Agents and Their Actions

Maximilian de Gaynesford

• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
• Year: 2011
• Print ISBN: 9781444339086
• eBook ISBN: 9781444346749
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Reflecting a recent flourishing of creative thinking in the field, Agents and Their Actions presents seven newly commissioned essays by leading international philosophers that highlight the most recent debates in the philosophy of action

• Features seven internationally significant authors, including new work by two of philosophy's 'super stars', John McDowell and Joseph Raz
• Presents the first clear indication of how John McDowell is extending his path-breaking work on intentionality and perceptual experience towards an account of action and agency
• Covers all the major interconnections between action-agency and central areas of Philosophy: Metaphysics, Epistemology, History of Philosophy, Ethics, Logic, Philosophy of Language
• Provides a snapshot of current debate on the subject, which is fresh, enlightening, and fruitful

1

REASONS FOR ACTION AND PRACTICAL REASONING

Maria Alvarez

Abstract

This chapter seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning: premises and conclusion. It argues that the premises of practical reasoning do not normally include statements such as ‘I want to φ’; that the reasoning in practical reasoning is the same as in theoretical reasoning and that what makes it practical is, first, that the point of the relevant reasoning is given by the goal that the reasoner seeks to realize by means of that reasoning and the subsequent action; second, that the premises of such reasoning show the goodness of the action to be undertaken; third, that the conclusions of such reasoning may be actions or decisions, that can be accompanied by expressions of intention, either in action, or for the future; and that these are justified, and might be contradicted, in ways that are not only peculiar to them (i.e. in ways that diverge from those found in theoretical reasoning), but are distinctively practical, in that they involve reference to reasons for acting and to expressions of intention, respectively.¹

This chapter explores practical reasoning. In particular, it seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning (premises and conclusion) and their relation. These are large and much debated issues. I shall first focus on the question: ‘What are the premises of practical reasoning?’ and, towards the end of the chapter, will say something about the conclusion of practical reasoning. As will become clear, my discussion is inspired in Elizabeth Anscombe’s remarks on practical reasoning in Intention and in her paper ‘Practical Inference’.²

A preliminary point. The term ‘practical reasoning’, one might think, is ambiguous, for it can be used to refer to the process of practical reasoning, or to the ‘content’ of that reasoning. I am not convinced by this ambiguity claim. At any rate, by ‘practical reasoning’ I shall here mean the reasoning that we, as rational agents, engage in. Engaging in such reasoning is taking certain statements as premises and, if all goes well, reaching a ‘practical’ conclusion, which has those premises as its grounds. So the questions I am concerned with can be put without ambiguity: what kind of statements play the role of premises when we engage in practical reasoning? And what is the conclusion of such reasoning?

The premises of practical reasoning

Many contemporary philosophers think the following gives the form of the most basic and simple piece of practical reasoning:

P1. I want to φ

P2. I believe that ψ-ing is a means of φ-ing

C. I shall/ should / ought to/ must, ψ.³

That is, for many contemporary philosophers, the first premise in practical reasoning is a statement such as ‘I want to φ’.⁴

It is, then, striking, though not surprising, that one should find the following remark in Anscombe’s discussion of practical reasoning: ‘ “I want” does not rightly occur in the premises [of practical reasoning]’.⁵

I say it is not surprising to find that her view on this is at odds with prevailing contemporary views because she tended to think that contemporary philosophers had lost sight of some important insights about human agency that Aristotle and his medieval commentators had gained. Nonetheless, her remark above requires explanation and defence, for contemporary philosophers certainly have on their side the strong prima facie plausibility of the claim that what was given above captures in schematic form how we often summarise the reasoning behind, or leading to, an action.

So why does Anscombe say that ‘I want’ does not rightly occur in the premises of practical reasoning? In order to answer this question, I shall make explicit something I take to be an uncontroversial claim, namely that whenever an action has a piece of practical reasoning as its grounds, the premises of the relevant practical reasoning are one’s reason for acting. Therefore, if we establish what our reasons for acting are, we shall know what kind of statements play the role of premises in practical reasoning, and will then be able to decide whether statements such as ‘I want to φ’ have any business playing that role. If, having done that, we find that Anscombe is right, then we will still have a question left: what role, if any, do such statements play in practical reasoning?

A point of terminological clarification is needed. The phrase ‘one’s reasons for acting’ may be used refer to the reasons that there are for one to act: what in the literature are called ‘normative reasons’. Here, I use the phrase rather to refer to what in the same literature are labelled ‘motivating reasons’: the reasons for which one acts, when one acts for a reason. These are reasons that favour one’s action in one’s eyes; they present the action as good or valuable in some respect; and they are the reasons in the light of which one acts.

The view about practical reasoning that I attributed to many contemporary philosophers goes hand in hand with what is often called the ‘Humean view of motivating reasons’.⁶ This is the view that my reason for ψ-ing is that I want to φ and that I believe that ψ-ing is a means of φ-ing.⁷ On this Humean view, then, when someone digs in order to find some treasure his reason for digging is that he wants to find some treasure and believes that digging is the way to find it.⁸

Thus, on this view an agent’s reason for ψ-ing, that is, the reasons that motivate him to ψ are that he wants to φ and that he believes that ψ-ing is a means of φ-ing. And since the reason that motivates can play the role of premises in practical reasoning, then, on this view, the premises of practical reasoning are statements to the effect that one wants and believes certain things; in our example, the relevant premises would be ‘I want to find some treasure’ and ‘I believe that digging is the way to find it’.

I have argued elsewhere that this view of motivating reasons is wrong: the reasons that motivate me to act are not, or not typically, that I want something, or that I believe something about how to achieve what I want.⁹ But it should be noted that, although both claims are wrong, the claim about wanting is doubly wrong. For, although the fact that I believe something is not normally my reason for acting, what I believe can be. So, for example, if I move house because my current house is too small to keep my books in, then my reason for moving house is not that I believe that my current house is too small to keep my books in. However, my reason is something I believe (or know): namely, that my current house is too small to keep my books in. By contrast, neither the fact that I want something, nor what I want, is normally my reason for acting.

Here I shall summarise an argument against the idea that the fact that I want something is my reason for acting.¹⁰ Reasons for doing something are, as we saw, reasons that favour the action in the agent’s eyes: such reasons encapsulate some feature or property of the prospective action that makes, or appears to the agent to make, the action good or valuable. But, in general, the mere fact that I want to do something does not favour, nor does it appear to me to favour, doing it.

The fact that I want to do something does have a connection with my reason for doing it, but the connection is not that the fact that I want to do it is itself my reason for doing it. Rather, the connection lies in the truth that many of the things we want, we want for reasons. Borrowing a term from Anscombe, we might call my reason for wanting to do something the ‘desirability characterisation’ that doing it has for me. And that desirability characterisation relates my doing that thing to the good (broadly conceived), because the things we want, we want because we see some good in them (the good may be aesthetic, prudential, hedonic, etc.). Whatever good we see in what we want is the reason why we want that thing; and for many of these things wanted, this good we see in them is also our reason for wanting them. As the Aristotelian-mediaeval slogan has it, what is wanted is wanted sub ratione boni (‘under the aspect of the good’).¹¹ Anscombe puts this point by saying that ‘good is the object of wanting’ as ‘truth is the object of judgment’ (Intention, p. 77); and she adds:

it does not follow from this that everything judged must be true, or that everything wanted must be good […] the notion of ‘good’ that has to be introduced in an account of wanting is not that of what is really good but of what the agent conceives to be good (Ibid.).

In this she is following Aristotle, who says that the object of desire ‘may be either the real or the apparent good’.¹²

This connection between wanting and the good applies to wanting to do things; and the desirability characterisation that the action has for the agent may be that she sees her doing that thing as good intrinsically or instrumentally. When it is regarded as intrinsically good (and hence it is intrinsically desired), the characterisation refers to something that is a form of the good of human beings, and recognisably so: such as health, or pleasure, or friendship, or beauty, etc. In such a case, the agent’s answer to what her reason for wanting to do that thing is will be a desirability characterisation that puts an end to the question: ‘What for?’ (See Anscombe, Intention, p. 74). When, by contrast, the desirability characterisation is instrumental, then it is possible to ask the question ‘What for?’ repeatedly, until we reach an answer that points to an intrinsic good and puts an end to that question.

Although every action that has a piece of practical reasoning as its grounds is done for a reason, the converse does not hold. What is the difference between actions done for a reason that have a piece of practical reasoning as their grounds, and those that are merely done for a reason?

One difference, emphasised by Aristotle, Aquinas and Anscombe, is that the former involve means-end calculation.¹³ So, for instance, ‘Skiing is healthy and fun so I’ll go skiing’ is not an instance of practical reasoning because no calculation about means to an end is involved here. If I go skiing on the grounds given in that statement, then my reason for going skiing is that it is healthy and fun. But that reason is not a premise in practical reasoning for I engaged in none (not even implicitly) when deciding to go skiing. Consider, by contrast, the following: ‘My doctor has recommended relaxing activities to lower my blood pressure; skiing is something I find relaxing, so I’ll go skiing’. Here, there is calculation about how to achieve an end (lowering my blood pressure through relaxation) and there is therefore practical reasoning. And the premises in this reasoning are my reasons for going skiing: that my doctor has recommended relaxing activities; that skiing is something I find relaxing, etc. It is possible, though not necessary, that there should have been more premises in between the first premise and the conclusion; for instance, premises comparing the relative merits of skiing with other relaxing activities vis-à-vis the end in view; and perhaps vis-à-vis other ends I have. For instance: ‘Sailing is also relaxing; but it’ll be harder to find sailing companions than skiing companions. Besides sailing is more dangerous/ expensive/ etc., than skiing and is not such good exercise’. And so on. Each of these statements are premises in my reasoning and are also my reasons for going skiing, if that is what I do on the grounds of this reasoning. The premises together show what the good of going skiing is for me; in this case, that it is a relatively inexpensive and healthy way of achieving my end.

Practical reasoning is employed, according to this view, in order to find means to achieving an end the agent has already settled upon, or to determine which end to pursue among various ends one has. Some of the ends that practical reasoning is deployed to achieve may themselves be the result of practical reasoning, namely those ends that are viewed by the agent as themselves instrumental to other ends. But ultimately each piece of practical reasoning will be related to some end that is itself not the result of the calculation of practical reasoning. Those are the ends that put an end to the question: ‘What for?’ for they are ends that are instances of some form of the good of human beings.¹⁴

So, among the reasons that play the role of premises in practical reasoning, some describe what is wanted...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Series page
• Title page
• Copyright page
• NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
• PREFACE
• CHAPTER 1: REASONS FOR ACTION AND PRACTICAL REASONING
• CHAPTER 2: AMBIVALENCE AND AUTHENTIC AGENCY
• CHAPTER 3: THE ROAD TO LARISSA
• CHAPTER 4: WHAT IS THE CONTENT OF AN INTENTION IN ACTION?
• CHAPTER 5: BEING IN THE WORLD
• CHAPTER 6: MORAL SCEPTICISM AND AGENCY: KANT AND KORSGAARD
• CHAPTER 7: SPEECH, ACTION AND UPTAKE
• Index
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