The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology

Michael Hannon, Jeroen de Ridder, Michael Hannon, Jeroen de Ridder

• Editore: Routledge
• Anno: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000371949
• Edizione: 1
• Argomento: Commerce
• Categoria: Capital de connaissances

As political discourse had been saturated with the ideas of "post-truth", "fake news", "epistemic bubbles", and "truth decay", it was no surprise that in 2017 The New Scientist declared: "Philosophers of knowledge, your time has come." Political epistemology has old roots, but is now one of the most rapidly growing and important areas of philosophy.

The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology is an outstanding reference source to this exciting field, and the first collection of its kind. Comprising 41 chapters by an international team of contributors, it is divided into seven parts:

• Politics and truth: historical and contemporary perspectives
• Political disagreement and polarization
• Fake news, propaganda, and misinformation
• Ignorance and irrationality in politics
• Epistemic virtues and vices in politics
• Democracy and epistemology
• Trust, expertise, and doubt.

Within these sections crucial issues and debates are examined, including: post-truth, disagreement and relativism, epistemic networks, fake news, echo chambers, propaganda, ignorance, irrationality, political polarization, virtues and vices in public debate, epistocracy, expertise, misinformation, trust, and digital democracy, as well as the views of Plato, Aristotle, Mòz?, medieval Islamic philosophers, Mill, Arendt, and Rawls on truth and politics.

The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology is essential reading for those studying political philosophy, applied and social epistemology, and politics. It is also a valuable resource for those in related disciplines such as international relations, law, political psychology, political science, communication studies, and journalism.

PART 1
Politics and truth
Historical and contemporary perspectives

Introduction to Part 1

Politics and truth have always had a fraught relationship. In the Republic, Plato recommends that political elites knowingly propagate a “noble lie” to maintain social harmony. In “Truth and Politics,” Hannah Arendt observes that “from the viewpoint of politics, truth has a despotic character.” Her anxiety about truth is that it forecloses disagreement and deliberation, which is the very essence of political life. According to John Stuart Mill, deliberating in public about politics is good for a democracy because it affords citizens “the opportunity of exchanging error for truth” (1859: 21). But if politics is essentially a realm of contestation, then truth might not be an appropriate category for political discourse. Indeed, some have rejected the very idea of objective truths in politics. Whatever we think about truth’s role in politics, Arendt was certainly right that “no one ever doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms with each other.”

The first part of this handbook explores the vexed relationship between truth and politics from both historical and contemporary perspectives. In Chapter 1, Tamer Nawar considers the role of knowledge in Athenian democracy. As Nawar points out, ancient philosophers were often critical of the epistemic features of democratic institutions. He examines the principal institutions of Athenian democracy and also clarifies Plato’s epistemic argument against democracy. Nawar then examines Aristotle’s more optimistic view about democracy and knowledge, which is rooted in the epistemic power of groups. This lays the groundwork for much contemporary work in political epistemology (see, for example, the chapter by Hélène Landemore). Nawar concludes by examining what Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic philosophers had to say about democracy and knowledge.

In Chapter 2, Chris Fraser argues that, according to ancient Chinese Mohists, social epistemology plays a crucial role for the legitimacy of political authority. In particular, the Mohists claim that political stability is achieved when the subjects of a state identify with the norms of judgment and conduct promulgated by its leaders. This doctrine of “identifying upwards” gives social epistemology a vital role in justifying the legitimacy of political authority because the norms that ground legitimacy are both moral and epistemic. Thus, political authority and epistemic authority are deeply intertwined on this conception of politics.

In Chapter 3, Anthony Booth explores the relationship between epistemology and politics in Islamic philosophy. He explains how medieval Islamic philosophers wrestled with the issue of the role and function of expertise in politics, which is a topic we are still grappling with today (see Part 7 of this handbook). Booth argues that medieval Islamic philosophers held an epistemological view that he calls “Islamic Moderate Evidentialism,” and Booth finds parallels of this idea in the mid-twentieth-century revolutionary Islamism of Sayyid Qutb and Abul A’la Maududi. Finally, Booth shows how understanding this movement from the perspective of medieval Islamic philosophy can shed light on other schools of political thought.

In Chapter 4, Paul Kelly gives an overview of Mill’s argument for liberalism and the conditions of acquiring knowledge. Mill believed that knowledge was ultimately based on inductions from experience that are always open to review and falsification, so the growth of knowledge would require freedom of speech and a rejection of censorship. In fact, Mill says we must not paternalistically attempt to spare people from error because that would undermine the epistemic basis for testing new beliefs and appreciating existing views. Thus, Mill defends the importance of error and unpopular opinion, as well as freedom from government limitation, because they serve an educative function in the broader process of democratic deliberation. However, Kelly points out that Mill’s domestic politics is far more progressive than his views about international politics, where Mill defends imperialism and is less tolerant of diversity or error.

In Chapter 5, Yasemin Sari reassesses Hannah Arendt’s view about the role of truth in politics. In particular, Sari examines the idea that people have a “right to unmanipulated factual information,” which Arendt says is crucial for establishing freedom of opinion. This chapter aims not only to demonstrate that factual truths play a key role in politics, but also to bring a new perspective to democratic theory by clarifying the relationship between factual truths and political judgment.

In Chapter 6, Simon Blackburn reflects on whether the very idea of political epistemology has doubtful application. While politics needs to be informed by knowledge from diverse fields, he claims there is no special, purely political element in its epistemology. Politics is more directly concerned with deciding what to do, and it is here that knowledge is a rare commodity, according to Blackburn. This is because we seldom know in advance which decisions are best, and we may not even know whether we could have done better with hindsight. This chapter ends by arguing that, contrary to what many writers have claimed, postmodern thought has little to do with the “post-truth” atmosphere.

In Chapter 7, the final chapter of this part, Amanda Greene tells a “tale of two tribes” with different political outlooks: the ‘heartlanders’, whose concern for truthfulness is anchored in personal and relational integrity, and the ‘metropolitans’, whose concern for truthfulness is anchored in impartiality and cosmopolitanism. According to Greene, each group exhibits qualities of truthfulness – sincerity and accuracy – in ways that the other group does not recognize. The result is that each group interprets the other group’s political participation as an abandonment of truth for the sake of power, thereby undermining political legitimacy. Greene builds on the work of Bernard Williams and John Stuart Mill to argue that finding common ground is necessary if truth is to play a role in the resistance of tyranny.

1
Democracy and knowledge in ancient Greece

Tamer Nawar

1 Introduction

Ancient philosophers were often critical of the epistemic features of democratic institutions. I first offer a critical review of the principal institutions of Athenian democracy. I then clarify what I take to be Plato’s central argument against democracy, which turns upon its epistemic failings. I then examine Aristotle’s views about democracy and knowledge and his views concerning the epistemic powers of groups. Finally, I conclude by examining what Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic philosophers had to say about democracy and knowledge.

2 Athenian democracy

There is evidence for egalitarianism, collective deliberation, and public discussion in various pre-modern societies (the kings of the Iliad engaged in some collective deliberation, e.g. Iliad 14.27ff, but there were risks for speakers of lesser status, 2.211ff). However, it seems that governing by the citizenry – dēmokratia, i.e. rule (kratos) by the people (dēmos) – originated in ancient Greece in the sixth Century bce. Athens was not the only ancient Greek democracy in the classical period and – despite what is often claimed (even by eminent authorities) – it may not have been the first (for the evidence concerning archaic city-states, see Robinson 1997; Hansen and Nielsen 2004; for classical democracies other than Athens, cf. Robinson 2011). However, Athens is the best documented ancient democracy and – despite two brief oligarchic interruptions (in 411 and 404 bce) – it was arguably the most successful on several measures (cf. Morris 2004; Ober 2015).

Ancient democracies, including that of Athens, were not liberal and are typically characterised as direct, participatory, or deliberative (as opposed to representative). In the fourth century (c. 340 bce), Athens’ citizenship was made up of perhaps 30,000 or so adult males (the population was significantly larger; Attica probably had over 200,000 inhabitants). Women, foreigners, and slaves were not full citizens and had no direct access to political participation but there was some diversity in terms of wealth and occupation among the (adult male) citizenry and all full citizens had isonomia (equality before the law) and isēgoria (equal right to public speech). The principal offices and institutions of Athenian democracy included the following:

• The ekklēsia (assembly): was responsible for passing decrees (but not laws) in domestic and foreign matters, electing magistrates, and several others matters. Meetings, which were open to all citizens and held 40 times a year, were usually attended by over 6,000 citizens. Votes were often made by show of hands.
• The dikastai (jurors): 6,000 citizens (over the age of 30), who served for one year and were selected by lot from those who applied. From this pool, nomothetai (legislators) and juries for the dikastēria (popular courts) were drawn.
  • Legislators (1,000+ jurors): passed laws. They met infrequently.
  • Popular courts (200+ jurors in private cases, 500+ in public cases; in some cases very much more than 500): passed judgement on court cases (which rarely lasted more than a few hours). They met very frequently.
• The boulē (council): 500 citizens (over the age of 30), who served for one year and could only serve twice in their lifetimes. They were chosen by lot from those who applied. They drafted agendas and proposals for the assembly. They met very frequently.

While there has been some disagreement among historians over the precise nature and function of these institutions, it is worth emphasising at least three facts.

First, voting was sometimes done by ballot and sometimes by show of hands but the manner in which votes were counted was often not straightforward (at least by modern lights, cf. Schwartzberg 2010). Despite some famous exceptions, such as the trial of Socrates (where the votes were split fairly closely), something like consensus may have been the norm.

Second, the popular courts were fairly ‘political’ institutions. They acted as checks on leading politicians and were also responsible for much public policy (cf. Aristotle Politics 1274a4–5).

Third, significant influence was exerted by a ‘political class’ with significant wealth who often had rhetorical education, i.e. the kind of people who would have paid very good money to be taught by Protagoras and other sophists (itinerant philosophy, politics, and economics teachers who were much in demand in ancient Greece; several readers of this piece will presumably fall into one of these groups or the other).¹ However, although it was sometimes claimed that Athens was a democracy primarily in name (e.g. Thucydides 2.65.9), it is unclear that elites dominated Athenian political life (Hansen 1987, 1991). At any time, a significant number of those who served as jurors and who attended the assembly would have previously served in the council and instead of seeking approval in occasional elections, leading political speakers and members of the elite had to continually command or commandeer public approval. As a result, they could expect close scrutiny and ran significant risks (cf. Balot 2014).

It has been argued, most notably by Josiah Ober (1989, 2008), that Athens’ success in an unforgiving environment was largely due to the role of its democratic institutions in promoting rational deliberation and efficiently employing the knowledge of its citizens (and even that Athens serves as a case study for the success of direct democracies, Ober 2017). Thus, for instance, while democratic deliberation imposed significant costs, Ober (2006, 2008) argues that knowledge dispersed among the citizenry could be aggregated through social networking (e.g. in demes and in the boulē) and social incentives (e.g. honours). Ober also suggests that public rituals, ceremonies, and other practices allowed those who shared the relevant preferences to better coordinate their actions (cf. Chwe 2001) and the nature and settings of meetings (e.g. in the courts) was such that they contributed towards a sense of unity and allowed a large body of citizens to build common knowledge. Athens’ direct democracy was thus able to effectively employ the dispersed knowledge of its citizens to a degree other political arrangements (including representative democracy) could not match. The involvement of Athenian citizens led to: more realistic and sustainable policy; non-experts contributing relevant knowledge which would not come to light in deliberations among experts; and increased transparency and accountability (which decreased corruption and partial interests).

Ober’s account of Athenian democracy has been highly influential and is attractive in several respects, but faces some potential objections. First, the state of the evidence makes it difficult to measure many of the relevant variables – let alone to attempt to discern a causal relation between them – and the fates of other states (e.g. successful, non-democratic states and unsuccessful, democratic states) seem to constitute counter-evidence to several of Ober’s central theses. Even if one were to grant that Athens was most successful when most democratic, it seems that Ober is – at best – offering an eikos muthos (likely story) about how ancient Athens may have effectively employed the knowledge of its citizens. (One might...