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PART I
Embracing Ambiguity
In 1980, the vast majority of writers on organizations subscribed to an ideology of communication that emphasized clarity as equivalent to effectiveness. Although clarity is without a doubt one important criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of communication, other considerations often apply. In this part of the book, I attempt to expose the ideological biases of this particular philosophy of communication, drawing connections among âinformation engineeringâ views of language, the growing interest in personal self-actualization through disclosure, and the emphasis on clarity, openness, and shared meaning. Starting from this critique, I lay the groundwork for a more nuanced view of effective organizational communication that emphasizes the potential value of ambiguity and selective disclosure.
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1
Ambiguity as Strategy in Organizational Communication
Written more than two decades ago, this essay was my first attempt to counter the prevailing ideology of clarity and openness in organizational communication theory and research that stood in sharp contrast to most peopleâs experience of organizational life. Cited hundreds of times in the fields of Communication and Organizational Studies, this essay identified four functions of strategic ambiguityâspecifically, its capacity to promote unified diversity, to preserve privileged positions, to foster deniability, and to facilitate organizational change. The discussion of plausible deniability foreshadowed a central theme of the Iran-Contra hearings, during which an American Lieutenant Colonel (Oliver North) testified to the U.S. Congress about the role and importance of âplausible deniabilityâ in the illegal sale of weapons to the Nicaraguan Contras. The lack of serious consequences for the Colonel or anyone else connected to the case showed the power as well as the potential for abuse inherent in this kind of communication.
In retrospect, this essay reflects my youthful desire to edify and explore the more mysterious and less rational aspects of human connection (I was 23 when I began work on it and 26 when it was published). In focusing on these things, I paid little attention to other dynamics, such as how ambiguity can mask and sustain abuses of power. Looking back, I am also unsure about my relational definition of strategic ambiguity; it seemed to make sense at the time, but has proven difficult to study. Nevertheless, the paper accomplished what I had hoped it would, prompting scholars and practitioners alike to reflect on their assumptions about the centrality of clarity and the potential uses of ambiguity in successful organizing.
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Conceptions of organizations have changed drastically in recent years. This change has occurred in two ways. First, while past conceptions paid little attention to the role of cognition in organizing, current work reflects a shift toward viewing organizational participants as thinking individuals with identifiable goals (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Harris & Cronen, 1979; Pfeffer, 1981; Smircich, 1983; Weick, 1978, 1979a). Second, whereas previous analyses of organizational behavior treated communication as an epiphenomenon, recent work focuses directly on communication processes in organizations (Dandridge, 1979; Farace, Monge, & Russell, 1977; Pacanowsky & OâDonnell-Trujillo, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981; Pondy, Frost, Morgan, & Dandridge, 1983; Smircich & Morgan, 1982). Interest in organizational symbolism has been far-reaching and is a central concern of students of Japanese management (Pascale & Athos, 1981) and of organizational culture (Jelinek, Smircich, & Hirsch, 1983). Pfeffer (1981, p. 44) provides a concise statement of this new emphasis: âIf management involves the taking of symbolic action, then the skills required are political, dramaturgical, and language skills more than analytical or strictly quantitative skills.â
This change in emphasis corresponds to developments in various fields. Researchers in communication (Bochner, 1982; Clark & Delia, 1979; Hart & Burks, 1972; Monge, Bachman, Dillard, & Eisenberg, 1982; Pearce, Cronen, & Conklin, 1979; Tracy & Moran, 1983) and linguistics (Brown & Levinson, 1978; Fowler, Hodge, Kress, & Trew, 1979; Levy, 1979) are studying communication competence in ways which have implications for organizational behavior. Most of these writers view competent communication as the strategic use of symbols to accomplish goals. Moreover, a communicatorâs goals are not assumed to be unitary or even consistent; rather, individuals have multiple, often conflicting goals which they orient toward in an effort to satisfy rather than to maximize attainment of any one goal in particular. This perspective has evolved largely as a critical response to the âoptimalâ model of communication which equates effectiveness with clarity and openness. Communication theorists have rejected this particular ideology in favor of a more rhetorical view of communicator as strategist (Bochner, 1982; Parks, 1982; Wilder, 1979).1
While the more practitioner-oriented journals continue to publish essays which equate effective communication with open communication (e.g., Bassett, 1974; Fisher, 1982; Frank, 1982; Lorey, 1976; Sigband, 1976; VonBergen & Shealy, 1982; Wycoff, 1981) recent theoretical work reflects a genuine willingness among leading scholars and practitioners to accept the notion that organizational members use symbols strategically to accomplish goals, and in doing so may not always be completely open or clear (e.g., Pascale & Athos, 1981; Pfeffer, 1981; Pondy et al., 1983).
The overemphasis on clarity and openness in organizational teaching and research is both non-normative and not a sensible standard against which to gauge communicative competence or effectiveness. People in organizations confront multiple situational requirements, develop multiple and often conflicting goals, and respond with communicative strategies which do not always minimize ambiguity, but may nonetheless be effective. This essay goes beyond the assertion that people in organizations manipulate symbols to achieve goals toward a more rigorous conceptualization of how this process operates, what strategies work under what conditions, and with what effects. Specifically, this paper explores how people in organizations use ambiguity strategically to accomplish their goals.
I am not suggesting a retreat from clarity. There are numerous occasions in organizations in which greater clarity is desirable. What I am advocating is a shift in emphasis away from an overly ideological adherence to clarity toward a more contingent, strategic orientation. Pascale and Athos (1981, p. 102) capture the sentiment: âExplicit communication is a cultural assumption; it is not a linguistic imperative. Skilled executives develop the ability to vary their language along the spectrum from explicitness to indirection depending upon their reading of the other person and the situation.â
The idea that people choose communication strategies to accomplish multiple goals is in sharp contrast to the classical-structuralist view of organizational behavior, which sees communication as primarily facilitating production. In the multiple-goal approach, communication is instrumental in building and maintaining self-image, in facilitating interpersonal relationships, and in advancing innovation, as well as in aiding production (Farace et al., 1977). From this perspective, organizational communication is the process by which organizing occurs, not something which takes place in organizations (Johnson, 1977; Putnam, 1983). Furthermore, the problem facing the typical organizational member is one of striking a balance between being understood, not offending others, and maintaining oneâs self-image. Many different strategies are used to orient toward conflicting interactional goals; some examples include avoiding interaction altogether, remaining silent, or changing the topic. One intriguing strategy which is of key importance to organizing involves the application of oneâs âresources of ambiguityâ (Burke, 1969). In the next section, a more precise definition of strategic ambiguity is offered.
Defining Strategic Ambiguity
Before a definition of strategic ambiguity can be considered, I must provide a philosophical context for its understanding. The present definition of ambiguity is a direct outgrowth of the relativist view of meaning. This perspective is critical of logical empiricism and the mirror metaphor of science (Rorty, 1979); it rejects the notion that an objective world exists which waits to be discovered. With no purely âobjectiveâ reality to describe, the existence of âliteralâ language becomes questionable, and all meaning is seen as fundamentally contextual and constructed, at least partly, by individuals. Language, perception, and knowledge are completely interdependent. Ortony (1979) provides an elegant summary of the argument: âKnowledge of reality, whether it is occasioned by perception, language, memory, or anything else, is a result of going beyond the information given. It arises through the interaction of that information with the context in which it is presented, and with the knowerâs pre-existing knowledgeâ (p. 1, italics added). The relativist position does not consider ambiguity to be a special problem, since meanings are constituted by individuals, not inherent in discourse. In contrast, the nonconstructivist position considers non-literal language to be unimportant and parasitic on ânormalâ usage (Ortony, 1979, p. 2).
Students of communication theory have found the relativist view of meaning to be appealing. It is reflected in the âinteractional viewâ of communication advanced by Watzlawick and Weakland (1977). From this perspective, all action is seen as potentially communicative, and context is the key factor in determining meaning. This view is most suitable for the study of strategic ambiguity, the meaning of which is heavily dependent upon the interactional context.
Now that the important epistemological issues have been addressed, the definitional process can proceed. Ambiguity has been addressed under a variety of labels, including indirectness (Branham, 1980; Nofsinger, 1976; Szasz, 1974), vagueness (Pascale & Athos, 1981), disqualification (Bavelas, 1983; Bavelas & Smith, 1982), and unclarity (Wender, 1968). The distinctions among these terms have themselves been unclear, primarily due to an inconsistent view of meaning. Most writers have endorsed the interactional view while at the same time attempting to identify specific messages which are more or less ambiguous. This is an impossible task, and more than one researcher has glossed the issue by remaining vague about the locus of ambiguity, i.e., whether it resides in the sourceâs intentions, the receiverâs interpretations, or in the message itself.
Some examples will illustrate the problem. In their study of equivocal messages in organizations, Putnam and Sorenson (1982) define ambiguity both in terms of message attributes (lack of specific detail, abstract language, absence of a course of action) and receiver interpretation (perceived equivocality of the message). Bavelas and Smith (1982) and Fowler et al. (1979) both posit an ideal message which is complete and clear and examine the ways in which actual messages are disqualified (Bavelas & Smith, 1982) or deviate from this hypothetical ideal.
Unfortunately, the concept of an ideally clear message is misleading in fundamental ways. Clarity (and conversely, ambiguity) is not an attribute of messages; it is a relational variable which arises through a combination of source, message, and receiver factors. Clarity exists to the extent that the following conditions are met: (1) an individual has an idea; (2) he or she encodes the idea into language; and (3) the receiver understands the message as it was intended by the source.2 In trying to be clear, individuals take into account the possible interpretive contexts which may be brought to bear on the message by the receiver and attempt to narrow the possible interpretations. Clarity, then, is a continuum which reflects the degree to which a source has narrowed the possible interpretations of a message and succeeded in achieving a correspondence between his or her intentions and the interpretation of the receiver.
Returning now to the central argument, people in organizations do not always try to promote this correspondence between intent and interpretation. It is often preferable to omit purposefully contextual cues and to allow for multiple interpretations on the part of receivers. Furthermore, clarity is only a measure of communicative competence if the individual has as his or her goal to be clear.
One important implication of accepting a contextual view of meaning is that ambiguity can be engendered th...
