1. tone
How does one go about creating a âfakeâ feeling? And to what uses might an artfully created feeling be put? Melvilleâs book The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade (1857) provides us with simple answers to both of these questions, in a miniature story passed on by one of the novelâs noisy throng of âoperatorsâ and âtransfer-agentsâ to a fellow passenger on the Mississippi steamer Fidèle.1 After nonchalantly mentioning that âthe president, who is also transfer-agent, of the Black Rapids Coal Company, happens to be on board here,â the Company representative delivers the pitch to his mark:
A month since, in a panic contrived by artful alarmists, some credulous stock-holders sold out; but, to frustrate the aim of the alarmists, the Company, previously advised of their scheme, so managed it as to get into its own hands those sacrificed shares, resolved that, since a spurious panic must be, the panic-makers should be no gainers by it. The Company, I hear, is now ready, but not anxious, to redispose of those shares, and having obtained them at their depressed value, will now sell them at par, though, prior to the panic, they were held at a handsome figure above. (CM, 26â27)
The confidence-man knows that this story about a fictitious version of a feeling that, according to Hobbes, âhappens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people,â is both seductive and believable because of the ordinariness of what it describes: the stock marketâs sensitivity not only to economic factors but to affective ones, as well as the way in which a panic âcontrived by artful alarmistsâ can generate repercussions identical to those of a genuine panic, producing a massive sell-off and âdepressingâ the value of stocks.2 Such âspuriousâ emotions and their real effects become the primary focus of Melvilleâs most formally innovative novel, last in a string of commercial and critical failures that began with Moby-Dick (1851) and continued with Pierre (1852). Indeed, the unpopularity of The Confidence-Man, the last novel Melville would publish in his lifetime, played a key role in his turn from the effort to make a living from writing fiction to his employment as a customs house inspectorâa job that ironically required his swearing âto prevent and detect frauds in relation to the duties imposed by the Laws of the United States.â3
It thus comes as no surprise that while continuing the savage parody of antebellum sentimentalism and the literary marketplace offered in Pierreâs account of a would-be serious novelist (who is, significantly, accused of being a âswindlerâ by his publishers for producing a âblasphemous rhapsody, filched from the vile Atheists, Lucian and Voltaire,â under âthe pretense of writing a popular novel for usâ), The Confidence-Man broadens its area of attack to include any âpositiveâ emotional attitude about virtually anything, ranging from Christian âbenevolenceâ to cosmopolitan âconviviality,â from a distinctively American âconfidenceâ in the speculative antebellum economy (what one character calls âthe Wall Street spiritâ) to a more general and romantic âfaithâ in humankind.4 Unfolding in a series of transactions involving the exchange of money and writing for emotional goods, The Confidence-Man could be described as a interrogation of antebellum Americaâs affective investment in âaffective investments.â5 Published soon after Congress passed the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, which allowed the Western Territories to become slave states, and in the same year as the financial panic known as the âWestern Blizzardâ (the name alludes to the swiftness with which the telegraph spread news of the embezzlement-related failure of a New York branch of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company across the country), The Confidence-Man might be described as an exploration of the new emotional economy produced by the general migration of âtrustâ from personal relationships to abstract systemsâa key theme in the twentieth-century sociology of modernity.6 If âpublicness, as the kind of Being that belongs to the Anyone, not only has in general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods and âmakesâ them for itself,â as Heidegger claims, it seems fitting that Melvilleâs story about public exchanges facilitated by an anonymous agent becomes primarily preoccupied with how âconfidenceâ and other feelings might be artfully created.7
What is important for our purposes is that every social and symbolic exchange in this story of public travel on the Mississippi, âthe artery of trade and commerce . . . as well as the division between slave states and free,â is an explicit demonstration of how feeling slips in and out of subjective boundaries, at times becoming transformed into psychic property, but at other times eluding containment.8 In this it recalls the distinction between affect and emotion elaborated by Lawrence Grossberg and Brian Massumi, insofar as both approach emotion as contained by identity in a way that affect is not.9 In calling attention to the process by which feelings are artfully contrived, and to the way in which these fake feelings may or may not be transposed into personally experienced emotions (like the real panic for investors that the alarmists have designed their illusory version to produce), The Confidence-Man provides a particularly compelling allegory for an investigation into the promiscuously used yet curiously underexamined concept of literary âtone.â For there is a crucial similarity between the affective-aesthetic idea of tone, which is reducible neither to the emotional response a text solicits from its reader nor to representations of feelings within the world of its story, and the slippery zone between fake and real feelings, or free-floating and subjectively anchored feelings, foregrounded throughout The Confidence-Man.
Thus, while the tone I investigate here shares the connotations of âstanceâ that it has for critics like I. A. Richards and T. S. Eliot, I use it to mean something much more holistic and explicitly affective than the narrow concept employed by Richards in Practical Criticismânamely, a speakerâs âattitude to his listener.â10 While the New Critics were the first to attempt a systematic definition and analysis of tone in terms of attitudes or dispositions (a project strikingly neglected in literary structuralism and semiotics), they also notably muted, and in some cases took pains to avoid, the affective dimensions of the problem. This de-emotionalizing tendency is already apparent in the way Richards separates âToneâ from âFeelingâ in Practical Criticismâs list of the four kinds of poetic or literary meaning (âSense, Feeling, Tone, and Intentionâ), even though the two categories are quite similar. For like âTone,â âFeelingâ is defined as âan attitude . . . some special direction, bias, or accentuation of interestâ (PC, 175). The primary difference is that those âattitudesâ Richards classifies under âFeelingâ apply specifically to âthe state of affairsâ created by the poem, whereas those classified under âToneâ apply to the relationship between the speaker and the implied listenerâas if the latter relation could be neatly separated from the former, which is not often the case.11 The tendency to divorce emotion from tone continues efforts by other formalists to expand and elaborate Richardsâ limited definition. These range from William Empsonâs concept of âMoodââwhich widens Richardsâ notion of tone to include anything that relates âany supposed âmeââ suggested by the poem (and not just its speaker) to any supposed other or others (and not just the âlistenerâ or âaudienceâ)âto Reuben Browerâs likening of a poemâs tone to its âdramatic situation,â which Brower defines not just as âthe implied social relationship of the speaker to his auditorâ but also as âthe manner he adopts in addressing his auditor.â12 Switching from poetics to narratology, we find a similar effort in GĂŠrard Genetteâs concept of âvoice,â which designates the âsituationâ of a narrator with respect not only to the audience he is addressing, but to all events narrated and the manner in which these narrated events are presented.13
One cannot help noticing the inelegance, even clunkiness of these attempts to expand âtoneâ by simply adding extra relationships to the primary one between speaker and audience in Richardsâ original definition. This awkward quality might be attributed to a conspicuous avoidance of the dimension of feeling already deeply associated with âtoneâ and even âattitudeâ in everyday usage, as in the familiar âI donât like the [insert unstated but implied emotional quality] tone of your voiceâ or âThat kind of [insert unstated but implied emotional quality] attitude will get you nowhere.â One further suspects that the motivation for this avoidance comes from the perceived threat of a âsoftâ impressionism which has always haunted feelingâs role in any analytic endeavor, and which theorists of aesthetic and critical judgment have repeatedly attempted to ward off in various ways: from Kantâs appeal to the oxymoronic-sounding concept of âdisinterestedâ pleasure, to its later echoes in Roger Fryâs âdisinterested intensity,â to the explicit antipsychologism of William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsleyâs âAffective Fallacy.â14 Yet the general strangeness of this evasion (particularly glaring in the case of Empsonâs deceptively named âMoodâ) comes to the fore when one considers how entirely appropriate emotive or affective qualities seem, as compressed assessments of complex âsituations,â for indicating the total web of relations sought after in each of these redefinitions. It is this holistic context we find emphasized, for instance, in Heideggerâs theory of moods as âattunementsâ (Stimmungen) that arise from and shape or modulate the totality of Being-in-the-world, disclosing the âsituatednessâ (Befindlichkeit) that enables things to matter in determinate ways. As Charles Guignon notes, âFrom this standpoint our moods are not âprivateâ or âpersonal,â but rather are essentially public, part of the âworldâ instead of something in the âself.ââ15
It should be clear that by âtoneâ I mean less the dramatic âattitudeâ adumbrated by the New Critics than a global and hyperrelational concept of feeling that encompasses attitude: a literary textâs affective bearing, orientation, or âset towardâ its audience and world. In other words, I mean the formal aspect of a work that has made it possible for critics of all affiliations (Marxist, feminist, postcolonial, historicist) to describe a work or class of works as âparanoidâ (Mary Ann Doane on the Hollywood âwomanâs filmâ of the 1940s), âeuphoricâ (Fredric Jameson on postmodern art and architecture), or âmelancholicâ (Anne Cheng on Asian-American literature); and, much more importantly, the formal aspect that enables these affective values to become significant with regard to how each critic understands the work as a totality within an equally holistic matrix of social relations. It is in this manner that Walter Benjamin isolates âa curious variety of despairâ in the work of Weimar poet Erich Kästner, in order to launch a critique of the political mindset of the German left-wing intelligentsia to which Kästner belonged, and Cheng speaks of a âmelancholiaâ suffusing texts by Asian-American writers that points back to long histories of systematic racism in U.S. culture and national policy.16 To speak of tone is thus to generalize, totalize, and abstract the âworldâ of the literary object, in a way that seems particularly conducive to the analysis of ideology. There is a sense in which tone resembles the concept of collective mood frequently invoked by historians (âCold War paranoiaâ and so forth), but poses the additional difficulty of aesthetic immanence, of being something that seems âattachedâ to an artwork. As the affective âcomportmentâ of a literary text, the aesthetic notion of tone we will be working with bears less resemblance to any of its New Critical formulations than it does to Susanne Langerâs notion of a âsignificant formâ whose import is âthe feeling of the whole work,â or Mikel Dufrenneâs concept of the âaffective qualityâ that constitutes the artworkâs âexpressed world,â or even Roman Ingardenâs notion of the âpolyphonic harmonyâ that holds together all of the values and perspectives generated by a literary textâs multiple âstratifications.â17 These attempts to account for the affective dimension of literature implied but ultimately avoided in New Critical definitions of âtoneâ provide much more salient models than any that are available in literary theory proper for the global concepts of feeling attributed to aesthetic objects by contemporary analysts of literature and ideology.
Langer is as impatient as any New Critic with the critical focus on a literary workâs emotional effects on readers or with the emotions supposedly expressed by its author. Yet the question of feeling in art is nonetheless her primary concern in Feeling and Form (1953), and in fact is the problem her bookâs overarching theory of art as âsignificant form,â a phrase she adopts from Clive Bell, is explicitly designed to solve.18 As she notes, âThe relation of art to feeling is evidently something subtler than sheer catharsis or incitement. In fact, the most expert critics tend to discount both these subjective elements, and treat the emotive aspect of a work of art as something integral to it, something as objective as the physical form, color, sound pattern of verbal text itselfâ (FF, 18). Searching for a precedent for her âmore radical handling of feeling as something objective,â Langer turns to Otto Baenschâs âKunst und GefĂźhlâ (Art and Feeling; 1923), where the matter of what I am here calling tone is laid out as follows:
The mood of a landscape appears to us as objectively given with it as one of its attributes, belonging to it just like any other attribute we perceive it to have. . . . We never think of regarding the landscape as a sentient being whose outward aspect âexpressesâ the mood that it contains subjectively. The landscape does not express the mood, but has it; the mood surrounds, fills, and permeates it, . . . the mood belongs to our total impression of the landscape and can only be distinguished as one of its components by a process of abstraction. (Quoted in Langer, FF, 19)
For Baensch, the âobjective feelingâ of a work of art is distinct from its sensory qualities precisely in this holistic character. Whereas sensory qualities âare combined and composed, so as to produce, jointly, the appearance of the object,â the nonsensory quality called âfeelingâ is said to âsurround and permeate this whole structure in fluid omnipresenceâ (FF, 21, italics added). The workâs âfeelingâ thus âcannot be brought into an explicit correlation with its component elements,â much as the âeuphoriaâ Jameson attributes to Duane Hansonâs latex sculptures of anxious-looking tourists is difficult to locate in any isolated formal feature.19 At the same time, the feeling is not a free-floating phantom; rather, as Baensch notes, it is âalways embedded and inherent in [an object] from which [it] cannot be actually separated, but only distinguished by abstraction: objective feelings are always dependent parts of objectsâ (quoted in FF, 20). While Langer uses this discussion to introduce her own comprehensive theory of art as a materially created abstraction, she dissolves Baenschâs so-called paradox through what she herself describes as a simple and obvious move: by redescribing what he calls âfeelingâ as the artworkâs âsignificant formâ or âsemblanceâ of feeling (in Schillerâs sense of Schein). This form is best exemplified in the highly articulate but nondiscursive realm of music, which she examines in Philosophy in a New Key. As Langer notes, âThe basic concept is the articulate but nondiscursive form having import without conventional reference, and therefore presenting itself not as a symbol in the ordinary sense, but as a âsignificant form,â in which the factor of significance is not logically discriminated, but is felt as a quality rather than recognized as a functionâ (FF, 32).20 But the same problem of a âsignificanceâ that is not reducible to signs or signification is important to literature, too, where âaffectâ seems a fugitive presence attached to or hovering in the vicinity of words. Indeed, Grossberg seems to have literature specifically in mind when he notes, âAffect is perhaps the most difficult plane of human life to define and describe, not merely because it is a-signifying (and contemporary theory is so heavily directed toward signifying practices), but also because there is no critical vocabulary to describe its forms and structures. But this does not mean that affect is some ineffable experience or a purely subjective feelingâ (OTP, 80). It is clear, however, that tone often has an impact on these subjective resp...