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The History of Hermeneutics
Eileen Brennan
The topic of the history of hermeneutics was always given at least some consideration in the varied and occasionally conflicting accounts of hermeneutic philosophy offered by Martin Heidegger (1889â1976), Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900â2002), and Paul Ricoeur (1913â2005). Heidegger discussed the topic in an early work, OntologyâThe Hermeneutics of Facticity (Heidegger 1999). In that work, he spoke about the original meaning and development of the word âhermeneutics.â His history of hermeneutics was, then, the story of a concept, a Begriffsgeschichte.1 But that history of the concept was not to be taken as a âhistoryâ in any conventional sense of the term. That is to say, it was not narrowly historiographical.2 Gadamer and Ricoeur shared a different view of the history of hermeneutics. It was, for them, the history of the âhermeneutic problem.â Gadamer presented his account of that history in Truth and Method (Gadamer 2003). Although the focus of Gadamerâs history of hermeneutics was not the same as Heideggerâs, Gadamer followed Heidegger in rejecting the standard model of intellectual history in favour of history as critique or âdestructionâ (Destruktion). Ricoeurâs history of the âhermeneutic problemâ was more conventional, although he did make the point that it was impossible to assume a neutral perspective on that history. All that he could hope to do, he said, was âto describe the state of the hermeneutical problem, such as I receive and perceive it, before offering my own contribution to the debateâ (Ricoeur 1981, 43). He presented his version of the history of the âhermeneutic problemâ in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences.
This chapter has four parts. The first part tries to explain why Heidegger felt obliged to jettison the most commonly used senses of âhistory,â and how he arrived at the two senses that he considered appropriate for use in philosophical investigations. The second part then draws on those explanations as it comments on key features of Heideggerâs history of the concept of hermeneutics. The third part is devoted to Gadamerâs history of the âhermeneutic problem.â It discusses points of continuity between Heideggerâs version of historical inquiry and that of Gadamer; and notes the distinctive features of Gadamerâs history of the âhermeneutic problem.â The fourth part discusses Ricoeurâs version of the history of hermeneutics, underscoring its concern with two âpreoccupationsâ in the recent history of hermeneutics: âderegionalizationâ and âradicalization.â
Heideggerâs Destruction of the Six Senses of âHistoryâ
In the Summer Semester of 1920, in a lecture course entitled, Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation, Heidegger identified six different senses of the word âhistoryâ (Heidegger 1993, 43â44). Theodore Kisiel lists them as follows:
- My friend studies history.
- My friend knows the history of philosophy.
- There are people (Volk) who have no history.
- History is the magister of life.
- This man has a sorry history.
- Today I underwent an unpleasant history (Kisiel 1993, 127).
Heidegger then analyzed each one of those senses in turn, using a modified version of Husserlâs method of intentional analysis.3 Heidegger had modified the method so that it would also permit the identification of a concept type which was unknown to Husserl. Husserl employed âorder conceptsâ (Ordnungsbegriffe), which had a two-part structure: (1) a âcontent senseâ (Gehaltsinn); and (2) a âreference senseâ (Bezugssinn). But Heidegger was not interested in concepts of that type. His point was that it was also possible to encounter and indeed to use concepts that have a three-part structure: (1) a âcontent senseâ; (2) a âreference senseâ; and (3) a âperformance or enactment senseâ (Vollzugssinn). He gave the name âexpression conceptsâ (Ausdrucksbegriffe) to that second group of concepts. As we shall see, he had a particular interest in âexpression conceptsâ, believing that they were better suited to the task of capturing phenomena like history and indeed life itself.
The main purpose of Heideggerâs intentional analysis of the six senses of the word âhistoryâ was to establish which ones were âorder conceptsâ, which ones âexpression concepts.â And the plan was to work with the latter and simply disregard the former. To allow him to make the correct judgment about the six senses of âhistory,â his modified version of phenomenological analysis involved an attempted re-enactment of the âperformance sense.â The idea was that if the attempt at re-enactment were to fail, Heidegger would know that he was dealing with an âorder concept.â He used the term âdestructionâ (Destruktion) to refer to the attempted re-enactment of the âperformance senseâ; he used the term âphenomenological dijudicationâ (phänomenologische Diiudication) (Heidegger 1993, 74) to refer to the judgment that was made in the course of that exercise.
Heidegger looked upon âorder conceptsâ as concepts that had had their âperformance senseâ severed (Greisch 2000, 103). They had, he thought, suffered an âerosion of meaningâ (Verblassen der Bedeutsamkeit) (Heidegger 1993, 37). But, as Jean Greisch reminds us, this âerosion of meaningâ had nothing to do with faulty memory or lack of interest. Nothing had been forgotten. Nothing had gone unnoticed. It was solely a matter of the cessation of a practice or performance. Of course, âorder conceptsâ retained their âcontent senseâ and their âreference sense,â and so could still be used to say something intelligible about things in the world. But this use-value was immediately offset by a characteristic failing: âorder conceptsâ objectified history and other temporally structured phenomena. Heidegger hoped that his deconstructive strategy would allow him to counteract the tendency toward objectification which, he noted, was then prevalent in philosophical circles.
Of the six senses of the word âhistory,â whose âperformance senseâ Heidegger tried to re-enact, two were judged to be âorder concepts.â They were (1) âMy friend studies historyâ (i.e., âhistoryâ in the sense of scientific or academic inquiry); and (2) âMy friend knows the history of philosophyâ (i.e., âhistoryâ in the sense of the focus of such an inquiry) (Heidegger 1993, 43). Heidegger held that when the term âhistoryâ is used in either of those senses, the experience of life is diluted. Fortunately, there were, he thought, other nonobjectifying senses of âhistoryâ to be found, two of which he judged suitable for use by philosophers.
The first of those was (3) âThere are people (Volk) who have no historyâ (i.e., âhistoryâ in the sense of tradition) (Heidegger 1993, 43). As Heidegger noted, the medieval Christians showed that it is possible to have or to live âhistoryâ in the sense of tradition. Having or living a tradition is all about relating to a people. And this relationship âinvolves a sense that I, as a latecomer, am following something that preceded me. I sense that this past is being preserved for the sake of my own becomingâ (Kisiel 1993, 128). Heidegger thought that the following captured the second sense of the word âhistoryâ, which philosophers might safely use: (5) âThis man has a sorry historyâ (Heidegger 1993, 44).4 He drew a careful distinction between the manner in which a man has a personal history and a people have a tradition. He held that the relationship that a man has with his own past is âdeeper and more intimateâ than the relationship between a people and their tradition (Kisiel 1993, 128). The manâs past has become part of who he is; it is present in his âinner tendencies.â And it was because of the depth and intimate nature of the manâs relationship with his own past that Heidegger considered âhistoryâ in the sense of having a sorry history to be the more âoriginalâ of the two.
Heideggerâs History of the Concept of Hermeneutics
Three years later, in the lectures on the hermeneutics of facticity, Heidegger would make the following statement: âA few references will allow us to narrow down the original meaning of this word [namely, âhermeneuticsâ] and understand as well the way its meaning has changedâ (Heidegger 1999, 6). He would also comment on a series of phrases and some longer statements taken from works by Plato, Aristotle, Philostratus, Thucydides, Philo, Aristeas, Augustine, Johannes Jakob Rambach, Schleiermacher, and Dilthey. If you did not know that he was already trying to work out an alternative to the existing model of historical inquiry, you would be forgiven for thinking that you were looking at the notes for a fairly standard history of ideas (Heideggerâs history of hermeneutics is essentially a set of concise and at times highly condensed lecture notes). But as the lectures of the Summer Semester of 1920 have indicated, Heidegger had a special interest in âexpressionâ concepts and simply refused to use âorder concepts.â So, even if the appearance of his history of the concept of hermeneutics suggests otherwise, it is not a conventional history of ideas.
The challenge now is to arrive at a clear understanding of what Heidegger meant by the history of the concept of hermeneutics. The first thing to clarify is the sense of the easily misunderstood phrase, âoriginal meaning.â As Heideggerâs âdestructionâ of the six senses of âhistoryâ has shown, the âoriginal meaningâ of a word is not necessarily the sense it had for the first person ever to have used the term. Indeed, commenting specifically on the word âhermeneutics,â Heidegger notes that âits etymology is obscureâ (Heidegger 1999, 6). What makes one particular sense of a word like âhistoryâ or âhermeneuticsâ the original meaning is its unsurpassed bond with a human agent. As we have already noted, Heidegger considered âThis man has a sorry historyâ to be the most original sense of âhistoryâ because the relationship that a man has with his own past is the deepest and most intimate relationship with the past that it is possible to have (Heidegger 1993, 47â48).
In the lectures on the hermeneutics of facticity, Heidegger makes a statement about the way he uses the âexpression âhermeneuticsâ,â which points to a relationship that could also be described as deep and intimate. Here is Heideggerâs statement: âThe expression âhermeneuticsâ is used here to indicate the unified manner of the engaging, approaching, accessing, interrogating, and explicating of facticity [i.e., the being of Dasein]â (Heidegger 1999, 6). It is easy to see how a man could be said to have a deep and intimate relationship with his own past, but could the same be said of a manâs relationship to âhermeneutics,â as Heidegger uses that expression? I believe so. Hermeneutics in the sense of a âunified mannerâ of conducting an inquiry into the being of Dasein is a way of going about that task that a man can rightly call his own. Indeed, he cou...