RUSSIA 2018

PREDICTABLE ELECTIONS, UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Aldo Ferrari

• Publisher: Ledizioni
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9788867057054
• eBook ISBN: 9788867057078
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Campaigns & Elections
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Be it for the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the intervention in Syria or the alleged interference in the US presidential election, Russia has been increasingly under the spotlight over the last years. In 2018, the world's eyes will be upon two events: the presidential elections taking place on March 18, and the World Cup, which will kick off in June. While the outcomes of the latter are still uncertain, President Vladimir Putin's victory looks like a safe bet.Even so, these elections bear important consequences for both Russia's domestic and foreign policy, since they will affect Putin's ability to both cement his power at home and pursue his objectives abroad. What are the main domestic and international challenges facing Russia? Will Putin continue to question the Western-championed liberal order or seek reconciliation with the West? The authors of this Report address these key issues, offering in-depth analyses of Russia's political system, economy and society, as well as tracing their evolution and pointing at future scenarios for the EU-Russia relations.

Notes

1 M.S. Fish, “When More is Less: Superexecutive Power and Political Underdevelopment in Russia”, in V. Bonnell and G.W. Breslauer (Eds.), Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder?, Westview Press, Boulder Co. 2001. See also M.S. Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

2 A.I. Tsygankov, The Strong State in Russia. Development and Crisis, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014. As declared by Vladimir Putin: “Russia needs strong state power ad must have it”. V. Putin, “Rossija na rubezhe tysjachiletii” (Russia in between millenia), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 December 1999.

3 G.M. Hahn, Russia’s Revolution from Above, 1985-2000: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of Soviet Communist Regime, New Brunswick NJ, Transaction Publishers, 2002. See also O. Krishtanovskaya and S. White, “Putin’s Militocracy”, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 19, no. 4, October-December 2003, pp. 289-306.

4 However, it is worth remembering that Yeltsin’s political and physical weakness allowed the parliament – even after the 1993 crisis – to play a significant role. Although the presidency still possessed the upper hand over the parliament, it still managed to check the President’s power and influence public policy in a number of significant issue areas because the presidential administration and government were often divided. Putin disciplined policy making within the executive branch, and reengineered the internal procedures of legislative chambers in order to ensure consistent and reliable majorities in favor of presidential rule and to direct the whole decision-making process.

5 G. Pavlovsky in “Vremya Novostej”, 30 March 2004. Pavlovsky was a political analyst close to the Presidential Administration. “Managed normalisation” was supposed to provide the means to revive the state and enable it to incorporate different social demands through the creation of greater state autonomy from special interests (oligarchic economic interests and regional political elites). S. Prozorov, “Russian Conservatism in the Putin Presidency: The dispersion of a hegemonic discourse”, Journal of Political Ideologies, vol. 10, no. 2, p. 125. See also R. Sakwa, “Regime Change from Yeltsin to Putin: Normality, normalcy or normalization”, in R. Caeron (Ed.), Russian Politics under Putin, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004, pp. 17-36.

6 Undoubtedly, at the heart of Putin’s politics of stability was the influence of various phases of Russian history. In the foreign policy sphere Putin insisted that Russia should be treated as a “normal great power”. He also stated that Russia’s foreign policy should serve the country’s economic interest, a policy that was particularly evident in debates over the Union of Russia and Belarus.

7 For an overview of the issues in defining “sovereign democracy” see A. Kasantse, “Suverennaja demokratiya: struktura i sotzial’no-politicheskie funktsii konceptsii” (Sovereign democracy: the structure and social-political function of the concept), Forum Novejshej Vostochnoevropejskoj Kul’tury (Forum of the Newest East European Culture), vol. 4, no. 1, 2007, pp. 1-16.

8 According to Vladislav Surkov, Russia had its own democratic traditions and standards that were different from liberal and pluralist Western notion of democracy. “Sovereign democracy” depends on these traditions and standards, created and supported by Russian state sovereignty and meant a different “democratic” understanding of rights and political competition. Moreover, State and civilisation are mutually supportive, the president is the “unifier of differences” and guarantees against factional politics and “dangerous pluralism”. Obviously, “sovereign democracy” was supposed to immunize Russia from the “colour revolution virus” and to guarantee to recover the status of a “great power”, because first and foremost “sovereignty” means competitiveness on international scale. So, ensuring sovereignty for Russian democracy would preserve Russia’s status of a great power. See V. Surkov, Russkaya polit...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front
• Colophon
• Table of Contents
• Introduction
• Does Putin’s Strong State Have a Future?
• Russia. A Conservative Society?
• Moscow: In Search for an Opposition
• Islam in Today’s Russia
• Russia’s Quest for Economic Independence
• Russia and the West
• Policy Recommendations for the EU
• The Authors
• Notes