Leopold von Rankeâs formulation
Unlike Humboldt in âOn the Historianâs Taskâ, Ranke did not publish his theoretical views regarding the character of history and of historical knowledge in a separate essay or work. The partial exceptions are the three essays on his conception of the state, which we have published in Part II of this volume, which deal with aspects of his views on history. He did, however, begin many of his lecture courses with general theoretical observations. In the winter semester of 1831â1832 he devoted an entire course to âThe Study of Historyâ. His remarks on the theory of history and of historical knowledge are buried in the extensive lecture notes he left behind. We are here presenting five excerpts from those notes. In all five selections Ranke defends the autonomy of history against the claims of the philosophy of history.
Philosophy, he explains in Selection 2 (âOn the Relations of History and Philosophyâ), proceeds through abstraction and history through the perception of the particular. The philosopher fails to grasp the concrete living reality of the individuals who compose history, which can never be âcharacterized through only one idea or one wordâ or âcircumscribed by a conceptâ. In contrast, the historian is filled with âa feeling for and a joy in the particular in and by itselfâ. But while concentrating on the âoriginal geniusâ that expresses itself in each individual, the historian keeps âhis eyes open for the generalâ. He will not approach the particular with preconceived ideas as would the philosopher. Rather, the particular itself will reveal the general to him because the external manifestations of every individuality (e.g., a state) rest on a spiritual basis and possess a spiritual content. In contrast to the philosopher, the historian thus keeps to the facts. But in Selection 4 (âThe Pitfalls of a Philosophy of Historyâ), Ranke rejects a purely fact-oriented method that âconcentrates mainly on externalsâ. âThe particular,â he suggests in Selection 6 (âThe Role of the Particular and the General in the Study of Universal Historyâ), âis always related to a larger contextâ. Critical method and broad synthesis can and must go together in historical inquiry and writing. âWithout a general view research would become sterile.â
The methodological implications of Rankeâs position are spelled out in greater detail in Selection 3 (âOn the Character of Historical Scienceâ). The historian can approach the general through the particular because he ârecognizes something infinite in every existence: in every condition, in every being, something eternal, coming from Godâ, which constitutes âits vital principleâ. Like Humboldt, Ranke believes that the historian must go beyond the external manifestations of historical phenomena to grasp the essential principle that reveals itself to his critical contemplation. âIn the last analysis every unity is a spiritual one (geistig),â and because it is spiritual it is capable of âspiritual apperceptionâ. The road to this apperception begins with the critical confrontation of historical reality as revealed in the available documents. But it does not end there. Ranke calls upon the historian to have a broad âuniversal interestâ in all aspects of social and intellectual life, not merely in politics and war, as too many historians have had in the past. The historian must seek the causal nexus (Zusammenhang) between events, taking care however not to project an extraneous image onto the past. The observation of the events themselves will reveal their inner connectedness. Objectivity means impartiality; that is, it requires us to recognize the parties in any historical struggle in their own terms, to âunderstand them before we judge themâ. In the final analysis the task of history is the same as that of philosophy, namely understanding the ultimate things. âIf philosophy were what it ought to be, if history were perfectly clear and complete, then they would fully coincide with each other.â But history approaches the problem of the coherence of universal history by confronting reality, not, as in philosophy, by subordinating it to a scheme. Unlike philosophy, it recognizes that the solution to the riddle of world history is known only to God: we can only divine it and approach it from a distance.
The emphasis on the individual as an irreducible entity runs through Rankeâs discussion of the process of history in Selection 5 (âOn Progress in Historyâ). Here, as in the other selections, Ranke rejects a philosophy of history that sees the epochs of history as stepping stones in a great cosmic process. As we saw in the Introduction: âEvery epoch,â he asserts, âis immediate to God, and its worth is not at all based on what derives from it, but rests in its own existence, in its own self.â This emphasis on the objective equality of all epochs appears in contrast to Rankeâs assertion in Selection 2 (âOn the Relation of History and Philosophyâ) and in the preface to the Universal History (Selection 14) that only certain ages and nations deserve the historianâs attention. Both in Selection 5 (âOn Progress in Historyâ) and in Selection 6 (âThe Role of the Particular and the Generalâ) Ranke seeks to reconcile the stress on individual spontaneity and freedom with a recognition of the role of necessity in history. Certain âleading ideasâ or âgreat tendenciesâ give continuity and coherence to history. But these tendencies âcan only be describedâ; they âcannot be subsumed under one conceptâ. Unlike Hegel, Ranke sees the meaning of history not in a unified process but rather in the multiplicity of developments in which mankind expresses itself.
None of the following selections was published during Rankeâs life time, hence the titles in the present edition are our own. Selections 2 and 6 (respectively, âOn the Relations of History and Philosophyâ and âThe Role of the Particular and the General in the Study of Universal Historyâ), were first published by Alfred Dove in the introduction to Part IX, Section II, of the Weltgeschichte, Leipzig, 1888. Selection 5 (âOn Progress in Historyâ) is taken from the introductory lecture in the series of lectures that Ranke delivered in 1854 to King Maximilian II of Bavaria, entitled âOn the Epochs of Modern Historyâ. These lectures were posthumously reconstructed by Alfred Dove on the basis of stenographic notes and were published in Part IX, Section II, of the Weltgeschichte. Selections 3 and 4 (âOn the Character of Historical Scienceâ and âThe Pitfalls of a Philosophy of Historyâ respectively) were originally published by Eberhard Kessel in the Historische Zeitschrift, volume CLXXVIII (1954). A part of Selection 3 (âOn the Character of Historical Scienceâ) was first published by Erich Mulbe in his doctoral dissertation, âSelbstzeugnisse Rankes ĂŒber seine historische Theorie und Methode im Zusammenhang der zeitgenössischen Geistesrichtungenâ, Berlin, 1930.
The selections in the original 1973 edition were published with the permission of the Historische Zeitschrift and of Professor Kessel. Professor Walther Peter Fuchs, co-editor of Leopold von Ranke, Aus Werk und Nachlass, graciously made available to us his own readings of these two manuscripts. We have compared Professor Fuchsâs readings with Professor Kesselâs versions and have indicated the divergences in the readings that are relevant to the English translation. Professor Lothar Gall, the current editor of the Historische Zeitschrift, generously permitted us to reprint the selections in the present version. We decided to insert an additional selection before the five selections listed above, namely an early letter by Ranke to his brother Heinrich in which he states the topics that interest him, the emergence of the modern European world, and expresses his religious faith, both of which will accompany him throughout his life.
All six selections have been translated by Wilma A. Iggers for this volume.