Part I
THE NEW COLD WAR ERUPTS 2014â2015
Patriotic Heresy vs. Cold War
August 27, 2014
(Adapted from a talk given in Washington, DC, on June 16, 2014.)
WE MEET TODAY DURING THE WORST and potentially most dangerous American-Russian confrontation in many decades, probably since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The Ukrainian civil war, precipitated by the unlawful change of government in Kiev in February, is already growing into a proxy US-Russian war. The seemingly unthinkable is becoming imaginable: an actual war between US-led NATO and post-Soviet Russia.
Certainly, we are already in a new Cold War that Western sanctions will only deepen, institutionalize, and prolongâone potentially more dangerous than its 40-year predecessor, which the world barely survived.
Weâopponents of the US policies that have contributed so woefully to the current crisisâare few in number, without influential supporters, and unorganized. I am old enough to know our position was very different in the 1970s and 1980s, when we struggled for what was then called dĂŠtente. We were a minority, but a substantial minority with allies in high places, including in Congress and the State Department. Our views were solicited by mainstream newspapers, television, and radio. In addition to grassroots support, we had our own well-funded lobbying organization in Washington, the American Committee on East-West Accord, whose board included corporate CEOs, political figures, prominent academics, and statesmen of the stature of George Kennan.
We have none of that today. We have no access to the Obama administration, virtually none to Congress, now a bipartisan bastion of Cold War politics, and very little to the mainstream media. We have access to important alternative media, but they are not considered authoritative, or essential, inside the Beltway. In my long lifetime, I do not recall such a failure of American democratic discourse in any comparable time of crisis.
I want to speak generally about this dire situationâalmost certainly a fateful turning point in world affairsâas a participant in what little mainstream media debate has been permitted but also as a longtime scholarly historian of Russia and of US-Russian relations and informed observer who believes there is still a way out of this terrible crisis.
Regarding my episodic participation in the very limited mainstream media discussion, I will speak in a more personal way than I usually do. From the outset, I saw my role as twofold.
Recalling the American adage âThere are two sides to every story,â I sought to explain Moscowâs view of the Ukrainian crisis, which is almost entirely missing in US mainstream coverage. What, for example, did Putin mean when he said Western policy-makers were âtrying to drive us into some kind of corner,â âhave lied to us many timesâ and âhave crossed the lineâ in Ukraine? Second, having argued since the 1990s, in my books and Nation articles, that Washingtonâs bipartisan Russia policies could lead to a new Cold War and to just such a crisis, I wanted to bring my longstanding analysis to bear on todayâs confrontation over Ukraine.
As a result, I have been repeatedly assailedâeven in purportedly liberal publicationsâas Putinâs No. 1 American âapologist,â âuseful idiot,â âdupe,â âbest friend,â and, perhaps a new low in immature invective, âtoady.â I expected to be criticized, as I was during nearly twenty years as a CBS News commentator, but not in such personal and scurrilous ways. (Something has changed in our political culture, perhaps related to the Internet, but I think more generally.)
Until now, I have not replied to any of these defamatory attacks. I do so today because I now think they are directed at many of us in this room and indeed at anyone critical of Washingtonâs Russia policies, not just me. Re-reading the attacks, I have come to the following conclusions:
None of these character assassins present any factual refutations of anything I have written or said. They indulge instead in ad hominem slurs based on distortions and on the general premise that any American who seeks to understand Moscowâs perspectives is a âPutin apologistâ and thus unpatriotic. Such a premise only abets the possibility of war.
Some of these writers, or people who stand behind them, are longtime proponents of the twenty-year US policies that have led to the Ukrainian crisis. By defaming us, they seek to obscure their complicity in the unfolding disaster and their unwillingness to rethink it. Failure to rethink dooms us to the worst outcome.
Equally important, these kinds of neo-McCarthyites are trying to stifle democratic debate by stigmatizing us in ways that make our views unwelcome on mainstream television and radio broadcasts and op-ed pagesâand to policy-makers. They are largely succeeding.
Let us be clear. This means that we, not the people on the left and the right who defame us, are the true American democrats and the real patriots of US national security. We do not seek to ostracize or silence the new cold warriors, but to engage them in public debate. And we, not they, understand that current US policy may have catastrophic consequences for international and American security.
The perils and costs of another prolonged Cold War will afflict our children and grandchildren. If nothing else, this reckless policy, couched even at high levels in a ritualistic demonizing of Putin, is already costing Washington an essential partner in the Kremlin in vital areas of US securityâfrom Iran, Syria, and Afghanistan to efforts to counter nuclear proliferation and international terrorism.
But we ourselves are partially to blame for the one-sided, or nonexistent, public debate. As I said, we are not organized. Too often, we do not publicly defend each otherâŚ. And often we do not speak boldly enough. (We should not worry, for example, as do too many silent critics, if our arguments sometimes coincide with what Moscow is saying. Doing so results in self-censorship.)
Some people who privately share our concernsâin Congress, the media, universities, and think tanksâdo not speak out at all. For whatever reasonâconcern about being stigmatized, about their career, personal dispositionâthey are silent. But in our democracy, where the cost of dissent is relatively low, silence is no longer a patriotic option.
We should, however, exempt young people from this imperative. They have more to lose. A few have sought my guidance, and I always advise, âEven petty penalties for dissent in regard to Russia could adversely affect your career. At this stage of life, your first obligation is to your family and thus to your future prospects. Your time to fight lies ahead.â Not all of them heed my advice.
Finally, in connection with our struggle for a wiser American policy, I have come to another conclusion. Most of us were taught that moderation in thought and speech is always the best principle. But in a fateful crisis such as the one now confronting us, moderation for its own sake is no virtue. It becomes conformism, and conformism becomes complicity.
I recall this issue being discussed long ago in a very different contextâby Soviet-era dissidents when I lived among them in Moscow in the 1970s and 1980sâŚ. A few people have called us âAmerican dissidents,â but the analogy is imperfect: my Soviet friends had far fewer possibilities for dissent than we have and risked much worse consequences.
Nonetheless, the analogy is instructive. Soviet dissidents were protesting an entrenched orthodoxy of dogmas, vested interests, and ossified policy-making, which is why they were denounced as heretics by Soviet authorities and media. Since the 1990s, beginning with the Clinton administration, exceedingly unwise notions about post-Soviet Russia and the political correctness of US policy have congealed into a bipartisan American orthodoxy. The natural, historical response to orthodoxy is heresy. So let us be patriotic heretics, regardless of personal consequences, in the hope that many others will join us, as has often happened in history.
I turn now, in my capacity as a historian, to that orthodoxy. The late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan famously said: âEveryone is entitled to his own opinions, but not to his own facts.â The US establishmentâs new Cold War orthodoxy rests almost entirely on fallacious opinions. Five of these fallacies are particularly important today.
Fallacy No. 1: Ever since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, Washington has treated post-Communist Russia generously as a desired friend and partner, making every effort to help it become a democratic, prosperous member of the Western system of international security. Unwilling or unable, Russia rejected this American altruism, emphatically under Putin.
Fact: Beginning in the 1990s with the Clinton administration, every American president and Congress has treated post-Soviet Russia as a defeated nation with inferior legitimate rights at home and abroad. This triumphalist, winner-take-all approach has been spearheaded by the expansion of NATOâaccompanied by non-reciprocal negotiations and now missile defenseâinto Russiaâs traditional zones of national security, while excluding Moscow from Europeâs security system. Early on, Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Georgia were Washingtonâs âgreat prize.â
Fallacy No. 2: There exists a âUkrainian peopleâ who yearn to escape centuries of Russian influence and join the West.
Fact: Ukraine is a country long divided by ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, economic, and political differencesâparticularly its western and eastern regions, but not only those. When the current crisis began in late 2013, Ukraine was one state, but it was not a single people or a united nation. Some of these divisions were made worse after 1991 by a corrupt elite, but most of them had developed over centuries.
Fallacy No. 3: In November 2013, the European Union, backed by Washington, offered Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych a benign association with European democracy and prosperity. Yanukovych was prepared to sign the agreement, but Putin bullied and bribed him into rejecting it. Thus began Kievâs Maidan protests and all that has since followed.
Fact: The EU proposal was a reckless provocation compelling the democratically elected president of a deeply divided country to choose between Russia and the West. So too was the EUâs rejection of Putinâs counterproposal for a Russian-European-American plan to save Ukraine from financial collapse. On its own, the EU proposal was not economically feasible. Offering little financial assistance, it required the Ukrainian government to enact harsh austerity measures and would have sharply curtailed its longstanding and essential economic relations with Russia. Nor was the EU proposal entirely benign. It included protocols requiring Ukraine to adhere to Europeâs âmilitary and securityâ policiesâwhich meant in effect, without mentioning the alliance, NATO. Again, it was not Putinâs alleged âaggressionâ that initiated todayâs crisis but instead a kind of velvet aggression by Brussels and Washington to bring all of Ukraine into the West, including (in fine print) into NATO.
Fallacy No. 4: Todayâs civil war in Ukraine was caused by Putinâs aggressive response to the peaceful Maidan protests against Yanukovychâs decision.
Fact: In February 2014, the radicalized Maidan protests, strongly influenced by extreme nationalist and even semi-fascist street forces, turned violent. Hoping for a peaceful resolution, European foreign ministers brokered a compromise between Maidanâs parliamentary representatives and Yanukovych. It would have left him as president, with less power, of a coalition reconciliation government until early elections in December. Within hours, violent street fighters aborted the agreement. Europeâs leaders and Washington did not defend their own diplomatic accord. Yanukovych fled to Russia. Minority parliamentary parties representing Maidan and, predominantly, western Ukraineâamong them Svoboda, an ultranationalist movement previously anathematized by the European Parliament as incompatible with European valuesâformed a new government. Washington and Brussels endorsed the coup and have supported the outcome ever since. Everything that followed, from Russiaâs annexation of Crimea and the spread of rebellion in southeastern Ukraine to the civil war and Kievâs âanti-terrorist operation,â was triggered by the February coup. Putinâs actions were mostly reactive.
Fallacy No. 5: The only way out of the crisis is for Putin to end his âaggressionâ and call off his agents in southeastern Ukraine.
Fact: The underlying causes of the crisis are Ukraineâs own internal divisions, not primarily Putinâs actions. The essential factor escalating the crisis has been Kievâs âanti-terroristâ military campaign against its own citizens, mainly in Luhansk and Donetsk. Putin influences and no doubt aids the Donbass âself-defenders.â Considering the pressure on him in Moscow, he is likely to continue to do so, perhaps even more directly, but he does not fully control them. If Kievâs assault ends, Putin probably can compel the rebels to negotiate. But only the Obama administration can compel Kiev to stop, and it has not done so.
In short, twenty years of US policy have led to this fateful American-Russian confrontation. Putin may have contributed to it along the way, but his role during his fourteen years in power has been almost entirely reactiveâa complaint frequently directed against him by more hardline forces in Moscow.
* * *
In politics as in history, there are always alternatives. The Ukrainian crisis could have at least three different outcomes. The civil war escalates and widens, drawing in Russian and possibly NATO military forces. This would be the worst outcome: a kind of latter-day Cuban Missile Crisis. In the second outcome, todayâs de facto partitioning of Ukraine becomes institutionalized in the form of two Ukrainian statesâone allied with the West, the other with Russia. This would not be the best outcome, but neither would it be the worst.
The best outcome would be the preservation of a united Ukraine. It will require good-faith negotiations between representatives of all of Ukraineâs regions, including leaders of the rebellious southeast, probably under the auspices of Washington, Moscow, the European Union, and eventually the UN. Putin and his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, have proposed this for months. Ukraineâs tragedy continues to grow. Thousands of innocent people have already been killed or wounded.
Alas, there is no wise leadership in Washington. President Barack Obama has vanished as a statesman in the Ukrainian crisis. Secretary of State John Kerry speaks publicly more like a secretary of war than as our top diplomat. The Senate is preparing even more bellicose legislation. The establishment media rely uncritically on Kievâs propaganda and cheerlead for its policies. American television rarely, if ever, shows Kievâs military assaults on Luhansk, Donetsk, or other Ukrainian rebel cities, thereby arousing no public qualms or opposition.
And so we patriotic heretics remain mostly alone and often defamed. The most encouraging perspective I can offer is to remind you that positive change in history frequently begins as heresy. Or to quote the personal testimony of Mikhail Gorbachev, who said of his struggle for change in the late 1980s inside the even more rigidly orthodox Soviet nomenklatura: âEverything new in philosophy begins as heresy and in politics as the opinion of a minority.â As for patriotism, here is Woodrow Wilson: âThe most patriotic man is sometimes the man who goes in the direction he thinks right even when he sees half of the world against him.â
Distorting Russia
February 12, 2014
THE DEGRADATION OF MAINSTREAM AMERICAN PRESS coverage of Russia, a country still vital to US national security, has been under way for many years. If the recent tsunami of shamefully unprofessional and politically inflammatory articles in leading newspapers and magazinesâmost recently about the Sochi Olympics, Ukraine, and, as usual, Russian President Vladimir Putinâis an indication, this media malpractice is now pervasive and the new norm.
There are notable exceptions, but a general pattern has developed. Even in the venerable New York Times and Washington Post, news reports, editorials, and commentaries no longer adhere rigorously to traditional journalistic standards, often failing to provide essential facts and context; make a clear distinction between reporting and analysis; require at least two different political or âexpertâ views on major developments; or publish opposing opinions on their op-ed pages. As a result, American media on Russia today are less objective, less balanced, more conformist, and scarcely less ideological than when they covered Soviet Russia during the preceding Cold War.
The history of this degradation is also clear. It began in the early 1990s, following the end of the Soviet Union, when the US media adopted Washingtonâs narrative that almost everything President Boris Yeltsin did was a âtransition from communism to democracyâ and thus in Americaâs best interests. This included Yeltsinâs economic âshock therapyâ and oligarchic loot...