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Section IV
INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY ISSUES IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AGENCIES
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CHAPTER 8
Comprehensive Planning of Criminal Justice Information and Intelligence Systems
ATFâs Experience in Implementing Firearms Tracing in the United States
GLENN PIERCE AND ROBERTA E. GRIFFITH
In 2002, there were 9,369 firearms-related homicides in the United States, and of these, 3,651 involved victims under 25 years of age. In terms of aggravated assault and robbery, 19.0% of the 894,348 aggravated assaults and 42.1% of the 420,637 robberies reported by the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program in 2000 involved firearms (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2003).
Firearms violence in the United States has been linked to the operation of illegal gun markets (Blumstein & Cook, 1996). Importantly, because two of the most frequent groups of firearms offenders in the United Statesâcriminal offenders and juvenilesâare legally prohibited from purchasing handguns nearly everywhere in the nation, such individuals are likely to turn to illegal markets to obtain firearms. Equally important, research suggests that if the supply of guns could be stopped or severely disrupted, gun violence could be hindered. Research by Braga, Cook, Kennedy, and Moore (2002) shows that âillegal gun markets consist of both âpoint sourcesââongoing diversions through scofflaw dealers, trafficking rings, and gun thievesâand âdiffuse sourcesââacquisitions through direct theft and informal voluntary salesâ (p. 337). This research suggests that a better understanding of the illegal firearms markets is a necessary step toward a more comprehensive understanding of violent firearms crime.
Research also indicates that there is significant regional variability in the character of illegal firearms markets (Pierce, Braga, Hyatt, & Koper, 2004). This type of complexity presents challenges to law enforcement officials interested in disrupting the illegal supply of guns to criminal offenders and other prohibited persons because it suggests that there may be no single best strategic and/or tactical approach to disrupting the illegal supply of guns across different jurisdictions in the United States (Pierce et al., 2004). Given this variability, jurisdictions engaged in disrupting illegal gun markets and reducing gun violence need ready access to accurate and comprehensive information on the character of illegal firearms markets within their respective communities.
Such information can help to provide a basis for improving our strategic and tactical understanding of local and regional firearms trafficking, and this in turn provides the potential for better focusing and coordinating law enforcement resources and intervention initiatives. A major source of this type of information is potentially available through analyses of traced firearms recovered by law enforcement from criminal offenders, juveniles, other prohibited persons, and/or criminal circumstances.
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) is the agency responsible for tracing firearms, which is the systematic tracking of the movement of firearms recovered by law enforcement. Ideally, ATF will trace a firearm from the manufacturer or importer through the distribution chain (i.e., wholesalers and retailers) to the first retail purchaser or to a point where all other possibilities of identifying the original purchaser have been thoroughly exhausted. There are two primary components in the tracing process: (a) the systematic collection of information on crime-related firearms from law enforcement units that confiscated or found these weapons and (b) the tracing of the commercial transactions of the crime-related firearms recovered by law enforcement.
A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM PLANNING
The objective of this chapter is to examine the information management, crime analysis, and intelligence capabilities developed by ATF over the past decade so as to use crime gun trace data to investigate firearms trafficking and help reduce firearms crime. In addition, the chapter examines the context within which ATF developed firearms tracing information systems and crime analysis/intelligence systems so as to help formulate improved guidelines for designing and implementing complex applications for the criminal justice system.
The challenge of developing this type of capability goes well beyond information technology (IT)-related issues. The structure and geographic organization of criminal justice has had profound effects on the evolution of information systems. The American criminal justice system operates at the local, county, metropolitan, state, and federal levels of government. At each level of government, agencies are further divided along functional lines (e.g., police, courts, prosecution and defense, corrections, probation and parole). In addition, various state and local jurisdictions operate under different legal and regulatory systems. Finally, variations in the character of violent crime across jurisdictions can result in different regional law enforcement priorities and the concurrent need for different types of intelligence and crime analysis. The results are organizational disjunctures that present significant potential barriers to developing integrated information systems but also represent a major rationale for developing such systems.
Beyond geographic, functional, and legal factors, organizational disunity and communication problems are increased when multiple agencies have responsibility for implementing and managing a given policy or set of policies. Peters (1996) notes that for multi-agency policy implementation/management, âthe problems of organizational disunity and communication become exaggerated when the individuals involved are not bound even by a presumed loyalty to a single organization but have competing loyalties to different organizations, not all of which may be interested in the effective implementation of a particular programâ (p. 120).
The current analysis examines the legal, organizational, and technical contexts that shape ATFâs ability to acquire, analyze, and ultimately use information on illegal firearms markets for the purpose of controlling firearms crime. A review of these factors suggests a set of questions or issues that provide a framework for examining ATFâs efforts in this arena. Importantly, the analysis also provides a more general framework for assessing IT systems and intelligence projects in the criminal justice system.
The specific research questions/issues incorporated in the framework include the following:
- How does the legal context of ATF affect the agencyâs ability to (a) collect, manage, and disseminate firearms trace data from law enforcement agencies and (b) use these data to identify patterns (and specific instances) of illegal firearms trafficking?
- How does the organizational context of ATF affect the agencyâs ability to (a) collect, manage, and disseminate firearms trace data from law enforcement agencies and (b) use these data to identify patterns (and specific instances) of illegal firearms trafficking?
- How has ATFâs communication and information systems infrastructure evolved to support the agencyâs ability to collect and manage information on crime-related firearms recovered by law enforcement agencies?
- Can firearms trace information be used to identify patterns of firearms trafficking and specific instances of firearms trafficking?
- Can intelligence derived from firearms trace data be effectively disseminated to appropriate law enforcement personnel?
- How does the organizational context of a law enforcement agency that potentially wishes to use firearms trace information affect the agencyâs ability to use this information to help focus, prioritize, and coordinate its activities, initiatives, and programs?
- What are the policies and crime control implications of using an intelligence/knowledge-based system to reduce firearms trafficking and violence in the case of ATF or to meet a criminal justice agencyâs goals more generally?
The proposed framework is intended to provide a set of questions to help guide analyses of the design, implementation, and use of information and intelligence systems within specific legal and organizational contexts. In particular, we are interested in how information collected and managed in such systems is ultimately used by an organization for strategic and tactical purposes. Questions 1 to 5 focus on the development and implementation of systems to acquire, manage, analyze, and distribute criminal justice-related information and knowledge. Questions 4 and 5 have been examined in three studies funded by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and ATF conducted by Northeastern University, Abt Associates, and RAND Criminal Justice. Questions 6 and 7 focus on the capacity and readiness of an agency to use this type of data and on the utility of such information to the agencies. This chapter focuses primarily on Questions 1 to 5 outlined in the framework. In the case of ATF, Questions 6 and 7 are beginning to be addressed,1 but these efforts involve agencies and law enforcement partnerships across the country and are beyond the scope of this analysis.
FIREARMS TRACING AND ATF
Legal and Regulatory Contexts of Firearms Tracing
Context
ATF regulates the firearms industry and enforces civil penalties and criminal laws relating to firearms production, import (not export), sales, transport, use, carrying, and possession. It collects, maintains, and uses firearms-related information for six purposes: (a) as directly specified by statute; (b) to assist in agency management; (c) to support firearms-related education and compliance measures, regulation, and enforcement; (d) to inform the public; (e) to respond to executive branch oversight bodies, Congress, and others seeking information about, evaluating, or doing research associated with ATF activities; and (f) to protect the public and reduce violence.
The primary legislative foundation for ATFâs authority is the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA), which established a set of requirements that allowed for the âchain of commerceâ of any given firearm to be traced from its manufacture or import to its first sale by a retail dealer. Following passage of the act, ATF began conducting traces recovered by law enforcement. The GCA mandated that each new firearm, whether manufactured in the United States or imported, must be marked with a unique serial number.2 In addition, the GCA requires all federally licensed firearms dealers (FFLs), including manufacturers, importers, distributors, and retail dealers, to maintain records of all firearms transactions, including whole/retail sales and shipments received. In response to a request for trace information, the GCA also requires FFLs to provide information from transaction records (i.e., acquisition and disposition logs) to ATF and to report multiple handgun sales3 and information on firearms stolen from dealers to ATF. ATF can perform an audit of an FFLâs transaction records once during a 12-month period to ensure compliance with record-keeping requirements of the GCA. Finally, when an FFL goes out of business, the GCA requires the FFL to transfer its transaction records to ATF, which stores them for the purpose of tracing. In essence, the GCA created enhanced record-keeping procedures, thereby establishing a paper trail for gun transactions that can be followed by ATF agents.4
The submission of ATF traces by any law enforcement agency remains voluntary. However, in 1994, Congress recognized tracing as an essential tool for firearms law enforcement by requiring firearms manufacturers and FFLs to cooperate with ATF in providing information to complete a firearms trace within 24 hours.
Congress has also passed legislative mandates that place restrictions on the collection and management of firearms trace information. During the late 1970s, Congress passed a restriction prohibiting ATF from consolidating or centralizing records of receipt and disposition of firearms maintained by FFLs. Specifically, ATFâs fiscal year 1979 appropriation provided that
no funds appropriated herein shall be available for administrative expenses in connection with consolidating or centralizing within the Department of the Treasury the records of receipt and disposition of firearms maintained by Federal firearms licensees or for issuing or carrying out provisions of the proposed rules of the Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, on Firearms Regulations, as published in the Federal Register, volume 43, number 55, of March 21, 1978.
Congress has passed similar restrictions in ATF appropriation since then.
Implications
The information that ATF collects and maintains closely mirrors the agencyâs statutory authority. ATFâs legal and regulat...
