Researching the Public Opinion Environment

Theories and Methods

Sherry Devereaux Ferguson

• Publisher: SAGE Publications, Inc
• Year: 2000
• Print ISBN: 9780761915317, 9780761915300
• eBook ISBN: 9781506314099
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Languages & Linguistics
• Subtopic: Communication Studies
• Index: Languages & Linguistics

Researching the Public Opinion Environment informs the reader on the rationale, purposes, theories, and methodologies involved in researching publics. The book is divided into four parts. Part one looks at theories and systems relevant to opinion research. Part two addresses the topics of monitoring and analyzing the media. Part three describes the basics of survey research, focus groups, Delphi techniques, stakeholder assemblies, and Q methodology. And finally, part four analyzes the impact of the media.

Although a number of books have been written on public opinion, few address both theoretical and methodological issues. Graphs, tables, and sample analysis help the reader to understand applications described in the book. The material discussed in this book has numerous applications. Communicators can apply information acquired on key publics to plan and evaluate campaigns, track the extent to which messages have appeared in the media, assess organizational image, develop marketing strategies, and manage their issues. Students will learn an important job function for added credibility when they apply for jobs.

PART

I

Theory and Systems

1

Role of Public Opinion in Democratic Societies

The classical debate over whether the mass public has a role to play in the affairs of government continues unabated, even after centuries of discourse. At the same time, modern academic literature has added another theme to the debate: Assuming that there is a role to be played, is there any credibility to the manner in which leaders engage the public? While the scholarly debate continues, political leaders ponder the very pragmatic question: How can I cope with the consequences of yesterday’s opinion poll and predict tomorrow’s public opinion crisis?

The Classical Debate

Authors such as Plato, Hobbes, Hamilton, and Madison express serious reservations about the potential of the average citizen to make a meaningful contribution to the workings of government. Plato (427-347 B.C.) believes in a society governed by a philosopher king, whose wisdom far exceeds the knowledge and intellectual capabilities of the general population. In The Republic, Plato (trans. 1963) argues that the average person is not capable of comprehending the complexities of government. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) also questions the value of involving the masses of people in the workings of government. Although Hobbes (1963 version) believes that public consent is a prerequisite to the formation of government, he does not think that the role of the public extends much beyond this point. He says that once the people have committed to a social contract, forged to protect them against the “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” vagaries of life without government, they should acquiesce to the ruling powers (p. 143). In other words, they should “confer all their power and strength upon one man, or one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will” (p. 149).

Alexander Hamilton (1937 version) espouses a similar view in 1787 when he urges the Constitutional Convention not to trust the “many” to make judicious decisions on matters pertaining to government. He says that their decisions are too grounded in emotions and too often based on selfish motives. Hamilton further argues that the tendency of the masses to oppose groups with wealth can lead to unwarranted change and unstable and chaotic conditions. James Madison agrees with Hamilton that the people best able to govern are those who hold property. He says that conflicting interests and divided loyalties on the part of the masses create a lack of incentive to cooperate for the common good. For this reason, Madison (1961) takes a federalist stance that argues for separation of powers in government and a loose confederation of states.

In Democracy in America, French statesman Alexis de Toqueville (1805-1859) also expresses grave reservations about the wisdom of involving the public too heavily in the machinations of government. In coining the classic phrase “the tyranny of the majority,” De Toqueville (1957 version, p. 115) articulates the fear that the majority may not always protect the interests of minorities. In the twentieth century, Walter Lippmann (1922) takes his place alongside these classical and later writers when he argues that citizens cannot understand the intricate workings of government. He says that any individual “lives and works on a small part of the earth’s surface” and sees “at best only a phase and an aspect” (p. 53). The psychic affiliation of Lippmann with the views of some of the earlier elitists can be seen in his reference to Hamilton as the “most imaginative” of the founding fathers. Thus, this first group of philosophers and political scientists view citizens as having no role to play in the workings of government. In a modern twist, political theorists worry that the rapid pace of change in science and technology creates a situation in which the public is unable to keep abreast of the changes. They worry that this inability to keep up with change has “profound implications for democracy” (J. Kitzinger, personal communication, November 26, 1999). Many major funding bodies, as well as firms such as Leverhulme, have committed large sums of money to the study of this topic.

A second group of philosophers adhere to the view that even though the mass public has little to contribute to government, their elected leaders cannot afford to ignore their views. In other words, they view citizen engagement as a necessary evil. For example, in The Prince, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) writes that public opinion can either support individual ambition or, alternatively, the collective good. In The Prince, Machiavelli (trans. 1963) states that public opinion is fickle, driven by the fact that humans are “ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers, anxious to avoid danger, and covetous of gain; as long as you benefit them, they are yours” (p. 120). To remain in power, rulers must either manipulate or accommodate public opinion. To ignore its existence is to risk loss of power. British philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) agrees that even the most despotic or authoritarian of governments cannot disregard this public will. He notes that it is “on opinion only that government is founded” (as quoted in Yeric & Todd, 1989, p. 8). According to German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (trans. 1952), public opinion is “the unorganized way in which a public’s opinions and wishes are made known” (p. 149). Despite the fact that public opinion contains “all kinds of falsities,” it wields “great power” (p. 149) that no leader can ignore. Even though Hegel does not believe that public opinion should guide political action, like Machiavelli and Hume, he argues that those in positions of power must be aware of public wants and needs. In summary, the second group of philosophers view citizens as uninformed but nonetheless strong in their potential to bring down an unpopular government. Thus, out of necessity, they have a role to play.

A third cluster of philosophers espouse the view that public opinion has a critical role to play in democratic societies. Plato’s most renowned student, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), departs from the views of his mentor when he speaks about the benefits of involving the “many” as opposed to the “few” (phrases that were later put to other uses by Hamilton). In Book III of Politics (trans. 1962), Aristotle recognizes the potential superiority of a collective intelligence: “They may surpass—collectively and as a body, although not individually—the quality of the few best” (p. 123). He is optimistic that public debate and discussion can be the vehicles for informed, intelligent decision making.

John Locke (1632-1704) makes a major contribution to the debate over the role of public opinion in democracy with his book, Two Treatises of Government (1690). Although recognizing (like Hobbes) that the legitimacy of government derives from a social contract with the people, Locke (1952 version) argues that those in power have a duty to protect the rights of the governed. He says that the community ultimately is the “supreme power,” and that the law of public opinion is equal in importance to civil and divine law (p. 59). The Social Contract (trans. 1963), written by French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), reflects the philosophies of Aristotle and Locke. Like Aristotle, he views the “organic” or “general” will of the community as more than the sum of individual opinions. He argues that this general will is “always right and tends always to the public advantage” (p. 123). Nonetheless, Rousseau warns,

It does not follow that the deliberations of the people have always the same rectitude. Our will always seeks our own good, but we do not always perceive what it is. The people are never corrupted, but they are often deceived, (pp. 223-224)

As the first major philosopher to use the term l’ opinion publique, Rousseau speaks of the importance of public opinion, its impact on rulers, and the necessity of being able to influence and control opinion. Writing in 1802, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) displays some of the same pragmatism. Bentham warns legislators that they must recognize and increase the moral force of public opinion as well as regulate its intensity. Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) is one of the most articulate advocates for taking public views into account. Adamant that well-educated people can act with judgment and responsibility, Jefferson sees farmers as the most independent, virtuous, and loyal of the citizenry, by virtue of their ties to the land, and he believes that the abundance of land in the newly forged United States creates the right conditions for mass participation in government. The Declaration of Independence (trans. 1963) operationalizes Jefferson’s strong faith in the ability of people to participate in government. Thus, this final group of philosophers and political scientists sees the potential for citizens to perform a critical and important role in the governing of a country.

In conclusion, the first school of philosophers (pessimists) views citizen engagement as undesirable and unnecessary. The second school of thought (pragmatists) views citizen involvement as undesirable but necessary. The third group of philosophers (optimists) views citizen engagement as both desirable and necessary.

This preamble establishes a backdrop against which many contemporary discussions are set. The fundamentals of the debate have not shifted, and many civic leaders believe that they face a no-win situation. They are damned if they “do” and damned if they “don’t.” If leaders follow public opinion, critics say that they have no leadership qualities—that they follow public whims, which change on a daily basis. If leaders ignore public opinion, however, critics attach labels of elitism and arrogance. The most cynical say that governments monitor public opinion to learn how best to influence and manipulate that opinion. Knowing the philosophical foundations of the debate cannot solve the problem that leaders face on the issue of how much priority to give to public opinion; it can help us to understand their dilemma, however.

The Modern Debate

Some claim that Lippmann’s (1922) work, a bridge into the modern age, shifts the emphasis from philosophical treatises on public opinion to scientific studies of opinion. This statement is only partly true, however, because in fact the philosophical debate continues, with a twist. The current debate can be articulated as follows: Should organizations engage in public opinion research? Bauman and Herbst (1994) describe the evolution of the debate as follows: “Since the early Greek democracies, people have debated about the nature of public opinion. Only recently, however, has the debate over the character of public opinion been tied (at times almost exclusively) to polling data” (p. 142).

Lipari (1999) offers one of the most cogent accounts of this debate. She says that there are three schools of thought: the populist, social constructionist, and critical perspectives. Curran (1996a, 1996b) and Morley (1996) discuss a fourth perspective—the revisionist perspective. It is interesting to consider these four perspectives against the three-pronged classical debate (engaging optimists, pragmatists, and pessimists) over the role of public opinion in society.

Populist Perspective

The populist perspective (also characterized as a liberal functionalist approach) assumes that “communication in society flows from bottom to top; that an aggregation of individuals constitutes a public; and that these individuals have values, beliefs, and opinions separate from political institutions, which are capable of being measured” (Curran, 1996a, p. 138). According to the populist perspective, media facilitate a two-way flow of communication between governors and their constituencies. Thus, public opinion research has an important role to play in democratic societies because it provides a means for the mass public to participate in and influence government (Lipari, 1999).

The populist view reflects the optimism of Jefferson, Rousseau, and Aristotle. Adherents include individuals such as the “deliberative democratic theorists” (Cohen, 1989; Gastil & Dillard, 1999), who search for better ways to inform and engage citizens in the democratic process. Populists view citizen participation as credible because they view Western media as highly autonomous. They argue that market systems force the media to consider public needs, wants, and opinions (Curran, 1996a).

Social Constructionist Perspective

This perspective views public opinion as the product of symbolic interactions in society involving language, greatly influenced by political discourse. In the spirit of Machiavelli (the pragmatic perspective), the social constructionist approach views public opinion as malleable and subject to manipulation by those in power. The implication, however, is that people participate in the process: Lavine and Latane (1996) note, “We believe that public opinion is the complex result of nonlinear dynamic processes occurring within the minds of individuals and as a result of social interaction and communication” (p. 56). According to this view, the drive for cognitive consistency interacts with the process of social influence. The emphasis on the symbolic departs from the classical debate, which does not address intrapersonal or psychological dimensions of public opinion. Social constructionists believe that people create their own realities through interacting with others and through co-constructing and living stories. These processes of interaction are reciprocal, reflexive, binding, and long-term in their consequences. Social constructionists view persons in conversation as the raison d’etre for living (Pearce, 1995; Pearce & Cronen, 1980). They believe that the manner in which people communicate can be as important as what they say to each other and that communication has long-term effects that are reflexive in nature. Social constructionists do not believe that one truth exists. Pluralistic in their orientation, they honor the principle of multiple truths and the validity of many cultural traditions. Curious about the world, they believe in participating actively in a quest for greater understanding.

As noted previously, the origins of social constructionism are highly pragmatic, influenced by individuals such as John Dewey (Griffin, 2000), Mead (1934), and Blumler (1972). According to the constructionist perspective, public opinion research is a “mechanism of managed democracy” (Lipari, 1999, p. 86), and political will can become manifest only through political and social discourse. Through symbolic interaction with others, people form their political views and attitudes, which are flexible and sometimes contradictory. Therefore, polls and other opinion research instruments can only capture moments in time, not ultimate truths about what people believe and think. Thus, although public opinion research has a function, this function is limited by the nature of the communication process, which is ongoing, changing, and difficult to capture. The realities of individuals are shaped by their interactions with others in their social universes; thus, no one reality exists. Social constructionists would advocate the concept of multiple publics, each with valid concerns.

In comparing social constructionist theory with the views of the classical pragmatists, it can be stated that, like Machiavelli and Hegel, constructionists recognize the existence of many different publics with varying degrees of influence. These publics have distinct views that, although constantly changing and evolving through the social and political discourse of the day, have the potential to impact on positions of leadership at any given moment in time. This third school also reflects the philosophy of Lippman (1922), who said that we construct “pictures in our heads.”

Critical Perspective

Highly pessimistic in its point of view, the critical perspective (also called the “radical functionalist” approach) states that what masquerades as mass opinion, in fact, is elite opinion because the elites (including those in government) manipulate the polls to achieve their own ends. Adherents include individuals such as Habermas (1962/1989), Herman and Chomsky (1988), and Ginsberg (1989). Critical theorists would not agree with Hamilton or Madison that elites should control society; nonetheless, they would argue that elites do exercise control. Curran (1996a) discusses the three strands of what he terms radical functionalism:

One strand of radical functionalism holds that the political economy of the media—its ownership by corporate business, its links to the state, the socialization of media staff into organizational norms, and the constraints imposed by market distortions, advertising, and the pursuit of profit more generally—all predispose the media to serve dominant interests (Murdock and Golding, 1977; Curran, 1977). Another structuralist-culturalist strand of radical functionalism sees the media as shaped by the dominant culture and power structures of society (Hall, 1986; Hall, Catcher, Jefferson, & Roberts, 1978). A third, more mainstream tradition argues that the structures of control within media organizations intermesh with those in society (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). But common to all three positions is the conviction that the media tend to sustain dominant social forces in society. (p. 129)

Proponents of “political economy of the media” believe that monopolistic control of media is happening on a global, not just national, level. Because media serve commercial interests, they cannot be independent, they do not act in the public interest, and they do not reflect the full range of public opinion. Instead of producing consensus, the media produce consent (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).

Other critics charge that mainstream media tend to reflect the views of official sources and professional communicators while ignoring other sectors of the population (Page & Tannenbaum, 1996). Philo (1995) claims that media neglect “whole areas of opinion” while they upgrade or downgrade other areas. Moreover, he notes that broadcast media are undemocratic in their manner of choosing spokespersons, favoring senior civil servants. Finally, he argues that media often use the opinions of low-status individuals to “back up” the dominant view, including only “brief unsubstantiated” comments from minorities (p. 183). Carter, Branston, and Allan (1998) discuss the way in which media tend to disregard the views of women. Others, such as Isaacs (1998) and Yankelovich (1991), also speak cynically of the yawning gap between mass and elite opinion.

In summary, this school of thought views public opinion research as another manifestation of a drive to manipulate and control the mass public, token and negative in its implications. If these assertions are accurate, then obviously media monitoring would only illuminate the views of elites and not those of the mass public. Some critics claim that the views of elites are already overrepresented in data acquired from public opinion polls. Elites, they say, tend to be more affluent, better informed, and more conservative in their ideological orientations. Faced with survey questions, they are able to offer informed opinion on many of the questions co...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Dedication
• Introduction
• Acknowledgments
• PART I: THEORY AND SYSTEMS
• PART II: MONITORING AND ANALYllNG THE MEDIA
• PART III: RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES
• PART IV: THEORIES ON THE IMPACT OF THE MEDIA
• Appendix A
• Appendix B
• References
• Author Index
• Subject Index
• About the Authors