Chapter 1
Relative Value
The Concept of Relative Value
Relative value is a quantitative analytical approach toward financial markets based on two fundamental notions of modern financial economics.
Proposition 1: If two securities have identical payoffs in every future state of the world, then they should have identical prices today.
Violation of this principle would result in the existence of an arbitrage opportunity, which is inconsistent with equilibrium in financial markets.
This proposition seems relatively straightforward now, but this wasnât always the case. In fact, Kenneth Arrow and GĂ©rard Debreu won Nobel prizes in economics in 1972 and 1983 in part for their work establishing this result. And Myron Scholes and Robert Merton later won Nobel prizes in economics in 1997 for applying this proposition to the valuation of options. In particular, along with Fischer Black, they identified a self-financing portfolio that could dynamically replicate the payoff of an option, and they were able to determine the value of this underlying option by valuing this replicating portfolio.
Most of the financial models discussed in this book are based on the application of this proposition in various contexts.
Proposition 2: If two securities present investors with identical risks, they should offer identical expected returns.
This result may appear intuitive, but itâs somewhat more difficult to establish than the first result. Of particular interest for our purposes is that the result can be established via the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, which assumes the existence of unobservable, linear factors that drive returns.
In this case, itâs possible to combine securities into portfolios that expose investors to any one of the risk factors without involving exposure to any of the other risk factors. In the limit, as the number of securities in the portfolio increases, the security-specific risks can be diversified away. And in this case, any security-specific risk that offered a non-zero expected return would present investors with an arbitrage opportunity, at least in the limit, as the remaining risk factors could be immunized by creating an appropriate portfolio of tradable securities.
For our purposes, this is a powerful result, as it allows us to analyze historical data for the existence of linear factors and to construct portfolios that expose us either to these specific factors or to security-specific risks, at our discretion. In fact, principal component analysis (PCA) can be applied directly in this framework, and weâll rely heavily on PCA as one of the two main statistical models we discuss in this book.
The Sources of Relative Value Opportunities
From these two propositions, itâs clear that the absence of arbitrage is the assumption that drives many of the models we use as relative value analysts. This should come as no surprise, since one of the main roles of a relative value analyst is to search for arbitrage opportunities.
But for some people, this state of affairs presents a bit of a paradox. If our modeling assumptions are correct about the absence of free lunches, why do analysts and traders search so hard for them?
This apparent paradox can be resolved with two observations. The first is the recognition that arbitrage opportunities are rare precisely because hard-working analysts invest considerable effort trying to find them. If these opportunities could never be found, or if they never generated any profits for those who found them, analysts would stop searching for them. But in this case, opportunities would reappear, and analysts would renew their search for them as reports of their existence circulated.
The second observation that helps resolve this paradox is that even seemingly riskless arbitrage opportunities carry some risk when pursued in practice. For example, one of the simpler arbitrages in fixed income markets is the relation between bond prices, repo rates, and bond futures prices. If a bond futures contract is too rich, a trader can sell the futures contract, buy the bond, and borrow the purchase price of the bond in the repo market, with the bond being used as collateral for the loan. At the expiration of the contract, the bond will be returned to the trader by his repo counterparty, and the trader can deliver the bond into the futures contract. In theory, this would allow the trader to make a riskless arbitrage profit. But in practice, there are risks to this strategy.
For example, the repo counterparty may fail to deliver the bonds to the trader promptly at the end of the repo transaction, in which case the trader may have difficulty delivering the bonds into the futures contract. Failure to deliver carries significant penalties in some cases, and the risk of incurring these penalties needs to be incorporated into the evaluation of this seemingly riskless arbitrage opportunity.
These perspectives help us reconcile the existence of arbitrage opportunities in practice with the theoretical assumptions behind the valuation models we use. But they donât explain the sources of these arbitrage or relative value opportunities, and weâll discuss a few of the more important sources here.
Demand for Immediacy
In many cases, relative value opportunities will appear when some trader experiences an unusually urgent need to transact, particularly in large size. Such a trader will transact his initial business at a price that reflects typical liquidity in the market. But if the trader then needs to transact additional trades in the same security, he may have to entice other market participants to provide the necessary liquidity by agreeing to transact at a more attractive price. For example, he may have to agree to sell at a lower price or to buy at a higher price than would be typical for that security. In so doing, this trader is signaling a demand for immediacy in trading, and heâs offering a premium to other traders who can satisfy this demand.
The relative value trader searches for opportunities in which he can be paid attractive premiums for satisfying these demands for immediacy. He uses his capital to satisfy these demands, warehousing the securities until he can liquidate them at more typical prices, being careful to hedge the risks of the transactions in a cost-effective and prudent manner.
Because these markets are so competitive, the premiums paid for immediacy are often small relative to the sizes of the positions. As a result, the typical relative value fund will be run with leverage that is higher than the leverage of, say, a global macro fund. Consequently, itâs important to pay attention to small details and to hedge risks carefully.
Misspecified Models
It sometimes happens that market participants overlook relevant issues when modeling security prices, and the use of misspecified models can result in attractive relative value opportunities for those who spot these errors early.
For example, until the mid-1990s, most analysts failed to incorporate the convexity bias when assessing the relative valuations of Eurodollar futures contracts and forward rate agreements. As market participants came to realize the importance of this adjustment, the relative valuations of these two instruments changed over time, resulting in attractive profits for those who identified this issue relatively early.
As another example, until the late 1990s, most academics and market participants believed vanilla swap rates exceeded the yields of default-free government bonds as a result of the credit risk of the two swap counterparties. Due in part to our work in this area, this paradigm has been shown to be flawed. In particular, the difference over time between LIBOR and repo rates now is considered to be a more important factor in the relative valuations between swaps and government bonds.
In recent years, as credit concerns have increased for many governments, it has become increasingly important to reflect sovereign credit risk as an explicit factor in swap spread valuation models, and we discuss this issue in considerable detail in this book.
Regulatory Arbitrage
The fixed income markets are populated by market participants of many types across many different regulatory jurisdictions, and the regulatory differences between them can produce relative value opportunities for some.
For example, when thinking about the relative valuations of unsecured short-term loans and loans secured by government bonds in the repo market, traders at European banks will consider the fact that the unsecured loan will attract a greater regulatory charge under the Basel accords. On the other hand, traders working for money market funds in the US wonât be subject to the Basel accords and are likely to focus instead on the relative credit risks of the two short-term deposits. The difference in regulatory treatment may result in relative valuations that leave the European bank indifferent between the two alternatives but that present a relative value opportunity for the US money market fund.
The Insights from Relative Value Analysis
In some sense, relative value analysis can be defined as the process of gaining insights into the relationships between different market instruments and the external forces driving their pricing. These insights facilitate arbitrage trading, but they also allow us more generally to develop an understanding of the market mechanisms that drive valuations and of the ways seemingly different markets are interconnected.
As a consequence, relative value analysis, which originated in arbitrage trading, has a much broader scope of applications. It can reveal the origins of certain market relations, the reasons a security is priced a certain way, and the relative value of this pricing in relation to the prices of other securities. And in the event that a security is found to be misvalued, relative value analysis suggests ways in which the mispricing can be exploited through specific trading positions. In brief, relative value analysis is a prism through which we view the machinery driving market pricing amidst a multitude of changing market prices.
As an example, consider the divergence of swap spreads for German Bunds and US Treasuries in recent quarters, which might appear inextricable without considering the effects of cross-currency basis swaps (CCBS), intra-currency basis swaps (ICBS), and credit default swaps (CDS).
In this case, CCBS spreads widened as a result of the difficulties that European banks experienced in raising USD liabilities against their USD assets. On the other hand, arbitrage between Bunds, swapped into USD, and Treasuries prevented an excessive cheapening of Bunds versus USD LIBOR. As a consequence, Bunds richened significantly against EURIBOR (see Chapter 14 for more details).
However, given the relationship between European banks and sovereigns, the difficulties of European banks were also reflected in a widening of European sovereign CDS levels. Hence, Bunds richened versus EURIBOR at the same time as German CDS levels increased.
An analyst who fails to consider these interconnected valuation relations may find the combination of richening Bunds and increasing German CDS opaque and puzzling. But a well-equipped relative value analyst can disentangle these valuation relations explicitly to identify the factors that are driving valuations in these markets. And armed with this knowledge, the analyst can apply these insights to other instruments, potentially uncovering additional relative value opportunities.
The Applications of Relative Value Analysis
Relative value analysis has a number of applications.
Trading
One of the most important applications of relative value analysis is relative value trading, in which various securities are bought and others sold with the goal of enhancing the risk-adjusted expected return of a trading book.
Identifying relatively rich and relatively cheap securities is an important skill for a relative value trader, but additional skills are required to be successful as a relative value trader. For example, rich securities can and often do become richer, while cheap securities can and often do become cheaper. A successful relative value trader needs to be able to identify some of the reasons that securities are rich or cheap in order to form realistic expectations about the likelihood of future richening or cheapening. We discuss this and other important skills throughout this book.
Hedging and Immunization
Relative value analysis is also an important consideration when hedging or otherwise immunizing positions against various risks. For example, consider a flow trader who is sold a position in ten-year (10Y) French government bonds by a customer. This trader faces a number of alternatives for hedging this risk.
He could try to sell the French bond to another client or to an interdealer broker. He could sell another French bond with a similar maturity. He could sell Bund futures contracts or German Bunds with similar maturities. He could pay fixed in a plain vanilla interest rate swap or perhaps a euro overnight index average (EONIA) swap. He could buy payer swaptions or sell receiver swaptions with various strikes. He could sell liquid supranational or agency bonds issued by entities such as the European Investment Bank. Depending on his expectations, he might even sell bonds denominated in other currencies, such as US Treasuries or UK Gilts. Or he might choose to implement a combination of these hedging strategies.
In devising a hedging strategy, a skilled trader will consider the relative valuations of the various securities that can be used as hedging instruments. If he expects Bunds to cheapen relative to the alternatives, he may choose to sell German Bunds as a hedge. And if he believes Bund futures are likely to cheapen relative to cash Bunds, he may choose to implement this hedge via futures contracts rather than in the cash market.
By considering the relative value implications of these hedging alternatives, a skilled flow trader can enhance the risk-adjusted expected return of his book. In this way, the value of the book reflects not only the franchise value of the customer flow but ...