Asia’s Trouble Spots

The Leadership Question in Conflict Resolution

A. S. Bhalla

• Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9781786608352
• Edition: 1
• eBook ISBN:
  9781786608376
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The art of successful negotiations over protracted conflicts presupposes a political commitment to peace and a willingness to compromise, which are sorely lacking in the current disorderly world. Part of the blame for this lies in weak and ineffective national and global leadership. This book's sharp focus on the role of leadership at different levels—national government, rebel and Western/regional government mediators—as well as that of the UN and non-governmental players in settling intra-state disputes, is a unique feature which sets it apart from others. Much of the existing literature does not adequately discuss the role of the above actors in developing countries. Asia's Trouble Spots is a serious attempt to fill this gap. The seven country studies in Asia—Myanmar, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India and China—discuss, inter alia, how peace negotiations between national political and rebel leaders have unfolded. The role of state-sponsored cross-border terrorists and non-state spoilers such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS is addressed in the context of geopolitical rivalry among regional and global powers. A. S. Bhalla challenges the view that Western leaders can act as impartial mediators in intra-state and inter-state disputes. With few exceptions, their record has been dismal at best. Their failure in conflict resolution arises from a loss of moral authority and credibility, which follows the gradual erosion over the years of such liberal values as the rule of law and respect for democracy and human rights. Commercial and strategic self-interests have also tended to undermine peacebuilding efforts.

Chapter 1

Leadership and Conflict Resolution

Violence and secessionist forces have resurfaced following the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the creation of dozens of new countries not only in Europe but also elsewhere. Nationalism based on ethnicity or religion has re-emerged despite the powerful forces of globalization. Nehru was prescient when he wrote in 1946: ‘Recent events all over the world have demonstrated that the notion that nationalism is fading away before the impact of internationalism and proletarian movements has little truth. It is still one of the most powerful urges that move a people, and round it cluster sentiments and traditions and a sense of common living and common purpose’.¹ Resurgence of nationalism and ethnic identities has occurred in response to the marginalization of some social and religious groups and the persecution of minorities. Their quest for self-determination and eventual independence grew out of their colonial history. The Asian countries discussed in the book were under colonial rule with the exception of China and Thailand. The seeds of nationalism in these countries were sown as a result of subjugation and oppression.

To understand conflict, we need a counterfactual, that is, what keeps some countries and societies free from civil strife and social disorder. In practice, it is very hard to find concrete examples of peaceful countries. But in theory at least, several factors and situations can explain the absence or lack of violence and conflict: (1) Strong and legitimate state; (2) Strong national leadership; (3) Effective formal and informal institutions; and (4) Strong civil society.

A strong state maintains law and order and social harmony between individuals and social groups. The Hobbesian state represents a social contract in which individuals exchange sovereignty for social order. Thus, a strong state should in theory be better placed to prevent social disorder and conflict than a weak one. Some observers believe that an authoritarian and unitary state (e.g. Myanmar and Sri Lanka) are more prone to civil unrest and violence than democratic and federal ones. Implicit in this belief is the assumption that decentralization and delegation of authority promote social cohesion and lead to conflict resolution. Cornell sees it as a ‘compromise between a minority aiming at self-determination and a state protecting its territorial integrity’.² But both centralized and decentralized societies can be considered ‘strong’ if the overall level of social control is high. In the former, social control is concentrated in the state, whereas in the latter among various non-governmental social organizations. The case studies in the book (chapters 2 to 8) demonstrate that conflicts occur in both unitary centralized structures (e.g. Myanmar and Sri Lanka) and decentralized federal structures such as India.

Sri Lanka (chapter 6) demonstrates that violent conflict between the state and Tamil Tigers occurred despite functioning (albeit weakly) democracy. So has the Kashmir conflict become bloody even though democratic institutions have been functioning. On the other hand, in Indonesia, democratic transition from dictatorship and civilian control of the armed forces created a political environment which became conducive to peace building. But other factors such as leadership are also at play. Before turning to the leadership question, it is pertinent to ask what causes conflicts in the first place.

Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflicts

Three categories, namely, ‘ethnic groups’, ‘nation’ and ‘state’, are relevant in any discussion of intra-state conflicts. In theory, these categories may be distinct but in practice the boundaries between them are blurred.

Starting with ethnic groups, ethnic and religious identities are often considered interchangeable as if they are one and the same thing. But the two are distinct but interrelated. Religious faith generally invokes stronger loyalty and passions among its believers than ethnic loyalty based on culture, language or history. With growing Islamophobia today, religious loyalty is becoming stronger not only among Muslims but also among those who practice other faiths. There may be overlaps between religious and ethnic identities, and the two may reinforce each other. The social and political fabric and national leaders who shape it cannot remain immune from their influence when there are competing demands for group loyalty among such different affiliations as religion, ethnicity and class.

Gellner defines a nation in simple terms of ‘shared culture’ and ‘nationalist vision’ and a ‘centralized state’.³ According to him, three factors are relevant to discuss varieties of nationalist experience, namely, shared culture, power and education. A violation of the principle of congruence of state and nation offends the nationalist sentiment. A nation within a state which is without power and influence would be particularly upset and may raise its voice in protest. There are different shades and forms of nationalism, from the extreme ‘murderous virulence form’ à la Gellner (which may verge on ‘ethnic cleansing’ as in Myanmar) to ‘civic’ nationalism which is benevolent and ensures cooperation between different ethnic groups. History is replete with benign cases as well as those which involved atrocities, ethnic cleansing and even genocide.

In the colonial states of Asia, national territorial sovereignty has coexisted with a large number of ethnic nations. It is fair to assume that there is less chance of a single national identity emerging in a weak state than in a strong well-governed state. Competing demands for group loyalty grow stronger when political leadership is weak and when it fails to effect social changes and harmonious social relations.⁴ Discrimination against any particular group may not occur especially if the number of ethnic groups is large and these are widely dispersed geographically across large areas. In fragmented societies, these groups may neutralize each other’s power and thus prevent the dominance of any particular group, which would eliminate scope for discrimination against any particular ethnic group.⁵ But ‘dominance’ and ‘fractionalization’ may not be independent of each other and the precise outcome may turn out to be much more complex in multi-ethnic societies.

The role of the state and non-state players in inciting violence has been explained by three main concepts and arguments: (1) ‘state-centric’, (2) ‘state-society centric’ and (3) ‘society-centric’. These concepts are based on the experiences of India and Indonesia respectively.

Under ‘state-centric’ thesis Wilkinson presents his analysis in light of the Indian experience of vested electoral interests of the political elites.⁶ His thesis is based mainly on data from Uttar Pradesh (UP), the largest state in India with sizeable Muslim minority population, where Muslim-Hindu riots have periodically occurred. He explores inter-state and inter-town variations in ethnic violence. Indeed, this subject has preoccupied several scholars of Indian politics from 2001 to 2004 when Wilkinson’s book was published. Two other books by Varshney and Brass posed the same question.⁷

The three authors use different methodologies and arguments to explain Muslim-Hindu riots. Wilkinson argues that politicians have a vested interest in fomenting unrest and violence, for example, under conditions of electoral competition. They may be reluctant to control such violence despite capacity to do so if it goes against their electoral interests. In other words, they become spoilers, a situation which is rarely recognized. Instead, it is generally believed that the real spoilers are rebel leaders, which is far from the truth. Political elites in India and elsewhere may themselves incite and instigate violence by playing ethnic and caste politics. There is less violence when competition is limited to two main parties than when intense electoral competition takes place between many parties.

Wilkinson’s arguments can be extended to authoritarian regimes under which there are no elections and the leaders may be prepared to prevent ethnic violence against minorities if they are important for offering financial and political support to the regime (e.g. the case of Indonesian Chinese under Suharto). The Wilkinson thesis of a direct link between political competition and communal violence is confirmed by the Brass study which is based on data from Aligarh (also in UP) through what the author calls ‘institutionalized riot systems (IRS)’ to instigate communal violence. Brass claims that other studies explain why riots take place but not how (the process) they happen. In an attempt to explain the latter, he presents two main agents which operate under the IRS, namely, the ‘fire tender’, an informant, who informs the politicians, the press and the general public about the occurrences of inter-ethnic incidents and tensions, and the ‘conversion specialist’, invariably a politician, who converts the riot potential into communal violence by inciting crowds and by hiring criminal gangs. Both Brass and Wilkinson underline the importance of political competition in such violence. However, the focus of the Wilkinson study is on proximity to elections, that of the Brass study on the existence of an IRS to explain variations in violence.

Both Wilkinson and Brass reject Varshney’s ‘society-centric’ explanation in terms of ‘the level of civic engagement’. The Varshney study is based on evidence from six paired Indian cities which vary in communal violence but are similar in socioeconomic and demographic features. Wilkinson argues that state-level factors are more dominant in India than the local and that the contribution of inter-ethnic associations to peace is difficult to isolate from other factors. In his view, it is difficult to determine precisely ‘which level or threshold of civic engagement is necessary to lead to peace’. Brass, also critical of Varshney, argues that IRS and collective premeditated violence would generally override any civic engagement between Hindus and Muslims.

In practice, both the state and non-state actors may explain variations in violence on which Tajima’s ‘state-society centric’ thesis is based. On the basis of the Indonesian experience in ethnic violence during the transition to democracy, Tajima discusses ‘how institutions that were in equilibrium under authoritarian regimes can produce violence when they are knocked off of their equilibrium paths during transition. Over time, however, the institutions re-equilibrate as communities adjust to new expectations of state intervention’.⁸

Tajima argues that the ‘state-centric’ explanation fails to prove why some local communities in Indonesia maintained social order during transition despite the weakening of the state. He concludes that ‘existing theories that focus on the weakening of the state lack a mechanism to explain how changes in the coercive capacity of the state can lead to violence in some contexts but not in others’ (p. 18). Besides mismatches discussed earlier, the expansion of state building weakens the capacity of informal institutions which leads to communal violence during transition when state security forces withdraw and there are no (or weak) non-state actors to provide local security.

Formal institutions, based on well-established laws and regulations, are the norm in advanced industrial societies. On the other hand, in developing societies, informal institutions, norms and social (family and kinship) networks regulate interaction between individuals and social groups and fill a vacuum created by a lack of formal institutions or lack of access to them. Social fragmentation discussed earlier has a debilitating effect on institutions and modes of political participation.⁹

Mismatches can occur within formal (state) institutions as in Myanmar, which Tajima does not discuss. The Tajima thesis is also silent on the role of local leaders, in the absence of which local security networks may not function effectively or may simply cease to operate. While a new equilibrium has undoubtedly emerged in Indonesia (chapter 3), it has not in Myanmar (despite the 2015 democratic elections) and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future (chapter 2). Discontent and violence occur when such institutions as army, security and police forces are biased in favour of some ethnic groups and against others (as in Myanmar and Sri Lanka). Also access to formal and informal institutions needs to be widespread amongst all members of society, which is, in practice, not the case. If some are excluded, their legitimate grievances are likely to be expressed violently.

The aforementioned explanations are based on the assumptions that violence is caused largely by domestic factors and that conflict resolution is within the control of the state, assumptions which are not entirely valid in reality. Hostile neighbours close to the trouble spots may inflame tensions in the adversary’s territory through cross-border terrorism. For example, such state-sponsored violence has occurred in Kashmir (India) and eastern part of Myanmar where China in the past supported extremist elements who were fighting the Myanmar state. While useful in explaining the mechanisms which lead to violence, the aforementioned analysis does not adequately explain why violence occurs in the first place. The existing studies do not discuss why some transitions lead to institutionalized violence, while others experience only a temporary spurt in conflicts. Myanmar (Burma) is a case of institutionalized communal violence which has been condoned or abetted by both its military and civilian leaders.

Nationalism has to be congruent with state boundaries if conflicts are to be avoided. But in practice, rarely is there such c...

Table of contents

• List of Tables and Figure
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 Leadership and Conflict Resolution
• 2 Myanmar’s Leadership and Rohingya Muslims
• 3 Indonesia: Autonomy (Aceh) versus Separation (East Timor)
• 4 Tackling Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao (Philippines)
• 5 Thai Leaders and Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand
• 6 Ending Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency by Force
• 7 Indian Leadership and Insurgencies in Kashmir and the Northeast
• 8 The Challenges of Conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang in China
• 9 The Way Forward or Impasse?
• Bibliography
• Name Index
• Subject Index
• About the Book
• About the Author