References
Introduction
1 Stephen Jay Gould, Leonardo’s Mountain of Clams and the Diet of Worms: Essays on Natural History (Cambridge, MA, 1998), p. 376.
2 Martin Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Frankfurt am Main, 1988), pp. 409f.
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, trans. Peter Winch (Oxford, 1998), p. 24.
1 Wittgenstein’s Lion and Kafka’s Ape
1 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1986), p. 223.
2 For a good account of these signs, see Genevieve von Petzinger, The First Signs: Unlocking the Mysteries of the World’s Oldest Symbols (New York and London, 2016).
3 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 206.
4 Ibid., p. 223.
5 Franz Kafka, ‘A Report to an Academy’, in The Metamorphosis and Other Stories, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir (New York, 1995).
6 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Robert B. Louden (Cambridge, 2006), p. 233n.
7 Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Machine Man and Other Writings, trans. Ann Thomson (Cambridge and New York, 1996), pp. 11f.
2 Language
1 For a good, summarized overview and discussion around the research into the language of apes, see John Dupré, ‘Conversations with Apes’, in Humans and Other Animals (Oxford, 2006), chap. 11.
2 Cf. Kevin N. Laland, Darwin’s Unfinished Symphony: How Culture Made the Human Mind (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, 2017), p. 178.
3 Marc D. Hauser, Noam Chomsky and W. T. Fitch, ‘The Faculty of Language: What Is It, Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve?’, Science, 298 (2002).
4 Cf. Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven, CT, 1944).
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions, 1912–1951 (Indianapolis, IN, and Cambridge, 1993), p. 394.
6 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1986), § 206.
7 Wittgenstein, Zettel, Werkausgabe, vol. VIII (Frankfurt am Main, 1984), § 567.
3 Seeing Animal Consciousness
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1986), p. 178.
2 Ibid., § 357.
3 Cf. ibid., p. 223.
4 Ibid., p. 213.
5 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London, 1984), p. 316.
6 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 647.
7 Cf. ibid., § 580.
8 Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie ii, Werkausgabe, vol. VII (Frankfurt am Main, 1984), § 570. Cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel, Werkausgabe, vol. VIII (Frankfurt am Main, 1984), § 225.
9 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 303.
10 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London, 1962), p. 184.
11 Wittgenstein, Zettel, § 526.
12 Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie II, § 328.
13 Wittgenstein, Zettel, § 520.
14 Gregory Berns, What It’s Like to Be a Dog: And Other Adventures in Animal Neuroscience (New York, 2017).
15 Michael S. Gazzaniga, Who’s in Charge? Free Will and the Science of the Brain ( New York, 2011), p. 190.
16 Adam P. Steiner and A. David Redish, ‘Behavioral and Neurophysiological Correlates of Regret in Rat Decision-making on a Neuroeconomic Task’, Nature Neuroscience, 17 (2014).
4 A Human Form
1 Conwy Lloyd Morgan, An Introduction to Comparative Psychology (London, 1894), p. 53.
2 Conwy Lloyd Morgan, Animal Life and Intelligence (London, 1890–91), pp. 398f.
3 Frans B. M. de Waal, ‘Anthropomorphism and Anthropodenial: Consistency in Our Thinking about Humans and Other Animals’, Philosophical Topics, XXVII/1 (1999).
4 Zana Bahl...