On Being Presidential

A Guide for College and University Leaders

Susan R. Pierce

• Publisher: Jossey-Bass
• Year: 2011
• Print ISBN: 9781118027769
• eBook ISBN: 9781118133200
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Higher Education

Praise for On Being Presidential

"This is the best book I've ever read on being a college president."—Arthur Levine, president, Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation, and president emeritus, Teachers College, Columbia University

"A must-read for anyone involved in higher education. Susan Resneck Pierce's cautionary tales and commonsense approach to college management present, in a very entertaining way, the 'dos' and 'don'ts' of effective postsecondary academic leadership. Highly recommended... I am so enthusiastic that I plan to share On Being Presidential with two new university presidents!"—Barbara Young, vice-chair, Sweet Briar College Board of Directors, and two-time appointee to the University of Kentucky Board of Trustees

"Susan Pierce provides an insightful guide to the successful presidency, lessons based not on theory but gleaned from meaningful experiences. Nearly every page contains pearls of wisdom both for college and university presidents and for those who aspire to lead campuses."—Constantine W. Curris, president emeritus, American Association of State Colleges and Universities

Part I

Being an Effective President

1

Some Cautionary Tales

I have been privileged throughout my career to work with and learn from some exemplary presidents who, among other things, created and executed data-informed, mission-based, and financially sound strategic plans; were committed to teaching and learning; fostered teamwork; encouraged creativity; and communicated effectively both to internal and external audiences, thereby inspiring commitment from both groups. I have been equally privileged to work with exceptional trustees who provided their presidents with support and counsel, saw themselves as the president's strategic partner, and gave generously of their time, their talent, and their resources to the institutions they served. I have also worked with faculty leaders who, in addition to being exemplary teachers and sometimes admirable scholars, thought institutionally and collaborated with the administration to advance the college or university.

At the same time, I have been saddened and dismayed by the number of colleges and universities that have been damaged by ineffective presidents or indifferent or incompetent boards. Specifically, far too many colleges and universities—despite their talented faculty and promising students, and despite well-meaning presidents and trustees—have, in my judgment, suffered from a significant and sometimes devastating failure of presidential leadership and trustee oversight. As a result, many of these institutions have encountered serious financial problems, declining enrollments, and tarnished reputations.

Leo Tolstoy began Anna Karenina by observing, “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” And so it is with presidents and boards. Despite the diversity of the institutions they serve, successful presidents and effective boards exhibit common behaviors, whereas unsuccessful ones are unsuccessful in a variety of different ways. Thus, with apologies for beginning with the negatives, let me offer some cautionary tales before turning in the next chapters to how presidents, trustees, senior administrators, and faculty leaders can avoid making these mistakes, and even more importantly, how they can be highly effective instead.

Presidential Missteps

The world of higher education is replete with stories of presidents who have floundered, often in their first several years. (Fortunately, there are many more examples of presidents who succeed in the first year and beyond, but as John Milton demonstrated so brilliantly in Paradise Lost, it is the character who suffers a fall that often is the more compelling.) In many of these instances, the presidents used poor judgment, acting without first consulting their boards, thereby losing the confidence of their trustees and often losing their presidencies. In only a few cases did the presidents act out of anything other than the best of motives, but their unilateral decision making had serious if not disastrous consequences for their institutions.

In other examples, well-meaning and committed trustees deferred too much to presidents whom they judged to be successful, failing to ask questions, request important data, require effective strategic plans, insist on balanced budgets, and hold presidents accountable. These trustees often defined their fiduciary responsibility quite narrowly to financial matters, serving diligently on the finance, facilities, audit, and investment committees but considering each of those functions as separate from the institutional mission or strategic priorities. The presidents in each of these examples did not educate their boards about institutional problems, challenges, and opportunities or about the national landscape of higher education. The trustees, many of whom were successful corporate executives, accepted behaviors from the administration that they would not tolerate in their own companies.

On campuses, there is often a lack of understanding of what the president does (and should do) beyond raising money and about the larger issues facing the institution, issues that the president grapples with daily. This lack of understanding tends to be accompanied by confusion about the appropriate role and responsibilities not only of the faculty but also of the president and the trustees. On some campuses, there is also a tradition of faculty opposition to the administration, regardless of the issue. I have witnessed myriad examples where the faculty and the administration and sometimes the faculty and the board find themselves at odds over governance. The resulting conflict often paralyzes institutions and in some instances leads to a failed presidency.

Many of the specific examples I cite have been covered in the press. The others I've either learned about from friends and colleagues or observed firsthand as a member of an accreditation team or the administration, or as a consultant. In all instances, I have tried to disguise the identities of the institutions and the presidents—sometimes but not always changing the gender of the individuals or the nature of the institution. Taken as a whole, these examples illustrate the need for more effective presidential leadership, more effective board oversight, and a better understanding on the part of boards and campuses of what presidents do.

Judgment

Prominent among the presidents who alienated their campuses and lost the confidence of their boards are those who have spent excessive and sometimes even exorbitant sums on renovating the president's house prior to or immediately after arriving on campus, thereby worrying the board and alienating the campus. One such president of a financially strapped college overspent the budget for the president's house renovation by 50 percent and then defended himself by arguing illogically that since he would be living there, it would have been a “conflict of interest” for him to have overseen the renovation budget. A second president similarly justified the overspending by pleading that the board had approved some of the renovations and that he had not been involved in all the spending decisions. A third president spent more than $1 million renovating what the campus thought was an already-lovely residence at a time when the college was cutting departmental budgets and constraining salaries. Each of these individuals was ultimately terminated.

Other presidents have created problems for themselves by announcing plans to change their institution in ways that the current board, faculty, staff, students, or alumni found disparaging. In one widely publicized incident, a new president announced his plan to upgrade the quality of the students, implicitly denigrating the university's alumni by asserting that without such an improvement, the university would not be able to transform its students into high achievers but rather would simply turn “mush into mush.” Another began his tenure by announcing that the college, which historically had attracted students because of its emphasis on teaching and which had a minimal endowment and limited resources for faculty development, would base all future tenure and promotion decisions on publication in prestigious journals and presses. Another new president at a top-tier institution squandered his honeymoon period by unceremoniously firing longtime staff members, many of whom had the respect of the board and the affection of the faculty. Then there was the first-semester president who announced his plan to downgrade athletics and eliminate the Greek system, somehow overlooking the fact that many of his trustees had themselves been student-athletes and members of fraternities and sororities.

Communication

In contrast, some presidents overstate their institution's successes. I've known several cases where sitting presidents have persuaded their boards that their institution is poised for national prominence because of what they characterize as the college's unique commitment to such commonplace initiatives as civic engagement, service learning, global education, social justice, student-faculty research, and close relationships among and between students, faculty, and staff. They represent their institution as being a pathfinder and a national leader in one or more of these areas. In one such instance, it took a presidential candidate to encourage the trustees to review the websites of the university's peer institutions—all laying claim to the same initiatives and some actually doing a great deal more than this college was. In this case, the trustees came to understand that what the college was doing was indeed praiseworthy but just was not unique or even distinctive and certainly would not bring it the prominence that the retiring president had promised.

Other presidents have made decisions that may well have had merit but angered their trustees because they neglected to consult or communicate with them about the decisions. In two such cases, influential trustees were angered when they learned about a significant presidential decision not from the president but in the press. By ignoring the principle that presidents should never surprise their boards with bad news, these presidents lost the confidence of their trustees and ultimately their presidencies.

There are also presidents who have damaged their presidency by viewing the faculty as their adversaries. For example, one former president became so enraged at his faculty colleagues that he stormed out of a faculty meeting, telling them as he slammed the door behind him, “You're incorrigible. You're all children.” Another equally unhappy president resigned, telling his board that the faculty “wouldn't let him do anything” and that they needed to get the faculty under control. The faculty members at these institutions were equally unhappy and felt disenfranchised.

Management Style

Some presidents fail to advance their institutions because of their management style. Some are motivated by a desire for popularity rather than respect. Some refuse to draw the wrath of the faculty by recommending to the board that it deny tenure or promotion to a faculty member. For example, a relatively new president announced to the faculty that he would deny tenure to any candidate that he or they deemed questionable. He privately directed the provost to be “tough.” Most of those considered for tenure that year had, in the provost's judgment, clearly earned it. In two cases, however, the departments had been split (something unusual at this small college, where the faculty historically endorsed all candidates for tenure) and the elected faculty tenure and promotion committees had been split as well. The provost, having taken seriously the president's directive that she be “tough,” recommended against tenure for both. Her recommendation was greeted with anger on the part of the candidates’ friends and supporters. In the face of intense lobbying, the president overruled her. The provost, feeling undercut, went on the market, and in what seemed a moment of poetic justice, became president of a competitor college.

Other presidents, seeking popularity, approve most requests for resources without regard to mission or finances. One such individual, in a year when there was an enrollment shortfall and debt already close to the size of the endowment, nevertheless borrowed several million dollars and overspent the operating budget by $2 million. He was simply unwilling to say no to any new idea. Another president, in the face of significant budget deficits, announced that he did not want the budget to inhibit planning. In so doing, he inadvertently gave the message that the funds would be there for every good idea. In both cases, there ultimately was huge campus disappointment and disillusionment. Yet other presidents have persuaded their boards to approve an increase in the size of the student body with the intent of gaining more tuition and room and board revenue, only to learn that the additional students did not materialize.

There are also some presidents who are simply afraid to make decisions. Some prefer ongoing conversation about alternatives. Some simply prefer planning to action. Their paralysis inevitably paralyzes those who report to them because they cannot move forward without presidential approval. One president was unable to recommend a set of fundraising priorities to the board—despite campus consensus that the greatest needs were additional financial aid endowment, new faculty positions, a new library, and a new academic building—delaying the beginning of the campaign by at least a year.

There are also many examples of micromanaging presidents whose insistence on being involved in all decisions inevitably stifles creativity and initiative. My favorite example of micromanagement is this: the president who insisted on reviewing and approving the food served for all catered events on campus. He worried about the menu, even down to the quality of the salads being served at luncheons.

Some micromanaging presidents foster competition rather than collaboration among their senior staff. These presidents tend to tolerate, if not encourage, silos rather than teamwork. They work in a spoke-and-hub way, with they themselves being the hub. This model requires each of the president's direct reports to work directly with him or her, thereby dividing the senior staff. In one memorable instance, a senior administrator told me that no one at her institution would willingly share information. Rather, she said, if required to do so, people would “throw the information over the transom” of the door of those with whom they were sharing. They would, however, refuse to interpret or analyze that information.

Planning

Presidents need to be wary of developing strategic plans that are neither strategic nor plans but rather constituency-driven wish lists. Such documents always seem to have titles that envision a bright future for the institution. Unhappily, these plans generally do not derive from the institutional mission, establish strategic priorities, tie the identified hopes and dreams to budgets (current and future), offer time lines, assign responsibility for actions, hold people accountable for results, or suggest methods of assessment. Nor do they differentiate between the strategic and the tactical.

The strategic planning document developed at one regional university is a case in point. This nearly forty-page list of desired initiatives and programs was to be the institution's blueprint for the future. The problem: everything in the plan was something that someone or some group wanted, but there was no effort to prioritize the items or differentiate between institutional imperatives and things that would simply be nice to do if the college someday secured the resources to do them. By blurring the strategic and the tactical and giving equal weight to all goals, the plan suggested that improving the quality of the student body and buying equipment for the art department were, like all goals, of equivalent value. Nor did the document identify the costs (much less the benefits) of each item noted, the time frame in which things were to happen, the method of assessment, or the people charged with making each one happen. Moreover, the president had instructed the planning teams not to worry about resources but rather to describe the university of their dreams in twenty years.

There was a similar situation at a small private college where the president announced that the budget would not drive planning but that planning would drive budget. He was right, of course, but his message was heard very differently from what he intended. What the campus and the CFO heard was that the college should dream big and worry about resources later. As a result, neither the college's operating budget nor i...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Foreword
• Dedication
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• About the Author
• Part I: Being an Effective President
• Part II: Becoming an Effective President
• References
• Resources
• Index