Managing Construction Logistics

Gary Sullivan, Stephen Barthorpe, Stephen Robbins

• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
• Year: 2011
• Print ISBN: 9781405151245
• eBook ISBN: 9781444390414
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Construction & Architectural Engineering
• Index: Technology & Engineering

Every major industry except construction uses logistics to improve its bottom line…

Poor logistics is costing the construction industry at least £3 billion a year according to a report – 'Improving Construction Logistics' – published by the Strategic Forum for Construction. Additional costs arise as a result of operatives waiting for materials, and skilled craftsmen being used for unskilled jobs. Inadequate management of logistics also has an adverse effect on quality, causes delays to projects, and adds to the health and safety risks on site.

This practical book highlights the benefits of good logistics as well as the use of consolidation centres on projects. It shows how reduction in transport movements, less money tied up in stock, less waste, and the more efficient use of skilled craftsmen will reduce the cost of projects, reduce construction time, improve quality, reduce risks to health and safety, improve environmental performance and generally improve the image of the industry.

The authors offer practical ways of achieving these benefits through integrated project teams and supply chains and the increased adoption of information technology including electronic communications, bar coding, and electronic tagging for tracing products. They also show how specific roles for each part of the industry can help to improve logistics.

•Practical, clear and accessible
•First book to address logistics in construction
•Written by the industry-recognized logistics experts
•Tackles issues of key concern: efficient use of labour; sustainability; waste and supply chain management

Part 1: Contextualising Logistics for Construction

Chapter 1

The Origins of Logistics

This chapter provides definitions and an overview of the origins and development of the concept of logistics. From its original military associations to the more universally applied supply chain resource applications, logistics has developed and become accepted as an integral component of modern business practice, particularly in the retail and manufacturing industries.

Definitions and Origins of Logistics

According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), logistics comprises the ‘organization of supplies, stores, quarters, etc., necessary for the support of troop movements, expeditions, etc.’ The OED’s first recorded usage of the term is 1879.

Further research, however, reveals that the term was in use at least seven decades earlier, at the time of the Napoleonic Wars. The year 1811 saw the publication of the informatively entitled Elements of the Science of War Containing the Modern Established and Approved Principles of the Theory and Practice of the Military Sciences: viz the Formation and Organization of an Army and their Arms &c &c. Artillery; Engineering; Fortification; Tactics; Logistics; Grand Tactics; Castrametation; Military Topography; Strategy; Dialectic and Politics of War, written by William Müller, an engineer.

A contemporary reviewer stated that ‘in the composition of this work it has been Mr Müller’s object to give a scientific view of the whole business of war from the mere handling of a spade up to the conduct of an army’ (Anon 1812). The era which saw the mobilisation of unprecedentedly large armies across Europe had also produced widespread interest in all elements of the prosecution of wars, including the mechanics of supply, and classic military writers such as Jomini and Clausewitz were driven to explore new theories so that they could try to understand the battles that raged across the continent.

It is sometimes imagined that the word must have been derived from the Greek logos, meaning ‘word’, from which we get ‘logistician’, meaning ‘someone who is skilled in logic’. Whilst an aptitude for logical thinking is undoubtedly a major asset to a logistician concerned with organisation and supply, the word, when used in this sense, actually comes from a completely different source. In low Latin, a laubia was an arbour, or temporary shelter made from trees. This became the French loger, and from thence brought words such as ‘lodge’ and ‘logistics’ into the English language (Chambers 1875). Whereas logos, the term for ‘word’ and ‘reason’, has always had a spiritual dimension in English – ‘In the beginning was the Word’, the Gospel of John begins – loger was always firmly rooted in the temporal. From its earliest forms, it has been a word to describe practical responses to changing contingencies. The exacting nature of the task of organising such responses is now so well established that the OED has recently drafted a new entry for ‘logistical nightmare’, citing Lord Mountbatten’s description of Assam in 1944 as an early usage.

Whilst the word ‘logistics’ was long used to describe military situations, its usage in the world of retail and manufacturing is now well-established, although, as noted in the Preface, too often conflated with transport. Taylor (1997) advises that the comprehensive definition of logistics developed by the US Council of Logistics Management in 1986 is:

The process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of raw materials, in-process inventory, finished goods and related information from point of origin to point of final consumption for the purpose of conforming to customer requirements.

‘Logistics’ is defined by the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport (2006) in the UK as, ‘the process of designing, managing and improving such supply chains, which might include purchasing, manufacturing, storage and, of course, transport’.

A word with its origins in temporary shelters made from trees has come to describe one of the most complex and demanding functions in modern commercial activity. In the following two chapters, we will trace that development, beginning here with its origins in the world of warfare. The military origins and application of logistics provide a fascinating insight which helps our understanding of how modern logistics has developed today.

The Military Origins of Logistics

A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader’s plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with those factors, and battles are only won by taking risks.

Field Marshall Wavell (van Creveld 2004)

As the military historian John Keegan has observed, there are some basic constants to warfare. In Roman times, it was advised that soldiers should practise carrying loads of up to sixty pounds, whilst on the Somme, in 1916, sixty-six pounds was the average burden of a foot soldier (Keegan 1993). Little had changed over two millennia. He goes on to point out that there have been exceptions to this limit, such as the massive loads carried by the first British troops to land in the Falklands in 1982, but that even the fittest elite forces find it physically exhausting to carry such weight for any length of time.

Given the physical limitations of the soldiers themselves, the matter of how to provide enough food for soldiers fighting away from their own territory has been a problem ever since war ceased to be a fleeting and localised affair. As warfare became more sophisticated, and living off the land became problematic, supplies of foodstuff and other essentials had to keep pace with the advancing armies. Then there was the problem of maintaining essential supplies for both armies and livestock. These problems could partially be solved by placing additional loads on pack animals and wagons. These laden wagons became known collectively as the ‘baggage train’ and were normally placed at the rear of the marching column.

Until relatively recently, there were usually a large number of non-combatants who accompanied an army, especially during sustained and persistent invasions and campaigns. Even during raids, a substantial number of non-combatants, including carpenters, blacksmiths, tailors, armourers, fletchers, cooks, bakers and whores, accompanied the fighting forces. The non-combatants in a persisting force might have been more than double the number of combatants, therefore seriously exacerbating the supply problems.

A well-stocked baggage train allowed an army to be relatively self-contained as it carried its entire supply of requirements for the conduct of battle and the sustenance of troops and animals. However, the necessity of having a baggage train introduced its own distinct problems. The distance and speed at which an army could travel depended greatly upon the ability of the baggage train to deliver the supplies at the right place and time. This situation was not entirely satisfactory, as increases in the size of an army dictated a corresponding increase in the size of the baggage train. A large, ponderous baggage train was also susceptible to enemy attack.

Two methods of acquiring supplies on the move were therefore developed for use when a baggage train was unsuitable or impractical. The first was to purchase (or take) supplies from people living near to or along the army’s route of march. The alternative was to stockpile supplies at fixed, fortified bases along the route of march and either bring them forward by wagon to the army as required or collect them as the army marched by.

The Romans were considered the first acknowledged great ‘global’ power to use a combination of all three systems quite successfully. The Roman legion’s ability to march fast was attributed to various factors, such as superb roads and efficiently organised supplies. Their supply trains featured mobile repair shops and a service corps of engineers and armourers. Supplies were usually obtained from local sources and stored in fortified depots.

For instance, the Scottish campaigns of the Roman emperor Septimius Severus at the beginning of the third century saw the Roman fort at South Shields, at the mouth of the river Tyne, being converted into a supply base (Johnson 1983). The original interior was demolished, and all that was retained of the fort’s original structures were the headquarters’ building and the fort’s double granary. The rest of the interior was replaced by no fewer than 18 single granaries. The garrison itself was moved into an annexe. Grain would have been imported by sea, perhaps from as far away as Holland. Long before the advent of the modern world, large-scale international solutions could be engineered when it suited the military aims of a major power.

However, it should also be remembered that most early armies marched on foot, and that the poor quality of the roads, which were often little more than tracks, meant that travelling by land was enormously difficult. The exception was the great routes carved out by the Roman Empire. When that empire, and its roads, collapsed, ‘that decay spelt an end to strategic marching everywhere for more than a thousand years’ (Keegan 1993).

The leaders who realised the importance of finding solutions to these limitations had a strategic advantage. Alexander the Great benefited from the innovations of his father, Philip II, who had realised that ox carts were undesirable because of their slow speed and poor endurance over long distances. Instead, he reduced the train by increasing the loads of his soldiers as much as possible and banning women and children from following the army. This ‘made the Macedonian army the fastest, lightest, and most mobile force in existence, capable of making lightning strikes … Alexander’s astonishing speed, which so terrified his opponents, was due in no small part to Philip’s reforms’ (Engels 1980).

Still, the army could not stay self-sufficient for long, unless near a sea port or navigable river. Therefore, Alexander always garrisoned his troops in well-stocked, populous areas until the winter harvest was gathered, and tried to avoid moving his entire army into an area before a surrender – and therefore supplies – had been successfully negotiated (Engels 1980). Plunder has always featured heavily in warfare, but few areas, willingly or otherwise, can support a sizable army for long, particularly in winter.

Another later example of logistical skill as a military advantage is that demonstrated by the Mongols, who, in the thirteenth century, derived much of their strength from developing excellent supply systems. Their cavalry armies had one of the most efficient logistical systems known. It was based on self-containment and local supply supplemented by bases established at strategic positions. In normal movements, the Mongol armies divided into several corps and spread over the country, accompanied by trains of baggage carts, pack animals and herds of cattle. Routes and campsites were carefully selected for accessibility to good grazing and food crops. Foodstuff and forage were stored in advance along the routes of march. The Mongols conquered extensively from Europe to the Pacific, demonstrating the value of their efficient logistics system.

During the medieval period, however, there was little development in the theory of logistics. Commanders tended to rely on the thinking of the ancients, continuing a tradition whereby ‘war consisted mainly of an extended walking tour combined with large-scale robbery’ (van Creveld 2000). The history of logistics is one of negligible progress followed by rapidly accelerating change in the wake of technology and new thinking.

Between the wars of the mid-sixteenth century and the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, significant changes occurred in strategy, tactics and technology. This military revolution was initiated by the Spanish in the Spanish Netherlands during the Eighty Years War of 1568 to 1648. During this conflict, the infantry gained ascendancy over the cavalry and standing, professional armies were founded. The size of the battlefield expanded, armies increased in size and greater control over the army was exercised by centralised bureaucracies and monarchies.

While the supply problem had remained essentially the same as in the fourteenth century, revised supply and transportation methods had to change in order to cope with changes in military tactics. The Spanish were deprived of sea supply routes by the Dutch and had to develop sophisticated overland supply routes from Spain to the Netherlands using supply stations en route a day’s march apart. A contractor at each station, hired by Spanish officials, was responsible for providing sufficient supplies. Spanish garrisons in Flanders had their food supplies and other necessities provided by contractors and private entrepreneurs in a concept known today as ‘contracting-out’.

The magazine concept (known today as a ‘primary distribution centre’ or ‘consolidation centre’) used by the Spanish evolved during the reign of Louis XIV of France (1643–1715). There were two underlying principles to the magazine system. First, a ration scale was developed to indicate exactly what each member of the army was entitled to. Second, there were standard contracts for the provision of the required services, whereby contractors supplied direct to the army or at an agreed established supply base.

Also during this period, a number of books came out on the theory of war, including a notable contribution by an Italian called Raimondo Montecuccoli. He helped to define what society came to understand as war – primarily a conflict between states rather than an internal uprising or insurgency. However, he ‘still failed to distinguish between strategy, the operational level and tactics’ (van Creveld 2000). This meant that he and his eighteenth-century successors tended to work from the ‘bottom up’ (van Creveld 2000), focusing on technical operations and building tactics around them, rather than using logistics to support a strategic goal.

During this period, gunpowder was increasingly used, and despite the difficulty of supplying its vital constituent of saltpetre (there being no synthetic way of producing it until the mid-nineteenth century) infantry armed with pikes had all but disappeared in Western warfare by the end of the seventeenth century. As the method of waging war changed forever, the rise of the musket and cannon meant that the supply of ammunition powder and muskets became paramount for the conduct of modern warfare. More than ever, supply trains became an absolute necessity. This change also introduced a new element of distance to warfare – aside from a contingent of archers, war had previously been a hand-to-hand melee. It also meant that infantry could be trained far quicker. Mastering the longbow was a lifetime’s study for the medieval archer, whereas a musketeer could be trained in a matter of weeks.

Just as gunpowder introduced an element of distance to battles, the development of cartography to the point where, by the end of the eighteenth century, physically accurate maps became available meant that operations could sensibly be planned at a distance as well. This would have an impact on the development of military thought, notably the contribution of Adam Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow (1757–1807).

Bülow understood the rising importance that firearms had accorded to logistics, and theorised that military advantages could be obtained by spreading out supplies so that they were being brought to the front via multiple lines of communication. He dealt with this in a highly mathematical way, arguing for converging lines that were spread out geometrically from a wide base. This was intended to make the disruption of supply lines by the enemy as difficult as possible (Gat 2001).

Indeed, Bülow believed that such strategies could ultimately render actual battles totally unnecessary, since a retreat could be forced merely by cutting the supply line. ‘War will be no longer called an art, but a science,’ he said. He believed that through the application of a set of rules ‘the sphere of military genius will at last be so narrowed, that a man of talents will no longer be willing to devote himself to this ungrateful trade’ (Bülow quoted in Gat 2001).

Unfortunately, Bülow’s logical and abstract approach to the prosecution of war took little account of geographical peculiarities or other situational factors. Paradoxically, this theory of warfare was both rooted in logistics and incapable of properly accounting for it. This failing became painfully apparent through the example of his contemporary, Napoleon Bonaparte, who was bringing a new vigour to war across Europe, without apparently resorting to Bülow’s geometrical approach to supply.

Napoleon knew that an army marches on its stomach – he was the originator of the expression. In his early campaigns, he had been forced to rely on local levies and loot from captured areas. He was also acutely aware of the challenges good military logistics present. ‘Qu’on ne me parle pas des...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Foreword
• Preface
• About the Book
• About the Authors
• Dedication and Acknowledgements
• Glossary of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part 1: Contextualising Logistics for Construction
• Part 2: Construction Logistics in Practice
• Part 3: The Future of Construction Logistics
• Conclusion: The Argument for Change
• Index