AI for Digital Warfare

Niklas Hageback, Daniel Hedblom

• Editore: CRC Press
• Anno: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000422894
• Edizione: 1
• Argomento: Informatique
• Categoria: Intelligence artificielle (IA) et sémantique

AI for Digital Warfare explores how the weaponising of artificial intelligence can and will change how warfare is being conducted, and what impact it will have on the corporate world. With artificial intelligence tools becoming increasingly advanced, and in many cases more humanlike, their potential in psychological warfare is being recognised, which means digital warfare can move beyond just shutting down IT systems into more all-encompassing hybrid war strategies.

1

Principles of War: Clausewitz and Beyond

Aus ihnen wird sich ein gewisser Schwerpunkt, ein Zentrum der Kraft und Bewegung bilden, von welchem das Ganze abhängt, und auf diesen Schwerpunkt des Gegners muß der gesammelte Stoß aller Kräfte gerichtet sein

Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed

Carl von Clausewitz (1780–​1831),
legendary German war strategist

War is a messy business, no matter how meticulous one tries to plan for a military campaign, things are bound to go wrong. History is full of cases of the many unforeseen events that suddenly have turned the fortunes on the battlefield. In fact, even defining war is not all that straightforward, strange as it has been such an integral part of human history that has shaped many of the conditions we now are having to adhere to. Maybe this propensity to so readily be prepared to engage in violence is simply part of our DNA, highlighted as a manifest of our survival instinct to make sure we stay ahead of rivalling tribes in the quest for food, women, and whatever that ensures our biological survival. War is by some perceived as an efficient, albeit crude, tool to solve problems, but unfortunately being applied far too often and not unusually on issues not really suitable for military solutions, at least not in the long term. Beyond the deaths and destructions that war brings with it, it also has other, perhaps equally detrimental, consequences. To unleash a wave of violence, even if attempting to rigidly control it, comes with moral, cultural, and social repercussions that inevitably will spill over to areas outside the battlefield. It is said that starting a war is easy but ending it is not, there is certainly no lack of evidence of the fallouts from war spanning over generations. Whilst war for the sheer sake of it does occur, organised sadistic joyrides of that sort are thankfully exceptions, instead they generally serve as an instrument to achieve economic and/or political objectives. Thus, a military capability must be considered from an integrated perspective, optimised in the context of other available tools, be that of a diplomatic, economic, political, or even psychological nature.

Given that war has proven to be such a pivotal game changer, theories of how it best should be conducted dates back millennia. The Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz (1780–​1831) is considered to be the proverbial father of modern warfare strategies. His work On War (Vom Krige) is still widely read and is part of the curriculum in many military academies. Remarkable, given that it now dates back almost two centuries, and with the technical upgrades we have seen, not unusually driven by armed conflicts themselves, which have made the way wars were fought in his days unrecognisable with how war is conducted today. On War is considered a difficult read; for one, it was posthumously compiled by his widow from a selection of Clausewitz’s earlier writings, some just being unfinished drafts that reflected thoughts finding their form, and these were not conclusively arranged chronologically. But also, his complex writing style, in both the original German as well as the English translations, reflects a world view that in many aspects are vastly different to ours. Clausewitz was obviously influenced by the Enlightenment Era he lived in, where questioning perceived truths and dogma brought science forward considerably. Acting in that spirit, his writings were a break with the reigning theories on warfare, as his approach to strategy took its starting point in realism rather than an ivory tower perspective. He recognised that re-​enacting historical battles and from these seeking to derive rules to replicate, which was for the time the prescribed manner to teach warfare, would not capture the many irrational moments that are bound to occur in a conflict, as being able to capitalise on these were often decisive for the outcome. In fact, these situations were rarely properly chronicled in the historical records which often gave a too idealised description of the events. According to Clausewitz, what defined military genius, was a combination of rational cognitive faculties and a creative capacity that often is described as intuition, which provided an ability to competently deal with the irrational moments where fixed rules cannot be indiscriminately applied. It is from this perspective Clausewitz’s writings must be considered, and it was for its time revolutionary, as he argued that a war theory cannot be formulated in terms of strict operational guidelines. He instead suggested broad-​brushed principles because armed conflicts could only be planned to a minor degree given this irrationality that would arise from a number of uncertainties, using the term frictions, of which some were:

• insufficient intelligence about the enemy
• rumours that, true or not, influence perceptions
• an unrealistic understanding of one’s own military capacities
• miscalculation of allied troops’ capabilities and intents
• a discrepancy between expectations of outcome and realities on the ground
• issues with supplies and logistics¹

What Is War Really?

One might argue that war is a bit like pornography, one knows it when one sees it, but defining it is no easy matter. Clausewitz provided a definition of the rationality of war, considering it being merely an instrument, and not serving a purpose itself: “war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale [and] an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” and that physical force constitutes the means to “render the enemy powerless.”²

Therefore, he argued that war should not be treated as a separate matter but has to be contextualised from a political perspective, and a war strategy has to be designed with political objectives in mind. In the current setting, one can somewhat further expand on Clausewitz’s view of war as the capacity to use organised force for political purposes, regardless of it resulting in actual violence or not. Hence, what can be considered a credible threat of using violence might therefore already constitute war, of course this makes this definition of war much more void of bloodletting than previously thought of. This especially in the context of some nation’s access to nuclear deterrents, which would classify the Cold War era as an actual war, where sabre rattling at times could give the desired political effect – ​the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 being a case in point, as well as the numerous proxy wars that were fought between the East and West by, outwardly at least, non-​state-​affiliated militias and even criminal groups. Thus, it could be argued that the current trade war between the US and China, if it eventually includes being backed by a credible threat of violence, under this definition also would be classified as war proper. Philosophical ponderings such as these make the definition of war a highly blurred exercise, and one is bound to occasionally land in the fringes of what commonly and traditionally has been understood as war, namely, organised violence of some magnitude that is acted out for a continuous period of time. It is also important to ascertain who the combatants are, they need not exclusively be interstate adversaries but could include domestic groups that seek political control of existing or perceived nations through engaging in coordinated fighting, not unusually overlapping with criminal activities. In all, a conservative core definition of war would then read as:

• organised violence
• waged by two or more distinguishable groups against each other
• in pursuit of some political objective (meaning power within a social construct)
• sufficiently large in scale and social impact to attract the attention of political leaders
• continuing over a period long enough for the interplay between the opponents to have impact on events³

By analysing war from a political narrative, Clausewitz introduced a key fundament that came to hold together much of his theories, something he referred to as wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit which translates to something like “the remarkable trinity.” The three parts, which can also be viewed as points of attractions, are:

• passions (irrational forces), and in this context typically being hatred and animosity, Clausewitz attached them to the people
• probability and chance, which represented the military forces and their capacity for creativity on the battlefield
• rational calculations, being represented by the government (and one can only wonder if Clausewitz in our times would have bestowed governments with such competence)

These three forces can form a number of combinations, as they are interconnected, and will come to define the unique character of each armed conflict. In essence, they are a representation of the amalgamation of irrationality, random elements of chance, and reason, which together will influence the outcome of a battle. One of them might be dominating but they tend to be shifting over the course of a military campaign, and it is this ongoing dynamic interaction that is so decisive for the articulation of a war strategy. Thus, it becomes critical to understand the psychological makeup and intellectual abilities of an opponent as these are such influential components in Clausewitz’s trinity, in particular the modus operandi military leaders apply when confronted with the unknown. It was this insight and the manner in which he articulated it in a simple yet elastic formula that covered both the motivational forces and execution capabilities in armed conflicts that came to set Clausewitz far apart from existing war theories, which were merely focused on static formations.⁴

So, drumming up passionate war fever in people through promoting jingoism, scapegoating, or similar tactics allows for the psychological backing of engaging in military campaigns; initially at least, a military genius of sorts is required to capitalise on any unexpected opportunities that are bound to arise on the battlefield with intuition playing an important part, and finally rational and realistic political objectives set by the government, in all the making of the optimal trinity combination. A war strategy, therefore, needs to be shaped by these calibrated considerations, not in a fixed setting but by being able to adjust as changes occur. Important to note is that the technical capacities of one’s arsenal was not part of this trinity, and that was not for historical reasons, the development of new weaponry was notable during Clausewitz’s years, this as both the constraints and objectives of politics decided much of the extent of its actual deployment.⁵

There Is War and Then There Is War…

To prove the point of irrationality distorting any perceived war logic, Clausewitz distinguished between war in its purest, or most extreme, form – ​absolute war – ​which is war not controlled by politics as it is allowed to roam freely with no holdbacks of firepower. An absolute war will in effect come to mean an elimination war which goes on until one side is literally wiped out. In stark contrast stands the limited war, which is the most common form where political considerations will influence, almost always moderating them, the objectives of military targets and also the overarching means to get there. Albeit tactical short-​term objectives are typically left to the generals’ discretion. Clausewitz spent considerable time to explore the differences between this idealised pure form of war with how it is fought in reality given the many practical constraints that always come to apply. They would only overlap if and when the political ambition was total annihilation of the enemy, with a carte blanche provided to the armed forces, something which only infrequently ha...