The Forgotten Airwar: Airpower In The Mesopotamian Campaign

Major Peter J. Lambert

• Editore: Tannenberg Publishing
• Anno: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781786256485
• Argomento: History
• Categoria: World War I

This thesis discusses the role of airpower in the Mesopotamian Campaign of World War I. Britain conducted military operations against Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia to defend Britain's oil interests and lines of communication, but also to open an additional front against the Turks. The battles conducted from the commencement of hostilities in November 1914 until the Turkish surrender in October 1918 were carried out with the use of a new technology on the battlefield—the aeroplane.This thesis explores the roles of airpower in the Mesopotamian Campaign, and what affect airpower had on military operations. The thesis also looks at the missions of the Royal Flying Corps in Mesopotamia, how they evolved during the course of the conflict, and what impact they had on post-war Royal Air Force development. The study concludes by determining airpower in the Mesopotamian Campaign influenced the policy of air control in the post-war British Empire, and positively influenced the perception of ground commanders to the value of airpower to ground maneuver.

CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION

Captains Kerring and King-Harmon are having a typical early morning flight in their two-seater “Voisin,” spotting for the British artillery. Flights this early in the morning are becoming the norm for Kerring as the blistering heat of the Mesopotamian summer ensures no activity takes place during the day. Coordination between the artillery and the aircraft is going exceedingly well this morning: Turk ammunition dumps have been hit, and troop formations noted. Overall a good day, but about to become a bit more exciting. Both Kerring and his observer King-Harmon note the “enemy aircraft” signal from their ground station, and immediately begin looking furiously for the enemy aircraft. Kerring finds the German machine moving to maneuver between the sun and his machine. The two machines pass within 150 yards of one another, both attempting to gain a better position. However the German machine is able to fire a few shots, hitting the rudder control of the British machine, forcing Kerring to make a controlled landing near the British airpark. Both Kerring and King-Harmon run from their damaged machine, jump into a new machine, return to the fight, and continue to successfully direct artillery on the enemy. A harrowing experience, but ultimately successful.{1}

The campaign is now operating on several fronts, yet no aerial reinforcements to support the multiple efforts. Wing Commander Lieutenant Colonel J. E. Tennant hears of complaints about the lack of adequate support from the air. Air support for the drive on Al-Kut and Baghdad had been easier; one front eliminated duplication of effort and allowed for an effective span of control of his machines by one air commander. Three fronts are now in play, with flights of machines detached to support each front, each commanded by relatively junior officers who in turn are subordinate to the army staffs to which they are attached. Tennant’s machines are a new technology for many of the infantry and cavalry officers who now find themselves organizing aircraft employment. The junior flight officers are growing increasingly frustrated by the orders of the army officers, which make their employment inefficient and uneconomical. Furthermore, Tennant knows the army staffs are not taking full advantage of what his machines can offer. Tennant believes that if he does not intervene as the senior Royal Flying Corps (RFC) representative, the situation will only grow worse. He decides to intervene with the staffs to ensure everyone is getting what they need, and moreover, clarify the utility of his machines. His efforts go to no avail with his army counterparts. He has no alternative but to seek counsel from the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Mesopotamian Forces, General Maude, who is able to soothe over ruffled feathers, and bring a semblance of agreement between the army and air staffs.{2}

Enter a new revolution in technology—the airplane, flown for the first time just twelve years prior at Kitty Hawk, and not considered by Great Britain until 1908 as a technology worth pursuing. It is now 1914. War clouds loom and the Indian Government finds a total of four aircraft in the entire country, none of which are worthy of deploying to Mesopotamia.{3} Furthermore, if the Indian Government could spare any of the four aircraft from its North-Western Frontier, the materials on these obsolete machines would not stand up to the elements in Mesopotamia, and would be rendered useless. And what of trained pilots? The Indian Government will have to turn elsewhere to form the nucleus of what was to become the RFC’s contingent in the Mesopotamian Theater. Surprisingly, the Indian Government turns to an unlikely source: Australia and New Zealand. These two far-flung members of the British Empire will spearhead the nascent air effort until Britain and India can create a cadre of trained pilots and mechanics.{4}

Prior to 1914 the limited employment of the airplane had not forced significant doctrinal development. Yet during the course of the war, both in Europe and in the Middle East, an evolution took place transforming the use of the aircraft from strictly reconnaissance to directing artillery (with the onset of wireless radio), photographic reconnaissance, air-to-air combat, bombing and aerial resupply.{5} As the evolution in air power theory and doctrine transpired on the European continent, so did the evolution take place in the Mesopotamian Theater. Certain aspects of these missions were groundbreaking for the RFC in the Mesopotamian Campaign. Yet not only was an evolution taking place on the tactical employment of the airplane, but airmen in Great Britain such as Sykes and Trenchard were moving the evolutionary process forward on the theoretical employment and conduct of air power.

Much has been written on the war in the air over Europe, but as noted by a senior officer after the Campaign had concluded, the Mesopotamian Campaign was considered nothing but a “sideshow,” and little attention has been given to the employment of air power in this under-reported conflict. A closer look at this campaign will reveal air power had a role to play in the conduct of the campaign, and materially affected post-war policies. Startlingly, issues initially discussed, debated and argued over in the World War I-era remain today. Practitioners of military operational art, today’s leaders and senior officers, should take note of the conduct of this campaign to avoid repeating the mistakes of the men who fought in this forgotten air war of World War I.

CHAPTER 2—BACKGROUND: WHY MESOPOTAMIA?

The professional journal for British military officers serving in India, The Journal of the United Services Institution of India (JUSII), had no discussion of Mesopotamia in 1914. Indeed, a review of issues throughout the year would not indicate the potential for impending military operations in the area. The October journal noted the outbreak of war in Europe, gave an engaging discussion of the latest British Antarctic expedition, and had a fairly technical article on “Notes on Aircraft,” which opined, “it appears at any rate that we are on the verge of important developments in aerial warfare and it is necessary to give the matter serious thought.”{6} Captain M. Crofton, Royal Horse Artillery, published a study of the Balkan conflicts and Turkish military accomplishments. Of the ability of the Turks he stated, “The Turkish soldier is physically well developed, a good though slow marcher, fearless and possesses an instinct of duty and subordination to authority which is engrained in him by his religion. He is lacking smartness, initiative and dash and is best behind entrenchments.”{7} Yet still no discussion on anything related to the Middle East. In fact, the latest reference to the area had been published anonymously in January 1914, and focused solely on Persia and its importance as a buffer state to the security of India. No mention of oil or the security of the Persian oilfields. No mention of encroaching European interests in the Persian Gulf. And no mention of forces in India readying for war, or for that matter, any inkling of London’s concern for the developing situation in the Persian Gulf area.

Clearly, in August 1914, all eyes were focused on Europe. With such dedication of men and resources to Europe, what were Great Britain’s concerns with Mesopotamia, and what were Turkey’s interests in the region? Britain’s strategic interests in Mesopotamia revolved primarily around three areas of concern: expanding foreign (German) economic interests in the area that had offered Britain most-favored nation status; oil; and lastly strengthening Arab-British relations.{8}

German economic influence had been growing within the Ottoman Empire, and Germany was seen as an influential financier with ulterior commercial (and possibly geopolitical) motives behind Turkish plans for the construction of the Baghdad Railway. As early as 1903, Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, stated,

“It is a foundation principle of British policy that we cannot allow the growth of any rival or predominant political interest in the waters of the Gulf....But if the Turkish Government is resolved on building of the railway in so far as it lies within its own territory...then I think His Majesty’s Government are entirely entitled and are bound to enter a discussion.”{9}

The possibility of a German intrusion on Britain’s sphere of influence ensured Britain’s negotiations with Turkey for the terminus of the railway from Baghdad in Basra. Britain believed that if it were not involved with the construction of the line, particularly in the Basra area in southern Mesopotamia, the line would eventually offer Germany a potential base for military operations in this area of British influence. However, Britain’s Foreign Secretary saw German intrigue behind the railway, and coupled with German economic activities in southwest Africa, raised a flag of concern regarding its potential impact on British worldwide economic activities. Indeed, Germany did view the railway as an extension of a proposed Berlin to Baghdad line, which could divert trade from sea-lanes controlled by Great Britain, to land routes to Germany.{10}

Oil, and in particular British oil concessions in Persia were an additional strategic interest in the area. Britain had pursued oil concessions in Mesopotamia, but at the advent of the war, Abadan in Persia remained the primary focal point for oil to Britain. The Abadan refineries offered the British Royal Navy, which was converting from coal to oil, a British-controlled supply. As early as January 1914, security for the oil fields had been discussed in London. Sir Percy Cox, the Persian Gulf Chief Political Officer, reported to the Admiralty that between two brigades and a division would be necessary to secure the facility in times of trouble. Ironically, Sir Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, believed as late as September 1914 that no troops could be provided for the area because “Europe and Egypt have greater claims than we on the Indian Army.”{11} Despite Churchill’s misgivings about troops to protect the facility, the British Foreign Office quietly assured the Anglo-Persian Oil Company of Britain’s and India’s resolve to defend the complex in the event of conflict.

Lastly, Britain’s position vis-à-vis the Arabs was the last major strategic pillar for Great Britain in Mesopotamia. Arab relations were important to maintain British influence in the area, and to avoid a much-feared Islamic jihad against British interests in the Gulf Region. Specifically the potential negative affect it could have on British Muslim subjects throughout the Empire, particularly in India, and could have far reaching consequences for the stability of the Empire. As early as 1908, a British official noted the potential of a resurgent Pan-Islamic movement from within the crumbling Ottoman Empire, “I think...that this Pan-Islamic movement is one of our greatest dangers in the future, and is indeed far more of a menace than the “Yellow Peril.”{12} Sir Arthur Hirtzel, the Political Secretary at the India Office noted the potential impact on India and stated,

“The political effect in the Persian Gulf and in India of leaving the head of the Gulf derelict, will be disastrous, and we cannot afford, politically, to acquiesce in such a thing for an indefinite period while the main issues are being settled elsewhere...though under German officers it may not be wholly effective, but it will be worked for all it is worth for the sake of political effect which the Turks and Germany hope to produce through it on Muslim feeling in India.”{13}

However, as war approached, the proximity of Arabia and Mesopotamia to India and the potential of Turkey’s release of control in the area had a growing importance to London. An additional fear of a power vacuum in the region of Mesopotamia might interest Persia, or even Russia to fill the political void. Nevertheless, Britain wanted to ensure the Arabs would remain pro-British, and would not agitate and endanger the British relationship with its Muslim subjects.{14}

British concerns of an Islamic uprising did indeed have a foundation. On 2 August 1914, German General von Moltke urged the German Foreign Ministry to agitate the Muslim populations of India and Egypt, and ultimately throughout the Middle East and Muslim population centers in Africa. German influence within the Ottoman Empire ultimately paid dividends when on 14 November, the senior Islamic cleric of the Ottoman Empire, in the presence of the Sultan in Constantinople, issued the declaration of a Holy War against France, Britain and Russia.{15}

Turkey’s strategic interests in Mesopotamia rested on a historical foundation of Mesopotamia as part of the greater Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans had administratively divided Mesopotamia into three vilayets (regions): Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. Of these, Basra was within Britain’s sphere of influence, based on negotiations conducted with the Turks. Administrative control was tenuous throughout the vilayets, and generally only effective in the larger towns. Turkish administrators were responsible for collecting taxes for their respective vilayets, and if this was done in a timely manner, Constantinople maintained a very laissez-faire attitude with Mesopotamia’s administration.{16} As if to underscore the Ottoman’s lack of concern with Mesopotamia on the eve of World War I, the Turks had shifted the majority of the 12th and 13th Army Corps (minus one division) to Syria and Anatolia, where the Turkish and German staff officers felt a British military operation was more likely.{17} Turkey relied on local gendarmerie and one division of Ottoman forces at the onset of the war to cover the entire Mesopo...