Retreat and Retribution in Afghanistan 1842

Two Journals of the First Afghan War

Margaret Kekewich

• Editore: Pen & Sword Military
• Anno: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781844685905
• Argomento: History
• Categoria: Modern History

The blow to British pride and confidence caused by the crushing defeat of their army in Afghanistan during the winter of 1841/2 compares in its impact to the disaster in New York on 11 September 2001. The British had replaced a popular and effective monarch with a weak one in the mistaken belief that he would keep the Russians at bay. Two years later, nearly all the British and Indian soldiers in the region were killed in a popular uprising.Margaret Kekewichs perceptive new study of the conflict describes the British defeat, their reoccupation of Afghanistan in the spring of 1842, then their final withdrawal at the end of the year. Her account, which is based on the graphic diaries written by two British eyewitnesses, gives a fascinating insight into the conflict in Afghanistan 150 years ago.The story is told by, first, Lady Sale who together with over 100 women, children and soldiers was captured and imprisoned by the Afghans. The second account comes from the Reverend Allen, a young chaplain to the army that invaded Afghanistan in April 1842 to avenge British humiliation and rescue the prisoners. Both these eyewitnesses deplored the follies that had led to war and defeat and also the suffering that was inflicted on many innocent Afghans.At a time when British forces are deeply engaged in another war in Afghanistan, Margaret Kekewich offers a balanced and thought-provoking new perspective on a previous conflict in the region.

PART I

LADY FLORENTIA SALE'S JOURNAL, SEPTEMBER 1841 TO SEPTEMBER 1842

Introduction

If we are not to repeat the bloody mistakes of the past in Afghanistan we must learn about its history

General Sir Michael Rose, 2002

The blow to British pride and confidence delivered by the defeat of their army during its retreat from Kabul in Afghanistan in January 1842 may be compared in its impact to the disaster in New York on 11 September 2001. The Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, and the Governor General of India, Lord Ellenborough, were torn between the desire for retribution and fears of a further disaster. The generals on the ground successfully pressed for a campaign to penetrate as far as Kabul to punish the Afghans and rescue the captive British officers and their families: a similar impulse, perhaps, to the recent desire of the US and its allies to punish the Taliban for harbouring their enemies.

Much of the history of the later stages of the first Afghan War is encapsulated in the journals of two of the participants. Lady Florentia Sale was the wife of General Sir Robert Sale, ‘Fighting Bob’, one of the few commanders who remained undefeated in 1842. She described in her Journal the deteriorating situation in Kabul, her journey accompanying the retreat of the British army through the passes from Kabul in early January 1842, then as a captive in the mountains, followed by the return to Kabul and then to Bamian where she and her companions were released eight months later. The Reverend Isaac Allen recorded his journey in his Diary as he went first as chaplain to General William Nott's force in Kandahar and then with his army that fought its way to Kabul from August to September 1842 where they joined General Pollock's army that had previously relieved General Sale at Jalalabad. Only staying in Kabul long enough to rescue the prisoners and destroy part of the city as an exemplary punishment, the whole force withdrew from Afghanistan to India, via the Khyber pass, before the worst of the winter set in. Allen recorded their welcome back to India by Lord Ellenborough who was delighted that some honour had been rescued from the ruins of defeat.

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From the late seventeenth century the partnership between the British Crown and the East India Company had progressively delivered the major part of India to their rule either directly or through alliances with Indian princes. This was supported by a large British army composed of thousands of European foot, cavalry and artillery soldiers and even larger numbers of Indian troops. The North West Frontier, however, presented several threats to security: the Sikh control of the Punjab interposed a volatile and warlike people between British India and Afghanistan. That country was controlled by a number of mutually hostile princes or warlords, most notably Shah Dost Mohammed of the Barukzai dynasty, the King of Kabul, a forebear of the last King of Afghanistan, Mohammed Zahir Shah who ruled until 1973 and died in 2007.

By the 1830s the complex relationships between the various rulers in Afghanistan, the Shah of Persia (Iran) and the British and Russian empires threatened to destabilise the region. The situation marked the beginning of ‘The Great Game’, as one of the political agents (British army officers who liaised with local rulers) called it. ‘The Game’ involved Russia and Britain attempting by diplomacy, trade, bribery and military force to gain power and influence in that area. The Russians were motivated by the wish to extend their empire southwards, the British by the need to protect their interests in India. Several factors sparked off their invasion of Afghanistan in late 1838: the fear of Russian influence; the Shah of Persia's attempt to seize the city of Herat from the Afghans and the animosity that existed between Britain's Sikh ally, Ranjit Singh (ruler of the Punjab), and Dost Mohammed. The Sikh ruler had recently seized Peshawar from the Afghans, intensifying their hatred of him.

The British held the mistaken belief that the Afghans would welcome the restoration of a former ruler in Kabul, Shah Shujah-al-Mukh of the Sadozai dynasty. He had been deposed thirty years earlier and lived in comfortable exile in India under British protection. The idea was not supported by Alexander Burnes, a political agent who had travelled extensively in the region, spoke fluent Persian and had formed a high opinion of the abilities of Dost Mohammed. An ambitious officer, Burnes suppressed his true opinion in the face of the enthusiasm for regime change shown by Lord Auckland, the Governor General of India, and his adviser Sir William Macnaghten. This misjudgement was to destroy the reputation of Auckland and the lives of Burnes, Macnaghten and many others.

‘The army of the Indus’ set out from northern India in December 1838 commanded by Sir John Keane. It included contingents led by Shah Shujah and the Sikhs (who soon withdrew) as well as sepoy and sowar (Indian infantry and cavalry soldiers) and British regiments, approximately 9,500 men plus about 38,000 servants and camp followers. These included handlers for the 30,000 camels plus grass-cutters for the large number of beasts that also included ponies, asses, bullocks and horses: one officer kept two camels just to carry his cigars. The logistics of leading and feeding such a large and diverse force in harsh weather over very difficult terrain and through high passes were considerable. The army encountered stiff opposition, especially at the great fortress of Ghazni, but once that had been taken the road to Kabul was open.

Shah Shujah was established as ruler in August 1839 and occupied the palace/fortress of the Bala Hissar in Kabul: Dost Mohammed fled and later surrendered to go into exile in India (Illustration 1). The British appeared to have achieved all their objectives although they found no trace of the Russian influence that they had feared (readers will be reminded of the non-existent ‘weapons of mass destruction’ in Iraq in 2003). Most of the army under Sir John Keane returned to India leaving garrisons in Kandahar, Kalat-i-Ghilzai, Bamian, Charikar and Ghazni. In Kabul Sir William Macnaghten, a chilly intellectual with an inflated idea of his own sagacity, was the envoy with political authority. General William Elphinstone was appointed by Lord Auckland (in 1841) a sickly and indecisive commander of two brigades: 5,000 sepoys and British soldiers, whilst Alexander Burnes was knighted and became the resident in Kabul. All was well for the first two years but the Afghans resented the British presence and never developed any respect for Shah Shujah. In the words of the Reverend Gleig, principal chaplain to the forces who published his history in 1846: ‘There was no increase of good feeling on the part of the inhabitants towards the invaders. The province submitted, or appeared to submit, to Shah Shujah, but of enthusiasm in his cause no class of society exhibited a sign; while the bearing of all their intercourse with the English was as hostile as ever.’ (Gleig, 39).

The directors of the East India Company and the Governor General were appalled at the continuing cost of maintaining Shah Shujah and the army that protected him in Afghanistan. Macnaghten was ordered to cut down his expenses and he halved the subsidies paid to the tribes that dominated the passes that led to and from India and controlled the hinterland of Kabul. Many Afghan chiefs had already found that the authority that they had always exercised over their lands had been usurped by the presence of the British army acting in the name of Shah Shujah. The result was unrest and a few murders culminating with the assassination of Sir Alexander Burnes in his house in Kabul on 2 November 1841. This was the signal for an uprising of the Afghans, and the cantonments (semi-permanent military stations) were constantly attacked causing many British casualties and their treasury and food stores were looted. In this vulnerable situation, despite the early onset of a harsh winter, Macnaghten, Elphinstone and his senior officers started negotiations to withdraw to India through the passes.

Akbar Khan, the favourite son of Dost Mohammed, appeared on the scene and became the leader of the hostile chieftains. He drove a hard bargain demanding hostages, money and most of the army's heavy guns, in return he guaranteed that it could leave Afghanistan without being attacked. Sir William Macnaghten met him on 23 December to clinch the deal but was murdered by Akbar and some of his fanatical followers. Despite this blatant act of bad faith the gullible General Elphinstone concluded an agreement with Akbar and the chiefs for the total withdrawal of the British army from the country. Shah Shujah had the choice of accompanying them or remaining in the comparative safety of the Bala Hissar and he took the second option.

On 6 January 1842 the British army and its many camp followers straggled out of the cantonments already weakened by months of scanty rations and with inadequate transport for their few guns, supplies and with clothing, in many cases, unsuited to the harsh winter weather. The story of the disaster that ensued is well known and Lady Sale and some of her fellow survivors told it graphically. Most histories of the period gloss over the subsequent imprisonment of the European women and children and some officers, troops and their servants in a few sentences. Lady Sale, however, and fellow captives, Captains Mackenzie and Lawrence and Lieutenant Eyre, provide details that illuminate the developing political situation and the Afghan mentality, since they had a great deal of personal contact with Akbar, his allies and other less-committed chieftains. The prisoners, for example, were constantly fed incorrect information about the situation in India, Kandahar, Ghazni and, especially, Jalalabad by their captors in the hope that they would prevail upon Sale to leave the town. Officers such as Captain Mackenzie were allowed to come and go as negotiators between Jalalabad and the prisoners in the spring and summer of 1842 and this had an impact on the situation, especially after the arrival there of General Pollock in mid-April.

Correspondence between Lady Sale and her husband runs as a leitmotif through her Journal for nearly a year. In some ways it was as influential on the developing situation as her letters and Journal that were read by the Governor General and the directors of the East India Company and published in India and England. In Jalalabad the political agent, Captain Macgregor, and clever officers like Captains Havelock and Broadfoot probably prevailed upon the general to seed in all sorts of propaganda. Conversely political agents imprisoned with Lady Sale, Major Pottinger and Captains Mackenzie and Lawrence, probably gave her their opinions about what it was wise to report to Sale. The domestic details of the imprisonment are also compelling, giving a unique insight into the living conditions and attitudes of a small group of European men, women and children who were in the power of the Afghan chieftains.

The Reverend Allen's Diary was little known and not used for any major accounts of the war in the nineteenth century or subsequently. He was by no means a ‘yes-man’, criticising the politicians whose folly had led to so many British, Indian and Afghan deaths. He praised the courage, generosity and good humour of his fellow soldiers (he counted as an officer) but could castigate snobbery and brutality when he saw it. He sincerely admired the courage and professionalism of General Nott without being blind to at least one of his shortcomings: his failure always to give due credit to the achievements of his subordinates. Allen was a gifted amateur artist and left some fine sketches and many written descriptions of what he saw, but if a portrait of him ever existed it is not known to survive. Unlike Lady Sale, he had little contact with Afghans but his account of camp life and the attitudes of his fellow officers and their men to the campaign is invaluable.

There were two major aspects of the war, however, that Allen and Lady Sale, who was deliberately misled by her captors, were not in a position to report: the siege of Jalalabad where ‘Fighting Bob’ Sale defeated the vastly superior forces of Akbar Khan in early April and Pollock's arrival there later in the month and subsequent advance on Kabul. Elphinstone was dead and Pollock became the senior commander on the campaign. A lively correspondence was maintained between the senior generals, Pollock and Nott, who was defending Kandahar, and Lord Ellenborough, Governor General since February 1842, in India. He was torn between his desire to deliver exemplary punishment to the Afghans and fear that the attempt to do so would end in another humiliating disaster.

Nott and Pollock, however, were made of sterner stuff than Elphinstone and they had also learnt from his mistakes. The camp followers to their armies had been scaled down, improving discipline and reducing the provisions required and the camels (invariably in short supply) to carry them. They were better supplied with food than either the original force of 1838 or the refugees from Kabul in January 1842, and although they were marching in harsh conditions they avoided the worst of the winter. They had also learnt that it was essential to ‘crown the heights’ if their forces were to make progress through the passes and hilly regions of the country. The various tribes that fired down on the British found that they were rapidly displaced by small detachments of their enemy that had been ordered up to beat them at their own game. Ellenborough was given sufficient confidence by the relief of Jalalabad and a few small victories to allow his generals to choose whether they would withdraw from Afghanistan by way of Quetta and Peshawar or via Kabul. A glance at the map will show that this was offering them the options of taking routes back to India avoiding the concentration of their enemies in and around Kabul, or of prolonging the campaign by attacking it. Nott had written on 2 June ‘How I should like to go to Cabul!’ In early August 1842 he had his wish leading his army out of Kandahar towards that city.

Both Pollock's army from Jalalabad and Nott's army from Kandahar encountered stiff opposition during their march to Kabul which they overcame with acceptably low levels of casualties. Once they arrived they faced the problem of what to do with the surviving sons of Shah Shujah since the British government had no intention of remaining in Afghanistan to support them. All but the youngest decided to leave with the army for impecunious exile in India. Pollock sent columns to wreak vengeance on the Kohistan, an area prominent in the revolt of the previous year. Villages were ruthlessly sacked, especially if they were found to contain loot taken from Elphinstone's retreating army in January (Tanner, 200). If possible, Afghan hatred of the British infidels was intensified. As soon as the European prisoners had all been recovered, Pollock planned his departure, via Jalalabad, for India but he needed to demonstrate British power and disgust at the atrocities and broken faith that had led to their defeat early in the year. Allen was horrified at the destruction of the Great Bazaar and the looting that followed but admitted that, since it was where the mangled remains of Sir William Macnaghten had been displayed, the former was probably inevitable.

Allen left Kabul in early October with the combined forces of Nott and Pollock, including General and Lady Sale, and suffered further distress at the sight of the bodies of those who had died during the previous winter's retreat. More deaths occurred as the tribesmen of the Khyber harried and robbed the stragglers from ‘the army of retribution’. It is clear, however, both from Allen's account and those of his fellow officers who kept journals that the return to India was not a disorderly retreat, as was claimed by some writers and politicians at the time, but a calculated and disciplined withdrawal with acceptable levels of casualties. Like many observers Allen had mixed feelings about Ellenborough's magnificent reception of the army at Ferozepore on 23 December 1842, although he was impressed by the splendour of the occasion.

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We live in a time when most aspects of Britain's former Empire and those who served it are invariably condemned. This is the prevailing assumption, for example, in Philip Hensher's engrossing novel The Mulberry Empire, which deals with the years leading up to the catastrophe in Kabul. The only people who are portrayed sympathetically are Alexander Burnes and some of the Afghans (the Sales are harshly treated). The contemporary accounts of the tragedy, however, give a surprisingly nuanced picture of events: Lady Sale showed concern for the unfortunate servants and the sepoys who suffered and died in huge numbers as well as for her family and the British officers. She was aware of the impact of her letters and Journal as they were published in India and in England and was indignant when she was misrepresented as being too lenient in her opinion of Akbar Khan. The wife of one of the few commanders who emerged with credit from the war, she could afford to express herself robustly. Both before and during the retreat from Kabul she made her disgust at the suffering caused by foolish policies and lack of leadership manifest.

The Reverend Allen was a junior member of the Anglican Church and the army but he made his dislike of the retribution business clear. Yet he recognised the need to go as far as Kabul to rescue the prisoners and also felt that the excellent qualities of his fellow officers and the soldiers were often ignored. He was irate that the return to India was misrepresented in the press as a flight rather than an orderly retreat: ‘I have not hesitated to express censure where I thought it deserved, and hav...