empires and states rise and fall, technologies decline and advance, but the location of continents, islands, seas, and oceans has not changed significantly throughout recorded history. That is why great nations neglect the study of geography at their peril.

No one understood better the important relationship between geography and world history than the great British geographer, Halford John Mackinder. Born in Gainsborough, England in 1861, Mackinder attended Gainsborough Grammar School and Epsom College before entering Oxford in 1880. As a boy, according to W. H. Parker, Mackinder had “a strong curiosity about natural phenomena,... a love of the history of travel and exploration, an interest in international affairs, and a passion for making maps.”¹

At Oxford, Mackinder fell under the influence of Michael Sadler and Henry Nottidge Mosely, key figures in the effort to establish geography as an independent field of study in England. Mackinder was appointed a lecturer in natural science and economic history in 1886 and that same year joined the Royal Geographical Society. According to Brian W. Blouet, one of Mackinder’s biographers, the membership of the Royal Geographical Society “consisted of men with a general interest in the world and its affairs, officers from the army and nav...